Control of Speech in Japan and Germany Censorship under the American Occupation

Censorship in Germany

During the first days of the occupation, military officers of the Allies suspended the German presses, radio stations, and film studios. Allied personnel rigidly regulated the media in their zones and initially forbade German use of these communication tools. All four powers, the U.S., the U.K., France, and the Soviet Union, set out to reorganize the media and denazify media figures.

At the outset, the media were regulated closely on a zonal basis, since the dissonant ideological agendas and scheme of nation rebuilding were disputed among the four powers. Yet, by 1946 the transformation in the political situation stimulated the U.S. and the U.K. to accelerate to establish a more robust economic relationship between their respective zones. The Bizonia was created in July 1947, and in the following months, ICD officials worked with their British counterparts to create a new structure that could jointly formulate a common film policy and execute it identically.²⁰²

The radio programs were less striking than those broadcasted by the Russians from Berlin, but they were certainly less inaccurate and propagandistic.²⁰³ A rather cautious policy was adopted in the entertainment field. Movies and theatres were not permitted to operate in the American Zone for several months after V-E Day, in contrast to the Russians which had authorized such entertainment almost immediately.²⁰⁴.

Nevertheless, even by the winter of 1945, ICD had not acquired any specific instructions regarding American policy in Germany. The former press officer in Bavaria complained to General John H. Hilldring, chief of the Civil Affairs Division in the War Department in Washington, that any success by ICD was being “jeopardized by lack of adequate personnel and policy in Washington.” Within the framework of the American military government, likewise, information policy varied considerably. The chief of the Publishing Operations Branch (POB), Hans Habe, took it upon himself to presume that he could issue a “far better newspaper” than inexperienced antifascist German editors.²⁰⁵

Notwithstanding, the OMGUS activity developed gradually. American activities in this regard began almost immediately after the war. As Robert McClure, chief of ICD, wrote to his friends in July 1946:

At the end of 1948, in the U.S. zone there were 62 licensed newspapers, in the British zone there were 45 newspapers, in the French zone more than 25 newspapers, and in the Soviet zone 25 newspapers. So all together in mid-1948, there were about 860 newspapers in Germany (see Table 4). In 1932, Germany had 4,700 newspapers but the number of newspapers declined sharply. At the turn of the year of 1945, the number had declined to 970. In the early stage, the majority of license holders were former émigré or people removed from the press and publishing during the Nazi period.

Table 4: Newspaper Licensed Granted in the U.S. Zone, 1945-1948.²⁰⁷

1. A Case of German “Self-Censorship”

Moreover, American control of procurement also brought about self-censorship. Procurement was possible only through OMGUS and the press officers. The press officers, who were journalists as well, were supposed to supply the technical facilities for the new newspapers, because “the licensee had almost nothing – no space, no machinery, no paper, no personnel for the editorial offices, composing or press rooms, advertising and business offices, and above all no money.” The press officers also controlled the establishment and allocation of paper supplies. OMGUS treated newspapers preferentially, in regards to paper supply, in contrast to book printers and other industries that also relied on paper.

Germany had a prominent example of self-censorship in other ways too. In July 1946, the former UFA producer Erich Pommer, a German émigré-turned-American-citizen, was installed as the chief of the Motion Pictures Branch (MPB) of ICD.²¹⁰ He thought about seriously how to democratize and attempted to protect German film industry from the economic pressure of the Hollywood movie industry. He considered that a native film product was essential for the reeducation of Germans.²¹¹

In March 1947 at an Allied meeting, American officials suggested making void all censorship legislation of the German Reich, and then exploring “the possibility of substituting self-censorship by the German film industry for censorship by the government. Pommel thus proposed a draft of regulations for self-censorship on the basis of American-style industry self-censorship. This proposal was important because it brought different positions/views into sharp relief and contrast.²¹²

An incredible number of meetings were held between the groups concerned so that compromise could take place.²¹³ By February 1949, a proposed industry self-censorship code was agreed upon by the German producers, MPB, the British and French military governments, and the state ministers of culture in the three Western zones.²¹⁴ In May 1949, the Basic Law was promulgated and 7 September the Federal Republic was created, when Military Government authority withdrew. Walter Keim, a high official of the Bavarian Cultural Ministry, named the series of negotiation an “experiment” in the “democratic self-administration of a great cultural area.”²¹⁵

3. The Difference of Continuity between Japan and Germany

Table 5: The Number of Newspaper Company and Magazines allowed to Publish.

