Appendix 6: Space Percentage of News Source of the Three Major Newspapers274

1 Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power. New York: Vintage Books, 1990, p.96. My observation and experience have the same results.

2 Tatsuya Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers Are Not Interesting (Shimbun Ga Omoshirokunai Riyū). Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2001, p.10.

3 Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, p.96-97.

4 Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers, p.10.

5 Norma Field, “the Japanese society passionately believes in the advantages of being genuinely opinion-less if possible and unassertive if not,” in In the Realm of a Dying Emperor. New York: Vintage Books, 1993, p.88, 219.

6 The black list incidents in Ishikawa-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (1960s-2004), Toshiba Ōgi-kai list incident (1974-now). Some of Ōgi-kai check-indicators say that the person as follows are on the black list, in Makoto Sataka and Akira Uozumi, the Responsibility to be deceived, (Damasareru Koto No Sekinin). Tokyo: Kōbunken 2004, pp.137-139.

* The person who are interested in the problem of work environment, politics, society, and economy.

* The person who positively help his colleagues, especially younger employees.

* The person who talk about autonomy, society, and politics during a small talk.

7 I know some cases of the intellectuals (ex. a university professor and an interpreter). Of course, these cases were not reported on newspapers.

8 I heard directly one case that a female who supported Afghanistan refugees received police officers visit to her job place several times (2002).

In an incident of posting a flyer in letterboxes of Tachikawa Self Defense Force, three citizens were arrested and prosecuted (2004).

9 Crushed to death of a female high-school student at the school gate incident (1990), Matsumoto-Sarin incident (1994), Okegawa-stalker murder case (1999), Refusal of Stay of Hansen’s disease former patient incident (2003).

10 Norma Field examines Japanese taboo of expression of everyday life and worried about the people who had brave to express their opinion publicly: “What has happened to those who risked signing their names…those still active in the mainstream of contemporary Japanese society? Have they had to pay for what might have proven a reckless, solitary moment of resolve once they returned to the relentless sociality of routine? Have they found that other mothers are more polite than ever when they cannot avoid them, or that colleagues maintain an awkward distance until they can drunkenly blurt out their disapproval?,” in Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor, p.219.

11 Taketoshi Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation. Tokyo: Hōsei University Press, 1996, pp.557-558.

12 The Press Law replaced of the Press Rules of 1875 and the Publishing Law was from the Publishing rule of 1869.

13 Representation of resistance to the state would bring about punishment and sometimes death. Only a few people explicitly protested against this tendency, such as the journalist Yūyū Kiryū, and the filmmaker Fumio Kamei and Akira Iwasaki. But the latter two were eventually imprisoned for their outspokenness during a time of war. Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo, p.31.

14 Junji Banno, and Sōichirō Tahara. Democracy of Empire of Great Japan. Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2006, pp.6-7.

15 Jun Etō, Closed Space of Language: Censorship of Occupation Forces and Postwar Period Japan (Tozasareta Gengo Kūkan: Senryō Gun No Ken-Etsu to Sengo Nippon). paperback ed. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1994.

16 Etō, Closed Space of Language, p.139, pp.272-273.

17 There are many Internet site and blog. Most of them have a tendency of conservative, or nationalistic. It is remarkable that many anonymous citizens refer to his book.

18 Dobbins, J., and John G. McGinn, et al. America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p.xiii.

19 http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=554 (9 May 2006)

Japanese Press Clubs, which is set in almost of all central governments’ ministries, local governments, economic federations and leading big companies, are notorious to control the Japanese mass media as well as to exclude foreign press and the rest of Japanese journalists.

20 Japan is the worst among so-called developed countries, but Spain, Italy and the U.S.

21 The Nazis succeeded in ending Weimar democracy and turning Germany into a one-party dictatorship, organizing massive propaganda campaigns to win the cooperation and loyalty of the German people. The Nazi Propaganda Ministry, which was directed by Dr. Joseph Göbbels, took control of all forms of communication in Germany: newspapers, magazines, books, public meetings, and art, music, movies, and radio. The Nazis emphasized films propaganda so much that it came to be called “Hitler’s Fourth Army after the Army, Navy, and Air Force was Propaganda, of which the psychological ‘atom bomb’ was the film,” in Wollenberg, Hans H. Fifty Years of German Film. Translated by Ernst Sigler. London: Falcon, 1948, p.46.

22 German basic laws guarantee freedom of speech with the exception of speech that supports the Holocaust, a kind of “self-censorship.” West Germany had conservative administrations for many years, and it confronted one of the most difficult political struggles between East and the West in the Cold War. It is thus natural for publications to afford a particular ideology or degree of self-censorship to increase sales or reflect the wishes of editors and owners.

23 John van Maanen, "Introduction." In Varieties of Qualitative Research, edited by John van Maanen, James M. Dabbs, Jr., and Robert R. Faukner, 11-30. Beverly Hills, London, New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1982.

24 Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1987, p. xiv.

25 Such as Harold Zink (1947), American Military Government in Germany. Richard Merritt (1995), Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949. John Dower (1999), Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson Moore (2002), Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur. Michael Ermarth ed. (1993) American and the Shaping of German Society 1945-1955.

26 Such as Barry M. Katz (1989), Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942-1945. Rudolf Janssens (1995), What’s Future for Japan?: U.S. Wartime Planning For the Postwar Era, 1942-1945. Cordell Hull (1948), The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!

27 I enumerate all books I grasp as follows.

Jun Etō (1984), Closed Space of Language: Censorship of Occupation Forces and Postwar Period Japan. Monica Braw (1986), The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Japan 1945-1949. Kyoko Hirano (1992), Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: Japanese Cinema under the American Occupation, 1945-1952. Kiyoko Horiba (1995) Forbidden Experience of the Atomic Bombs, Yuzuru Kai (1995), GHQ Censor. Kazutoshi Yamamoto (1996), Media Analysis During the American Occupation. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (1999), Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany 1945-1955.

