FACTS: The appellant raided a farm where marijuana was stashed, and during the raid the wife of the dealer was killed. She had led at least one person to the stash. Appellant initially gave an alibi, but recanted it later and showed the police to the location of the body while blaming an accomplice for the killing. At trial, the testimony of the two differed - Pritchard claimed that Wall accidentally shot the wife, while Wall claimed that he had nothing to do with the raid. The appellant’s girlfriend said that he returned the night of the killing with trunks of marijuana.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Verdict of first degree murder at trial. Appeal dismissed.
ISSUES: Is the appellant guilty of first or second degree murder, since the Crown claims that the killing was committed in the course of an unlawful confinement?
DECISION: Appeal dismissed, trial verdict upheld.
REASONS: Murders committed during crimes of domination are particularly blameworthy, and incur first degree charges. Robbery is not a crime of domination, but unlawful confinement (coercive restraint or direction contrary to a person’s wishes that prevents that person from acting freely) is. Unlawful confinement, in the course of a robbery, is still unlawful confinement, so long as it is significant enough to trigger s. 279(2). S. 231(5) will still be triggered if the killing occurs during the unlawful confinement, so long as the confinement and the killing are distinct criminal acts carried out as a single transaction(the confinement was not integral to the killing - some extra act of domination is required). That the confinement occurred during a non-enumerated crime is irrelevant for s. 231(5). The two do not need to coincide exactly, but there has to be a close temporal and causative link between them, and the accused has to take advantage of the position of power that the domination established to kill the dominated party. It was open to the jury to decide that the wife was killed while she was unlawfully dominated, and it constituted a single transaction.
RATIO: First degree murder can be established through the combination of a murder and an enumerated predicate offence if the two are distinct but temporally and causally connected in the course of a single transaction. For unlawful domination, this occurs when the accused uses the position of power created through the domination to kill the victim.
R v Wallen [1990] 1 SCR 827 (Lamer J.)
FACTS: Appellant killed his wife while she was at work. Their relationship was dissolving, and he believed that her coworkers were responsible (believed she was having an affair). Accused had taken multiple Ativan and a significant amount of alcohol, but it is unclear if he was intoxicated. A psychiatrist testified that he suffered from “delusional jealousy” and that his judgment was impaired by the drugs and alcohol.
ISSUES: Does the appellant’s intoxication preclude conviction for murder 1? Did the trial judge err by not distinguishing between intent and the capacity to form the intent to murder?
DECISION: Appeal allowed 2-2-1.
REASONS: It is required that the judge distinguish between intent and capacity for planning when intoxication is raised as a defence, given the serious difference in punishment for murder 1. In this case, the judge seems to have equated the two, and the charge was ambiguous as to whether a lesser degree of intoxication could negate the latter while still allowing the former. It is unclear that a jury would’ve returned murder 1 without this confusion.
RATIO: A lesser degree of intoxication can negate the capacity to plan and deliberate prior to a murder than would be required to negate the capacity to have an intent to kill, and the jury must be informed of this difference.
DISSENT/CONCUR: McLachlin J. - The effect of intoxication is treated separately for intent and planning, and a lesser degree of intoxication can negate the capacity to plan. But the level of intoxication for both is quite high, and it is not necessarily a failure of justice to not distinguish the two as it is self-evident that capacity to plan is extinguished sooner. It is a question of fact not of law.
La Forest J. - Agree with Lamer, but McLachlin is right that there is no hard rule about distinguishing the levels of intoxication, as it is considered in the context of the charge as a whole.
R v Briscoe 2010 SCC
Facts: Briscoe drove the victim to a secluded golf course (that he chose), and handed the perpetrators weapons. He did not join them on the course at first, but was present for the murder (and told the victim to be quiet). At trial, he was acquitted – he performed the actus reus for aiding the offence, but the judge held that he didn’t have the requisite knowledge of the killing. It was found that he knew that something was going to happen, but he didn’t want to know what.
There is no distinction between a principal offender and a secondary offender for the purpose of liability. If actus reus and mens rea are proven, then they’re guilty.
Assistance must be provided for the purpose (intention + knowledge) of aiding the principal offender – doesn’t require desire, nor does it require that they share the intention. What is required is that the aider knew that the accused intends to commit the crime (in some way), and they provide aid for the purpose of aiding the crime. (Aid not provided for the purpose of committing a crime, e.g. renting the primary offender a car, does not satisfy mens rea requirement.)
Wilful blindness can fill in for full knowledge in mens rea offences – it’s not a form of recklessness. It requires that the accused have a suspicion of a probability (not a mere possibility) that the offence was going to occur, but deliberately did not confirm that to avoid liability. Wilful blindness is adequate to establish partyship for murder – it does not fall afoul of the subjective mens rea requirement established in Martineau.