In the American zone of Germany, the conflict between the licensed press and OMGUS was much less than that in Japan, because individual licensees in Germany were selected to make sure their ideas were in line with occupation policy. This does not mean, however, that German journalists simply prostrated themselves before the press code; they were able to often express their complaints to the OMGUS officers.

This leads to the question of whether Japanese journalists really could not complain about the suppression or whether they just kept quiet with their intention. During the occupation period, the organizing of the media/information by national newspapers proceeded swiftly for both ideological and commercial reasons. This was done primarily through the press clubs and by grouping/consolidating news companies through the power of bureaucrats and GHQ. Even when SCAP did lift its pre-publication censorship on major newspapers, the mass media did pretty much follow the policies of GHQ, just as the latter had hoped. All of this has led to a climate of self-censorship and mutual watching which has survived up through the present day.

In addition, Yamamoto estimates the number of Japanese who worked for GHQ as approximately from 20,000 to 30,000. Many of these were involved directly with American censorship. Although Etō asserts that ordinary Japanese people believed American propaganda, because they did not know the existence of the censorship per se, we have seen that this was not necessarily the case.

6. The Crossroads of Democratization Process and Freedom of Speech

In this chapter, I will examine what happened in the spot where the democratization process and information control came to cross-purposes, by analyzing the several examples of democratization and the control of information. I will focus on the Japanese situation, by utilizing the German cases to present a contrast.

1. Criticism of the Authorities

   1. SCAP/ the Allies and Japanese Government

In the course of time, censorship grew from a minimum level into a maximum, which meant protection from any critical words. For instance, among those banned: criticism of other Allies, references to racial prejudice toward people of color by the Allies, descriptions of the Soviet Union as socialistic, the U.S. and the U.K. as capitalistic, and China as semi colonial.²¹⁷ Censorship and purification extended not only to current international or domestic events, but as well to events of the past.²¹⁸

Yet, it was the preservation of MacArthur’s image that was the most meaningful task of CCD and CIE. GHQ deliberately directed the myth of MacArthur as a great leader.²¹⁹ The press could not criticize MacArthur but could not praise him too much either. Since such kinds of criticism were checked precisely, “the censors’ files contain more than a little that borders on the ridiculous.”²²⁰

Apparently, these deletions were beyond the reasonable excuse of censoring for the security of the American soldiers; censorship went so far as to beautify the presence of the Allies. Even criticism against the Japanese government had become restricted because the Japanese press began to blame GHQ policies through satires on Japanese policies. The Cartoonist Kon Shimizu observed that cartoonists, including himself, did not really produce “political cartoons,” but rather “cartoons about the political world.”²²¹ This statement reminds me that in the present day major national newspapers do not report “politics or policies,” but rather “the factious fight among the politicians, as referred to in 1.1.

The emperor was not formally off limits to satire. Although GHQ had an intention to utilize the Emperor as an instrument of propaganda, even small references to the Emperor in reports of the Tokyo Tribunal were carefully removed, and after 1947, even mild satire of the Emperor disappeared. Since GHQ decided to keep the status of the Shōwa Emperor, it became even more imperative that no one expresses negative opinions of the Emperor. Such articles were ordered to delete by GHQ because they violated the press code, despite the fact that there were in fact no press code or key logs for limiting expression of the emperor. GHQ’s logic was that such expressions against the Emperor criticized GHQ policies, because GHQ was the one who made the decision to keep the Emperor.²²²

This policy then also protected the Japanese conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and the Emperor himself. Namely, protecting the Emperor system securely meant that GHQ would not allow any attack or attempt of formulating the old authorities of Japan.