28 Etō visited Mckeldin Library (University of Maryland,) National Record Center (Suitland, Maryland,) National Archives, the Library of Congress, and the MacArthur Memorial. (Washington D.C.), in Etō Closed Space of Language, pp.12-13.

29 Ann Sherif, "The Politics of Loss: On Etō Jun." Positions 10, no. 1 (2002): 111-39, p.132.

30 Kyoko Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: Japanese Cinema under the American Occupation, 1945-1952. Washington, London: Smithsonian Institution, 1992.

31 Heide Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany - Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler. Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

32 Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995, pp.291-315.

33 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W. W. Norton & Company/ The New Press, 1999, p.439.

34 Teruo Ariyama, Media History Research in Occupation Period: Freedom and Control 1945. Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1996.

35 Such as, Ernestine Schlant ed (1991), Legacies and Ambiguities: Postwar Fiction and Culture in West Germany. Ian Buruma (2002), The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan. Ken Ishida (2004), The Defeat and Constitution: the Comparative Studies on Making Constitutions in Japan, Germany, and Italy.

36 Eiji Takemae, and Rinjirō Sodei, “A round-table talk: Verification of the accumulation of the research of the occupation period,” in Intelligence, vol.3, 2003, p.17. Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.557.

37 Etō, Closed Space of Language: pp.182-183, 222-223.

38 Etō does not define the term “Japanese linguistic space.” He only says “the Japanese linguistic space, in which we must breathe,” Etō, Closed Space of Language, p.10.

39 Etō, Closed Space of Language, pp.263-291.

40 Etō, Closed Space of Language: p.270.

41 Ordinary people possibly did not know the existence of censorship at the beginning of the occupation, but there was a lot of evidence, such as diaries, memoirs, and letters, that almost all people knew that articles were censored and that the Americans were the ones who wrote the script of the radio program the Truth is like this, in Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.551-552.

42 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.405.

43 Takumi Satō, “The Complicity Relation permit the Control,” in Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 March 2006.

Takumi Satō, Control of Speech: An Information Official Kurazō Suzuki and a Slogan "National Security State Realizes Freedom and Equality by Education" (Genron Tōsei: Jōhōkan Suzuki Kurazō to Kyōiku No Kokubō Kokka). Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shin Sha 2004.

44 Kazutoshi Yamamoto, “The Lie of the Announcement was known,” in Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 March 2006.

45 Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, p.94-96.

46 The conservative advocators, including Etō, have contended that what Japanese history was rewritten by the Americans have led the Japanese people to the wrong way, Yoshiko Sakurai, Breaking the spell of the “Box of Truth” made by GHQ,” 2002. There are many conservative advocators, such as Susumu Nishibe, Yoshinori Kobayashi, and Nobukatsu Fujioka.

47 Norihiro Katō, Arguments over Post: Defeat-War (Haisengo Ron). Tokyo: Kōdan Sha, 1997, pp.9-93.

48 Eiji Oguma, and Yōko Ueno. Nationalism For "Healing": A Fieldwork Research of the Grass Roots Conservative Movement ("Iyashi" No Nationalism: Kusanone Hosyu Syugi No Jisshō Kenkyū). Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku University Press, 2003, p.3.

49 Takemae et al. “A round-table talk: Verification of the accumulation of the research of the occupation period,” in Intelligence, vol.3, 2003, p.19.

50 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. revised, enlarged edition ed. Vol. 2: From Pearl Harbor to Victory. New York: Bantam Books, 1950. Reprint, 2^nd, pp. 693-694.

51 According to Anne Armstrong, “the announcement was casual and informal, but the formula of unconditional surrender was the reflection of a very considered policy. It represented not only the American war in the Second World War but also a basic American attitude towards the enemy, towards international politics and towards war,” in Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy Upon World War II. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961.

52 Barry M. Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942 - 1945. Cambridge U.S., London: Harvard University Press, 1989, p.14.

Christopher D. O'Sullivan, 2001. Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order 1937-1943. In Gutenberg-e, Columbia University Press, O'Sullivan, 2001. “Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning,” Ch.1.

53 Frederick S. Voss, Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II, pp.22-25.

54 The school hired three civilian Area experts, one for Germany, Arnold Wolfers, one for Italy, Henry Powell, and one for Japan, Hugh Borton. The first course opened on 11 May 1942 for 50 student officers. They thought, however, that it was not enough, because a study at Charlottesville tried to determine how many officers might need, and concluded 4,000 officers to govern four million people. But Charlottesville could not train the needed number of officers, and even if it could, enough candidates with the required skills and talents could not be situated found within the Army. From September 1942, the military government training program was moved to be under control of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp.11.

55 In November 1942, the school was harshly accused by anti-New Dealer and Republican, as in vain, but Roosevelt eventually made a decision to continue it, in Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp. 13-14.

56 The Charlottesville estimated again in September 1942 that 6,000 trained officers would be needed worldwide, another 6,000 being recruited from tactical units as areas were occupied, in Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.20.

Other study concludes no less than 3,000 military officers and 9,000 civilians would be necessary for only governing Japan after the commencement of occupation. Consequently, the result was the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP). The Military Department established the Civil Affairs Training School from 1943 at main universities, such as Yale, Harvard, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Michigan, and Stanford University, in Akinori Suzuki, Japanese Constitution Produced in a Locked-up Room for Nine Days (Nihon Koku Kenpō Wo Unda Misshitsu No Kokonoka Kan). Tokyo: Sōgen Sha, 1995, p.87.

The students spent the first month in basic military government training at the Provost Marshal General’s School at Fort Custer, Michigan. In the second phase, they would receive three months’ training at one of a number of universities. The student spent half his time studying a foreign language and most of the other half in foreign area studies. The CATP graduate was expected to deal directly with the people in occupied areas, the Charlottesville graduate primarily with his own and allied staffs, in Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.18.

57 The President remained convinced that the job was a civilian one, and in June 1943, he undertook to put policy-making and direction clearly in civilian hands. But finally he had to obey Stimson, Secretary of the War Department indication that this job should be subjective to the Army, in Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.18.

