Committee on the civil dimension of security
The situation in occupied Crimea
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- Ukraine’s political landscape and reform agenda
- Ukraine’s reform record: the glass half full
- International assistance to Ukraine
- Conclusions
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
The situation in occupied Crimea21. The illegal occupation of Crimea is very different from that of Donbass as Russia’s position is unambiguous and firm: it considers the peninsula to be an integral part of Russia and the issue as closed. At the same time, the position shared by Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic community is equally firm: the illegal annexation was a gross violation of international law and will never be recognised.5 Crimea, where the Russian-speaking population only became a clear majority after World War II as a result of the deportation of Crimean Tatars,6 has enjoyed broad autonomy within Ukraine. Even unabashed Kremlin propagandists were unable to find any evidence of oppression within the local population by Kyiv’s “fascist junta”. During the two years since the illegal annexation, Crimea’s residents, primarily its ethnic, religious and national minorities, have faced grave civic, political, and human rights violations. Meanwhile, Russia increasingly invests in the fortification of Crimea and the deployment of ground and air forces to support the Black Sea Fleet. 22. Human rights violations and the infringement of other fundamental rights in Crimea, especially of those who were opposed to the annexation, have been recorded by several international organisations. According to international human rights watchdogs, in the past two years, authorities have failed to conduct meaningful investigations into the actions of armed paramilitary groups implicated in acts of torture, extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, attacks and the beating of Crimean Tatar and pro-Ukraine activists and journalists (HRW, 2016). In addition, according to the data collected by the OSCE, only 3,427 permanent residents of Crimea were able to reject the automatic Russian citizenship by the April 2014 deadline. Those residents who did not manage to obtain Russian passports or rejected the forced citizenship requirement continuously face obstacles in every aspect of their lives, including finding employment, accessing social services and owning property (OHCR, 2016). In July 2016, Russia's Federal Financial Monitoring Service Authorities published a list of 22 people who were born on Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula as "terrorists and extremists." The list includes journalists, civil activists, and political prisoners who have criticized Moscow's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region (RFE/RL Ukrainian Service, 2016). 23. Crimean Tatars, estimated at 300,000, have endured harsh treatment and targeted abuses. Prominent Crimean Tatar leaders and members of their council, the Mejlis, have remained vocal opponents of the rule of the de facto authorities in Crimea. For their participation in the February 2014 events, Crimean Tatar demonstrators faced criminal prosecutions. When initial attempts made in March 2015 to win over the support of the Mejlis failed, the de facto authorities adopted repressive policies, targeting the Mejlis and its activists. Leaders of the Crimean Tatar national movement and former chairmen of the Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, were banned from entering Crimea. In April 2016, the supreme court in Crimea declared the Mejlis to be an “extremist organisation” and banned its activities in the territory of Russia and the illegally occupied Crimea. A Council of Europe human rights delegation led by Swiss diplomat Ambassador Gerard Stoudmann visited Crimea in January 2016 and found that Russia’s draconian law on extremism seems “to target mostly Crimean Tatars, often with links to family members or friends in exile, as they are considered by the local authorities as the biggest threat of extremism and dissent towards the present order.” The Council of Europe delegation brought back an impression that the cases of repression were targeted against individual opponents instead of reflecting a collective repression policy against the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group. However, they feared that the declaration of the Mejlis to be an “extremist organisation”, “would indicate a new level of repression targeting the Crimean Tatar community as a whole” (CoE, 2016). 24. Re-registration requirements in accordance with Russian law for non-governmental organisations, media outlets, and religious organisations have reportedly been used against those who oppose the Russian annexation (OSCE, 2015). By the January 2015 deadline for re‑registration, only 232 media outlets were authorised to continue working in Crimea, a significant decrease from the approximately 3,000 media registrations before the annexation (OSCE, 2015). The most prominent and widely consumed media channels and publications of the Crimean Tatars, including QHA (the Crimean News Agency) and ATR television stations, were unable to re-register and forced to cease operations in Crimea. Ukrainian news agencies, internet providers and mobiles have limited or no access to the peninsula. In Crimea, the Tatar and Ukrainian languages are gradually being removed from school curriculums. 25. Similarly, due to re-registration requirements, many of the religious communities working in Crimea prior to the annexation have lost their legal status. According to the Russian Ministry of Justice, 365 religious communities operating in Crimea were re-registered, while over 1,000 lost their legal status (OSCE, 2015). Despite growing pressure from the de facto authorities, the Ukraine Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate chose not to follow the re-registration procedures. At least five churches have been closed down throughout the peninsula (OHCR, 2016). 26. The Crimean de facto authorities continue to expropriate (or “nationalise”) Ukrainian public properties and enterprises as well as many private properties and businesses belonging to Crimean residents. Whereas in February 2015, the Crimean de facto authorities reported 250 nationalised public enterprises, the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice estimated the actual number to include approximately 4,000 such enterprises (OSCE, 2015). The owners of these properties have received no compensation. 