Class 1 Introduction and the Civil Law Tradition Sept. 5 3


R. Jukier, “The Emergence of Specific Performance as a Major Remedy in Quebec Law” (1987) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 47



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R. Jukier, “The Emergence of Specific Performance as a Major Remedy in Quebec Law” (1987) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 47.


CCLC Article 1065 says a creditor may demand specific performance (SP) "in cases which admit of it." The 1897 CCP allowed prohibitive injunctions, to specifically enforce obligations NOT to do things, but there was no procedural remedy to enforce a positive obligation to do something until 1965, when the new CCP introduced the mandatory injunction in Article 751.  The two cases involving the plaintiff Propriétés Cité Concordia (PCC) illuminated the breadth of the remedy of SP in cases of positive obligations and the meaning of the phrase "in cases which admit of it."
Facts: In Feb 1997, PCC leased two premises in its La Cité complex to the Royal Bank.  Both leases contained a clause that said the Bank would stay open during normal business hours.  The occupancy of the complex was lower than expected, so the Bank wanted to reduce its hours. PCC petitioned for an injunction to order the Bank to stay open 9-5 with minimum staff of three people.  In the first case, in 1980, the Quebec Superior Court (QCSC) dismissed this motion, saying there was a contractual breach but SP wasn't an appropriate remedy since to be effective they would have to make the Bank offer lots of personnel and services, and this would take too much supervision from the Court. This is a traditional approach for QC, but a new trend is emerging.

  1. The Traditionally Restricted Ambit of SP: In theory, SP is the classic civil law remedy.  It's the principal remedy in France, and in Quebec doctrine says it's on par with damages, but in practice courts have applied it restrictively, especially where it involves an obligation to DO something.

    1. The Influence of the Common Law Approach to SP: QC judges have been inclined to view the CCP injunction as a remedy borrowed from the Common Law, so they apply it restrictively the way Common Law courts do.  Many QC decisions have adopted the Common Law position that SP will not lie where damages are an effective remedy. Jukier says this judicial attitude should have no place in QC because it challenges the theoretical availability of SP as an equal remedy in Civil Law, and it challenges the principle that the creditor gets to choose his remedy.  The judiciary is finally acknowledging this contradiction, in Societe Coinamatic v. Armstrong (1984 QCCA) and Restaurant Jasmo v. Drouin (1986 QCSC).  There's a trend away from Common Law style application of SP, but recent jurisprudence hasn't been uniform.

    2. The Nemo Praecise Rule: There's a rule in Civil Law against forcing a person to do an act by physical violence or constraint, because he'll only do a half-ass job anyway, and because it contravenes individual liberty.  But where the constraint lies on the debtor's property, instead of his person, the rule is not infringed.  In France, SP is granted for all obligations except artistic activities and personal services.  The SCC said in Nault v. Canadian Consumer Co. (1981) that a judgment can't order SP for a contract of sale of an uncertain or indeterminate thing. QC courts have said SP is only appropriate where the debtor could get a third party to do the required act.

    3. The Dichotomy b/w Enforcement of Obligations To Do and Obligations Not To Do: The judiciary has created this illogical and artificial dichotomy, because of the 1897 CCP and the nemo praecise rule.  Jukier says it's unjustifiable because the nemo rule should apply equally to obligations to do and not to do, since both involve just as much personal action, and because it's often difficult to classify what's a positive and what's a negative obligation, as evidenced by inconsistent case law.

    4. Problems of Supervision: It's harder to supervise an order to DO something.  In the Common Law, SPwill usually be refused where it would require a complex series of acts or the maintenance of an ongoing relationship.  This played a large role in the first PCC case, above.  But recent Common Law authorities don't see supervision as such a big problem anymore. Some say the real question is whether there is a sufficient definition of what has to be done to comply with the court order.  This liberal attitude is catching on in QC.

