Constitutional Law: Professor Yoshino Spring 2009 Outline


Judicial Review History of Marbury v. Madison



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Judicial Review



  1. History of Marbury v. Madison


    1. Spectrum of gov’t power:

      1. Very strong centralized gov’t: King George

      2. Strong centralized gov’t: federalists

      3. Weak centralized gov’t: anti-federalists

      4. Very weak centralized gov’t: states under Articles of Confederation

    2. 1800: Federalists lose election → try to entrench themselves in gov’t by appointing life-tenured Federalist judges (e.g. Chief Justice Marshall)

      1. Marbury is a similar appointment → BUT appointed to be justice of the peace (not life-tenured, Art. III judge)

    3. Republican backlash: try to undue Federalist entrenchment, incl. by withholding commissions
  2. Primary Criticism of Judicial Review: counter-majoritarian

  3. Justifications for Judicial Review


    1. Not in the text of const. → requires two functionalist moves:

    2. Justifications for Constitutional Supremacy:

      1. Intent of Framers to bind future generations w/ their principles

      2. Written-ness of const.

      3. Supremacy Clause: fed. const./laws supreme law of land

    3. Justifications for Judiciary as Ultimate Interpreter of Constitution

      1. Judicial competence to interpret all laws

      2. Judicial competence to interpret at least some cases under the const.

      3. Judges take an oath to uphold the const.
  4. Defense of Judicial Review


    1. SCOTUS must have supervisory role: most important is fed. review of state legislation → protects federalism

      1. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee [CB 128]: state court finds unconst. fed. statute granting fed. appellate jx. over state court decisions/const. of state laws → court: state sovereignty is subject to fed. sovereignty: fed. const. worried about state prejudices/interests obstructing regular admin. of justice, and of creating uniformity of decisions throughout country

    2. Courts protect fundamental values: legislatures are subject to politics of the time → judges are better able to pronounce and guard our fundamental values (“ways of the scholar”) (Bickel)

    3. Courts keep political process pure: courts step in at times of process failure (Ely)

    4. Courts protect minorities from majority tyranny

    5. Court is not a distinctively counter-majoritarian body

      1. Court has its own base of power/legitimacy, which it’s unlikely to risk by going against majority (Dahl)
  5. Marbury [CB 108]: important for establishing power of judicial review, as well as political question (justiciability) doctrine


    1. FACTS: Adams withholds Marbury’s comm’n as justice of the peace → court held that, although Adams violated Marbury’s legal right and he was entitled to a remedy, the law giving SCOTUS power to issue writ of mandamus was unconst.

    2. Holding: Judiciary Act vested original jx. in SCOTUS to issue writs of mandamus → BUT, since mandamus isn’t listed in Art. III(2), Congress only could give SCOTUS appellate jx. to issue writ

    3. Marshall’s justifications for judicial review:

    4. How could Marshall have avoided reaching the question of judicial review?

      1. Recusal: he was the Sec. of State that didn’t deliver comm’n → he didn’t have to recuse himself (statute at that time was lax; modern statute would have forced recusal), and felt he had a unique contribution to make to the case

      2. Delivery: could have said delivery of the comm’n was necessary, and since it wasn’t deliver, Marbury was not entitled to relief → Marshall says no: delivery was just a formality (like mailbox rule in contracts)

      3. Political Question: could have said that const. puts the power of comm’n solely in executive’s province, and that it is only a political, not a justiciable, question → Marshall says no: executive was required by law to deliver the comm’n; once Marbury was appointed, political part was over

      4. Statutory Interpretation [SEE HANDOUT]: could interpret statute not as granting original jx. to issue writ, but simply saying its something SCOTUS can do within its appellate jx. (which would still mean that SCOTUS was not able to issue the writ in this case)

      5. Const. Interpretation: says that Congress can make exceptions to the grant of appellate jx. in Art. III
  6. Limits on Judicial Review


    1. Political question doctrine: certain questions are political in nature such that court won’t hear the case

      1. What are political questions (Baker factors boiled down):

        1. Textual commitment of adjudicatory power to another branch

          1. Powell v. McCormack [CB 890]: Const. did not give Congress adjudicatory power to add new requirements for Congress → BUT Congress did have adjudicatory power over disputes over textual requirements (e.g. age)

        2. Institutional competence: lack of judicially administrable standards

          1. Voting rights cases: adjudicating gerrymandering involved a lot of data analysis outside of court’s competence

        3. Comity: prudential reasons against interference → judges are less politically accountable and are often asked to act after important/hard-to-reverse decisions have already been made

          1. Decision to wage war

      2. By declining to intervene in a political question, court isn’t saying anything about the merits of the case → just saying there’s an countervailing reason for not intervening

    2. Standing: are you the right person to bring the case?

      1. Const. Requirements:

        1. An injury in fact that is

        2. Fairly related to defendant’s conflict, and

        3. Likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision

      2. Prudential Requirements:

        1. Prohibition on assertion of legal rights of third parties

        2. Prohibition on asserting generalized grievances shared widely among large group of people (e.g. “taxpayer” standing)

          1. Exception: taxpayer standing to challenge violation of Establishment Clause when money is being paid (Chambers)

        3. Prohibition on asserting claims not within “zone of interests” Congress sought to protect

      3. Justifications:

        1. Limit number of potential plaintiffs

        2. Difference in quality of advocacy if you don’t have dog in the fight

        3. Art. III: there must be a “controversy” → if there are no actually injured parties, there really is no controversy (prohibition on AOs)

    3. Ripeness and Mootness

      1. Temporality: is it too early or too late?

      2. Exception to mootness: when particular completed act is capable of repetition (e.g. abortion)

    4. Cert. practice

      1. No appeal as of right to SCOTUS

      2. SCOTUS denies vast majority of cert. petitions

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upload documents -> Fed Courts Outline: 26 Pages

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