27. In order to draw international attention to the situation in Crimea, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists initiated a “civil blockade” in September 2015 in order to cut off any trade with the peninsula. The activists succeeded in sabotaging the electricity supply from mainland Ukraine to Crimea. It had been partly restored as of mid-December, but the future of this electricity link is uncertain due to contract disputes between Ukraine’s energy company and the Crimean de facto authorities. Moscow is urgently working on expensive projects to connect Crimea to Russian infrastructure, including a USD4.5 billion bridge and the laying of electric cables across Kerch Bay.7 28. The economy of the peninsula has been affected by inflation; the rate in 2015 was 26.4%, much higher than the average inflation in Russia (12.9%). Tourism, the principal economic activity, is in decline. Over the next five years, the Russian government has pledged to provide Crimea with USD18 billion of aid for federal subsidies, additional social benefits, improved infrastructure and pension increases. However, Russia’s own economic problems make such promises difficult to fulfil. When visiting Crimea in May 2016, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvdev was confronted by local residents with complaints that pensions were not being adjusted to rising prices. Medvedev was forced to publicly admit that “there just isn’t any money now” (RFE/RL, May 2016). 29. Since the annexation, Russia has been boosting its military capabilities in Crimea. In addition to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which has been based in Sevastopol since Soviet times and before, according to a long-term lease agreement with Ukraine, a group of forces corresponding to a combined-arms army has been deployed in Crimea, reinforced by an aviation division made up of air force and advanced air defences (IISS, 2016). Russian news agencies reported that over 15 new Russian combat ships reinforced the Black Sea Fleet in 2015. Russia plans to spend USD2.3 billion on the Black Sea Fleet, with 80 new vessels expected to join the fleet by 2020 (Manea and Visan, 2015). By 2018, the fleet should receive six new Admiral Grigorovich class frigates and six new Vershavyanka class submarines. In addition, the press service of Russia’s Southern Military District added that the units possess two brigades of Iskander-M ballistic missiles. On August 2016, Russia deployed S-400 missile systems to Crimea, which have a range of up to 400 km (Reuters, 2016). By modernising the Black Sea Fleet and fortifying Crimea, Russia has strengthened its capabilities for anti-access/area-denial operations (A2/AD), a threat of increasing concern to NATO (Klein, 2016). Ukraine’s political landscape and reform agendaAPPOINTMENT OF A NEW GOVERNMENT30. Following presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014, Ukraine seems to be set up for efficient policy-making. Reformist President Petro Poroshenko was elected in the first round, while pro-Western parties have acquired an overwhelming majority in the parliament.8 Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s government included a number of foreign-born reformers and embarked upon implementing an ambitious reform agenda. However, Ukrainian politicians failed to overcome completely their personal, party or oligarchic influences and, as a result, power struggles in the top echelons resumed. First, the central government engaged in conflicts with overly independent regional leaders, such as billionaire Ihor Kolomoisky, who played a key role in preventing the advances of pro-Russian forces to the Dnipropetrovsk region, but who also later started to defy Kyiv. The President eventually dismissed Kolomoisky. Conflict also erupted between Prime Minister Yatsenyuk and the governor of the Odessa region (and former President of Georgia) Mikheil Saakashvili, who retained his office due to the support of the President. 31. Because the Ukrainian constitution grants comparable powers both to the President and the Prime Minister, inevitable tensions between the two offices exist. By late 2015, the ruling coalition had effectively fallen apart. The brewing antagonism turned into a full-scale conflict in February 2016, when the Lithuanian-born Minister of Economy Aivaras Abromavicius announced his resignation, citing the inability to conduct reforms and the pressure to make non‑transparent decisions.9 Although his criticism was mainly directed towards President Poroshenko’s confidant Ihor Kononenko, deputy Head of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko parliamentary faction, the President announced his backing for Abromavicius and called for an overhaul of the government. However, the President’s supporters in the parliament failed to collect enough votes to dismiss Yatsenyuk. The Prime Minister finally bowed to pressure and resigned in April 2016. 32. The two main parties, Poroshenko’s bloc and the People’s Front, agreed to form a new coalition, although they depend on the support of smaller parties and individual deputies to hold the majority in the parliament. On 14 April 2016, the speaker of the parliament and Poroshenko’s close ally, Volodymyr Groysman, became the new Prime Minister. The composition of his cabinet reflects the trend of relying more on local political figures and less on foreign-born technocrats. The appointment of the new government is also widely seen as the consolidation of power by the President. In his inaugural speech, Groysman identified fighting corruption as the key priority. Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze assured members of NATO PA that the new government is firmly committed to implementing fundamental institutional and defence reforms despite the constraints imposed by the war. During its first 100 days, the Groysman government presented 177 draft laws to Parliament, of which 11 were adopted (Aslund, August 2016). 33. It remains to be seen whether the appointment of the new government will bring an end to the protracted political instability. An early parliamentary election is still possible. This option is favoured by political forces which are becoming increasingly popular, namely Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland”, which owes its popularity to Tymoshenko’s economic promises and the fact that the hero pilot Nadiya Savchenko was first on its electoral list, the Opposition bloc, and an anti‑corruption movement led by the Odessa governor Saakashvili. Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front, on the other hand, has lost so much of its support base that the party did not even participate in local elections in October 2015. In these elections, pro-Western parties were still victorious, but the forces associated with the Yanukovich era – the Opposition bloc and “Our Land” – began to recover their electoral support, particularly in the southern and eastern regions. Political uncertainty in Ukraine was cited as the main reason for the postponement of the delivery of the IMF’s latest financial assistance tranche, which is part of a total USD17 billion assistance package. 34. The split between the Ukrainian-speaking pro-Western central and western part of Ukraine and the pre-dominantly Russian-speaking East and the South is currently less prominent than under the previous regime, but it still exists. According to a survey conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Sociology Institute in 2016, more than 60% of western and central Ukrainians identify themselves first and foremost as citizens of Ukraine, compared to 45% in the south and the east. Between 39 and 47% of eastern and southern Ukrainians identify primarily with their city or region. Only about 30% of the Donbass inhabitants are proud to be citizens of Ukraine, compared with some 77% in western Ukraine. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainian Russian-speakers support the European integration of Ukraine. Only 25% of respondents are in favour of closer union with Russia and Belarus – down from 61% in 2010 (DIF, 2016). Ukraine’s reform record: the glass half full?35. The Poroshenko-Yatsenyuk government has promised the people of Ukraine to transform their country into a European democracy. Poroshenko's "Strategy 2020" identified 60 reform packages designed to prepare the country for EU membership by 2020. Radical reforms are indeed necessary to make up for the time Ukraine lost when, in the 1990s, other Central and Eastern European countries were reforming themselves to meet EU standards.10 36. Ukraine’s reform record has been mixed since the Euromaidan protests two years ago. There are some impressive achievements: Ukraine’s political system is competitive, and Presidential, parliamentary and local elections were transparent and assessed positively overall. While the media scene is vulnerable to oligarchic influences, it is certainly pluralistic.11 Ukraine’s fiscal decentralisation and the empowerment of local governments have been milestone achievements. The dependence of local budgets on subsidies was significantly decreased from 96% in 2014 to 74% in 2015 (RPR, 2015). Under the new budgeting system, the financing of local law enforcement, health and education services has been transferred to the district level. 37. Ukraine has also largely succeeded in replicating Georgia’s flagship police reform: the officers of the Ukrainian police forces are now better paid, better trained, and less corrupt. As in Georgia, public trust in the new police force has increased dramatically, from 5% to 85% (Carnegie Endowment, 2015). 38. Under the leadership of reform-minded ministers of finance and economy, Ukraine has done a lot to improve business conditions, reduce red tape and keep the budget deficit under control (1.6% of GDP in 2015, compared to 4.5% in 2013) while simplifying and reducing the tax burden (including introducing a “flat” social security tax). The country’s economic contraction in 2015 was severe (15.9%), inflation hovered at about 46% and foreign reserves plummeted to USD5.6 billion in 2015 (Krasnolutska, 5 August 2016). This year, GDP is expected to grow, albeit very modestly (1.5%) and foreign reserves to more than double. Prices this year have risen by only 12% and the currency’s value has been stable since 2015. International financial support has been critical to this stabilisation effort. 39. As the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) entered into force on 1 January 2016, Russia and Ukraine imposed new sanctions on each other’s goods. In addition to the restrictions, Moscow also imposed a temporary ban on truck and railway transportation of Ukrainian goods via Russian territory. However, since Ukraine’s trade has been re-directed to other markets, with Russian-Ukrainian trade falling from USD50.6 billion in 2011 to USD12.5 billion in the first ten months of 2015, the negative consequences for Ukraine have been manageable (Carnegie Endowment, February 2016). 40. The government has also begun the painful but necessary process of reducing subsidies in the energy sector, which alone represented a whopping 10% of GDP. A very important step was the reform of the gas sector, traditionally the most non-transparent sector of the economy and closely linked with the personal interests of oligarchs and senior politicians. Household and commercial natural gas prices have been unified. Ukraine’s main energy company, Naftogaz, is being transformed into a commercial-like entity. Gazprom’s influence in Ukraine has reduced significantly due to newly developed infrastructure that allows Ukraine to receive gas from Central Europe. In fact, between November 2015 and June 2016, Ukraine could afford not to buy any gas from Gazprom, as the two countries have been locked in a bitter payment dispute over Russian gas prices and Ukraine’s gas transit fees (Zachmann, 2016). Ukraine has also adopted important legislation to improve energy efficiency – an issue of strategic importance to Ukraine.12 41. Ukraine has made notable progress improving its border and migration management systems as well as introducing biometric passports. As a result of this progress, the European Commission has suggested lifting visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens entering the Schengen area for a short stay. 42. Finally, the Ukrainian government authorities have made efforts to strengthen their armed forces and over the past year have increased them from 146,000 to 280,000 soldiers (Carnegie Endowment, 2015). Since major Western powers are reluctant to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine, Kyiv has to rely on domestic weapons producers to provide equipment and ammunition for the expanding army. Kyiv expects that domestically-produced high-quality weapon systems will gradually replace Soviet weapons in the Ukrainian armed forces (UT, 2016). However, Ukraine needs foreign assistance with certain equipment such as reconnaissance and surveillance devices (Scarborough, 2016). Several reforms have been adopted by the Ministry of Defence to improve the effectiveness of the military and curb corruption, including an online procurement system, a polygraph examination for finance-related applicants, and the introduction of short-term military service contracts (RPR, 2015). In particular, Ukraine has adopted a milestone Strategic Defence Bulletin, which provides a roadmap to adopting and implementing NATO standards and promoting greater interoperability between Ukrainian and Allied forces. Ukraine is also planning to transition to fully civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defence by 2018, although certain members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly believe that this transition should have taken place earlier. 43. These achievements are indeed remarkable, particularly given the exceptional circumstances, and the internal and external challenges the country is facing. However, in the eyes of many Ukrainians, these achievements are negated by the fact that the political sphere remains dominated by oligarchs and corrupt officials who have not been brought to justice. The rule of law is weak in practice, the judicial system remains largely unreformed and there are many questions about the objectivity of prosecutors. While voters are presented with real choice in elections, and the counting of votes is fair, the OSCE has expressed concerns over the business interests that influence the election process. Ukraine has also done little to reform pension systems and state‑owned enterprises. In spite of achievements on all fronts, recent surveys found that 68% of respondents believe that the state of the economy is bad, 76% believe that the country is headed in the wrong direction, only 14% trust the leadership of Mr Poroshenko, and 70% do not trust the new government (Weir, 2016, Carnegie Endowment, July 2016). 44. Although the post-Maidan government has made strong pledges to eradicate corruption, it remains the biggest threat to national security and stability, alongside the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Unlike their predecessors, the new Ukrainian leadership is open to talking about the scale of the problem, but the people of Ukraine are frustrated by the mismatch between words and deeds. A survey revealed that about 80% of Ukrainians believe the current level of corruption is the same or greater than before the Euromaidan. However, the share of respondents who had personally encountered corruption did not increase, which suggests that the gloomy view of corruption in Ukraine is to a degree the result of greater awareness of the problem among the Ukrainians. There is a noticeable growth of civic consciousness among the population: some 65% of Ukrainians believe that giving or taking bribes is not justifiable (Carnegie Endowment, July 2016). 45. Although Ukrainians are confronted with demands for petty bribes in all areas of their lives, particularly in health care and education, the most damaging corruption is perpetuated at a higher level. Ukraine has adopted important anti-corruption legislation, including a package of anti‑corruption measures as recently as October 2014. The package included the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies, in particular the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NACB). According to the European Commission’s assessment, the establishment of the NACB is well on track: around 100 investigators have been recruited and trained. It has already made its first investigations, resulting in the arrests of people who previously might have been considered untouchable. It has also helped prosecute six judges accused of corrupting the judicial process. According to a recent study, the NACB which began operating only in late 2015 had already opened 148 criminal investigations, frozen UAH220 million worth of illegal revenue, and brought 15 cases to court. However, the courts have not scheduled a single trial so far and seem to be obstructing the NACB investigations. Without efforts to promote an independent judiciary, the laudable NACB efforts could well continue to be frustrated (Firestone, 2016). 46. At the high-level seminar in Kyiv in June 2016, NATO Parliamentarians were told that the Bureau lacks sufficient political support and capabilities. In addition, the NACB cannot be fully operational without a specialised anti-corruption prosecution office. While the setting up of this new office has begun (special anti-corruption prosecutor was appointed on 30 November 2015), the European Commission had doubts about its independence and integrity, mainly due to shortcomings in the selection process for the leadership of the office (EC, 2016). Ukraine is also setting up a National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), which is charged with checking asset declarations. Recent reforms have also opened up property registers to public scrutiny and said that this is helping journalists and others to do their investigative work. New laws were also adopted on the financing of political parties and on asset recovery.13 Last but not least, the new system of electronic public procurement (pro-Zorro) has proved to be efficient and has been widely praised internationally (Carnegie Endowment, July 2016). 47. On 1 September 2016, a milestone in the fight against corruption in Ukraine was achieved with the launch of the e-declaration system for public officials. Indeed, back in October 2014, a law was passed requiring officials to file an e-declaration disclosing all their financial assets, including those held by family members — subjecting them to criminal prosecutions in case of false declaration and corruption investigations if their declared assets do not match their income. Multiple attempts to weaken or delay the adoption of the law seem to have failed so far, although the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is currently considering an appeal made by 48 MPs to get rid of the most critical provisions of the law (Krasnolutska, 31 August 2016, Cohen, 2016). 48. Overall, the newly adopted bodies have not had a significant impact in the fight against corruption. Although some criminal cases have been opened against top officials, practically none have resulted in trials or recovery of embezzled funds. In 2015, Transparency International still ranked Ukraine as 130 out of 177 countries with regard to corruption, making it Europe’s most corrupt country. A large percentage of Ukrainians (94.4%) put corruption among the top three most serious issues in Ukraine, according to a poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. It is widely believed in Ukraine that the fight against corruption is obstructed by the prosecutor’s office. The general prosecutor Viktor Shokin, seen as a representative of the “old guard”, has been widely criticised for turning a blind eye to the many multi-billion embezzlement cases that have been exposed in the media by independent investigators (Aslund, January 2016). Shokin was forced to resign in February 2016, but not before he fired his deputy, Georgian-born David Sakvarelidze, who was regarded as the leading pro-Western reformer within Ukraine’s prosecutor’s office. Despite the removal of Shokin, it remains unclear whether the prosecutor’s office will be freed of corrupt influences. In May 2016, the President appointed his close ally Yuriy Lutsenko, a former Interior Minister and head of Poroshenko's parliamentary faction, as the new Prosecutor General. He told the Ukrainian Parliament he was keen to "break the current inefficient and partly criminal system" (Polityuk, 2016). In just over 100 days in office, Lutsenko has aggressively gone after officials linked to the Yanukovych regime. So far, he has filed criminal cases against the former legislative majority leader, the former Minister of Justice, multiple heads of failed banks, a former high-ranking judge, and prosecuted security officers involved in violent acts against protestors, including killings, during the Euromaidan (Karatnycky, 2016). 49. Ukrainians continue to distrust their judicial system. A survey conducted by the Centre for Political and Legal Reforms demonstrated that the prevalence of corruption among judges (94%) and the politicisation of judges (81%) are the key problems that are undermining people’s confidence in the judicial system. Although the government, with the assistance of the Venice Commission, has devised a strategy for judicial reforms for 2015-2020, the implementation and adoption of much-needed judicial reforms has been slow. In June 2016, the parliament has adopted a crucial constitutional reform package, aimed at making judges more professional and independent from political influence. The legislation also partly limits their immunity from prosecution in case of malpractice. The reform, supported by more than 300 lawmakers, has been widely applauded by the international community and is critical in ensuring the continuation of the IMF support to Ukraine (EurActiv, 2016). 