Chinese Wind Energy Disad
NC/1NR—Turns Global Economy
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- China Growth Good—Trade
- Interdependence empirically decreases the risk of conflict—prefer theoretical backing for impacts
- Asian economic decline sparks multiple scenarios for nuclear war.
2NC/1NR—Turns Global EconomyChina’s key to the global economyEichengreen et al. 11-Barry Eichengreen is George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley,a Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, United Kingdom, Kwanho Shin is a professor in the Department of Economics, Korea University, and Donghyun Park is Principal Economist at the Economics and Research Department of the Asian Development Bank, March 2011, "WHEN FAST GROWING ECONOMIES SLOW DOWN: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA", NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16919.pdf?new_window=1 In addition, the large and fast-growing Chinese economy is increasingly viewed as a key engine of growth for the world economy. The advanced industrial countries, the traditional engines of global growth, have inherited serious problems from the crisis: weakened household balance sheets, increased public debts, and still troubled financial systems. In contrast, China experienced few problems as a result of the crisis. There were few bank and enterprise failures. At the height of the crisis in 2009, growth “slowed” just to 9.2 per cent. Both advanced and developing countries benefited from China’s resilience. Robust Chinese demand lifted capital goods exports from Germany and Japan and commodity exports from Africa and Latin America. In particular, demand from China contributed substantially to recovery in East and Southeast Asia, which has close trade linkages with China. China Growth Good—TradeChinese growth is key to multilateral free trade—this evidence answers all turns.Kenny 11—Charles Kenny is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, a senior economist on leave from the World Bank, and author [September 6, 2011, “Red Dawn,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/06/red_dawn?page=full] But if the world is underestimating the accelerating speed of China's rise, Subramanian's analysis also suggests that we're overestimating the problems that an economically ascendant China will impose on the rest of us. The country's rise, he points out, has been intimately connected with globalization, including the expansion of trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO) umbrella as well as growing cross-border flows of finance and technology. In 1820, during the last period in which China was the world's economic heavyweight -- and a fiercely isolationist one -- exports accounted for 1 percent of global GDP and considerably less than 1 percent of China's economy. In 2008, the same statistics were 29 percent for the world and 35 percent for China. China is already a far more globally integrated economy than either Britain or the United States was in their respective heydays. In 1870, exports accounted for only 12 percent of Britain's output. In 1975, they accounted for a mere 7 percent of the U.S. economy. The same percentages for imports were 7 percent for the United States in 1975 and 25 percent for China in 2008. And the fact that much of today's trade is part of multicountry production processes for goods makes China even more bound to an open global economic system than the raw numbers would suggest. Furthermore, China will become the dominant economic power in a period where the international trading regime appears likely to have weathered the threat of a retreat behind tariff walls that doomed the last great period of globalization during the Great Depression. And it will do so as an economy still benefiting from "catch-up growth" -- the low-hanging economic fruit that China, as a poorer country, can grab by adopting innovations already widely used in richer countries -- which, because it involves exploiting technologies and processes developed in those rich countries, demands a level of openness to the world. Both of these points suggest that China will remain a fair-dealing member of the WTO out of self-interest. Certainly, it is an active one. In 2009, half of the WTO disputes filed involved China on one side or the other. Most are still working their way through the settlement process, so it is too early to say with certainty how law-abiding China will be; nonetheless, Subramanian notes that the WTO has been a powerful mechanism for controlling the bullying instincts of economic heavyweights in the past. The United States, for example, has been subject to complaints in 88 WTO disputes, leading to findings of 33 violations, and the United States has complied or is complying in 26 cases. Meanwhile, China's rise -- and the United States' concomitant decline -- is likely to increase the likelihood of the renminbi becoming a global reserve currency, a prospect that economic prognosticators have begun to consider with some seriousness since the 2008 economic crisis. But if anything, this shift -- if it happens -- is likely to mitigate some aspects of China's role in the global economy that the rest of the world finds most problematic. As Subramanian notes, China will have to develop financial markets that are deep, liquid, and open to foreigners. At the moment, the country's capital market is closed, the renminbi is undervalued and not fully convertible, and domestic financial markets are rudimentary. At the same time, there are signs that the government is responding to some of these challenges, for example by issuing 6 billion renminbi-denominated sovereign bonds to offshore investors in Hong Kong in 2009. And further steps in that direction would increase the export competitiveness of the rest of the world's goods as well as create an exciting investment opportunity for those few in the rich world still actually saving money. In short, China will be a different kind of global power because the nature of global power has changed dramatically over the past two centuries. Geographical domination is no longer necessary; today a considerable part of power does not even involve physical goods, let alone land, but rather is tied up in finance, technologies, and services. Just as the United States demonstrated in its eclipse of Britain that a