Control of Speech in Japan and Germany Censorship under the American Occupation

Security Treaty and Rearmament

1. Secret Decision in Japan

Before the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, there were many arguments among politicians, academic scholars, and communists or leftists. Although some magazines gave space to these debates, the national large newspapers printed only the opinions that went in the same direction as the government.²⁵²

In addition, only a few ministers and the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew the existence of the negotiations for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which was signed on the same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Only the Prime Minister Yoshida attended the ceremony to sign the treaty in San Francisco.

There was censorship or punishment of those who went against this. An editor who printed arguments against the Japanese government’s concluding a peace treaty without the Soviet Union was sanctioned. Another who opposed the continuing stationing of the American bases in Japan were vilified as ‘red’ from major newspapers and NHK.²⁵³ The theme of bases in Japan was not taken up even after the occupation because most journalists were indifferent of the everyday life of the local people around the bases, and the rest of people did not know the existence of these problems.

“For all their talk of democracy, the conquerors worked hard to engineer consensus; and on many critical issues, they made clear that the better part of political wisdom was silence and conformism.”²⁵⁴ The Japanese politicians and the mass media joined the American side.

2. Negotiation and Compromise in West Germany

Adenauer struggled to persuade the German people who still were getting weary of war, by taking high risk in his political life. It took him four more years to solve problems to achieve the goal, and eventually in 1953 he got more than two-thirds of the Congress that were necessary to amend the Basic Law. In parallel, he negotiated with international opinion that had still feared a revival of the strong military state of Germany to assure the world that it would never again pose a threat.

As we have seen, in Germany, Adenauer harshly struggled to gain the consent of the Diet and ordinary people about security issues. He survived intense debate and achieved the compromise in the end.

5. Difference of the Relationship between the Political Leaders

Both were in charge of their countries during very difficult periods after the occupation and both leaders were often called liberal. The contents of their liberalism were different: Shigeru Yoshida, who served as prime minister in 1946-1947, and again from 1948 to 1954, was called a liberalist. Nevertheless, his liberalism was applied to only the economic sphere; his political thought was aristocratic and elitist.²⁵⁷ He disparaged the possibility of making Japan democratic, saying, “the Japanese people were not capable of genuine self-government and anyone who argued otherwise was either blinded by ethnocentrism or hypnotized by left-wing propaganda.”²⁵⁸

On the other hand, ex-Weimar Bonn mayor Adenauer was also called liberalist and it was applied to both politics and economy. He emphasized the influence of liberal economy on political freedom. He asserted, “Centralizing of both political and economical power in the form of the state should not interfere with the freedom of the individual in economics.

Both Yoshida and Adenauer blamed the ills of society on socialism or communism, though for different reasons. Adenauer argued that forms of national socialism by the Nazis, communism in the Soviet Union, or social democracy in the SPD would in fact paralyze individual free initiative and lead to the rule of the masses by a select few. According to political scientist Hideo Ōtake, however, Yoshida did not have such virulent views toward communism and his concern with economic freedom and critique of socialism was based upon his interest in economic efficiency.²⁵⁹

Both leaders also doubted public opinion and denied the idea of direct democracy. For instance, Adenauer forced an unpopular foreign policy of re-armament on the public and ignored the majority opinion in the beginning of the 1950s. He asserted, “Judgments of the propriety of each policy should not be left directly to people,” but as I mentioned above, he attained agreement with the parliament. However, Yoshida was even more critical than Adenauer of public opinion and his method of parliament governance did not perceive public opinion important but instead as something to be manipulated so that he might survive factional politics, resist GHQ and maintain his secrete diplomacy.²⁶⁰

These differences of individual character in the leaders of Japan and West Germany affected the methods of formulating the relationship between power and the media and were aggravated by inconsistencies in American policy. Adenauer liberalism and Clay’s or OMGUS indecisive attitude were consonant with each other, while Yoshida’s aristocratic nature supported MacArthur and Willoughby’s desire for controlling media.

6. Lessons from the Cases of meeting of Democratization and Control of Information

Major national newspapers and radio colluded with the Japanese governments and the American authorities. That is, GHQ, the Japanese government, and the Japanese mass media interacted with each other, and the mass media thus never become a power to criticize the political authority.

This was a contrast to the German case. Germans could read a lot of criticism and bilateral arguments in newspapers. People perceived specific distance between the mass media and the state power. In addition, the German government used much energy for debating, negotiating, and compromising not only with the American officials, but also with the German Parliament and its people.

7. Causes of the Suppression of Freedom of Speech Society

Table 6: Censorship of Freedom of Speech Society <1. Conflict inside Americans>

From Table 7, seemingly, the American censorship in a narrow meaning was very strong in Japan, because it was accompanied pre-censorship for major newspapers and radio, while from the beginning post-censorship for all media in Germany. However, in the American zone of Germany, every applicant was investigated severely, and only those who were verified for non-Nazis were licensed. It took long time for the investigation, and the number of journalists increased slowly. In addition, in the early of the occupation, the licensed journalists consisted of pre-Nazis people and new faces who did not have any experience as journalists, and then native mass media had many trouble to issue newspapers.

