**Containment cp text

SCS

Working with Vietnam

China is working with Vietnam to manage disputes in the South China Sea

HANOI—Vietnam and China agreed to boost cooperation between their coast guards and better manage territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The memorandum of understanding was signed Monday, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, during a visit to Hanoi by Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi. Mr. Yang’s visit comes ahead of a verdict by an international tribunal in The Hague on China’s claims in waters in the South China Sea. “The two sides agreed that there is a need to promote friendly and comprehensive cooperation,” the ministry said following a meeting between Mr. Yang and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh. The ministry said the two officials discussed maritime issues, stressing the importance of not letting disputes escalate. Vietnam also announced that it will allow China to open a consulate in the central coastal city of Da Nang.

Military Power

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Military power is key to contain china and channel their decisions- key to maintain heg

JOSHUA EISENMAN, senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council, 1/21/16, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China”, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756

Whether a conflict occurs, the argument goes, depends on whether China is dissatisfied with the prevailing international order, because as James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon have written: "only if it believes that it is disadvantaged will China necessarily choose to use its newfound power to create a world more to its own liking in potentially disruptive ways.1 Jeffery Bader, who served as a top White House official in the first Obama administration, agrees that “China could play a more constructive role than it would by sitting outside of that system.2 So the prevailing wisdom holds and the thinking behind engagement goes, if China participates extensively in the international system, then it will help create a system it likes and not become revisionist. According to Evan Medeiros, who stepped down in June 2015 after six years as a top White House official on China, the U.S. and China "agreed that we would develop our relationship defined by cooperation on regional and global challenges while affectively managing our differences.3 Medeiros explained in an interview with China's official CCTV how this policy sought to avoid what IR theorists call the Thucydides Trap: Beginning when President Obama met President Xi for the first time formally at Sunnylands... we agreed that we did not believe conflict was inevitable between China and the United States, a rising power and an established power, and we agreed that we would work to make sure that rivalry didn't become inevitable. So that's the basic framework for our relationship, and we think we've succeeded in accomplishing that in recent years.4 To help make Beijing more cooperative, Washington can shape its choices, according to Bader: Underlying our approach was a clear understanding that our political, security, and economic policies in Asia needed to be grounded in traditional state-to-state relations and a commitment to shaping the choices of emerging powers like China through our diplomacy and deployments.5 But how to shape China's choices? To establish "a modicum of trust between U.S. and Chinese leaders so that there could be political incentives for cooperation," Bader recalls that Obama's Asia team built a China strategy based on "three pillars," which can be considered the pillars of engagement:6 (1) a welcoming approach to China's emergence, influence, and legitimate expanded role; (2) resolve to see that its rise is consistent with international norms and law; (3) endeavor to shape the Asia-Pacific environment to ensure China's rise is stabilizing rather than disruptive.7 The goal, according to Steinberg and O'Hanlon, is to shape "China's interpretation of U.S. strategy" and its "leaders' assessments of U.S. intentions." They argue that: "Washington can craft its own policies in ways that will call forth reciprocal, positive Chinese actions.8 Chinese assessments range from “one extreme that the United States is determined to maintain its hegemonic position and resist China's rise. At the other, they accept the argument that the United States is prepared to 'share power.'"9 The chances to avoid hostilities can be improved if "U.S. policymakers can reinforce the domestic political forces in China that are likely to support constructive Chinese strategies." By empowering Chinese moderates U.S. policymakers will reduce the possibility that more hawkish leaders will push China toward aggression. Thus, by reiterating the U.S.' willingness to share power with China Washington can reduce the chances of conflict with Beijing. In practice, this engagement-based China strategy means that scores (if not hundreds) of U.S. policymakers in numerous government agencies correspond regularly with their Chinese counterparts across a wide breadth of issues. In September 2014, President Xi Jinping said there were over 90 official mechanisms for U.S.-China exchange.10 Questioning Engagement Now, however, a growing contingent in Washington and beyond is arguing that extensive U.S. engagement has failed to prevent China from threatening other countries. One longtime proponent of engagement with China, David M. Lampton, gave a speech in May 2015 entitled "A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us," in which he noted that, despite the remarkable "policy continuity" of "constructive engagement" through eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, "today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat."11 Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd summarized this view: “Beijing's long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.12 Similarly, in June, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said on PBS Newshour: "The longstanding consensus that China's rise is good for the U.S. is beginning to break down.13 In response to these misgivings about Beijing's intentions, there have been calls for Washington to actively shape China's strategic choices by enhancing U.S. military capabilities and strengthening alliances to counterbalance against its growing strength. Recent publications reflect increasing apprehension; most argue that policymakers must avoid an enduring "structural problem" in international relations that causes rising powers to become aggressive. Some experts, like Princeton's Aaron Friedberg, contend that the U.S. should "maintain a margin of military advantage sufficient to deter attempts at coercion or aggression.14 Thomas Christensen, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, noted in June, that there are two primary questions for U.S. security vis-à-vis China: How to dissuade China from using force in East Asia? How can we get China to actively contribute to stabilizing global governance? These initiatives, Christensen noted, are based on the assumption that "whenever a country becomes a rising power, tensions with neighbors arise.15 Christensen agrees with Bader that the U.S.' "strategic goal" vis-à-vis China is to "shape Beijing's choices so as to channel China's nationalist ambitions into cooperation rather than coercion." 16 To elicit Beijing's participation U.S. policymakers should “persuade China that bullying its neighbors will backfire, while proactive cooperation with those neighbors and the world's other great powers will accelerate China's return to great power status.17 The U.S. should build a robust deterrence architecture to counter-balance China's rise and push Beijing towards meaningful engagement, Christensen argues. The U.S. and its allies "need to maintain sufficient power and resolve in East Asia to deter Beijing from choosing a path of coercion or aggression.18 "Chinese anxiety about a U.S. containment effort could carry some benefits for the United States: the potential for encirclement may encourage Chinese strategists to become more accommodating," resulting in more "moderate policies." Both engagement supporters and deterrence supporters agree that the U.S. should change China's strategic calculus in ways that increase the benefits of cooperation and the costs of aggression; where they disagree is on how to achieve this.

Deterrence

Deterrence is valuable and a crucial objective against Chinese aggression

Brooks and Woolworth in 2016 (Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College; William C, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College; “The Once and Future Superpower;” Originally published in the May/June 2016 issue of Foreign Affairs Magazine; Tribune Content Agency, team of passionate editors, rights managers and technology experts providing quality content solutions for publishers around the globe; April 21, 2016; http://tribunecontentagency.com/article/the-once-and-future-superpower/)

For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military blocs. By adopting its own area-denial strategy, for example, the United States could still deter Chinese aggression and protect U.S. allies despite China’s rising military power. Unlike the much-discussed Air-Sea Battle doctrine for a Pacific conflict, this approach would not envision hostilities rapidly escalating to strikes on the Chinese mainland. Rather, it would be designed to curtail China’s ability during a conflict to operate within what is commonly known as "the first island chain," encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Although China can "pose problems without catching up," in the words of the political scientist Thomas Christensen, the bottom line is that the United States’ global position gives it room to maneuver. The key is to exploit the advantages of standing on the defensive: as a raft of strategic thinkers have pointed out, challenging a settled status quo is very hard to do.

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