    5. Civil Imprisonment: Doctrine argues against SP because failure to perform the SP order can lead to imprisonment for contempt of court, and there should be no imprisonment for civil matters, since the 1965 CCP was enacted.  Jukier says this is bunk because the
      imprisonment IS for the contempt of court, which IS criminal, not for the failure to perform, which is civil.  And anyways that argument never stopped courts from granting prohibitive injunctions, so why should mandatory injunctions be any different?

  1. Emerging Jurisprudential Trends

1. The PCC 2 Decisions
The second case was about that same operating clause; the Royal Bank wanted
to close.  But this time, the QCSC and QCCA granted the mandatory injunction to keep it open, just one year after they had held the opposite. The Bank made the following arguments:
(i) The operations were of too personal a nature to be susceptible of SP;
(ii) The Court couldn't force the Bank to incur a deficit;
(iii) The Court couldn't supervise the proper execution of SP.
Hurtubise J. responded:
(i) The Bank's a Corporation, so the nemo praecise rule is not infringed;
(ii) The Court didn't really answer this, but Jukier thinks the argument's
bunk because a DF shouldn't be allowed to just fulfil its contractual
obligations when they're profitable;
(iii) The obligation to resume operations was sufficiently clear and precise.

2. The Effect of the Second PCC Decisions

Hurtubise J. spoke out definitively against the reliance by QC courts on the
restrictive Common Law position relating to SP.  The judiciary had been ignoring the legislator's intent, in the 1965 CCP, by keeping the restrictive approach.


CONCLUSION

Three factors have expanded the availability of SP:


(i) Rejection of the Common Law attitude;
(ii) Erosion of the distinction between obligations to do and not to do;
(iii) Recognition that forcing SP on a corporate body doesn't infringe the
nemo praecise rule.

Jukier hopes this trend will continue, because the creditor should get to choose his remedy, and SP will often be a better remedy for the creditor, because damages can take a long time to come through, whereas an injunction can have immediate results.  Also, commercial parties just want to continue operations, not get compensation.  Finally, SP is better because it enforces the Autonomous Will of the Parties, which is supposed to be the foundation of the Civil Law of contracts.




  • Jukier looks primarily at two decision involving Propriétés Cité Concordia [Concordia I and Concordia II) and argues that Quebec courts are rightfully moving away from the common law approach to specific performance towards an approach that is more consonant with civil law principles.

  • Although specific performance has always been available in theory in Quebec civil law, the bulk of jurisprudence up until the 1980s took a very restrictive view awarding it only in exceptional circumstances.

  • According to Jukier, “specific performance is the classic civil law remedy”, and doctrinal writers in Quebec assert that “specific performance is to be treated as at least on par with damages”. This can be attributed to the canonical influence imposing respect for the spoken word: pacta sunt servanda)

  • However, in practice, the courts have not given it the same weight it has in theory

  • Since injunctions are borrowed from equity, where specific performance takes the form of a permanent injunction, courts have been inclined to apply the common law approach. Jukier says, “this judicial attitude […] is erroneous and should have no application in the law of Quebec” because it restricts the choice of remedies that is supposed to be available to creditors

  • The Nemo Praecise rule is the primary reason invoked against specific performance: we are unwilling to force a person to accomplish an act if the only way to do so is by physical violence or constraint. Where the obligation is to deliver money or property, this is not seen to run afoul of the rule, and specific performance is not normally problematic.

