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| See, e.g., Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU Integration Process of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/themes/public-consultation-on-the-eu-strategy-for-the- adriatic-and-ionian-region (visited Dec. 19, 2017). US. Department of State, Background Information on Serbia provided to Committee Staff, June 30, 2017. Andrew Rettman, Western Balkans EU Blindspot on Russian Propaganda EUobserver, December 10, 2015. Public Opinion Survey of 1,050 Serbian Adults, Sept. 2017 (unpublished. Bosnia Making Military Progress in NATO Bid—Alliance General Reuters, Nov. 14, 2017. Bosnian Serbs Pass Non-Binding Resolution against NATO Membership Associated Press, Oct. 18, 2017. to examine the tools used by Russia laid out throughout this report and work closely with the EU to build its defenses. The government of the Republic of Serbia has dedicated substantial resources and political capital towards joining the EU. 462 But unfortunately, it has taken little action to defend itself from anti- EU Russian government propaganda that circulates throughout the country with little resistance. According to the US. State Department, the number of media outlets and NGOs taking pro-Russian stands has grown from a dozen to over a hundred in recent years, and the free content offered by Russian state outlets such as Sputnik make them the most quoted foreign sources in the Serbian press.’’ 463 For example, Sputnik articles in recent years have falsely claimed that Kosovar Albanians planned pogroms against Kosovar Serbs with the blessing of the West and that the West is fomenting instability in the Balkans to create a pretext for inva- sion. 464 This propaganda appears to have had an impact. Since Sputnik was launched in Serbia in January 2015, Russia’s favorability numbers among Serbians have increased from 47.8 percent to 60 percent in June Most EU aspirants adopt the foreign policy directives of the European Union as away to show commitment to solidarity even before they join. For example, Montenegro has adopted atop foreign policy priority of the EU—the sanctions regime on Russia—even though it is not a member. Once in the EU, countries are expected to adopt the foreign policies of the block on agreed-upon issues. Serbia has not signed onto the EU’s Russia sanctions, and, given its relationship with Russia, it is difficult to see Belgrade agreeing to such measures in the foreseeable future. This tension with the EU on a central foreign policy priority for Brussels makes a challenging situation for Serbia even more difficult. A similar dynamic is playing out next door in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where parts of the government have expressed a desire to join NATO. 466 In order to move forward, however, all three constituent ethnicities represented in the Bosnian presidency—the Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs—would have to agree on Bosnia’s NATO bid and make the commensurate reforms. Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (RS, or Serbian Republic, is one of two largely autonomous constitutional entities in Bosnia. It is majority Serb and maintains close relations with Moscow. An RS objection to joining NATO would collapse any deal. Although the central government in Sarajevo has expressed support for Bosnia’s implementation of a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP, the parliament in RS passed a nonbinding resolution in October 2017 opposing Bosnia s potential membership in the military alliance. 467 In recent years, Russia has intensified its relationship with RS Prime Min- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER |