**Containment cp text
Solvency **Note: Net Benefit is the containment DA** Generic
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Solvency**Note: Net Benefit is the containment DA**GenericHegUS containing China has hurt their sea power development – this is done in order to maintain US primacyLyle J. Goldstein Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI., 10-29-2014, "How China Sees America's Moves in Asia: Worse Than Containment," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-sees-americas-moves-asia-worse-containment-11560 The authors argue that the United States has become the most significant factor restricting the further development of Chinese sea power. They explain that sea power is at the core of American grand strategy and that China’s rapid rise is perceived in Washington to threaten the U.S. position of hegemonic leadership in the Western Pacific. These perceptions have given rise to “doubts and wariness” regarding China’s naval development. For these authors, China does not just confront “遏制” [containment] by the United States, but something perhaps even more bellicose: “围堵”[a condition of being under siege] or even “掣肘”[a condition of being held by the elbows]. For the purpose of restricting Chinese naval power in the eastern, southern and western flanks, Washington is said to be constructing a “超长防线”[super long line of defense] that stretches from the Aleutian Islands to the Persian Gulf. As noted above, this analysis puts a focus on three different vectors of U.S. activity. In the South China Sea, it is observed that over the last few years, the United States has begun to “directly contain” Chinese sea-power development. In that regard, the recent deployment of the new littoral combat ship (LCS) to Singapore is seen as deliberately aimed at countering China. These analysts outline the importance of Washington’s so-called “双锚”[dual anchor] strategy that seeks to facilitate enhanced military cooperation between Australia and Japan. Another vector of U.S. strategy, according to this analysis, concerns Taiwan. The island is said to form a critical strategic linkage to the South China Sea and its role in U.S. strategy is said to be increasing. The final vector of U.S. policy is said to concern the Indian Ocean and involves an effort by Washington to strengthen the Indian armed forces. The idea, according to these Chinese analysts, is to use the India-China territorial dispute on land to “牵制 ” [pin down] China by diverting its attention away from the maritime flank. The authors assert that China faces an immense challenge to develop as a “陆海复合型国家” [hybrid land-sea power]. They note that many great powers—including France, Germany and the Soviet Union—faced similar challenges as hybrid powers, and each ultimately met defeat. The US containment strategies majorly constrain china Sears 16 [Nathan; Nathan A. Sears is Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Las Américas, Quito-Ecuador. His research focuses mainly on strategic studies, international security, and international relations theory.; China, Russia, and the Long ‘Unipolar Moment'; 4/27/16; The diplomat; http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-russia-and-the-unipolar-moment/] However, instead of undermining U.S. influence and forcing states to “bandwagon” with China, Chinese revisionism is actually strengthening the U.S. alliance system in East Asia. The United States is in the process of upgrading its strategic cooperation with several of its longstanding allies, such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. The Obama Administration’s “Pivot to Asia” policy has sought to reassure U.S. allies of its enduring political commitment and military presence in the region. Recent evidence of the Pivot includes a number of port visits by the U.S. navy to its allies (e.g. Manila in March 2016), some high profile arms sales (e.g. the $1.8 billion arms deal with Taiwan in December 2015), and even new force deployments to the region (e.g. the plans to deploy long-range bombers in Australia and to gain access to five military bases in Philippines). Second, the United States is developing new strategic partnerships in East Asia, which could become full-fledged U.S. allies in the future. Anxiety about China’s rise is leading a number of ASEAN member states—such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia—to increasingly look toward the United States for security. Together, Singapore and Malaysia represent a geostrategic pivot for exercising control over the Straits of Malacca and thus their entrance into the U.S. alliance system would represent a major constraint on Chinese power. Perhaps the most surprising of the United States’ new security relationships is with Vietnam. In a manner consistent with the realpolitik maxim that in international politics “there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests,” the diplomatic rapprochement and security dialogues between the United States and Vietnam demonstrates the extent to which Chinese revisionism is pushing China’s neighbors toward the United States. US unipolarity solves for alliances, economic prosperity, inclusive democracy, and stabilityQuah in 2016 (Danny, Professor of Economics and International Development, and Kuwait Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS, Chair of the LSE-PKU Summer School Board, Academic Director of LSE’s Executive Summer School, Director of Public Relations for the Economics Department, and Director of LSE’s Kuwait Research Programme; “An Economic Perspective on the International System: Demand, Supply, and a Rational World Order;” Global Policy, innovative and interdisciplinary journal; May 4, 2016; http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/04/05/2016/economic-perspective-international-system-demand-supply-and-rational-world-order) The later part of the 20th century is widely viewed to have had a unipolar world order organized around the US, the single most powerful nation on the planet—whether measured by economic size, military capability, or status as perceived in the eyes of the rest of the world. It was an unstoppable economic juggernaut. The US harnessed liberal democracy and free market economics to devastating success, bringing prosperity to the American people, and admiration from and hope for all others on the planet. Whenever it mattered, the US could take unilateral action, to benefit itself or its allies. Over the course of what became known as the American Century, the US crafted a world order that was transparent, inclusive, democratic, and rules-based. These features should be more than enough to justify a unipolar world order. But there was yet more to recommend this particular one. Charles Kindleberger, the great economic historian who studied the world economy during and after the Great Depression of the 1930s, reckoned that having a global leader such as the US helped secure economic prosperity for all the world. The US was a hegemon that provided stability and leadership and thus space for policy coordination across the multiplicity of nation states. This idea became known as hegemonic stability theory, and helped explain the need for a unipolar world order. First, when the US began its period of stewardship at the head of the world order, it was mindful of how it would serve the needs of the world. The compelling case for US hegemony was never one of sheer power alone, but of power in tandem with that to which power was applied. Henry Luce spoke powerfully of the US being “the Good Samaritan to the entire world”. . It is precisely because of the economic downturn, the threats posed by other great powers and rogue states, that this is the time for such a clarion call. This time needs to be capitalized on, to advance the real need for a renewed American commitment to space. The country that makes this commitment will be the country with a secure future. AlliancesAllies would go along with the CP- they fear a resurgent Chinese foreign policyRobert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis in 2015, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf Fifth, critics may also say that the United States’ Asian allies and friends will never go along with the grand strategy outlined in this document. This concern seems to concentrate not on the merits of our strategic approach, but rather on its reception in the region. In any case, what the allies want is not to cut ties with China, but rather increased U.S. capabilities in the region, increased reassurance of American protection, and increased U.S. support for their own economic growth and security. The grand strategy outlined in this report advances all of these objectives. Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate the current anxiety among virtually all Asian nations about the strategic implications of the rise of Chinese power, recent examples of PRC aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas, and the conviction that only the United States can successfully deter Beijing’s corrosive strategic ambitions. Because of PRC behavior, Asian states have already begun to balance against China through greater intra-Asian cooperation—actions that are entirely consistent with and only reinforce our U.S. grand strategy. Indeed, the worry across Asia today is not that the United States will pursue overly robust policies toward China; rather, it is that Washington is insufficiently aware of Beijing’s ultimate disruptive strategic goals in Asia, is periodically attracted to a G2 formula, and may not be up to the challenge of effectively dealing with the rise of China over the long term. These deeply worried views across Asian governments are fertile ground on which to plant a revised U.S. grand strategy toward China. Moreover, a close examination of the specific policy prescriptions in this study reveal few that would not be welcomed by the individual nations of Asia to which they apply. Although this major course correction by the United States toward China would not gain allied endorsement overnight, with sustained and resolute U.S. presidential leadership and the immense leverage the United States has with its Asian allies and friends, this is not too steep a strategic hill to climb, especially given the profound U.S. national interests at stake across Asia. Finally, nothing in this grand strategy requires the United States and its allies to diminish their current economic and political cooperation with China. Rather, the emphasis is on developing those U.S. and allied components that are ultimately necessary to make this cooperation sustainable. In other words, if the balance of power alters fundamentally, U.S. and Asian economic cooperation with China could not be maintained. US is containing and delaying china through econ and alliancesBlackburn 16 ( Calvin; Calvin graduated from the University of Puget Sound with a B.A. in Chinese Language and Culture, and has spent time in China and Taiwan. Interested in all things China, Calvin loves his dogs, politics, and strong cup of coffee. Calvin graduated from the University of Puget Sound with a B.A. in Chinese Language and Culture, and has spent time in China and Taiwan; New