  • Thus traditionally, Quebec courts would not order specific performance unless the obligation could be performed by a third party. In such case, the debtor would not be unduly restricted because he or she could perform the obligation by getting someone else to carry out the specific task required. In Tremblay v. Université de Sherbrooke (1973) the Court refused to order the school to continue offering a certain program, because this could not meaningfully be carried out by a third party. (it would be interesting to see if this would still be decided the same way today, seeing as the university is a moral person, and the courts seem to have moved in the direction of not recognizing the personal nature of obligations to be performed by corporations (ie. Aubrais v. Laval)

  • Judiciary also created an artificial distinction between obligations to do and obligations not to do. The latter were not seen as being as offensive to the Nemo Praecise rule, although the distinction is completely artificial and cannot withstand scrutiny. Jukier gives the example of two cases of fences being wrongfully erected: in one case, the order is framed as a prohibitive injunction, prohibiting the defendant from restricting access, in the other a mandatory one, forcing the defendant to take down the fence. Moreover, the Nemo Praecise rule applies equally to both. To do or not to do something is a restriction of liberty. For example, an order to cease violating a non-competition clause.

  • The fact that both offend Nemo Praecise and that the distinction is so artificial means that any attempt to make legal distinctions based on positive or negative framing of the obligation should be abandoned.

  • Another influential reason for withholding specific performance has been the concern with “supervision”, which is at bottom a concern with the specificity of the order and the ability of the court to recognize and sanction a breach should one occur

  • Concordia I followed the traditional restrictive approach of the courts. However, in Concordia II, only one year later and on virtually identical facts, involving the same parties, the Superior Court ordered the Bank to continue carrying on its operations on a daily basis.

  • Bank’s argument was threefold:

  1. operations were of too personal a nature: Hurtubise J rejected this, citing two earlier unreported decisions in Chrysler and Loews Hotel, and making a distinction between contracts entered into by individuals and contract entered into by corporations. Jukier agrees with this distinction because, although corporations act through individuals, the order does not require specified individuals to perform. If, however, it is a closely held corporation, or there are only a few limited employees who could perform the obligation, the rule may be offended.

  2. Court couldn’t force bank to operate at a deficit: this was not directly addressed, but since they lost the case, it’s fair to say the judge didn’t buy it. Jukier says this should be rejected because it gives inappropriate protection to parties who enter into bad bargains. Removing recourse when the obligation becomes disadvantageous offends pacta sunt servanda and deprives the creditor of his right to choose the remedy. Jukier says that while it may be appropriate to protect a party from incurring a deficit in the provision of a public service, “it is not reasonable to protect a contracting party who was on equal bargaining footing with his co-contractant, and simply entered into a bad bargain.” (So, in Golden Griddle, if the parties had not been both sophisticated businesses, but rather an independent restaurateur opening her first business, arguably specific performance might not have been so readily enforced.)

  3. Order would require too much supervision: Court rejected this too – as long as obligations are sufficiently defined, supervision will not bar an order for specific performance. Jukier says courts are often relaxing this requirement which would have previously barred many claims for specific performance. However, Jukier draws a distinction between cases where the debtor asks to have an obligation performed, and cases where the debtor wants the obligation to be performed adequately. She gives the example of Favre v. Hopital Notre Dame (1984) where court ordered hospital to continue providing health services to a patient and C v. Hopital Q (1983) where court refused request for an order to provide adequate psychiatric treatment. The court said an obligation of means as compared to an obligation of result was too difficult to monitor. Personally, I think this is also an artificial distinction: especially in cases of medical treatment… in the first case, wouldn’t the adequacy of the treatment be implicit in the order?

  • Jukier’s conclusions: three factors which have contributed to expansion of specific performance:

  1. rejection of common law attitude that specific performance is a subsidiary remedy

  2. gradual erosion of artificial distinction between obligations to do and not to do

  3. reluctance to apply Nemo Praecise to corporations

  • Jukier worries about Mailhot, J’s 1986 decision in GMBH v National Trust, which denied an order for specific performance. Mailhot J discussed the Concordia II decision, and seemed to give it a reading which greatly restricted its scope to the particular facts of the case. Jukier hopes that this case will not end up being read so restrictively, but will instead signal an emerging trend in Quebec jurisprudence.

  • Interestingly, however, in Golden Griddle, the case which cites Jukier’s article, it is GMBH which is read down and distinguished on its facts.








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