58 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.18.

59 Edwin M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan. Stanford, London: Stanford University Press, Oxford University Press, 1948, p.5.

60 Such as Hugh Borton, John W. Masland, Cabot Coville, and Robert Fearey, and Hugh Borton received a PhD from Leiden University as a Japanologist, in Suzuki, Japanese Constitution Produced in a Locked-up Room for Nine, p.78.

The Group of Far Eastern Affairs (FEA) started from the analysis of the causes of Japanese militarism, and further researched on the emperor system, military organization, educational system, zaibatsu (big conglomerates), agricultural territorial system, religion, and militaristic ideology. The documents of the group were discussed in the Territorial Subcommittee, in which there was the State Department officials and some Congress members, in Janssens, 'What Future for Japan?' pp.119-120.

61 Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan, p. 16.

62 Suzuki, Japanese Constitution Produced in a Locked-up Room for Nine Days, p.80.

63 Historian’s appraisals are almost consistent that the Japanese Taisho Democracy was immature as well as people’s political rights were not enough guaranteed and civil rights were highly restricted. Hugh Borton examined Japanese prewar politics and concluded, “Only when the military caste and its machine have been wholly crushed and destroyed on the field of battle…and discredited in the eyes of its own people and rendered impotent to fight further or further to reproduce itself in the future, shall we in our own land be free from that hideous danger,” in the “Japan: Postwar Political Problems (T 381).”

64 Janssens, 'What Future for Japan? p.127.

65 Suzuki, Japanese Constitution Produced in a Locked-up Room for Nine Days, p.96. Joseph Grew had been the American Ambassador to Japan prior to the war for ten years, and became the Under Secretary from November 1944, consequently the Acting Secretary of State from April to June 1945, during when Roosevelt died and Nazi-Germany fell. He had a long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service and more importantly, and he could be called to be the highest placed Japan expert. He made speech a lot of times everywhere in the U.S. about the postwar Japan. For example, he addressed on 29 December 1943 at the Annual Banquet celebrating the 90th Anniversary of the Illinois Education association, in Chicago. In his speech, Grew argued that “when certain constitutional changes are made and the Japanese are given adequate time to build up a parliamentary tradition,” Japan would have “an opportunity to make the party system work.” (http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/003shoshi.htm)

These arguments were widely criticized in the U.S. as that he proposed the moderate reforms and the continuation of the Emperor system. But his advocacy was very similar to the concept of the Japanese specialists in the State Department.

66 A continuous work was led along with the result of the negotiations commenced by the Potsdam Declaration of July 26. Japan accepted the Declaration on 14 August after two atomic bombs falls. SWNCC 150 was amended for SCAP to “exercise his authority through Japanese government (Part II-2),” in order to adjust to the Potsdam Declaration that supposed the continuous of the Japanese government (SWNCC 150/3).

67 Ariyama, Media History Research in Occupation Period, pp.31-36.

68 SWNCC150/3 had not received the approval of the President until 6 September. It was finally released to the public on 22 September (SWNCC 150/4).

69 These directives have been first published in Japan in 1948.

http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html

In this directive, MacArthur was given the supreme authority to take any steps deemed advisable and proper to achieve the aims of the occupation, including direct action “as a last resort” if necessary, with the exception of the problem of the continued existence of the Emperor system

70 15 November June 1944, the document that specially treats the media policy for Japan, “Japan: Occupation: Media of Public Information and Expression (PWC288b)” was regulated that American military government would control Japanese media to realize some purpose simultaneously: to prevent the spread of ultra-nationalism ideology: to encourage them to express liberal opinion: to protect them from violence of the people who opposed liberal opinion: to abolish all regulation and state’s activity that had suppressed to express liberal opinion, and so forth, in Ariyama, Media History Research in Occupation Period, pp.22-24.

71 Ariyama, Media History Research in Occupation Period, p.23.

72 Ariyama, Media History Research in Occupation Period, pp.26-27.

73 Ariyama, Media History Research in Occupation Period, p. 30.

74 CCD was officially created in January 1945. 7 July

75 Ariyama, Media History Research in Occupation Period, pp.31-36.

76 JCS 1380/15, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html

77 The Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe was designed to reconcile American and British practices and policies as far as they were then known.

78 In December 1943, American General Eisenhower was appointed as the Supreme Commander of SHAEF. SHAEF was established at first in London, and it moved with the war situation. Finally, in December 1944, SHAEF was settled down in Versailles, France. SHAEF consisted of the force of the U.S., the U.K., Free France, and Canada.

79 O'Sullivan, Sumner Welles, p.39.

Assistant Secretary of War McCloy then explained to the U.K. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden that the U.S. War Department’s desire to keep the civil affairs control in Washington as a necessity of U.S. domestic policy. During the summer of 1944, the War Department had become convinced that a post surrender directive was imperative, because of the British drive to capture the post surrender planning for the London-based agencies.

80 Katz, Foreign Intelligence, pp.2-4.

81 William Langer was an American historian for European diplomacy and a high-class officer of OSS. William L. Langer joined in July 1941, a historian for European diplomacy at Harvard, was the director of the Research and Analytical Division from September 1942 for the duration of the war, in Katz, Foreign Intelligence, pp.2-4. He recognized the advantage of employing the refugee skilled experts from Europe to provide “fluent in the European languages, immersed in the intricacies of party politics, sensitive to cultural nuances, and attuned to points of strength, weakness, and resistance in enemy and enemy-occupied countries,” in Katz, Foreign Intelligence, p.10.

For example, Franz Neumann, Theodore W. Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Hermert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, Leo Löwernthal, and Arkadij Gurland were German émigré. A large number of the German applicants for the job of OSS insisted to help win the war. Sherman Kent, from the History Department at Yale, organized a Political Group that would grow into the Europe-Africa Division. The historian Perry Miller joined from Wiesbaden in occupied Germany, in Katz, Foreign Intelligence, p.8.