Predictions on American ‘Containment Through the Balance of Power’; 4/4/16; http://watchingamerica.com/WA/2016/04/04/new-predictions-on-american-containment-through-the-balance-of-power/” Currently, America’s plans for its strategic direction and deployments have already become quite clear, with the primary focus being on containing three strategic opponents and formulating the balance of power for three major geopolitical regions. The first is the balance of power between China and the Pacific region. China is a socialist country that has persistently rejected an American style system and American values, pursuing a road of modernization and national strengthening that is in line with its own national characteristics. Following 40 years of intense construction, China’s economy has already jumped to the number two spot worldwide, and is now approaching number one. Even though the Chinese government has repeatedly insisted that it has no intention of challenging America and will never pursue hegemony, China has nevertheless made America feel threatened, restless and very worried. In response, America has taken great pains and attacked the situation from two ends. The first approach is the relinquishment of restraints on Japan’s military affairs, inciting claimants to the South China Sea to make trouble. At the same time, America plots to string together nations such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and perhaps even Vietnam as a means of encircling and containing China’s North and Southeast Asian security systems. Additionally, America is supporting India as a way to balance China in the Southwest. Naturally, seeking to bring about these strategic goals will not be easy. The other means America uses are economic, sparing no effort to promote the Trans-Pacific Partnership, resolutely placing China outside of this group and plotting to delay China’s economic development. America’s wishful thinking is vested in a plan to use Asia’s power in response to China’s rise, with itself acting as a supporting force to its allies or as a biased intercessor as a means to realize the so-called “rebalance to Asia.” This move will manifest itself as the containment of China through the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. Solves CooperationCounterplan still solves cooperation over key issues- China will always work with the US when interests are at stake despite broader grand strategies to contain themRobert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis in 2015, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change, counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea, and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chinese leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition— would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of dominating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamental policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the rise of Chinese power. In any case, there is no reason why a China that did not seek to overturn the balance of power in Asia should object to the policy prescriptions contained in this report. And which of the policy prescriptions would those who wish to continue the current prevailing U.S. approach to China—that is, cooperation—reject? In short, these measures do not “treat China as an enemy” as some American analysts rightfully warn against; rather, they seek to protect vital U.S. and allied national interests, a reasonable and responsible objective. Washington simply cannot have it both ways—to accommodate Chinese concerns regarding U.S. power projection into Asia through “strategic reassurance” and at the same time to promote and defend U.S. vital national interests in this vast region. It is, of course, the second that must be at the core of a successful U.S. grand strategy toward China. In this same sense, there is no real prospect of building fundamental trust, “peaceful coexistence,” “mutual understanding,” a strategic partnership, or a “new type of major country relations” between the United States and China. Rather, the most that can be hoped for is caution and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China strategic competition becomes the new normal, and even that will be no easy task to achieve in the period ahead. The purpose of U.S. diplomacy in these dangerous circumstances is to mitigate and manage the severe inherent tensions between these two conflicting strategic paradigms, but it cannot hope to eliminate them. Former Australian Prime Minister and distinguished sinologist Kevin Rudd believes the Chinese may have come to the same conclusion: “There is emerging evidence to suggest that President Xi, now two years into his term, has begun to conclude that the long-term strategic divergences between U.S. and Chinese interests make it impossible to bring about any fundamental change in the relationship.”59 Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2014 2014 -> For want of a nail 2014 -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 2014 -> Ihbb asian Championships 2014 middle school bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> Ihbb european Championships 2014 Bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> International History Bee and Bowl 2013-14 Asian Division Question Set Bowl Round Six 2014 -> United states patent and trademark office 2014 -> Coffs harbour eisteddfod vocal syllabus 2014 -> Listen News Programs Schedule pledge now 2014 -> Slow club announce third album complete surrender Download 171.23 Kb. 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