50. Ukraine’s political crisis has been exacerbated by the leaking of the Panama Papers which revealed that the President’s former business, which he promised to sell when elected as President, was handled through off-shore accounts. President Poroshenko explained that he had not been involved in asset management since his election and delegated this function to consulting and law companies; the offshore legal entity was required to create a “blind trust” and was part of pre-sale restructuring, Poroshenko claims. Nevertheless, the revelation has seriously damaged the President’s reputation among Ukrainians. 51. Far more work is also required on the deregulation front, as commercial markets are still warped by complex and unnecessary permit requirements that simply add cost to doing business in the country. Ukraine’s small and medium-sized business sector is far too small, and such regulations are a real problem for small firms unable to cope with this tangle of rules and procedures. A 2015 survey of business executives and managers commissioned by the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine revealed that the most frequent reason for engaging in corrupt activities was a desire to accelerate slow bureaucratic procedures (Carnegie Endowment, July 2016). There are also far too many public companies. They are a drain on public finance and an invitation to corruption. 52. In conclusion of this chapter, it is important to note that in Ukraine, there are still powerful oligarchs deeply opposed to fundamental institutional reform. They are represented in the Rada and working diligently to slow down institutional change. These oligarchs still control much of the media and have managed to undermine some of the most prominent reforms in Ukrainian society. The current ruling majority is fragile and the government will have to rely on votes of deputies influenced by certain oligarchs. Political populism is rife and many politicians make promises to the public that they are in no position to ever deliver. This only strengthens the hands of those seeking to thwart fundamental change. The new government is faced with an unenviable task to dismantle this oligarchic system and put the country on the European development track. It requires sustained international support in these efforts. International assistance to Ukraine53. Since the Euromaidan started as a movement in support of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and given that European integration is Ukraine’s paramount strategic goal, it is natural that the EU is the most relevant actor supporting the transformation of Ukraine. Immediately after the Revolution of Dignity of 2014, the EU and European financial institutions committed EUR11 billion in support of Ukraine’s political, economic and financial stabilisation. 54. The EU provides macro financial assistance (EUR2.2 billion in low-interest loans have been provided since the outbreak of the crisis in early 2014), budget support and humanitarian assistance in the form of grants, technical assistance, and indirect support through trade preferences granted in the framework of the DCFTA, which entered into force on 1 January 2016.14 The EU has also established a Ukraine Support Group composed of experts from EU institutions and member states in different sectors to provide advice and support to the Ukrainian authorities in the reform sectors. Furthermore, the EU has been assisting Ukraine in transforming its energy sector. The EU and Ukraine are also finalising the visa liberalisation mechanism and the European Parliament has launched a programme designed to strengthen the role and capacities of the Ukrainian Parliament. 55. The IMF provides vital financial assistance to keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. In March 2015, the IMF announced a four-year bailout programme for Ukraine worth USD17.11 billion in loans. In 2015, Ukraine obtained the first two tranches - USD5 billion and USD1.7 billion respectively. The third tranche has been delayed since October 2015 due to concerns about Ukraine’s slow progress in improving governance and fighting corruption, and reducing the influence of vested interests in policy-making. According to Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Director, “without a substantial new effort to invigorate governance reforms and fight corruption, it is hard to see how the IMF-supported programme can continue and be successful” (IMF, 2016). At the time of writing, the IMF was very close to unlocking the next loan tranche to Ukraine. Originally supposed to be for USD1.7 billion, the loan is now expected to be around USD1 billion. With the release of the tranche and the IMF executive board "seal of approval", Ukraine is expected to access additional financing including a USD1 billion loan guarantee and EUR600 million from the EU (Siebold, 2016, Aslund, August 2016). 56. The new leadership in Ukraine has not officially applied for NATO membership. However, the Alliance is seen as a major partner and ideological ally of Ukraine. Senior Ukrainian officials, including Parliament Speaker Andriy Parubiy and Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, told members of NATO PA that Ukraine’s membership of NATO would provide ultimate security guarantees for their country and would contribute to stability in Europe. However, Kyiv has chosen, at this stage, to work hard on meeting NATO standards and to further explain the benefits of NATO integration to the people before formally applying for a Membership Action Plan. The popular view of NATO has increased considerably since the beginning of the conflict with Russia. According to an opinion poll conducted in July 2015, 64% of Ukrainians would support their country joining NATO (Vorobiov, 2015). Other polls suggest different results however: a survey conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Sociology Institute found that results for or against joining NATO are tied at 38% (StopFake, 2016). A recent survey by the Razumkov Centre showed that 41% of Ukrainians would reject a deal involving a “guarantee” of Ukraine’s non-membership of NATO in exchange for “peace” in Eastern Ukraine. 57. NATO has responded to Ukraine’s increased interest in having closer contact with the Alliance. At the September 2014 Wales Summit, NATO and Ukraine launched a comprehensive package of Trust Funds intended to modernise Ukraine’s security and defence capabilities in the following areas: logistics; command, control and communications; cyber defence; military career management; and medical rehabilitation. In June 2015, following a request from Ukraine, NATO agreed to launch an additional trust fund on countering improvised explosive devices to help Ukraine improve its security and defence capabilities. The Tactical Communications Support Project focuses on identifying surpluses in the budgets of NATO member states that can be allocated for assistance to Ukraine, potentially augmented with specific new acquisitions to provide a coherent and complete capability in coordination with national bilateral projects. The size of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine has tripled. 58. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the Allied leaders welcomed Ukraine’s intent to deepen further its Distinctive Partnership with NATO, as well as to continue contributing to NATO-led operations even while it has been defending itself against Russia’s aggressive actions. Allied and Ukrainian leaders endorsed the Comprehensive Assistance Package aimed at consolidating and enhancing NATO’s support to Ukraine, including by tailored capability and capacity building measures for the security and defence sector. NATO’s assistance is expected to enhance Ukraine’s resilience against a wide array of threats, including hybrid threats. Allied nations also contribute to the development of Ukrainian armed forces though multinational endeavours such as the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade. 59. Ukraine receives significant bilateral assistance from the EU and NATO member states. The United States in particular is instrumental in providing assistance to Ukraine’s security sector. The United States has provided non-lethal military assets to Ukraine, but the Obama administration has so far declined to offer weapons, despite strong voices in Congress promoting the idea of going beyond non-lethal support and providing “defensive weapons” such as man-portable anti-tank weapons. Since the crisis that began late in 2013, the United States has committed to provide over USD760 million in assistance to Ukraine, in addition to two USD1 billion loan guarantees. US economic and technical advisers also advise almost a dozen Ukrainian ministries and localities (Morelli, 2016).15 60. Germany has provided direct assistance to the tune of almost EUR200 million, which was made available in 2015, up from EUR130 million in 2014. On top of this comes a EUR500 million loan guarantee. The German Government additionally provided EUR18 million in humanitarian assistance in 2015. Acting on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, a German Advisory Group advises the Ukrainian government on questions of economic and social policy (Federal Foreign Office, 2016). 61. For 2015-2016, the United Kingdom is offering a substantial package of programme funding to help Ukraine make progress in reforms, communications, national reconciliation and the handling of the humanitarian situation. In 2015, the United Kingdom trained 2,000 members of the Ukrainian armed forces in several areas, including counter-IEDs, operations in urban environments, medical care, logistics and operational planning. The UK has also gifted over GBP1 million worth of equipment to the country (Ministry of Defence, UK, 2016). In March 2016, the UK announced that it would double its military assistance to Ukraine (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2016). ConclusionsThe Rapporteur wishes to emphasise the following two points. 62. Point 1: The Euro-Atlantic community, bound by its commitment to the values of democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, should reaffirm its commitment to support Ukraine and to take additional meaningful steps to help it in its struggle for independence and territorial integrity. The Euro-Atlantic community has to demonstrate patience and solidarity, and be willing to increase direct financial as well as expert assistance for Ukraine´s path of reforms. Realistically, Ukraine’s transformation will take time and will suffer setbacks. Ukraine’s institutional overhaul poses a serious challenge to a country that has been saddled with a burdensome Soviet legacy and decades of poor governance. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to disparage the efforts the country is making. These efforts would be doubly effective if the people of Ukraine and their political leaders received tangible manifestations of commitment from the Euro-Atlantic community, which has to avoid the pitfalls of “Ukraine fatigue”. Members of NATO and the EU should also continue diplomatic efforts to induce Russia to reconsider its assertive policies. Attempts to normalise relations with Russia cannot be made at the expense of Ukraine’s right to make strategic choices and to pick its alliances. At this stage, there is no alternative to the continuation of sanctions against those officials and entities in Russia responsible for destabilisation of Ukraine. Cancelling the current sanctions regime without winning concessions from Russia would be an invitation for that country to act with impunity. An aggressor will only embrace peace when it confronts a solid and united international front. The international community needs to see tangible results from the implementation of Minsk II. In particular, Russia and its proxies must immediately stop ceasefire violations and return the border control in Donbass to Ukraine. Launching an international police mission in Donbass would be essential to restore security there and create conditions for free local elections under Ukrainian law. Also, the democratic international community must not lose sight of the fact that Crimea has been de facto illegally annexed by Russia and must make it unambiguously clear that this illegal annexation will never be recognised. 63. Point 2: Ukrainian leaders must understand that the level of international support given to their country directly depends on their ability to deliver on promises of reforms. It is ultimately their responsibility to demonstrate with concrete actions that they are determined to forgo old, malign practices of governance. They must demonstrate with concrete actions that corruption, clientelism and oligarchic influences will be tackled resolutely and without exception. They should underpin a constitutional order that will be based on tolerance, inclusion, pluralism and unwavering commitment to human rights and minority rights. The conflict with Russia provides a very difficult backdrop for the introduction of policy reforms, but Kyiv must take advantage of the fact that Russia’s aggression has brought a sense of national unity and a common strategic vision for the future of Ukraine. This opportunity for a genuine transformation of the country should not be wasted. It is time for Ukrainian politicians to refrain from destructive political bickering, to put the Ukrainian people’s interests above their own; to concentrate on tough but necessary reforms for the remainder of their parliamentary and presidential terms; and to recognise that unless they tackle corruption at its root and the inadequacies of the judicial system they will postpone enjoying the full sympathy and support of their friends to the West. BIBLIOGRAPHYAslund, A. (2016, January 4). New Russian Management of the Donbas Signifies Putin May Be Ready to Negotiate. Retrieved from Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/new-russian-management-of-the-donbas-signifies-putin-may-be-ready-to-negotiate Aslund, A. (2016, August 29). Have Ukraine's Reforms Stalled? Retrieved from Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/have-ukraine-s-reforms-stalled Carnegie Endowment. (2015, December 7). Ukraine Reform Monitor: December 2015. 