Table 7: Censorship of the Suppression of Freedom of Speech Society <2. Conditions of Censorship>

	Germany	Japan
Familiar to ex-Control of Freedom of speech	Yes	Yes
American Censorship	Weak	Strong
American Propaganda	Strong	Strong
Continuity of Journalists	Replaced	Almost all the same
The number of newspaper companies	Limited	Many

On the other hand, in Japan, GHQ censorship officers examined each sentences in detail, and sometimes they presented excess cases that no one could explain the reason. However, the number of newspapers and magazines had increased splendidly during the occupation, and many Japanese native films were put on screens. I think that one cannot say that the suppression of freedom of speech as a result of the American censorship of Japan was severer than that of Germany.

In brief, from the Table 6 and Table 7, apparent causes of the difference of freedom of speech between Japan and Germany were not found.

On the contrary, deserving special mention here in Table 8, in Germany, many decision making for significant policies, such as making constitution and rearmament, took long time, many discussions, debates of a lot of levels, and compromise even under the American occupation, while Japanese government did secretly and promptly. Sometimes the American military authorities struggled to protect the freedom of the press from some conservative German politicians or religious groups.

In addition, this final table shows that Japanese government did not need to fight against the Japanese mass media. Japanese political establishments and major journalists were connected each other as same as the previous era. The American occupation at first attempted to use the existent governmental organization and the journalists, sometimes with thread of penalty, but afterwards GHQ's political power helped to reconstruct the solid relationship between the government and journalism. In this context, the Japanese government means not only the cabinet or conservative politicians, but also the bureaucrats of the central ministries and local governments.

Table 8: Censorship and the Suppression of Freedom of Speech <3. Reaction to Censorship>

	Germany	Japan
Dispute and compromise for obtaining basic policies during the occupation	Yes	No
Ingratiation with American by native Journalists (tendency)	No	Yes
Attitude of the mass media to political power	Criticism to the State	Pro-state
Self-Censorship	Limited restraint with clear standards	Strong without explicit legislation or political pressure.
Solid Mechanism to limit freedom of Press	No	Yes
Freedom of Speech (Current)	Yes	No

It is interesting to note that in South Korea all of the above items were the same as for Japan, with the exception of one. Korean press clubs were actually imported from Japan during the prewar colonial period and had many of the same characteristics as those in Japan. After the American occupation of Korea, the Korean military dictatorship utilized Korean press clubs sufficiently, but in 2001, the courts ruled these press clubs to be illegal. From 2002, all press clubs in South Korea were abolished. This suggests that the existence of the press clubs has been linked to the control of the freedom of speech.²⁶¹ This historical fact showed that governments could change laws established under occupation or colonization. In fact, immediately after the independence, some regulations provided in the occupation era were quickly amended or repealed in Japan.²⁶²

Returning to the analysis of postwar Japan, we have seen that Prime Minister Yoshida rejected the American offer to amend the Constitution during the occupation period, and that the Shōwa Emperor offered the permanent occupation of Okinawa to the Americans. Masajirō Takigawa, Japanese defense council at the Tokyo Tribunal, published Judging Tokyo Tribunal immediately after independence in 1952 and criticized the tribunal and the intense control of the press by GHQ. Later, in his preface for a new version of this book in 1977, he took aim at the attitude of the Japanese mass media, especially major national newspapers and critics who bashed his book as an “undesirable book” which had “a feeling of prosecution to impeach Japan.”²⁶³

In this article, I could not analyze the reaction of ordinary Japanese fully, but it can be said that ordinary people also supported the mass media, and they affected each other mutually.

8. Conclusions

This thesis shows how American censorship significantly defined the linguistic space of both Japan and Germany, during the American occupation period. However, it concludes that what we see today has been the product of more than one single cause, but of many factors such as American suppression, association with the Americans, the governments of Japan and Germany, and the mass media.

The German mass media was able to obtain freedom of speech with clear standards for both the press and ordinary people, with a few apparent exceptions. There was some conflict within the American military government, but ironically, the confrontation also helped spark long and serious debates as well as compromises among the Germans and the Americans. This process actually came to support the rebirth of the freedom of speech in Germany.

Meier claims, “The control of the licensed newspapers by OMGUS and its divisions was initially firm, but later quite liberal.” No licensee was divested of his license and paper suppression rarely occurred for any length of time.²⁶⁴ Does this then mean that the licensed press achieved its political goal to reorient the German people toward democracy? Meier’s answer to this question is no. He claims that broad segments of the population regarded the licensed newspaper as untrustworthy from the very beginning:

Meier adds, however:

On the contrary, there is also harsh criticism of the American censorship in Germany, as Robert Williams insists, “occupation-era policies and events prevented the formation of a highly partisan or anti-governmental press in ways similar to the experiences of the controlled press under the Nazis.”²⁶⁷

I think, however, the problem is not how ostensible restrictions were, but whether or not during the occupation, a durable system that could have much influence after independence was constructed. Williams himself writes in the last sentence, “Germans actively and passively appropriated the Allied-imposed press and began the project of transmitting postwar national discourse and construction a postwar identity,” while the Japanese mass media stayed inside of the power circle after 1952.

