Contention Three is the second Harms scenario: Democracy. Totalitarianism in Venezuela is hurting the U.S.’s ability to push for democracy globally, causing global instability.
1) Chavez left Venezuela’s democratic institutions in chaos and Venezuelan politicians will not be able to implement reforms on their own.
SULLIVAN, 13
[Mark, Specialist in Latin American Affairs with Congressional Research Service; “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” 4/09, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]
On the other hand, President Chávez also left a large negative legacy, including the deterioration of democratic institutions and practices, threats to freedom of expression, high rates of crime and murder (the highest in South America), and an economic situation characterized by high inflation (over 20% in 2012), crumbling infrastructure, and shortages of consumer goods. Ironically, while Chávez championed the poor, his government’s economic mismanagement wasted billions that potentially could have established a more sustainable social welfare system benefiting poor Venezuelans. Whoever wins the next presidential election will be faced with a host of significant economic, social, and political challenges facing the country. Chávez concentrated political power in his presidency and used his charisma to advance his populist “Bolivarian revolution” (named for the 19 th century South American liberator Simón Bolívar). It will be difficult for Venezuela’s next president to operate in the same way since few Venezuelan politicians have the charisma and popularity that Chávez enjoyed. Given the deterioration of democratic practices under President Chávez, it also could prove difficult to restore traditional checks and balances in Venezuela’s democratic political system.
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2) Venezuelan instability is leading to a global campaign of anti-Americanism, in which Venezuela is fomenting a counter-democratic movement.
WALSER, 12
[Ray, PhD., Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America; “Time Is Ripe for U.S. Policy to Address Anti-Americanism in Latin America,” 09/24, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/us-policy-to-address-anti-americanism-in-latin-america-needed/]
But Venezuela proved too small a country to contain Chávez’s ambitions. He launched a Latin American unity campaign in emulation of his hero, the great liberator Simon Bolivar, recasting the historic Bolivar as primarily an anti-U.S. nationalist. Chávez fashioned an alliance with his other great hero, Fidel Castro, importing Cuban doctors and teachers in exchange for billions in financial aid. He worked with Cuba to launch the ALBA alliance in 2002 to contest U.S. “hegemony” in Latin America. Chávez threatened neighboring Colombia, the U.S.’s closest ally in the region, and offered aid and safe haven to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a ruthless terrorist group that derives much of its funding from drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping. Using discounted oil as an enticement and rallying like-minded leftists to his cause, Chávez enlisted Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and several Caribbean islands under ALBA’s banner. In turn, ALBA has become the fulcrum for anti-Americanism in the Americas. It defended the regime of Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi until his death. While the Venezuelan foreign ministry regretted the recent deaths of U.S. diplomats murdered in Libya and denounced the terrorist attack, it was quick to blame the attack on “colonialist aggression” by NATO and demanded an “end to interventionism and campaigns of hatred against Arab and Muslim peoples.” In advance of the October 7 presidential elections in Venezuela, Chávez has sought to portray his rival as a puppet of U.S. imperialism. Chávez and his Bolivarian partners continue to offer diplomatic and economic support for the murderous, Iranian-backed Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. ALBA members hosted Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this year and promised to forge closer political, economic, and security ties with Iran. Reports of secretive financial deals with Iran and other sanctions-busting actions appear regularly. And just last month, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa offered diplomatic asylum to the notorious Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, who is now holed up in Ecuador’s embassy in London. Domestic assaults on private property, rule of law, and individual rights continue unabated among the Bolivarian states. There is an aggressive campaign against media freedom in the region, from virtually absolute control in totalitarian Cuba to increasing curbs on free speech and the imposition of gag rules on those who investigate and criticize government malfeasance in Venezuela. Similarly, the Bolivarian states have increasingly blocked outside assistance to pro-democracy civil society, replicating democracy backlash tactics from Cairo to Moscow.
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3) Failure to press for democracy in Venezuela is hurting U.S. credibility globally, and leading to more totalitarianism in Latin America.
WALSER, 12
[Ray, PhD., Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America; “The Chávez Plan to Steal Venezuela's Presidential Election: What Obama Should Do,” 09/19, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/the-chavez-plan-to-steal-venezuelas-presidential-election-what-obama-should-do/]
In recent years, U.S. influence and presence in Latin America have diminished noticeably. Challenges to democracy, the increased strategic presence of China, Russia, and Iran, and deep divisions in the inter-American system have characterized adverse trends in the region. A strategy of American leadership requires a reaffirmation of U.S. commitments to deeply rooted interests and values. These interests and values must be supported by policies that actively defend representative democracy, human rights, economic freedom, shared security, and a strong inter-American system. Under the Obama Administration, the U.S. has offered no comprehensive strategy or policy for dealing with Venezuela and Hugo Chávez. On taking office, the Administration made it clear that it was looking for improvement in relations with Chávez after U.S.–Venezuela tensions during the Bush years. Modest attempts at engagement—a handshake between President Obama and Chávez at the first Summit of the Americas in April 2009 and agreement to a return of ambassadors to both countries—failed to influence or alter Chávez’s behavior. In June 2009, the Obama Administration initially joined forces with Venezuela to denounce the removal of President Manuel Zelaya from office in Honduras in what appeared to be a Chávez-inspired power grab, and it was unprepared for the firestorm of anti-Americanism unleashed by Chávez when the U.S. signed a defense cooperation agreement with Colombia in August 2009. Chávez rejected President Obama’s nominee as U.S. ambassador to Venezuela in 2010. Neither modest sanctions on PDVSA for oil sales to Iran in May 2011 nor the naming of senior Venezuelan officials as drug kingpins has curbed Chávez’s enthusiasm for anti-American behavior. The Obama Administration, moreover, has done little to focus a spotlight on Chávez’s misdeeds, claiming that verbal sparring and confrontations reflect an unproductive “Cold War” or Manichean view of relations and only add fuel to the Venezuelan leader’s anti-U.S. bonfire. The Administration has been unable to build any sort of coalition critical of the deterioration of democratic governance under Chávez in the OAS, and democratic nations such as Brazil largely ignore the deteriorating conditions of democracy. Even Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has downplayed his nation’s concern about the state of democracy in Venezuela and ties with FARC in an effort to advance a peace deal and maintain advantageous commercial relations.
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