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The Military Balance: The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. Retrieved from International Institute of Strategic Studies. IMF. (2016, February 10). Statement by the Managing Director on Ukraine. Retrieved from International Monetary Fund: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr1650.htm Karatnycky, A. (2016, August 31). Anti-Corruption Cases Are Finally Moving Forward. Retrieved from Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/anti-corruption-cases-are-finally-moving-forward Klein, M. (2016, March). Russia’s Military: On The Rise? Retrieved from Transatlantic Academy Series: http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/russia%E2%80%99s-military-rise-0 Kofman, M. (2016, August 31). Putin's Military is Playing the Long Game in Ukraine. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/31/dont-look-now-but-russias-got-ukraine-surrounded-crimea/ Krasnolutska, D. (2016, August 4). 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Manea, O.; Visan, G. (2015, July 14). Crimea’s Transformation Into An Access-Denial Base. Retrieved from Romania Energy Center: http://www.roec.biz/bsad/portfolio-item/crimeas-transformation-into-an-access-denial-base/ Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. (2016, March 17). General of Army of Ukraine Stepan Poltorak: “The level of training of our military personnel has considerably improved with the assistance from Great Britain”. Retrieved from Ministry of Defence of Ukraine: http://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2016/03/17/general-of-army-of-ukraine-stepan-poltorak-the-level-of-training-of-our-military-personnel-has-considerably-improved-with-the-assistance-from-great-britain%E2%80%9D/ Ministry of Defence, UK. (2016, March 18). UK relationship with Ukraine strengthened by Defence agreement. Retrieved from Ministry of Defence, UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-relationship-with-ukraine-strengthened-by-defence-agreement Morelli, V. (2016, March 29). Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. 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Retrieved from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-parliament-prosecutor-idUSKCN0Y311A Pifer, S. (2016, February). Letting It Go. Retrieved from Brookings: http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2016/02/eu-us-minsk-ii-provisions-pifer Reuters. (2015, December 17). Putin: Russia did have people in Ukraine doing 'certain military tasks'. Retrieved from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-ukraine-idUSKBN0U019G20151217 Reuters. (2016, August 12). Russia deploys advanced S-400 air missile system to Crimea: agencies. Retrieved from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-missiles-idUSKCN10N1H4 RFE/RL. (2016, May 24). Medvedev’s Awkward Crimea Moment: ‘There’s Just No Money. But You Take Care!’. Retrieved from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-medvedev-crimea-visit-no-money-social-media-pensioner/27754644.html RFE/RL. (2016, July 14). UN Report Finds 'Rampant Impunity' For Killings In Eastern Ukraine. Retrieved from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: http://www.rferl.org/content/eastern-ukraine-rights-abuses-un-report/27858071.html RFE/RL Ukrainian Service. (2016, July 13). OSCE Expresses Concern Over Russia's List Of 'Terrorists, Extremists'. Retrieved from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crimea-journalists-list-extremists-terrorists/27855992.html RPR. (2015). Reforms Under the Microscope. Retrieved from Reanimation Package of Reforms: http://www.rpr.org.ua/uploads/files/source/briefs_web_eng.pdf Scarborough, R. (2016, January 10). Ukraine desperate for U.S. surveillance equipment in standoff with Russia. Retrieved from The Washington Times: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/10/ukraine-desperate-for-us-surveillance-equipment-in/ Siebold, S. (2016, August 30). Ukraine 'very close' to getting next IMF loan tranche: FinMin. Retrieved from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-imf-idUSKCN11527Z Stewart, P. (2016, August 12). U.S. general calls on Russia to allow observers at military drills. Retrieved from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-ukraine-idUSKCN10N2AO StopFake. (2016, August 20). Russian media distort Ukrainian poll results on eve of Independence Day. Retrieved from StopFake.org: http://www.stopfake.org/en/russian-media-distort-ukrainian-poll-results-on-eve-of-independence-day/ Taylor, G. (2016, August 16). Vladimir Putin’s rumbling raises new fears of Ukraine conflict. Retrieved from The Washington Times: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/15/vladimir-putins-rumblings-raise-new-fears-of-ukrai/ UNIAN. (2016, March 24). Russian 50th 'humanitarian convoy' sets off for Donbas. Retrieved from UNIAN Information Agency: http://www.unian.info/war/1298795-russian-50th-humanitarian-convoy-sets-off-for-donbas.html UT. (2016, March 19). Ukraine's New Sniper Rifles: Deadly weapons to fight Russia's war in Donbas. Retrieved from Ukraine Today: http://uatoday.tv/politics/ukraine-s-new-sniper-rifles-deadly-weapons-to-fight-russia-s-war-in-donbas-613507.html Vorobiov, I. (2015, August 13). Surprise! Ukraine Loves NATO. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/13/surprise-ukraine-loves-nato/ Zachmann, G. (2016, June). Reaching the point-of-no-return for Ukraine’s gas sector. Retrieved from German Advisory Group. Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting: http://www.beratergruppe-ukraine.de/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PP_03_2016_en.pdf Weinberg, K. (2016, August 12). Russian Build-Up In And Around Ukraine. Retrieved from The Institute for the Study of War; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%20in%20Ukraine%20August%202016_Final_FLAT.pdf Weir, F. (2016, August 24). For Ukraine, an Independence Day marked by deep public frustration. 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_______________________ 1 Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 2 For instance, on 30 March 2016, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said to Reuters that Russia was not complying with a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine and that "we've gone backwards over the last few months with more and more violations of the ceasefire". In July 2016, Ambassador Daniel Baer, head of the US mission to the OSCE, and US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt made statements saying that Russia's continued material support of separatist fighters in eastern Ukraine was "driving the conflict." Germany’s position is somewhat different however: addressing the UN on 29 February 2016, its Foreign Minister Frank‑Walter Steinmeier said that "both Ukraine and Russia continue to violate a ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine". 