sovereign empire wasn't needed to dominate the world economy, China may not need even the military strength that the United States exercised for the last 50 years to remain preeminent. And China's reliance on global trade and financial links, underpinned neither by force of arms nor sovereign control, means the newly dominant power has considerable self-interest in maintaining multilateralism. That suggests the more China embraces its role as economic heavyweight in an integrated world, the better for the rest of the world -- and perhaps in particular the United States -- in terms of national security and economic opportunity. Even for Americans who fear the rise of China, then, the best advice is to embrace the inevitable. Interdependence empirically decreases the risk of conflict—prefer theoretical backing for impactsGriswold 98—CATO Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies Peace on Earth [Daniel Griswold, “Free Trade for Men,” http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-31-98.html] With the Christmas season and its promise of "Peace on earth, goodwill toward men" upon us, and protectionist sentiment stirring in Washington, it is appropriate to revisit the question of whether free trade promotes world peace. Advocates of free trade have long argued that its benefits are not merely economic. Free trade also encourages people and nations to live in peace with one another. Free trade raises the cost of war by making nations more economically interdependent. Free trade makes it more profitable for people of one nation to produce goods and services for people of another nation than to conquer them. By promoting communication across borders, trade increases understanding and reduces suspicion toward people in other countries. International trade creates a network of human contacts. Phone calls, emails, faxes and face-to-face meetings are an integral part of commercial relations between people of different nations. This human interaction encourages tolerance and respect between people of different cultures (if not toward protectionist politicians). Ancient writers, expounding what we now call the Universal Economy Doctrine, understood the link between trade and international harmony. The fourth-century writer Libanius declared in his Orations (III), "God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distributed His gifts over different regions, to the end that men might cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another. And so He called commerce into being, that all men might be able to have common enjoyment of the fruits of the earth, no matter where produced." Open trade makes war a less appealing option for governments by raising its costs. To a nation committed to free trade, war not only means the destruction of life and property. It is also terrible for business, disrupting international commerce and inflicting even greater hardship on the mass of citizens. When the door to trade is open, a nation's citizens can gain access to goods and resources outside their borders by offering in exchange what they themselves can produce relatively well. When the door is closed, the only way to gain access is through military conquest. As the 19th century Frenchman Frederic Bastiat said, "When goods cannot cross borders, armies will." History demonstrates the peaceful influence of trade. The century of relative world peace from 1815 to 1914 was marked by a dramatic expansion of international trade, investment and human migration, illuminated by the example of Great Britain. In contrast, the rise of protectionism and the downward spiral of global trade in the 1930s aggravated the underlying hostilities that propelled Germany and Japan to make war on their neighbors. In the more than half a century since the end of World War II, no wars have been fought between two nations that were outwardly oriented in their trade policies. In every one of the two dozen or so wars between nations fought since 1945, at least one side was dominated by a nation or nations that did not pursue a policy of free trade. In the recurring Middle East wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, dating back to 1948-49, none of the direct participants were what could be described as open economies at the time of conflict, with the Arab countries enforcing a virtual boycott of trade with Israel. Saddam Hussein, the instigator of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, could be described in many ways, but not as a free trader. Wars have been fought between members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but only when at least one of the warring sides was protectionist in its trade policies. For example, India and Pakistan were both members of GATT during their 1965 and 1971 conflicts, but they were also both committed to protection as a trade policy. Great Britain and Argentina were members of GATT when they fought over the Falklands in 1982, but Argentina, the aggressor in that conflict, was at the time still under the protectionist spell of Peronism. After the nightmare of two world wars, the United States encouraged the nations of Western Europe to form a free-trade area not only to promote economic development but also to reduce international rivalries. Decades of trade liberalization have helped to make war among members of the European Union virtually unthinkable today or in the foreseeable future. A growing web of international investment has also strengthened peace among nations. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has pointed out what he calls the Big Mac thesis: that no two nations with McDonald's franchises have ever gone to war. A nation open enough and developed enough to be a profitable home for an established international franchise such as McDonald's will generally find war an unattractive foreign policy option. Asian economic decline sparks multiple scenarios for nuclear war.Auslin 9—Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. [February 5, 2009, “Averting Disaster,” The Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/115jtnqw.asp] AS THEY DEAL WITH a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict.
The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Essay writing guidelines Download 410.56 Kb. Share with your friends:
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