Cost Control cp


Turns Infrastructure Bank



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Turns Infrastructure Bank

And, congressional action key



Dove 2k12

(Robert, Robert Dove, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group, “Building American Transportation¶ Infrastructure Through¶ Innovative Funding,” pg online @ http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg72409/html/CHRG-112shrg72409.htm //um-ef)



3. For innovative financing practices like the infrastructure bank to be successful, Congress must provide additional reforms to our ¶ current transportation public policyThe creation of an infrastructure bank should be a manifestation of ¶ deeper, more profound changes to our national transportation policy; ¶ otherwise the bank and other innovative practices risk contributing to existing shortcomings in our transportation financing policies. ¶ Specifically, outcome-based performance standards should be encouraged ¶ at the baseline policy level. Clear, transparent, and concrete ¶ performance metrics are needed to measure the success and benefits of ¶ major transportation projectsLife-cycle costs should be an established criterion when evaluating ¶ a major capital project. Without it, an ``apples-to-apples'' comparison ¶ of the benefits of private investment vs. public debt financing is not ¶ possible and a flawed ``cost of capital'' analysis of the private ¶ investment option is likely. Additionally, requiring rigorous standards ¶ for analysis of expected users of a project, such as traffic studies, ¶ should be implemented so that accurate projections that affect costs ¶ and benefits are possibleCongress should establish measurable performance metrics on the economic benefits of a major project, or the environmental benefits a ¶ infrastructure project will provide.\6\ Such standards will provide ¶ financing entities like the infrastructure bank with the ability to ¶ provide more extensive and more accurate data to better assess the ¶ impact and worth of an infrastructure project.

States Solve Cost Overruns

States are key to solve cost overruns


Edwards 9 [Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Edwards has testified to Congress on fiscal issues many times, and his articles on tax and budget policies have appeared in the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and other major newspapers. He is the author of Downsizing the Federal Government and co-author of Global Tax Revolution. Edwards holds a B.A. and M.A. in economics, and he was a member of the Fiscal Future Commission of the National Academy of Sciences. “Government Cost Overruns” CATO, March 2009, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/government-cost-overruns#causes,accessed 7/16/12]

What is the solution for chronic cost overruns? Budget experts have suggested numerous ways to reform the procurement process, which would certainly be a step forward.51 But a more fundamental reform is to terminate and privatize as many federal activities as possible, and move funding for state activities, such as highways, back to the states. That way, federal policymakers could focus on ensuring that the few needed areas of federal spending, such as defense, are carried out as efficiently as possible.

*****Aff Answers*****

Uncertainty bad

Predictable funding solves cost overruns – the uncertainty of the cp kills solvency


Steenhoek, 12 – Executive Director, Soy Transportation Coalition (4/18/2012, Mike Steenhoek, “HOW RELIABILITY OF THE INLAND WATERWAY SYSTEM IMPACTS ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS”, http://transportation.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1609)
One of the arguments our ongoing analysis is examining "how money is allocated is just as important as how much money is allocated." One of the deliverables in our research is comparing major maritime infrastructure projects in other countries and compare them to those in the U.S. - particularly in the ability to complete projects on time and within budget. It is discouraging to observe how many other countries are able to construct their major infrastructure projects much more efficiently than we can. The Panama Canal expansion project is a great example. This $5.25 billion project commenced in 2007 and is scheduled to be completed in late 2014 or early 2015. The expansion project is more imposing and complex than any project we have underway or planned in our inland waterway system, yet all indications are that the project will be completed within budget and only a handful of months behind schedule. Compare this to our Olmsted Lock and Dam project that had an original cost estimate of $775 million and has recently been updated to over $3 billion with a significant time horizon remaining before it will be completed. When examining the various reasons for our repeated cost overruns and project delays, it quickly becomes evident that a major contributing factor is the piecemeal and unpredictable manner in which we finance these projects. Major investments of any nature - particularly infrastructure investments - require a system of funding that provides the money up front in a lump sum, or at least provides certainty that the incremental installments will be allocated. Our current system provides neither. In fact, if I were to design a funding system for infrastructure projects that would guarantee repeated cost overruns and project delays, I would design the system we currently have. It is our hope that we can have a productive discussion with other stakeholders that will result in better stewardship of the scarce resources we have to allocate to these inland waterway projects. The other argument in our ongoing analysts is "a predictably good inland waterway system is better than a hypothetically great one." During this period of fiscal scarcity, we are concerned that our nation is failing not only in providing new and expanded locks and dams, but also in maintaining and preserving our current inventory. Each lock and dam is a link in a larger logistics chain. If one fails, our ability to deliver on customer demands is greatly impaired. Committing to many of these major investment projects and failing to deliver on them, while allowing our remaining locks and dams to fall further into disrepair is a recipe for disaster. A preferable approach may be to first demonstrate stewardship of current locks and dams by providing assurance to users that a lock and dam, in the event of a major failure, will be operational within 48 or 72 hours, for example. If we allocate our resources that way and can provide this degree of predictability to those who utilize our inland waterway system, we will provide a superior message to the one we are currently sending. The Soy Transportation Coalition looks forward to working with other stakeholders in examining this potential approach. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and for exploring this important topic. I would be pleased to answer any questions. Read this original document at: http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2012-04-18-Steenhoek.pdf The United States Congress Document CONGDP0020120419e84i00098



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