2. Criticism of Power in Germany

Also, some conservative politicians in the Bavarian government persistently tried to impede the spread of freedom of the press and films in Germany. However, OMGUS perseveringly negotiated with them to protect the freedom. Finally, many German-owned newspaper began to combine traditional German forms of press expression with more Anglo-American press styles.²²³

2. Making a Constitution

   1. Who made the Japanese Constitution?

Although it is now well known that MacArthur’s staff originally drafted the constitution of Japan in only nine days, at the time of creation of the constitution ordinary people were not informed who actually wrote the draft because of key logs which contained this information were not made public, even to the Japanese media (see Appendix 3: key logs no.3.).²²⁴

It was a fact that the ordinary Japanese people even after the war were “the emperor’s subjects [and] after all had never had been entirely free to express their views and did not at that time possess the right to choose their form of government.”²²⁵ However, does it mean that “all” Japanese give up their right to know everything about the new constitution that they had to embrace?

On August 2 1947, the Education Ministry published the textbook, A Story of the New Constitution, for first year junior high school students. Naturally, it was edited under GHQ supervision. This textbook has been highly praised as a good introduction to the new constitution’s philosophy of democracy. Yet, by the end of the occupation the Ministry of Education had become more conservative.²²⁶ Although many critics deplore the transformation of the officials in the Ministry of Education, at the time it does not mean that the Ministry obeyed GHQ in a one-sided way.

Satoru Itō, a Japanese history researcher, insists that officials of the Ministry of Education successfully interpreted the articles of the new constitution “imperially,” by his analysis of the textbook with several academic and political essays and some speeches of politicians.²²⁷

The Ministry of Education did not deceive GHQ, nor did GHQ ultimately impose their own will on the editing of A Story of the New Constitution. The maintenance of the status of the Emperor was in the interests of the United States, the elites of the old regimes of Japan, and ordinary people.²²⁸ Thus, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Education planted this interpretation in the postwar people as well. Dower termed the new democracy made by the new constitution “Imperial Democracy.”²²⁹

Even though the majority of Japanese opinion supported the Emperor, it was also a fact that several Japanese pressed about the war responsibility of the Showa Emperor. These voices did not, however, appear in the newspapers, even if the Communist party insisted to abolish the emperor system in the Diet.²³⁰

Was there, then, no opportunity to represent dissenting opinion about the draft of the constitution? Some teachers in Aichi prefecture read the draft of the constitution and revised it themselves, sending this new draft back to the Ministry of Education, which was approved.

We might also ask, conversely, whether well known Article 9, which declared that Japan would renounce war as an instrument of the state, was really supported by ordinary Japanese. Opinion Polls taken by the Nagasue Opinion Poll Institute in 1946 show that 73 % of respondents answered that if foreign countries attack Japan, Japan should fight back.²³¹ This sentiment could not make its way into the decision making process of the new constitution, however.

But it can also be said that if each had the will to engage in politics, it was indeed possible to effect change, even though issues were debated among the small cadre of bureaucrats, some powerful politicians and GHQ, with no active debate or amendments in the Diet.²³²

The constitution has indeed remained controversial in Japan up to the present day. It has produced tangled confusion and division in Japanese society: conservatives have condemned this constitution as an “American imposed Constitution” which was designed to fit American foreign policy and economic relations. On the other hand, the left wing admires Article 9 and even labels the entire document “Peace Constitution” of Japan, while intensely criticizing current American foreign policy, noted above. What produced such conditions in Japanese society?

