Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files


AC: Venezuela Democracy Affirmative 66



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1AC: Venezuela Democracy Affirmative 66



4) USAID economic assistance has successfully been tied to democracy promotion initiatives in the past.
SCOTT AND STEELE, 11

[James, professor at Oklahoma State University; and Carie, professor at University of Illinois, “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the Developing World, 1988–2001,” International Studies Quarterly (2011), http://www.ucdc.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Academic/Courses/V12SB/demostatistical.pdf]


One of the most salient democracy promotion strategies has been USAID initiatives to provide foreign aid of a variety of kinds designed to foster democratic progress and consolidation. USAID manages billions of dollars of economic assistance annually. From these funds, individual USAID projects have often been geared toward what is now termed democracy promotion (strengthening independent judiciaries, etc.). However, since the end of the Cold War, aid has been explicitly provided to promote and support democratic transitions in recipient countries through such programs as the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act, the Freedom Support Act (Former Soviet Republics), and the ‘‘Democracy and Governance’’ initiative. In these programs, USAID has stressed four goals: the rule of law and human rights, competitive elections and political processes, civil society, and accountable governance. As Finkel, Perez-Linan, Seligson, and Azpuru (2006:26) detail, USAID has allocated increasingly larger amounts to its ‘‘Democracy and Governance’’ initiatives around the world. In constant 1995 dollars, such allocations grew from $121 million to $722 million per year from 1990 to 2003. In 2003, democracy aid amounted to about 9% of USAID assistance. Such aid typically bypasses the more official top-down aid channels to assist groups and implement projects directly or through third parties, including an increasingly broad and active set of international private voluntary organizations (Collins 2009). Naturally, USAID claims success in its democracy promotion efforts. According to Knack (2004:252), USAID proudly notes that 36 of the 57 states that successfully democratized between 1980 and 1995 were recipients of USAID assistance. For example, while USAID has sponsored programs in Guatemala off and on for decades, that state gained increased attention following the end of its civil war in 1996. From 1996 to 2000, USAID provided more than $18 million in aid for programs to train civil service officers, strengthen civilian control of government (in particular the military), rebuild the justice system, train an electoral tribunal, develop anti-corruption measures, and promote citizen advocacy and increased electoral participation. During this same time period, Guatemala’s Polity Regime Score steadily improved from 8 in 1997 to +9 in 2000. Similarly, Malawi’s Polity Regime Score of 5 in 1997 improved dramatically by 1999, coinciding with more than $11 million of USAID funding for transparency programs, judiciary training, election administration, parliament development, and participation programs. Although undoubtedly the result of many factors, these and other apparent successes lend anecdotal support to USAID’s claims. 3



2AC Harms – Iran: A/t - #1 “Advantage Contradicts” [1/2] 67



1) Our advantages do not contradict. Venezuela’s government is able to provide funding and support to Iran even if private businesses do not have investment because the government is corrupt and stealing private money. The government has money because it is not democratic.
2) The Venezuelan government is partnering with criminal organizations to traffic drugs, giving them access to illicit funds.
WALSER, 10

[Ray, PhD., senior policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation; “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Time to Add Venezuela to the List,” 1/10, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list]


In the same month, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) detailed the precipitous decline in U.S.-Venezuelan counter-drug cooperation while documenting the steady rise in the quantity of cocaine transiting Venezuela. It is estimated that the amount of cocaine transiting Venezuela rose from 50 metric tons (MT) in 2003 to 250 MT in 2008. Overall, nearly one-third of all the cocaine produced in the Andean region passes through Venezuela. As recently as November 18, 2009, a senior State Department official reaffirmed his concern about "increasing incidences" of cocaine flights passing through or over Venezuela. This non-cooperation with the U.S. and tepid cooperation with other recognized law enforcement authorities presents a serious challenge to international counter-narcotics enforcement. Fresh routes for cocaine trafficking pass from Colombia through Venezuela to the Caribbean, especially to the Dominican Republic and weak Haiti, while other routes run toward West Africa and then into Europe. The growing cross-Atlantic trade is also a lucrative target for radical Islamist groups. Given the increasing levels of corruption in Venezuela and the disappearance of transparency and accountability, profits from the drug trade can also more easily find their way to the pockets of Venezuelan officials or be diverted to criminal or terrorist groups.

2AC Harms – Iran: A/t - #1 “Advantage Contradicts” [2/2] 68



3) Venezuela is enabling and supporting rogue nuclear weapons programs in Iran and Russia, causing hidden proliferation.
WALSER, 10

[Ray, PhD., senior policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation; “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Time to Add Venezuela to the List,” 1/10, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list]


The U.S. is rightfully worried about increasing nuclear cooperation between Chávez and Ahmadinejad, and the nature of the cooperation is shrouded in deep secrecy.[62] On September 24, 2009, for example, Venezuela's Minister of Industries and Mines Rodolfo Sanz confirmed that Iran was assisting Venezuela's efforts to map and analyze potential uranium deposits.[63] Within hours, Caracas denied the statement. Chávez turned defensive, joked about working with Iran to develop "an atomic bicycle," and claimed Venezuela has no intention of seeking the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.[64] Venezuela has initiated the first stages of a nuclear program and signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, and has presumably begun cooperating with Iran on nuclear matters. Chávez claims oil-rich Venezuela needs a peaceful nuclear program but harbors no intention of pursuing a nuclear weapons program. While there is general agreement that a weak scientific base and resource limits imposed by the Venezuelan economy will slow Venezuela's nuclear program and that a full-fledged nuclear weapons program is still many years away, few doubt that the nuclear ambitions Chávez entertains are linked with his desire to project power well beyond Venezuela's frontiers and his readiness to support Iran even at the risk of clashes with the U.S.[65] Venezuela's essential utility for Iran is its ability to serve as a front for the Iranian Ministry of Defense and its Armed Forces Logistics and for any other state companies working to advance Iran's weapons programs, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The expansion of Iranian financial institutions into Venezuela and surrounding countries offers a case in point. The U.S. has already identified Iran's Export Development Bank and its affiliate in Caracas as a tool of the Iranian regime.[66] The project for a joint-development bank remains part of the bilateral program of cooperation. Venezuela was also detected assisting Iran to re-export Iranian-made arms in 2007 when it facilitated a shipment of Iranian weapons to Uruguay, disguising the weapons' origin.[67] Agents of Iran operating in the less constrictive environment of the Western Hemisphere can also use fictitious companies to acquire aircraft parts and dual-use technology, and generally evade U.S. export-licensing restrictions and munitions control.



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