Class 1 Introduction and the Civil Law Tradition Sept. 5 3


Cie immobilière Viger v. Giguère inc., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 67



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Cie immobilière Viger v. Giguère inc., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 67.


FACTS:

  • two agreement b/w the town of Plessisiville (‘Plessisville’) and the appellant Viger: a notarial deed (DP-4) on Aug. 10, 1966 AND P-15 agreement on Oct. 15, 1966. Both of the agreements included that it was at Plessisville’s “sole expense” to improve the lands sold.

  • A k b/w Plessisville and the respondent Giguère on Aug. 25, 1966, in which Plessisville awarded Giguère the k of levelling.

  • Later it was found that the agreements DP-4 and P-15 were null b/c, in undertaking to pay the cost of improving the lots, Plessisville was granting a benefit to Viger, thereby contravening the Municipal Aid Prohibition Act.

  • The levelling k b/w Plessisville and Giguère was found also null b/c it was never approved by the Municipal Commission.

  • Plessisville had already paid Giguère part of money for the work done, a sum of $75,000, but it was not enough to cover the whole cost of work. Therefore, Giguère claimed the cost of work: the price of the work, the profit and the interest.

  • The trial judge dismissed Giguère‘s action, while the court of Appeal allowed Giguère’s appeal and ordered Viger to pay Giguère the rest of the cost of work. Viger appealed the SCC.

ISSUE: the only issue here is whether the Court of Appeal was correct in concluding that Viger was unjustly enriched at Giguère’s expense?

HOLDING: yes, the appeal was dismissed.

REASONS:

  • the theory of unjustified enrichment is now undeniably incorporated into the civil law. French adopted the theory at the end of 19th century. In Quebec, both before and after promulgation of the Civil Code, case law implicitly but effectively applied the theory. The theory is no longer open to debate; discussion relates only to its theoretical basis and to the conditions of application.

  • The Civil Code does not contain the whole of civil law. It is based on principles that are not all expressed there, which it is up to case law and doctrine to develop.

  • The court then analyzed 6 conditions for the application of unjust enrichment in this case.

  • 1. An enrichment: Viger was clearly enriched by the value of the work necessary to improve the lot.

  • 2. An impoverishment: Giguère’s impoverishment is material and positive – a reduction of its patrimony.

  • 3. A correlation b/w the enrichment and the impoverishment: The theory of unjustified enrichment does not require that the enrichment pass directly from the property of the impoverishment to that of the enriched party. The impoverished party looks to the one who profited from its impoverishment. It is then for the enriched party to find a legal justification for its enrichment.  indirect correlation and the shift of burden of proof.

  • 4. The absence of justification: the divergence of opinion b/w the trial judge and the court of appeal.

-here the SCC separate the ks that Viger relied on to justify its enrichment and the real cause – the promise of aid made by Plessisville to Viger.

-“it was Viger’s and Plessisville’s intention that the aid, that is the levelling of the lots without cost, to the benefit of Viger, was to be guaranteed by the agreements b/w these two parties rather than by Viger’s ks of acquisition, which were only a formal stage in implementing the plan to set up the factory and the ks concluded b/w Plessisville and Viger.”

-Viger’s ks to purchase the lots thus have an object other than the cost of improvement; further, the cause of Viger’s enrichment and Giguère’s impoverishment is not to be found in these ks – except by separating them artificially from the project as a whole.

-the k concluded b/w Giguère and Plessisville is not intrinsically null, it was null b/c it did not meet the requirement of the formality.

-the ks b/w Viger and Plessisville are null b/c the law states that municipal subsidies are contrary to the public policy.

-in fact, Viger’s enrichment and Giguère’s impoverishment have a common origin in the agreement made b/w Plessisville and Viger, and this origin, far from constituting a justification, is clearly unlawful with respect to Viger.



-it was unjust and unlawful that a 3P should have to bear the cost of an illegality of which it is innocent.

  • 5. The absence of evasion of the law:

  • 6. The absence of any other remedy: the court here assumed a situation, in which Giguère may claim based on other cause in stead of unjust enrichment.

-“I doubt that the subsidiary nature of the action de in rem verso, if it exists, requires the court hearing the action to calculate the chances of success of an action for damages that the impoverished party might have brought against a party other than the enriched party, and to conjecture as to the possibility of executing a judgment thus obtained, if any. It would at least be necessary, for it to be so, that this other remedy be more apparent than it is in this case.

Loungnarath v. Centre hospitalier des Laurentides, [1996] R.J.Q. 2498 (C.A.) (edited).


FACT: the k b/w appellant Loungnarath and the respondent hospital included a clause of arbitration clause. It is the law that the services supplied by applt. to the respt. hospital will be compensated by RAMQ, not directly by the hospital. In failing to get the compensation as to the fixed fees for specific medical services, the applt. sued the hospital based on the action of unjust enrichment.

ISSUE: Was there unjust enrichment b/w the applt. and the respt.?

HODLING: No. Action dismissed.
REASON:
here the judges followed the conditions set up in Viger v. Giguère by the SCC. Even though they all refused the action brought by the applt., there were still slightly different in interpreting the conditions b/w the judges.

  • An enrichment, an impoverishment and the correlation b/w them:

LeBel: it is clearly that the applt. was impoverished and the hospital was enriched according to the decision in Viger and Giguere.

Fish: The hospital had no legal right – let alone any legal or moral obligation – to pay for those services in default of payment by the RAMQ. The RAMQ’s refusal to pay for the medical services in the case at bar has certainly impoverished the applt., but hardly enriched the hospital. Applt.’s loss was not their gain. Applt. seems to be entitled to compensation out of public funds for the professional services he rendered. Unfortunately, he cannot now exercise the wrong recourse against the wrong party merely b/c he failed to exercise in a timely manner the right recourse against his real debtor.

Chamberland: les intimés ne peuvent pas s’être ainsi enrichis puisqu’il ne leur appartient pas, en vertu de la loi, de payer les médicins qui traitent les patients qu’ils hébergent; la loi leur défend même expressément.

  • Absence of justification: there was the justification by the law – under which the hospital had the legal right not to pay the services that the applt. supplied.

  • Absence of any other remedy: L’action de in rem verso n’a qu’un caractère subsidiaire, elle ne peut être admise qu’en l’absence de tout autre recours; elle doit être refusée losque l’appauvri disposait d’un autre recours, en l’occurrence le recours à l’arbitrage, qu’il a laissé prescrire.

NOTES:

  • the majority in this case did not find the hospital’s enrichment, b/c the hospital was identical no matter the applt. got payment or not.

  • Here the legislation could also become a source of justification.





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