82 Katz, Foreign Intelligence, p.51.

In the Central European Section (CES) of OSS, the end of the fall of Nazis was predicted as a combination of external military force and internal political resistance of the German people. Therefore, the goal of the occupation of Germany had been destruction of fascism and “the reinstatement of democratic institutions by the Germany people themselves,” but not from outside. On the contrary, in the view of the analysts of CES, Roosevelt’s declaration of unconditional surrender would work as Nazis propaganda, to encourage German soldiers and citizens to fight until complete defeat. Neumann indicated that the Allies military invasion and occupation of Germany would “prevent the anti-Nazi reaction of the progressive forces then coming to its fulfillment,” that is, the idea of democratizing Germany would be variance with that of military occupation. CES insisted this idea repeatedly, but it meant to set a fundamentally different war aims and CES lost this political battle in Katz, Foreign Intelligence, pp.40-43, pp. 45-46.

83 Rudolf V.A. Janssens, 'What Future for Japan?: U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era, 1942-1945. Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1995, pp.253-255.

Morgenthau devised his own policy for Germany to divide Germany into three parts and eliminate heavy industry from Germany. He suggested that an agricultural population of small landowners should mean the end of a German threat to peace.

84 Janssens, 'What Future for Japan?, p.256.

85 State Department, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. I, p. 358.

86 On the eve of the Yalta Conference in February1945, the State Department’s opposition to JCS 1067 smoldered in deepening frustration. On the 14 March after Yalta, SWNCC talked about rewriting JCS 1067 in light of the new directive, knowing that the two ways, SWNCC and JCS1067, could not survive side by side. In forwarding the directive to the White House, the Secretary State Stettinius had reported that he intended to establish “an informal policy committee on Germany under the chairmanship of the State Department and including representatives of War, Navy, Treasury, and the Foreign Economic Administration.” (State Department, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. III, pp.433-434, quoted in Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.210.

87 Katz, Foreign Intelligence, p.44. This sensitivity came in part from criticisms that after World War I in Germany there had not been enough training and organization to guide the every day life of no less than one million people.

88 On 15 August 1945, President Truman said, “…Germans must be released from the men of power who brought about such a tragic situation,” in Yoshio Kisa, Senso Sekinin towa Nanika?: Seisan Sarenakatta Doitu no Kako (What is War Responsibility?: The Past of Germany That Was Not Buried.) p.201. This suggests that the aims of the occupation began to change and that German “people” were a kind of victims of the Nazis. On the contrary, France desired to punish Germany severely.

89 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999, p.12, p.14.

90 Alfred H. Paddock, "Major General Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare." Special Warfare vol. 12, no.4, (Fall 1999), p.3.

91 Earl F Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944 - 1946. Army Historical Series. Washington, D. C.: Center Of Military History United States Army 1975, p.108.

92 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.175.

93 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.175.

94 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.16.

95 Ernst Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany." Journalism Quarterly 31 (1954): 223-231.

96 Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, p.173.

97 “Agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on certain additional requirements was imposed on Germany; 20 September 1945,” in http://www.geocities.com/iturks/html/documents_2.html?20055

This agreement refers to censorship as follows: Section IV,

10. The German authorities will place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inter-communication system, including all military and civilian postal and telecommunication systems and facilities and connected matters, and will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for placing such inter-communication systems under the complete control of the Allied Representatives. The German Authorities will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives with a view to the establishment by the Allied Representatives of such censorship and control of postal and telecommunication and of documents and other articles carried by the Allied Representatives many think fit.

11. The German authorities will comply with all directions which the Allied Representatives may give regarding the use, control and censorship of all media for influencing expression and opinions, including broadcasting, press and publications, advertising, films and public performances, entertainments, and exhibitions of all kinds.

98 John W Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W. W. Norton & Company/ The New Press, 1999, p.406.

99 Australia worked in the Occupation Council on behalf of Britain.

100 Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan, p.5.

101 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy. Translated by Sebastian Swann Robert Ricketts. London, New York: Continuum, 2002, pp.88-89.

102 Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp.222-223

103 M. Mayo, "Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Defeated Japan 1943-45." In The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform, edited by T. W. Burkman. Norfolk, 1982, pp.83-84.

104 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” p.85. Takemae, Inside GHQ, p.180.

105 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” p.123. Declassified Reports of the Official Intelligence Research as of July 1, 1950, July 7, 1950, State Department, bibliography no.53, National Archives, Washington D.C., 9.

106 Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan, Appendix p.107.

107 Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo, p.35. Kōkichi Takakuwa, Newspaper Censorship by Macarthur. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1984, p.38.

Although we did not still find any evidence that the Japanese directive was founded on the order by GHQ, according to Hirano, Kokichi Takakuwa, a Japanese historian, believes that these early censorship measures were taken at the request of GHQ.

108 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” pp.88-89.

109 Takemae, Inside GHQ, p.41.

110 Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945-1952. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982, p.87. Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo, p.36. ” This directive was released toward the press through the Japanese Information Bureau on 12 September

111 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.177.

112 Its second chief Brigadier General Courtney Whitney assertively supported the policies for democratization and was often at variance with the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) under Colonel Donald Hoover, which handled intelligence.

http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/glossary.html

113 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, p.87.

114 Picture-story shows was a unique Japanese information transmitting apparatus. It was very popular for entertainment among people at the time.

115 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.407.

116 I know only three cases as exceptions: Yōko Yokoyama (1993) Shine Fireworks in Sumida Rive for Repose of the Souls. Yuzuru Kai (1995) GHQ Censor Official. Motohiko Hirao (2005) a master’s thesis at Hitotsubashi University.

117 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.299, CIS-2450.

118 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.432.

119 Voss, Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II, pp.22-25.

Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.301.

