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Perm

Congagment

Perm do both - Congagement – with emphasis on engagement – is successful and is welcomed by China


Jacques deLisle director of the Asia Program at FPRI and professor of law and political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Jan 2011 “The Elephant in the Room: Summitry and China’s Challenging Relations with Great Powers in Asia” http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-summitry-and-chinas-challenging-relations-with-great-powers-in-asia/

In the bilateral relationship more broadly, the U.S. policy sometimes described as "congagement" includes a large dose of engagement alongside the modest if growing and more Cold War-reminiscent elements of containment. Through building economic ties, supporting China’s integration into international organizations and the international order, and forging myriad channels of influence through educational, business, NGO and social connections, the U.S. has sought to further China’s transformation into a more benign and liberal system. Although Beijing chafes at such U.S. aims and endeavors as "peaceful evolution," Reform-Era China has moved notably (although far from fully) in the direction envisaged by proponents of engagement. Despite its complaints about American plots and their nefarious effects, the Chinese regime has found it worthwhile to tolerate, and even welcome, many of the activities that create entry points for ideas and ideals from the U.S. and other parts of the liberal-democratic and rule-of-law world.


Perm do both – congagement is the best option to integrate China


Bill Bishop MA in China Studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS and a BA from Middlebury College. 6-18-2015 https://sinocism.com/?p=11521

China has been embarked on a process of reform and modernization that has led to unprecedented economic development. The goal is to make China a developed country, which would, among other things, raise the standard of living and prepare the base for a strong military. The Chinese leadership considers good relations with the United States to be strongly advisable, if not absolutely necessary, but sovereignty concerns (especially with regard to Taiwan) could cause tensions in the Sino-U.S. relationship. China could emerge, by 2015, as a formidable power, one that might offer an alternative to the current U.S. role as the region’s preferred security partner and its ultimate security manager. At present, the best U.S. response appears to be a combination of engagement and containment, a congagement policy that would continue to try to bring China into the current international system while both preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to it and seeking to convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult and extremely risky to pursue.

Perm do both - “Congagement” – combining containment with emphasis on engagement is key to a laundry list including heg


Zalmay M. Khalilzad U.S. counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007 “The United States and a Rising China” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1082.pdf

The difficulties surrounding both containment and engagement raise the question of whether some type of combination of the two policies might be possible that would preserve some of the hope of the engagement policy while hedging against its possible inability to dis- courage China from challenging U.S. interests and objectives. Such a "third way" policy would continue to try to bring China into the cur- rent international system while both preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to it and seeking to convince the Chinese leadership that such a challenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky to pursue. The key to the success of such a policy would be keeping its elements in balance. It will need to minimize the negative effects on Chinese attitudes of steps taken to hedge against the possibility of future hostility. Many Chinese observers claim that the United States has already adopted a policy of containment toward China; it is hard to sort out to what extent this represents a true belief on their part and to what extent it is a tactic to put the United States on the psychological defensive. i.e.. to place on the United States the burden of prov- ing that it is not trying to contain China. Thus, determining the actual negative effect of any of these measures will be a difficult and uncertain process. In any case, this issue suggests the importance of paying attention to the way in which this policy is presented in public; the declaratory policies that go along with these steps may influence how they are perceived in China and how they affect the evolution of Chinese behavior. "Modified Engagement." This policy would continue a great deal ol the engagement policy. although modified in certain respects. In general. it would seek to enhance economic, political and cultural ties with China. In doing so, however, it would be less solicitous of Chinese sensitivities on such issues as human rights: for example. U.S. spokesmen would be more vigorous in criticizing Chinese practices., Without, however, suggesting that sanctions might be applied to change them. On these issues, U.S. policy would proceed from a recognition that. as President Clinton said of its attitude toward human rights and religious freedom, China is "on the wrong side of history" and will be, sooner or later, forced to make some accommodation to the demand for a freer system of government. A greater effort would be made to impose sanctions on specific Chinese companies that, for example, exported nuclear sensitive materials, violated U.S. export control laws, or otherwise thwarted major U.S. objectives. While the effectiveness of such a policy would be limited by an inability to understand all the interconnections and from companies involved, it might be possible, on at least some occasions, to impose real costs on Chinese corporations and individuals, which might lead to more careful behavior. Strengthening Ties to Regional Countries. The United States would seek to strengthen its ties to the East Asian nations (including coun- tries, like Russia, that are panly in the region), as well as to improve relations among them. The goal should be to prepare the way for closer security ties between the United States and states in the region, as well as for multilateral security arrangements, should they become necessary in the future. The underlying, but unstated, rationale of this activity would be to emphasize to China the costs of and thereby deter any Chinese attempt at seeking regional hegemony. Such a policy would have many elements, among which might be 1. Attempts to enhance military-to-military relations between Japan and South Korea. Efforts could include various "confidence- building measures." such as more transparency in their respective defense plans. 2. Attempts to enhance political-military cooperation among the ASEAN states. In particular. they should be encouraged to approach the issue of their overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea in a multilateral context that includes China; however, a Chinese refusal to engage multilater- ally should not prevent the other states from pursuing the issue among themselves. 3. Encouragement of a Japanese-Russian rapprochement, including a settlement of the dispute over the "northern territories." 4. Enhanced military-to-military cooperation between the United and the ASEAN states.

