2NC Extensions: A/t - #3 “No Link” [1/2] 339
1) The link does not depend on specific policies or actual completion, only on China’s perceptions of U.S. intent. China is working to increase government-to-government ties with Latin American countries while the U.S. is bogged down in other regions. The plan signals a change that the U.S. might start investing in Latin America again, which causes China to preemptively fear future policies. Extend our WATSON evidence.
2) The competition comes from relationships, not specific policies. Increased assistance from the United States creates a direct trade-off with investment from China because Latin American countries view the partnerships as zero-sum.
ELLIS, 12
[Evan, assistant professor of National Security Affairs at National Defense University; “The United States, Latin America and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?” May, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf]
The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the region’s receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources. The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran. At the political level, US engagement with Latin American countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” of the region, official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone. Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant to procure major military items from the PRC. The same logic has also applied to countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese oil companies. US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to engage with China, and other countries, to procure military hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable aircraft from the Czech Republic.
2NC Extensions: A/t - #3 “No Link” [2/2] 340
3) China is winning in Latin America because of the perception the U.S. no longer cares about the region. The plan puts American attention back on Latin America.
REUTERS, 13
[Gary Regenstreif, “The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America,” 6/12, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/]
Washington’s renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West’s history of meddling in domestic affairs. “It’s about influence and leverage,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, “…The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past.” The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy — which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washington’s domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words — as has happened before. China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there.
2NC Extensions: A/t - #4 “Hegemony Turn” [1/3] 341
1) We control the impact uniqueness. The plan causes China to turn unilateral, leading them to actively challenge the U.S. on every front and in every region. This is the worst possible outcome for hegemony, and an angry China is always worse for U.S. leadership than a multilateral one. Extend our FOOT and NYE evidence.
2) Chinese relationships with Latin American countries help solidify U.S. interests in the region. Chinese investment is unpopular with local revolutionaries, empowering them to overthrow anti-American governments and making the region for stable for U.S. leadership.
ELLIS, 12
[Evan, assistant professor of National Security Affairs at National Defense University; “The United States, Latin America and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?” May, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf]
Over the long term, however, there is potential for a “feedback effect” beneficial to the United States and other Western investors. High interest rates in the case of Ecuadoran loans and the questionable loan terms in Venezuela have already been used as political fodder by the opposition in those countries, increasing the likelihood that an explicit movement away from such loans and capital, and back to Western financial markets and institutions, may be on the agenda when changes in political regime occur in these states.
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