**Containment cp text


A containment strategy with China is needed to bring global warming under control



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Warming

A containment strategy with China is needed to bring global warming under control


Ajemian and Reid in 2010 (Chris K, Associate with Albers Center for Global Business; David McHardy, Professor of Global Business Strategy and Director Albers Center of Global Business; “Preventing Global Warming: The United States, China, and Intellectual Property;” Business Ethics at Bentley University; 2010; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228148011_Preventing_Global_Warming_The_United_States_China_and_Intellectual_Property)

Concerns of intellectual property infringement in China slow the dissemination of clean technology (Cleantech) innovation that could help bring the pace of global warming under control. We use the U.S. post-World War2 policy decisions with respect to Japan and Europe (the Marshall Plan) to show how this problem can be addressed. To date, much Cleantech innovation within U.S. industry and laboratories has yet to be commercially deployed in China over concerns of intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement. The use and promulgation of Cleantech IPR is a necessary part of any plan to contain runaway global warming, destructive energy competition, and increased geopolitical friction between the world’s largest economies. China, now denoting Cleantech and renewable energy as a strategic industry, is trying hard to make sure that its companies dominate globally. This means China’s industrialization is playing a determining role in global warming. An emergent consensus holds that environmental degradation constitutes a traditional security risk (Diamond 2004; Levy1995). Though many commentators use “security” to inflate issues to attract attention (Homer-Dixon 1995), the mere definition of a phenomenon as a security risk as opposed to some other category can, at least in the American context, mobilize action (Levy 1995). We argue that a strategy equal to the political and technological challenge of bringing global warming under control can be based in part on the strategy deployed in the Cold War. Cleantech IPR, we maintain, should be dispersed on favorable terms to accelerate the infrastructural investments necessary to rapidly limit the expansion of greenhouse gases in China and the United States. There is a perception in the United States that doing business in China puts intellectual property at risk. Loss of IPR is one of the major risks companies can expect to meet while doing business in a global economy, especially in locales such as China, where there is less developed respect for IPR law (Mertha 2005). The main threat facing the world currently is not the annihilation of human existence by nuclear weapons as in the Cold War, but a slower snuffing out of life by runaway levels of human-generatedCO2. Recognizing that China and the United States are facing the same fate climatologically is powerful incentive to create a political initiative on the scale of the Cold War containment strategy.

A2: Perms

Congagement is unsustainable for long periods of time – the more coherent strategy to confront China is throught containment


Pascal vander Straeten management consultant University of Washington, Michael G. Foster School of Business 11-11-2014 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141111222826-4628733-the-west-s-current-china-congagement-strategy-is-doomed?trk=pulse-det-nav_art