120 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," pp.223-231. Before the surrender, some press control was enforced in an occupied area of Germany by the Allied. On 24 November 1944, SHAEF issued a general prohibition against all newspapers and other information channels in Germany. Two months later, on 24 January 1945, before the surrender of Nazi-Germany, there appeared the first edition of a licensed newspaper, the Aachener Nachrichten, in an occupied area of Germany.

121 By the late May of 1945, the German government had been set up in almost every place and at every level below the central government, and by the end of 1945, the local German governments had made a good deal of progress in taking responsibility for governmental functions in their respective areas. The American civil Administration Division proposed a draft of election codes to the three states of the American Zone to examine it within a short time. Despite of the limited time, “a fairly satisfactory set of election rules” was prepared. This rule extended the franchise to both males and female above the age of twenty-one years old.

122 Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947, pp.62-63, p.75.

123 The American zone was South Germany (Bavaria, Baden-Wüttenberg, and Hessen), Bremen in North Germany, and the American sector in Berlin.

124 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, p. 53.

125 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, pp.45-46.

126 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.46.

127 The Government Manual for the Motion Picture Industry (1942) required that the war should be depicted as a democratic enterprise geared to Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms; the Operational Plan for Germany (1945) selected particular feature films in order to promote democracy and traditional American principles.

128 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.15.

129 Wm. David Sloan, Perspectives on Mass Communication History. Hillsdale, Hove, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991, Sloan, pp.259-261.

130 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.407.

131 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.493-495.

132 In July 1949, total circulations of the top 20 Japanese magazines were more than 6.3 million, Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.508.

133 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.491.

134 The Neue Zeitung's predecessor was the army newspaper Münchner Zeitung. The sub-title of the Neue Zeitung was “the American newspaper in Germany.” The first issue date of the Neue Zeitung was 9 June 1945 in München, and then from 1951 to 1953 it was published in Frankfurt am Main, and in Berlin in 1953.

135 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.52.

136 Meier, The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany, pp.224-225. The former goal emphasized the drawing of a clear and specific line between news and editorial comment in the U.S. press itself.

137 The reason is precisely depicted in Gienow-Hecht’s book, Transmission Impossible; the chief editor Hans Habe and his successor Wallenberg, German émigré journalists, did not follow OMGUS orders for the press, while OMGUS had difficulty controlling the Neue Zeitung since it was an American newspaper. An order of ICD that apparently indicated it to be more American, and therefore many criticisms from ICD were arrived, but the chief editors just ignored it. McClure and ICD faced a serious dilemma. There were many crashes, because of its German style, lack of homage to Abraham Lincoln on the occasion of his birthday, and criticisms to ICD. They complained about the absence of “laudatory features” on the U.S. culture and history, in Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, pp.79-83.

138 According to the opinion polls by OMGUS, these opinions of both readers and editors show us the fact that the psychological information programs implicitly fell apart. Gienow-Hecht summarizes that “the surveys confirmed the ICD’s worst suspicion": despite its masthead expressed “An American paper’s For German Populations,” the paper was overwhelmingly popular because of its “Germanophile approach,” in Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.83.

139 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, pp.80-81.

140 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," p. 224.

141 Lieutenant W. Phillips Davison, chief of Directives and planning in the division’s headquarters implied this remarks, in Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, pp.79-83.

The interest of the Neue Zeitung’s staff in German matters and their alleged indifference toward the nation were supposed to represent the feeling of the ordinary German people, in Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, pp.84-85.

142 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.169.

143 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.82.

Opinion polls conducted by the ICD in January 1946, present us the vivid reaction of both the editors of the licensed press and readers over the contradiction of the parallel existence of the licensed press and the Neue Zeitung. German editors of the licensed paper had complaints about the situation that they should follow the orders of the military government, while the Neue Zeitung was acting freely. One German editor of the licensed paper asserted that readers would accuse the licensed media of being much more anti-German in their coverage of denazification, propaganda, or German guilt than the Neue Zeitung. Another complained that the Neue Zeitung had to learn something from the licensed press, such as following military government orders more closely. Furthermore, two out of three readers preferred the Neue Zeitung to any other papers because it was more factual and presented a greater variety of material or had better national and international coverage. Half of the readers believed the Neue Zeitung presented a German point of view and two out of five thought that it was published by Germans rather than Americans.

But ironically, this tendency of the Neue Zeitung would invite another criticism in late-1947 to 1948 that it was highly nationalistic, William p. 16.

144 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.94.

145 Carl J. Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, New York: Rinehart, 1948, quoted in Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977, p.198.

146 Robert J. II. Williams, "Transmitting a Changing Germany: The Press in the American Zone of Occupation and the Early Construction of Postwar West German Identity." Vitruvian Perspectives 1, no. 1 (2006): 1-26, p.23.

147 There is a episode; Takeji Muno, a 30 years old reporter for the local news section of Asahi Shimbun of Tokyo, knew the coming surrender of Japan on 12 August, the next day of an atomic bombing on Nagasaki City. From the time, the section meeting had continued for three days, and Muno proposed all reporters and editors to quit from the company once. No one answered. Only one colleague said, “I have a wife and children…” as a result, on 15 August, only Muno resigned, in Noko Satō, "60 Years after the War: War Inherited by Newspaper Reporters." Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 December 2005.

148 Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo, p.32.

149 Hirano, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo, p.33.

150 Etō, Closed Space of Language, pp.221-223. Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, Part I Ch.1. "War Guilt Information Program of GHQ." Sankei Shimbun, 4 August 2005.

151 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, Part I Ch.1.

152 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 433.

153 Sōzō Matsuura, Speech Suppression under Occupation. Tokyo: Gendai Journalism Kenkyū Kai, 1969, pp.323-324.

154 Dower, Embracing Defeat, P.439.

155 Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers Are Not, pp.75-78.

156 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.370-371 (my translation).

157 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.372. (My translation).

158 Tamaki Shibukawa, Common Sense of Newspaper Understanding. Tokyo: Tōga Shobō. 1950, p.64.

159 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp. 373-374.