West Germany had survived one of the most difficult international circumstances, and it also had conservative governments for many years, much like Japan. Nevertheless, the German press has by and large been critical of its government as well as American foreign policy. In addition, Germany has a number of newspapers now and they have various colors and are independent of each other.

On the other hand, in Japan, major national papers are closely linked with the central government, the local government, and business circles, through the press clubs. Their personal human relationship is complexly linked each other, holding everyday time in common. Recently, major TV stations have jointed the power circle. The Japanese mass media has become a publicity apparatus to manipulate the masses of people. As a matter of fact, the mass media are commercial companies, and they react to the trends of public emotion. In this respect, ordinary people are not simply targets of manipulation.

This reminds us of the people’s reaction to the Etō's assertion in the early 1980s. This was so meaningful, because the Japanese “forgot” the fact that American censorship helped shape early postwar discursive space, even though many had themselves known and experienced directly the occupation. Etō' asserts that this oblivion was caused by just the American occupation.²⁶⁸ In contradistinction to him, however, this condition was caused not only by the American occupation, but, as this thesis has shown, by the mutual collaboration among the US, the Japanese government, the mass media, and ordinary people.

Recently in Japan, furthermore, things have become worse. In November 2005, the Tokyo district court dismissed an appeal to prohibit exclusion by the press clubs, in effect holding up the structure as it has existed, something in contrast to the recent abolishment of Korean press clubs that started from a court ruling. It is possible to suggest that the structure of the government and the mass media had its roots planted during the occupation period. With this in mind then, it is also likely that the continuing influence of the American occupation is used as an excuse to the excesses of self-censorship in Japan.

It is now very easy to find journalistic and academic discourse, and anonymous individual writings in Internet, which blame the American military suppression of the freedom of the press for Japan not being able to take its own course in the postwar era. These discussions often refer to Jun Etō and his book Closed Linguistic Space. Although his findings are noteworthy, his insistence on a uni-dimensional cause has misled intellectual debate and contributed to increased nationalism in contemporary Japan.

The findings of this thesis that there was indeed a collaboration between the establishment in the US and Japan can help explain how various levels of Japanese chose the best way that they could during the military occupation, whether the choice has been good or bad influential for current society. We can include in this choice the silence of ordinary people who knew what was going on but did not speak out.

Although Etō’s discourse is now consumed among the grass-roots right wing propaganda, if Etō or many nationalists and leftists were furious against the American occupation or former American foreign policy, as long as they perceived there were no choices under American power, they could not imagine any way out of the dilemma. When Japanese can realize that they themselves were involved in policy making during the occupation, it may be easier to accept the current problems as partial products of their own past and begin discussion about the direction of the future.

Appendix

Appendix 1: The Press Code for Japan²⁶⁹

1. News must adhere strictly to the truth.

2. Nothing shall be printed which might, directly or by inference, disturb the public tranquility.

3. There shall be no false or destructive criticism of the Allied Powers.

4. There shall be no destructive criticism of the Allied forces of occupation and nothing which might invite mistrust or resentment of those troops.

5. There shall be no mention or discussion of Allied troop movements unless such movements have been officially released.

6. News stories must be factually written and completely devoid of editorial opinion.

7. News stories shall not be colored to conform with any propaganda line.

8. Minor details of a news story must not be overemphasized to stress or develop any propaganda line.

9. No news story shall be distorted by the omission of pertinent facts or details.

10. In the makeup of the newspaper no news story shall be given undue prominence for the purpose of establishing or developing any propaganda line.

Appendix 2: Censorship Key logs ²⁷⁰

1	Criticism of SCAP.
2	Criticism of International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo war-crimes trials).
3	Criticism of SCAP Writing the Constitution (including any reference whatsoever to SCAP’s role).
4	Reference to Censorship.
5	Criticism of the United States.
6	Criticism of the Soviet Union.
7	Criticism of the United Kingdom.
8	Criticism of Korean people.
9	Criticism of China.
10	Criticism to Other Allies.
11	General Criticism of Allies.
12	Criticism of Japanese Treatment in Manchuria (referring to treatment of Japanese POWs or civilians by Russians and Chinese after Japan’s capitulation.).
13	Criticism of Allies' Pre-War Policies.
14	Third World War Comments
15	The Soviet Union vs. Western Powers Comments.
16	Defense of War Propaganda (described as “any propaganda which directly or indirectly defends Japan’s conduct of and in the War”).
17	Divine Descent Nation Propaganda.
18	Militaristic Propaganda.
19	Nationalistic Propaganda.
20	Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere Propaganda.
21	Other Propaganda.
22	Justifications or Defense of War Criminals.
23	Fraternization (referring in particular to fraternization of GHQ personnel with Japanese women.)
24	Black Market Activities.
25	Criticism of Occupation Forces.
26	Overplaying of Starvation.
27	Incitement to Violence or Unrest (on actual censored material this often was phrased as “Disturbs public tranquility”).
28	Untrue Statement.
29	In appropriate References to SCAP and the District Military Government Part.
30	Premature Disclosure.

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