Some Western policymakers apparently believe they can simultaneously weave a web of containment around China’s power while concomitantly still enjoy an economic relationship with Beijing worth hundreds of billions of dollars annually. A stellar example is the coming signature between Australia and China of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) aimed at further engaging the two countries economically speaking while at the same time Canberra is reinforcing (rightfully so) its defense systems (through investments in additional military assets as well as by allowing the deployment of U.S. forces on its territory) to contain a bullying China. Even Japan, aware that it cannot let pass the Chinese economic locomotive, is trying to re-mend the ties with Beijing (recent off-grid discussions at the APEC summit) while at the same time Tokyo is allocating increasing government resources to the strengthening of its military assets. That approach is best captured by the term “congagement”—a blend of containment and engagement—that became popular in foreign policy circles a decade ago. It was a clever term, but at heart it was, and remains, little more than a gooey ambivalence. The West's policy (whether the U.S., Australia, and/or even Europe as well as Japan) toward China is either a clumsy attempt at deception or an extraordinary case of self-deception. Even if they do not want to acknowledge it publicly, the Western countries have steadily built the components of a containment policy directed against Beijing, while steadfastly denying that it is pursuing any such policy. For instance, both Washington as well as Canberra have worked assiduously to strengthen and update their Cold War-era alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and to forge new security partnerships with countries such as Vietnam and India that previously had rocky relationships with these two countries. All of these Western moves have a common denominator: they involve significant security ties with countries that are hostile to China or at least worry greatly about the growth of Chinese power in East Asia. Yet Western leaders seem reluctant to face either the logic or probable consequences of the policy they are pursuing. This is perfectly illustrated by the arrangements to station 2,500 U.S. Marines in Australia where concomitantly Washington and Canberra are attempting to reassure the Chinese that the move is not directed in any way against their country and that China is actually welcomed as a “cooperative partner” in security affairs. Chinese leaders are likely regarding that assurance with the same skepticism that they are viewing official U.S. and Australian statements contending that Washington and Canberra remain neutral regarding the substance of Beijing’s dispute with Tokyo over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or the equally acrimonious feuds between China and its neighbors over the South China Sea. In both cases, U.S. and Australian actions belie protestations of impartiality. But this game of cat and mouse needs to stop, and Western leaders need to confront the reality - particularly now that Russia and China are forming a new axis - unpalatable though it might be, that their current strategy is not only internally contradictory, it is unsustainable over the long term. Given the emerging strategic developments in the Western Pacific and East Asia (China’s rising power combined with growing hostility and resistance to that power by the United States and Beijing’s neighbors), Western countries will have to adopt a more coherent approach in the relatively near future. That requirement means choosing among three rather stark options ranging from accepting pre-eminence to overt containment policy. Each one has major advantages and disadvantages. Many geostrategists are tempted by either having the West accepting - according to them the inevitable - the establishment of a Pax Sineca in Asia, or at least a balance of power in the region. While others, a minority, defy the rhetorics and prefer to play the open card of overt containment. Given that history is still a reminder for many amongst us, the mere suggestion of acknowledging China’s regional pre-eminence, though, provokes allegations of “appeasement.” Unfortunately, that term always evokes images of the feckless conduct of Britain and France toward Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. A Chinese version of the Monroe doctrine in East Asia is in the minds of these proponents and this appeasement policy would be based on mutual trust. However, such a result is far from certain as the political regimes of Western countries compared to the one of China are viscerally different. Another way to engage China would be through a regional balance of power. But fostering the development of an independent regional balance of power also has some drawbacks. It would require the United States to relinquish the security role it has played for nearly seven decades. And there is no guarantee that adopting a lower U.S. security profile in East Asia would produce the outcome we desire. The emergence of multiple well-armed powers could create greater instability in the region. Finally, a third and more coherent approach, would be to embrace an overt containment policy (that would also confront Russia). The benefits of this doctrine is that this approach would acknowledge and intensify the policy that the West has been pursuing unofficially for years. If the United States and Australia were successful in enlisting the substantive support of Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and other important geopolitical actors in the region, an overt containment strategy would have a high probability of constraining Beijing’s power for several decades. In essence, the West would replicate the successful policy that it used against an expansionist Soviet Union during the Cold War. Granted, a key reason why Western administrations were able to implement such an approach, though, was that the Western countries had meager economic links to the USSR. That is clearly not the case concerning bilateral ties with China. Not only is that country a major trading partner to the West, but in the specific case of the United States, China holds some $1.3 trillion in U.S. government debt. A blatant containment policy would put those relationships at risk. Not unimportantly, a related problem is that most potential partners for Washington in an anti-China containment strategy also have crucial economic ties to Beijing. Again, the contrast with the Cold War environment is striking. At least until well into the 1970s, major U.S. allies had minimal trade and other commercial relations with the Soviets. And even after that period, their economic stakes were not sufficiently large to cause them to defy Washington’s wishes on important security issues. U.S. leaders would find it challenging, to say the least, to gain support from countries that have lucrative economic ties with China for a hardline, long-term containment policy directed against that country. One point is increasingly apparent, however. Clear policy choices, even if painful, need to be made, and in the West we all know to what this Chinese expansion will lead ultimately (unless in the mean time China's house of cards is falling apart - not impossible at all). Indeed, as China’s power grows, it will become more and more difficult for the West to continue its strategy of trying to enjoy the fruits of all possible approaches to dealing with that country - particularly as Moscow is building deeper geostrategical ties with Beijing. Congagement was always an ephemeral evasion rather than a coherent policy, and its days grow increasingly short. But for that we need Western statesmen that have a vision and a geopolitical vision ... Where are you?

Containment and engagement is hopeless – makes China more powerful and relies solely on faith


Logan in 2013 (Justin, Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; “The Contradictions of US China Policy;” Cato, adapted from the author’s Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 717, China, America, and the Pivot to Asia; January 8, 2013; http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/logan-asia-pacific-century-2013.pdf)

US policy toward China suffers from two fatal errors of internal logic and is unlikely to produce the desired ends of policy makers. First, congagement, the combination of economic engagement and military containment, relies on a hopeless contradiction: it makes China more relatively powerful while seeking to ensure it acts as though it is weak. Second, reassuring US allies guarantees that the American taxpayer will continue funding the defense of states rich enough to defend themselves, forcing the United States to bear the burden as the balancer of first resort. At bottom, congagement relies on extraordinary faith in the idea that economic engagement and pleas for reform will transform China’s political system and/or that the existence of international institutions will limit its international ambitions. If the congagement advocates have the courage of their convictions, they should explain why they believe both that (a) economic growth will necessarily lead to democratization, and (b) democratization will necessarily lead either to a China that is at peace with American military hegemony in Asia or a China whose security interests will become identical with Beyond the dubious logic of congagement, the second problem with American strategy is that the policy of continually reassuring America’s allies has ensured that a disproportionate share of the cost of hedging against China will need to be borne by the American taxpayers and their creditors. Instead of urging states in China’s region to defend themselves, Washington reassures these states that America is committed to act as the balancer of first resort. This generates free riding and increases the costs to the United States. As University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer points out, geography and distribution of power are crucial factors that determine when states should balance against a potential threat or pass the buck to states closer to trouble.15 In the current context, both geography and the distribution of power should allow Washington to pass the buck for balancing against China to other countries in the region. This chapter argues that the Beltway foreign-policy establishment has flawed views on the rise of China and US China policy. That perception produces an inherently counterproductive policy: congagement. The flaws of congagement are coupled with the problem created by reassurance: free riding. In addition to shining a light on those misguided policies, this discussion suggests that questions remain about the future implications of demographic and economic change in the region, the impact of those changes on the ability and willingness of nations there to balance Chinese power, and the likely results of their doing so. The Pentagon’s plan to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific will likely exacerbate those policy woes. The contradictions of congagement present the military with an unenviable task: consider China the primary adversary of the United States while the rest of the government encourages and enriches that adversary through trade and the financing of debt. Furthermore, due to continual American reassurance, our allies may struggle to perform as reliable partners in a future conflict, much as NATO countries did in Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya.


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