160 For example, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Office has two press clubs, and offers them totally 1,147 ㎡ as their working space (485 ㎡and 446 ㎡), and the press conference room (216 ㎡), in Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers Are Not Interesting, p.47.

161 Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers Are Not Interesting. Sakurai, Yoshiko. You Are Ok, Whatever Will Happen. Tokyo: Shinchō Sha, 2005, p.296-298.

Keiichi Sasaki, "Tokyo District Court Rejected the Appeal for the Senseless Press Clubs." Review of Reviewed Item. (2006), http://www.mynewsjapan.com/kobetsu.jsp?sn=347.

162 Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers Are Not Interesting, in pp.20-44, pp57-108.

There has, however, been little academic study of the actual conditions surrounding the press clubs. Iwase sent questionnaires to about 800 public institutions and received 536 responses. From the analysis of these responses, he calculates the total cost that are offered from news companies participating in press clubs. Iwase says that each company must pay an average of more than 500 million yen (about 4.3 million dollars) per year to maintain their presence at these press clubs.

163 Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers Are Not Interesting, p.111.

164 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," pp.223-231.

165 Roger Smither, "Welt Im Film: Anglo-America Newsreel Policy." In The Political Re-Education of Germany & Her Allies: After World War II, edited by Nicholas Pronay and Keithh Wilson, 151-72. London, Sydney: Croon Helm, 1985, p.157.

166 M. L. G. Balfour, "Reforming the German Press 1945-1949." Journal of European Studies Vol. 3, no. 1 (1973), p.268.

167 The ways of supervision by each occupied government were carried on quite differently in the three occupation zones. In the British zone, a censorship “prior to” publication was imposed on all newspapers. The French military government established a control unit for each specific newspaper, Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," p.227.

168 Williams, "Transmitting a Changing Germany," p.2.

169 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," pp.226-229.

170 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," p.225.

171 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, pp. 58-59; OMGUS Papers, memo from William Patterson, chief of film production, to Heinz Roemheld, chief, FTM Branch, 24 November 1945.

172 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, p.59.

173 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.75.

174 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.407.

175 Etō, Closed Space of Language, p.9 (my translation.)

176 Press Code, 21 September 1945, SCAP “History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945, 1952 in Monograph no.15 Freedom of the Press” pp.9-10 USNA

177 The key logs were amended many times, and the document that Etō found is titled as “A Brief Explanation of the Categories of Deletions and Suppressions,” and was issued on November 25 1946.

178 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.385.

179 Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954, p.288.

180 Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp.409-410.

181 Kiichi Fujiwara, Memorizing Wars: Hiroshima, Holocaust and Present (Sensō Wo Kioku Suru: Hiroshima, Horokōsuto to Genzai) Tokyo: Kōdan Sha, 2001, p.127.Etō, Closed Space of Language, p. 252 (my translation.)

182 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.408,

183 First example occurred in September 1948 in Nikkan Sports, and it reported that an official in GHQ’s entertainment section told after visiting a nude show in Asakusa that the strippers were not very impressive and he would like to introduce them to a real American burlesque show. Though this article was passed by CCD censorship, after issuing, Nikkan Sports was accused of impugnation of GHQ. Before the first trial, the military tribunal sentenced to the editor was sentenced one year at hard labor, levied a fine of 75 thousand yen on Nikkan Sports, and suspended publication of the paper for six months. On appeal, the heavy fine was reaffirmed, but the editor’s hard labor and the paper suspension were overturned. This case revealed to The Japanese mass media, not to ordinary people because this incident was not reported, that the heavy price that could be exacted when they would transgress what SCAP deemed proper.

The second and third case was in 1949 more ideological one that three Communist editors of Nippon Hyōron, and Kaizō were sentenced to hard labor for they published seditious propaganda, and they were actually executed. Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, ch.3. Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp.433-435.

184 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.407.

185 Motohiko Hirao, who was 20 years old at the time, worked for Tokyo branch as an examiner. He gained 700 yen per month, while the average salary of an 18 year-old employee was 45 yen. Mail inspectors also used a key log to check the letters. When he thought a particular letter might violate the key logs, he made a summary of the letter in English and submitted to his boss in “A Guilty conscience to Invade the Privacy of Personal Correspondence,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 7 November 2005.

186 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.551-555.

187 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.548-554.

188 A guilty conscience to invade the privacy of personal correspondence,” 7 November 2005, Yomiuri Shimbun.

189 The photo from http://www.tanken.com/sinsyo.html (see 30 July 2006).

190 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.365-370.

191 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.295, CIS-2948.

I made Graph 1 from the table of Appendix 3.

192 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.294, CIS-2948, 2940.

I made Graph 1 from the table of Appendix 4.

193 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.436.

194 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.298-310.

195 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, p.104.

196 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.432.

197 Chikushi, Tetsuya. The Halfway of a Trip. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 2005, p.329 (my translation).

198 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 432.

199 Etō, Closed Space of Language.

200 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.320.

201 Paddock, "Major General Robert Alexis McClure," p.3.

It was also forbidden to mail books and periodicals from the United States to addresses in Germany, Ralph Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949, (London: Routledge, 1989), p.74.

202 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, p.69.

203 Radio firstly began in 1923 in Germany.

204 Zink, American Military Government in Germany, p.162.

205 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.45; 26.

206 Paddock, "Major General Robert Alexis McClure," p.3.

The gathering opinion of the Germans was not treated in this article, but here I will introduce it very briefly. During the time of Psychological Warfare, OMGUS devoted a considerable amount of energy to the public opinion poll among the Germans. All sorts of questions were asked to the German population in the American Zone as to their reactions to current military government practice as well as to pre-surrender events. Some of these questions were well chosen and carefully stated in order to collect valuable information for military government, but others were not especially pertinent and indeed were so carelessly phrased, so that the results became highly doubtful in validity. Zink, American Military Government in Germany, p.162.

DANA is the abbreviation of Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichtenagentur, which was the American sponsored newswire service, in Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.27.

207 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," p.229, and others.