3 For instance, on 29 July 2016, SMM officers, while following fresh tracks probably left by an infantry fighting vehicle were stopped at gunpoint by armed separatists near the separatist-controlled village of Lukove and ordered to leave the area. 4 Nadiya Savchenko was accused of deliberately killing two Russian journalists by directing artillery fire at the positions of pro-Russian forces. The evidence that she was already in captivity at the time of that incident was ignored by judges. The fact that it was impossible to recognise specific persons from a long distance and direct fire against them was also ignored. Russian authorities also made an absurd claim that Savchenko crossed the Russian border voluntarily disguised as a refugee (whereas in fact she was captured by rebels and illegally transported to Russia). By detaining and sentencing Savchenko, Russia has also violated her immunity status as a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Savchenko was an officer who fought against her country’s enemies on her country’s soil. Some of Savchenko’s supporters appealed to President Putin, an officer himself, to show due respect to the enemy and at least treat her as a prisoner of war. 5 Some Western politicians have expressed different views to their governments on the Crimean issue. In particular, a delegation of 11 French lawmakers, led by Thierry Mariani, visited Crimea in July 2016. This controversial visit was criticised by the French government as a "violation of international law". French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said that “entering Crimea without the Ukrainian authorities' permission means recognition of Moscow's claims". The visit was also strongly condemned by Kyiv. While in Crimea, Mr Mariani made comments that implied the recognition of the results of 16 March 2014 ‘referendum’ in Crimea. 6 Crimea has a long history and has been an intersection of different civilisations, particularly Greek and Turkic. For centuries, a Turkic Tatar population constituted a majority of the peninsula’s inhabitants. Crimea became a part of the Russian empire only at the end of the 18th century. The Tatars still constituted a significant share of the region’s population up until the end of World War II, when the Soviet government began to deport large groups of ethnic Tatars to Central Asia as punishment for alleged collaboration with German forces. Consequently, the demographic make-up has dramatically changed in the region since 1944. In 1954, Moscow, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, transferred the Crimean Oblast to Ukraine on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Cossack Ukraine becoming a part of Russia. The transfer was also justified for geographical reasons, a land corridor between Ukraine and Crimea. Since the independence of Ukraine, the Tatars started to repatriate back to their homeland, but only in small numbers, and therefore today they constitute a mere 14% of the population. The Tatar population overwhelmingly supported Crimea’s status as an autonomous part of Ukraine. According to the 2001 census, ethnic Russians made up 58% of Crimea’s population, followed by ethnic Ukrainians with 24%. 7 On 1st September 2016, the US government put the companies building the bridge to link the Russian mainland with the illegally annexed Crimea on an updated sanctions blacklist. 8 The biggest winners were Poroshenko’s bloc and the People’s Front, whose leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk was confirmed as Prime Minister. Three other parties – “Self-Reliance”, popular in nationally‑conscious Western Ukraine, the populist Radical Party and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland” – also supported the government. A relatively small opposition bloc – a remnant of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions – was the only force in the parliament opposing the new leadership. 9 Ten Kyiv-based Western ambassadors including those of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, issued a statement expressing deep disappointment by the resignation of a minister “who has delivered real reform results for Ukraine” and calling on Ukrainian politicians to “set aside their parochial differences” and “press forward on vital reforms”. 10 The most visible example is comparison with Poland, a country of similar size, whose economic output was comparable to that of Ukraine in the early 1990s. Currently, however, Poland’s GDP per capita is almost three times bigger than that of Ukraine. 11 It must be noted, however, that there has recently been a series of attacks against journalists in Ukraine. In May 2016, a nationalist website published thousands of e-mails containing personal information about a number of Ukrainian journalists. Controversially, the leak was praised by the Ministry of Interior, while Deputy Minister of Information Policy Tetyana Popova announced her resignation in protest. Some journalists continue to face threats or even assaults, such as Mykhaylo Tkach, who reports for the Skhemy Investigative Program. An award-winning Belarussian investigative journalist Pavel Sheremet was assassinated in Kyiv in July 2016. In September, a building of the pro-opposition Inter TV was set on fire. 12 Ukraine remains one of the most energy inefficient countries in the world – partly due to the corruption schemes that existed in the energy sector. Ukraine’s energy intensity – the ratio of energy consumption to GDP – is three times higher than the EU average. According to the International Energy Agency, by implementing EU energy efficiency standards, Ukraine could save more than 20 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas per year. Ukraine’s domestic gas production is also about 20 bcm (and could potentially be increased to 27‑30 bcm), while the country’s gas is currently at about 48 bcm. Thus, by reaching the energy efficiency level of its European neighbours, Ukraine could become independent of Russian gas altogether. 13 Ukrainian authorities claim that the Yanukovych regime had transported USD32 billion out of the country in cash in early 2014, only a tiny amount of which has been recovered. 14 The results of the consultative referendum in the Netherlands imply that parts of the EU-Ukrainian Association could be revisited. Free-trade provisions are currently being applied in a "provisional" format. 15 According to US Assistant Secretary Nuland, over USD266 million of the US support has been in the security sector, training nearly 1,200 soldiers and 750 Ukrainian National Guard personnel and providing 130 HMMWVs, 150 thermal goggles and 585 night-vision devices, over 300 secure radios, 5 Explosive Ordnance Disposal robots, 20 counter-mortar radars, and over 100 up-armoured civilian SUVs. 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