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Link Turn – Missile Defense Alternative to TNWs
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Link Turn – Missile Defense Alternative to TNWsSpending will trade off from TNWs to missile defense systems Young 10 (Thomas, writer for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 5/1, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/missile-defense-the-future-of-nato-burden-sharing) "If you are a NATO member, you have to work for collective security," Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov recently remarked in response to reports that his country is positioning itself as a potential host for components of the reconfigured European missile defense system. Borisov's statement encapsulates the spirit of NATO burden sharing: allies collectively shouldering the costs, risks, and responsibilities of maintaining adequate defenses. Those who argue for keeping forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe (maintained under the auspices of NATO defense commitments) frequently cite the need for burden sharing. And despite claims that nuclear sharing undermines the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), many see the arrangement as a source of NATO cohesion that has helped prevent a two-tier alliance of nuclear haves and have-nots. Such a divide is further avoided by allies' conventional contributions toward an effective nuclear strike package, including the provision of combat air support, reconnaissance, surveillance, and midair refueling. Moreover, the stationing of nuclear weapons on the continent symbolically affirms the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. Although the perceived value of these weapons for Western European allies has waned considerably since the end of the Cold War, the security assurances that they embody continue to be important to countries on NATO's eastern periphery (e.g., Poland, Estonia, and Turkey). Historically, Washington has viewed deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe as a contribution to nonproliferation, arguing that it prevented allies such as Germany from seeking their own nuclear weapon capability. Although this role is less relevant today, it continues to be applicable to Turkey--an alliance member that attaches particular value to NATO security assurances. In particular, NATO can influence Ankara's threat calculations (especially vis-à-vis Iran) by reassuring it of the alliance's commitment to defend its territory--something that is currently achieved, in large part, by the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons hosted at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. And yet, there's a growing consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that the weapons should be withdrawn. A decision will have to be made soon: The dual-capable aircraft tasked with carrying out NATO's nuclear mission are unlikely to remain in service beyond 2020. If the weapons are removed, then it's preferable that there be some form of replacement that makes withdrawal more palatable to NATO countries that face regional security challenges (i.e., Turkey). Exactly what would constitute a suitable replacement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons? One suggestion is that the alliance simply rely on the extended deterrence offered to non-nuclear weapon allies by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, Britain, and France. But this would contribute to perceptions of a two-tier alliance and could be seen as a weakening of Washington's commitment to Europe's defense. Another option is to reassure allies in Eastern Europe that there are conventional plans in place to protect them in the event of a crisis. Yet force planning of this type is likely to require military exercises--something that Moscow will vociferously oppose on the pretext that they're aimed at Russia. An alternative solution: missile defense. If countries agree to station interceptors on their territory or contribute missile defense assets such as Aegis ships, they would, in effect, be sharing the burdens and risks of collective defense in much the same way Germany, Turkey, and Italy do by hosting nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This option also has the added benefit of shifting the burden east toward those countries that are more skeptical of any symbolic weakening of the U.S. commitment to defend Europe. Further, the ability for mobile missile defense capabilities to be surged into regions at times of crisis creates the need for regular consultations within the Nuclear Planning Group or a similar NATO forum, thereby providing allies with continued influence over U.S. defense policy. Missile defense systems cost billions Coyle 6 (Philip E, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, 1/24, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask_this.view&askthisid=163) Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the Department of Defense has been spending about $10 billion per year on missile defense. The President's goal is to be able to shoot down enemy missiles of all types - short range, medium range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles - with interceptors launched from land, from sea, from aircraft and from space. It's called a layered defense. The idea is that if one layer misses the next one won't. Pentagon briefings picture the United States covered by a series of overlapping glass domes, and we are meant to imagine that enemy missiles will bounce off those domes like hail off a windshield. In a recent report the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that missile defense spending could double by 2013 to about $19 billion per year. The CBO also proposes an evolutionary approach that would reduce missile defense spending to only $3 billion per year by focusing on research and development, rather than continuing to deploy unproven hardware. Link Turn – TNWsRemoval of TNW’s would still incur the same costs as keeping them. Kelleher and Warren 9 (Catherine M., Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and Scott L. executive director of the nonprofit Generation Citizen “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher)KM The possibility exists in the near future for a reduction to a new symbolic level, for example, to 100 tactical weapons on the U.S. side, although the costs for infrastructure and security will remain near present levels. Because it is generally agreed that the present numbers are already purely symbolic, further reductions would be a signal and a commitment to the future, rather than a concrete measure such as elimination. A specific attempt should be made now to identify and eventually destroy any remaining British and French systems now in storage. The process of dismantling nuclear weapons totals in the billions Alger and Findlay 9 (Justin, a research assistant for the Nuclear Energy Futures Project, and Trevor, CIGI Senior Fellow, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Alger_Findlay_Cost_of_Disarmament.pdf) A study by Stephen Schwartz et al published in 1998 deserves an honourable mention for opening the discussion on how much nuclear weapons cost—both to keep and to get rid of. The authors delve into the costs of nuclear weapons, including building, deploying and dismantling them.7 The study approaches the question of disarmament from the angle of reducing nuclear weapons expenditures in the aftermath of the Cold War rather than that of complete nuclear disarmament, so some of the challenging questions about how to dismantle the nuclear weapons complex writ large (along with the costs of verification) are not addressed directly. However, the study does reveal how challenging it is to account for nuclear weapons costs, especially on the disarmament side, particularly with respect to the difficult question of the disposition of excess fissile material. Schwartz et al estimate the cost of dismantling American nuclear weapons between 1940 and 1990 at $40.6 billion.8 Of this total, 47.2 percent ($19.2 billion) was for plutonium disposition—making it one of the most expensive parts of the process.9 The authors also caution that these numbers reflect dismantlement costs in an era when warheads were being replaced rather than retired, which limited the amount of surplus material that needed to be permanently disposed of.10 In these instances the material taken out of a warhead to be retired was often held for future use in a replacement weapon. Complete nuclear disarmament would, in contrast, entail the additional cost of disposal of weapons grade material to render it unusable for a nuclear weapon. The options for such material disposition are numerous and include ‘burning’ it in fast reactors, using plutonium in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for civilian power reactors, blending high-enriched uranium (HEU) down also for civilian power reactor use, or vitrification with other fission products as waste. These options vary wildly in their potential cost.11 Disposing of all of the fissile material from large nuclear programs will be costly. Most of such states will already have facilities for handling, storage and long-term if not permanent disposal of such material, not just from their military programs but from their civilian nuclear power programs. In such cases the additional expense may not be as great as might be expected. TNW’s are expensive even in relocation – soldiers must be stationed and on stand-by for any potential changes. Meier 6 (“News Analysis: An End to U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe?” Oliver, Arms Control Association July/August http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2088)KM From NATO’s perspective, such an arrangement of “virtual” nuclear sharing might have a number of technical and political disadvantages. NATO member states may be reluctant to redeploy nuclear weapons in times of crisis for fear of sending a wrong, escalatory signal. The United States currently deploys specially trained Munitions Support Squadrons of approximately 125-150 soldiers each at every base where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. These units would either have to remain stationed at bases where nuclear weapons could be redeployed or kept on standby in the United States for possible relocation in Europe. Both are expensive options and may be difficult to justify, given how unlikely it is that NATO nuclear weapons would ever actually be used. There is also a fear at NATO headquarters in Brussels and national defense ministries that NATO’s nuclear policy may over time fade into irrelevance if the real weapons are withdrawn. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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