208 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, p.226-p.228. Until the currency reform in June 1948, Germany was very short of every kind of paper.

209 Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible, pp.226-228.

210 His effort brought the criticisms of both Americans and Germans; he was often blamed as the turncoat from Germans. He placed himself between dilemmas.

211 Since Pommer’s arrival, he had committed to creating a German Film Producers’ Association, because he considered it as a way to prevent “unwarranted cultural and political influence of the states, magistrates, church[es], political associations [and] trade unions.” Pommer also began promoting to export old German movies to gain the foreign currency and to take new German film projects. Nevertheless, American movie industry, the Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEA) objected, for thread of smaller marked in Germany and of competition with German films in the world market. Pommer had to negotiate with the chief of ICD, McClure, as well as MPEA repeatedly and persuaded, by reminding that film was “one of the permitted industries under the Potsdam agreement,” in Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, p.64.

212 The French resisted the proposal, since it would create a “unified and central body of censorship for the whole of Germany,” and the prospective German censorship board would investigate French film with hostility. The Soviet Union at first raised no objection, but consequently was on the French side. The U.K. opposed giving any right of political censorship to the Germans, but proposed giving the right of censorship on moral ground at an early date. American film industries disliked that the Germans would inspect American films. Some conservative German local politicians hoped to keep the right of censorship within states power. Certainly, in the first year of the occupation, the German Länder were notified by the ICD that “no censorship or audience limitation will be exercised by German civil authorities.” Catholic and protestant churches also desired to maintain opportunities to control films. German film producers themselves were scared the possibility of the friction between freedom of expression, which the prospective constitution should contain, in Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, pp.71-89.

213 Finally, a conclusion had been reached in May 1948, after the arduous negotiations had collapsed totally three times. The Freiwillige Selbskontrolle der Filmwirtshcaft (FSK) emerged and was approved as a “public sector” to make a self-censorship code, as well as to control self-censorship, in Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, pp.71-83.

214 The churches obtained representation in the FSK and were thereby bound to uphold the principles of self-censorship. However, it did not mean that the self-censorship code was not accepted by all groups. The FSK began operation on 15 July 1949, and Mayor announced both his resignation and the cessation of American censorship as of mid-July. He added that “this announcement was motivated by our desire to bring to an end the interminable procrastination of the Germans and get self control at length in operation,” in Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, pp.89-91.

215 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, p.91.

216 Etō, Closed Space of Language, pp.130-131.

217 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 424.

218 For instance, the sentence, “in the historical development of European nations such as Spain, Portugal, Holland, and Britain, there was a predominant tendency to acquire new lands as colonies,” was ordered to be deleted, in Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 424.

219 MacArthur desired to join the coming presidential campaign, in Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.538.

220 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.419.

221 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 423.

222 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.430.

A case of the suppression of Kamei Between War and Peace (1947) was extensively cut by exactly CCD staffs, though CIE staffs had permitted it to run. According to Dower, a censor officer was unnerved by the film’s answer to the question where the responsibility for all this postwar misery and degradation lied. The answer that Dower supposes was that “responsibility lay with ‘greedy people’ who had taken advantage of the emperor-centered socialization for war.”

223 Williams, "Transmitting a Changing Germany," pp.15-25.

Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, pp.77-89.

224 Key logs: 3. Criticism of SAP Writing the Constitution (including any reference whatsoever to SCAP’s role).

225 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.75.

226 Satoru Itō, "The Theory of 'Retaining the Fundamental Character of the State' in 'a Story of the New Constitution' (Atarashii Kenpō No Hanashi Ni Miru 'Kokutai Goji' No Ronri)." In How Did the People Welcome the Japanese Constitution (Nihon Koku Kenpō Wo Kokumin Wa Dō Mukaetaka), edited by History Educator Conference. Tokyo: Kōbunken, 1996, pp. 62-63.

227 The Constitution of Japan stipulates, “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power (Article 1).”

A Story of the New Constitution explains the new imperial system with solemnity honorific as to be: “That is, His Majesty the Emperor is a person who expresses the country of Japan ... His Majesty the Emperor expresses all the Japanese. It is the whole Japanese’s idea to have placed His Majesty the Emperor in such a status. From now on people have to do all the work that will govern a country. We have to place His Majesty the Emperor firmly in our center, and in case His Majesty the Emperor governs a country, we have to ensure there are no troubles. You must have understood the meaning of the constitution that considered His Majesty the Emperor as the symbol from the explanation,” in Ministry of Education. A Story of the New Constitution. Tokyo, 1995, p.28 (my translation.)

In the middle part, it seems to declare the people as sovereign, but the latter part of the story makes the people assistants of the Emperor.

228 Itō concludes from various essays that the essence of the conservative interpretation of the new constitution is that it is important for Japan to have declared to continue to place the Emperor in the heart of the society and it is important that the national political body has not changed,” in Itō, The Theory of 'Retaining the Fundamental Character of the State,' p.80 (my translation.).

229 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.277.

230 MacArthur announced the greetings of the new year of 1946 to the newspaper that the Showa Emperor has the volition to exercises a leadership in the Japanese people’s democratization. Kiyoshi Watanabe, who was a teenage soldier and dispatched to the war front in the Philippine, was indignant in his diary at the time, “It cannot be democracy when a monarch plays the role of a leader.” As his saying, the new “democratic” constitution embraced the contradiction before its enforcing,

Watanabe, Kiyoshi. Shattered God: A Demobilized Soldier's Memorandum (Kudakareta Kami: Aru Fukuinhei No Shuki) Paperback (first ed. in 1983) ed. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004, p.170 (my translation.)

231 Takane Kawashima, Defeat: 500 Thousand Letters to Occupation Forces. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1998, pp.224-225.