Congagement Smart

US strategy of containment and engagement is smart – creates a partnership that can solve the world’s problems


Wang in 2016 (Helen H, award-winning author and expert on China’s middle class; “America's Smart Congagement In Asia Pacific;” Forbes Foreign Affairs; April 29, 2016; http://www.forbes.com/sites/helenwang/2016/04/29/americas-smart-congagement-in-asia-pacific/#524c424624fd)

Mr. Russel began the talk by saying that the relationship between the U.S. and the Asia Pacific “has changed in a big way” in the last seven years. President Obama is determined to use diplomacy to advance American interests in the region. America recognizes that its future is critically linked to that part of the world. “High standards produce economic dynamism,” Russel said. “And the U.S. is at the center, re-enforcing our leadership.” “They are universal values. When we stand for these values, we make a lot of friends. We are the choice of security partner for many of these Asian countries.” Mr. Russel made a point to say that the “rebalance” is not about containing China. “During the Cold War,” Russel said, “we had a containment strategy. But [now] we are not pursuing a zero-sum game.” Russel pointed to the fact that the U.S. has engaged in high-level military-to-military dialogues routinely with China. And China has joined forces with the U.S. to fight climate change. In 2014, he said, President Xi Jinping and President Obama reached an agreement to curb carbon emissions. It was the first time China committed to cap its emissions, by 2030 if not earlier. From the American perspective, the U.S. is trying to set up rules and institutions in Asia Pacific so that no one country can exert its sphere of influence or bully other nations because of its sheer size. Obviously, much of this is directed toward China and to prevent China from challenging the existing international status quo. It may not be “containment” in its pure form, but it is a variation of containment with engagement, or a “smart congagement.” This strategy certainly has its risks, as we have seen tensions in the South China Sea and a deterioration in the US-China relationship in recent years. However, if it succeeds, it may create conditions for the U.S. and China to cooperate and work together to solve many of the world’s problems. As President Obama told Jeffery Goldberg of the Atlantic, “If we get that right and China continues on a peaceful rise, then we have a partner that is growing in capability and sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an international order.”


Creating a balancing between limiting and interacting with China is key


Blackwill and Tellis in 2015 (Robert D, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ashley J, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues; “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China;” Council on Foreign Relations Council Special Report No. 72; March 2015; http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf)

What flows from this assessment is nothing less than a call on their part for “a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.” The two authors acknowledge that this new policy “cannot be built on a bedrock of containment”; they also say that policymakers cannot simply jettison the prevailing policy of integration. But they do advocate what they describe as “crucial changes to the current policy in order to limit the dangers that China’s economic and military expansion pose to U.S. interests in Asia and globally.” Stated somewhat differently, the authors recommend a new U.S. policy of balancing China that would in effect change the balance of current U.S. policy, in the process placing less emphasis on support and cooperation and more on pressure and competition. There would be less hedging and more active countering. These changes, which constitute the heart of an alternative balancing strategy, must derive from the clear recognition that preserving U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of U.S. grand strategy in the twenty-first century. Sustaining this status in the face of rising Chinese power requires, among other things, revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict “high-leverage strategic harm” on the United States and its partners; concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China’s periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition—all while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests The necessity for such a balancing strategy that deliberately incorporates elements that limit China’s capacity to misuse its growing power, even as the United States and its allies continue to interact with China diplomatically and economically, is driven by the likelihood that a long-term strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington is high.


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