2. Making Basic Law in Germany

In 1948, Lucius Clay maintained it better for the Germans to come up with their own recommendations on a new constitution. He ordered the assembled minister-presidents of the western part of Germany to call a constituent assembly by 1 September. Afterwards, the Allies authorities and the German minister-presidents discussed and negotiated the issue. Finally, the Germans decided not to call a constituent assembly, or a national referendum.²³⁴ In addition, they denied calling it a “constitution,” choosing instead to call it Grundgesetz (Basis Law). Naturally, they discussed offers of the Allies about the contents and many compromises were reached.²³⁵

When the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany was Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949, occupation involvement in the German politics ended, except at the very top levels of decision-making.²³⁶ It did take a number of years to achieve a compromise among politicians of the central and local government and OMGUS.

For many Japanese scholars, such as Hideo Ōtake, judges Adenauer’s contribution was enormous and had no real counterpart in the Japanese case.

3. Labor Movement

   1. Labor Movement, Communism, and Censorship in Japan

On the other hand, GHQ had strengthened its anti-communism stance and was beginning to suppress these people’s movements. Simultaneously, the American military decided to offer a large quantity of flour to feed Japanese people to help secure society just at the time that the conservative Yoshida government came in, on 22 May 1946.²³⁷

During the latter half in 1946, against the background of the unprecedented inflation and shortage of food, some nation-wide labor unions were established and shook the Yoshida government, which rejected every claim of the labor unions. In the beginning of 1947, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida called those laborers “malcontents,” something that provoked them even more. The general labor unions banded together and decided on a general strike for 1 February. However, MacArthur issued an order to prohibit the general strike at 2:30 pm on 31 January as the highest instruction of SCAP.

At the time, the leader of the labor union of government and public officers, Yashirō Ii was brought by an American jeep to the radio station. He was forced to make an announcement to all laborers to stop the strike via NHK radio. He started with this statement:

This was an epoch-making affair. People, especially progressives, knew that the society had not changed much after all from the wartime era. Likewise, on 22 July 1948, MacArthur ordered the Ashida government to revise the National Public Service Law prohibiting strikes by public servants; this was approved on 30 November. Due to this law, Japanese government officers have had strongly limited freedom of organization and expression, even though then, as now, public sector workers were one important center of the labor movement. This early postwar amendment affected subsequent labor movements and the freedom of expression of government officers.²³⁹ The amendment was along with the intention of the Japanese government.

2. Arbitrary Execution of Censorship to the Communists

GHQ continued suppressions of Akahata and the Communist Party from the end of 1948. Early in 1949, the Japanese government, with SCAP’s concurrence, cut the rationed allotment of newsprint to official Communist publication from 86,000 to 20,000 pounds per month.²⁴⁶ Akahata itself was the only place searched by the Japanese Police under the supervision by GHQ, but Akahata was deliberately keeping the press code and GHQ could not punish it. Major national papers were spared in house-searches, and actually helped the authorities by spreading the image of the Communist Party as illegal and shadowy.²⁴⁷

By 1950, this Red Purge spilled over into many fields of activity, and swept through newspapers, public radio NHK, as well as the publishing and filmmaking industry. GHQ purged the leaders of Akahata and the Communist Party, and was suspended for on 26 June, one day after the outbreak the Korean War, for an indefinite period. During the next three weeks, 700 leftist or communist newspapers were forced to discontinue. As a result of this series of suppression, not only non-communist readers but also members of the Communist Party began to accept this treatment as inevitable; surprisingly, American journalists did not pay attention this suppression.²⁴⁸

American implementation of censorship policy on the labor movement and progressive or Marxist reformists' movement showed people who wanted a democratic reformation that American occupation was very arbitrary, American slogan of democracy and freedom was ostensible. As same as, silent majority received a message that it was highly risky to express a political opinion.²⁴⁹

3. Negotiations and Compromise in Germany

In the end, however, she concludes that the labor union movement was a successful case of transmitting the American model. She describes the long-time negotiations and discussions in many conferences on diverse levels among the American authorities and the Germans.²⁵¹

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