232 Ashida Hitoshi, the head of the constitutional amendment special committee of the House of Representatives, explains the article of the constitution, “People including the Emperor are the fountainhead of motion of the national will of our country. This is the soul of people’s sovereignty that has appeared in the new constitution.” Furthermore, he declares, “Japan has been always the country of people’s sovereignty. There were no ruptures by the new constitution being established and there was no serious change.” Also there were prominent scholars and politicians who supported his idea, in Itō, “The Theory of 'Retaining the Fundamental Character of the State,'” pp.77-78. That is to say, they insist that the political body was maintained as was earlier, even after the new constitution was established.

233 This delay, I think, meant very significantly to determine the character of the Basic Law. The German society became more stable, and the governments, from central to local, had been more virtually accepted by the people and OMGUS. Accompanying the escalation of the Cold War, German internal politics became more conservative. Consequently, the Law emphasized the protection liberalism against totalitarianism, and it was made, under leadership of the Western zone of the German politicians.

234 The German presidents shared a fear for communism with the Americans.

235 Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, pp.192-198.

236 Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, p.198.

237 GHQ purged the leader of the Liberal Party Ichirō Hatoyama, who was replaced by Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida was keeping a good relation with GHQ at the time, in Shinichi Arai, "The Occupation and Peace." In The Post War History (the First Volume): The Occupation and Peace, edited by Shōichi Fujii and Arai Shinichi et al., 57-64. Tokyo: Kenshū Shuppan, 1973, p.59.

238 Fujii, Shōichi and Arai Shinichi et al. ed. The Post War History (the First Volume): The Occupation and Peace. 16 vols. Vol. 15, A History of Japan. Tokyo: Kenshū Shuppan, 1973, pp.58-59, pp.98-99.

239 In 2006, there was an example of the guilty of this law, because a employee of Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare put posters of the Communist party after job time, in the neighborhood of his house, in “Guilty on the Employee of Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for putting a poster of a political party – Tokyo District Court,”9 June 2006, Asahi Shimbun, http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0629/TKY200606290487.html

240 However, this caution against to the left wing began earlier, not from 1947. Robert Spaulding, the later chief of PPB, afterwards granted that the censors became concerned with antidemocratic criticism of SCAP and the U.S. from the left as well as the right when the proclamation of civil liberties on 4 October 1945. Although it was not until around mid-1947 that “Leftist Propaganda” appeared as an explicit category on the key log, CCD began to prepare detailed internal surveys of the influence of the Soviet Union, and the trend of the left wing, in Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.435.

241 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 436.

242 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, Part II Ch.3.

243 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 436.

244 The readers sympathized not only with the policy, but the leaders themselves. Meanwhile, Akahata got many readers who were non-member of the party, because of the antipathy against the mass media as opportunists.

245The number of the circulation of Akahata and the elected person of the Communist Party

September 1947January 1949September 1949The number of elected person of the Communist Party in the election of 1949109,500143,484255,90035* CIS-2909, in Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.476.

246 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.436.

247 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, Part II Ch.3.

248 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.437. Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp. 385–457.

249 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.555. I agree with him very strongly.

250 Carolyn Eisenberg, "The Limits of Democracy: U.S. Policy and the Rights of German Labor, 1945-1949." In America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-1955, edited by Michael Ermarth. Oxford: Berg Publishers Inc., 1993, p.60.

251 Eisenberg, “The Limits of Democracy: U.S. Policy,” p.81.

252 Matsuura, Speech Suppression under Occupation.

253 Matsuura, Speech Suppression under Occupation, pp.254-280.

254 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.440.

255 Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, pp.198-199.

256 For instance, there was one episode to explain that Adenauer hurried the rearmament; on 10 March 1952, Joseph Stalin, a Russian political leader, issued a “Peace Note,” in which he offered to negotiate a settlement of the future of Germany. The U.S. and its allies, especially Adenauer, flatly rejected any talks that aimed at achieving a settlement. Adenauer was “extremely upset ant nervous” about any proposal that would decouple the Western part of Germany from the Washington-centered alliance, Thomas A. Schwarz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp.260-269. In this respect, the goal of the leaders of the Allies and the West Germany that the West Germany would become a member of the Western block was coincident.

257 Hideo Ōtake, Adenauer and Shigeru Yoshida. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron, 1986, p. 291.

258 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.84.

259 Ōtake, Adenauer and Shigeru Yoshida, pp.294-295.

260 Ōtake, Adenauer and Shigeru Yoshida, pp.302-303.

261 http://www.mynewsjapan.com/kobetsu.jsp?sn=347, http://www.seikyo.org/article186.html, http://incidents.cocolog-nifty.com/the_incidents/2005/12/14br_cd2e.html

262 For example, the Radio Regulatory Commission Act banned on 31 July 1952. The Act that was established in 1950 on GHQ suggestions, aimed to independently control assignment of radio wave, grant of a new license as well as a continuous license of radio and TV station. The Commissions was dissolved and the task was absorbed into the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. The Ministry of Home Affairs has now continued the task. There were several incidents that the government pressured on TV stations to change the contents of the news tendency.

263 Takigawa, Masajirō. Judging Tokyo Tribunal New ed. (First Edition published in January 1953) ed. Tokyo: Sōtaku Sha, 1978.

264 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," p.228.

265 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," p.231.

266 Meier, "The Licensed Press in the U.S. Occupation Zone of Germany," p.227.

267 Williams, "Transmitting a Changing Germany," p.25.

268 Etō, Closed Space of Language, p.10.

269 Press Code, 21 September 1945, SCAP “History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945, 1952 in Monograph no.15 Freedom of the Press” pp.9-10 USNA.

270 Etō, Closed Space of Language, pp.237-244 (my translation.) Original documents in English. Source: This table is sourced from “A Brief Explanation of the Categories of Deletions and Suppressions” (25 November 1946, The National Record Center, RG 331, Box No. 8568).

271 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.295, CIS-2948.

272 Yamamoto, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, p.294.CIS-2948, 2940.

273 Yamamoto, p.294, Media Analysis During the American Occupation, pp.70-71.

274 Iwase, The Reason Why Newspapers Are Not Interesting, p.111.

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