Cost Control cp
Status Quo Solves Accountability
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Status Quo Solves AccountabilityInstitutions are beginning to do independent forecasts—privates are becoming more involved, decreases risks to the companyFlyvbjerg 2k9 (Bent, professor of planning at Aalborg University, Denmark. He is founder and director of the university’s research program on large-scale infrastructure planning, “Survival of the unfittest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, pg online @ http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/bt/Documents/UnfittestOXREPHelm3.4PRINT.pdf //um-ef) Moreover, with private finance in major infrastructure projects on the rise over the past 15–20 years, capital funds and banks are increasingly gaining a say in the project development and management process. Private capital is no panacea for the ills in major infrastructure project management, to be sure (Hodge and Greve, 2009). But private investors place their own funds at risk, as opposed to governments who place the taxpayer’s money at risk. Capital funds and banks can therefore be observed not to automatically accept at face value the forecasts of project managers and promoters. Banks typically bring in their own advisers to do independent forecasts, due diligence, and risk assessments, which is an important step in the right direction. The false assumption that one forecast or one business case (which is also a forecast) may contain the truth about a project is problematized. Instead project managers and promoters are getting used to the healthy fact that different stakeholders have different forecasts and that forecasts are not only products of objective science and engineering but of negotiation. Why is this more healthy? Because it is more truthful about our ability to predict the future and about the risks involved. If the institutions with responsibility for developing and building major infrastructures continued to implement, embed, and enforce such measures of accountability effectively, then the misrepresentation in cost, benefit, and risk estimates, which is widespread today, might be mitigated. If this is not done, misrepresentation is likely to continue, and the allocation of funds for major infrastructure is likely to continue to be wasteful, unethical, and sometimes even unlawful. CP FailsAnd, the counterplan fails – several versions necessaryMudge 2k9 (This report was prepared by Richard Mudge, Vice¶ President with Delcan Corporation, Michelle Maggiore,¶ now Program Director for Planning and Policy with the¶ American Association of State Highway Transportation¶ Officials (AASHTO), and Keith Jasper, a Senior Associate¶ with Delcan. Emil Frankel and Joshua Schank from the¶ Bipartisan Policy Center provided numerous helpful¶ Suggestions, “Performance Metrics¶ for the Evaluation of¶ Transportation Programs,” pg online @ http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20NTTP%20Metrics%20fnl.pdf //um-ef) Requiring states to measure and report on the metrics¶ identified in this report provides a first-step toward¶ accountability. However, a true performance-based¶ program will likely take several iterations of surface¶ transportation legislation. Additionally, system deficiencies¶ and maintenance needs are an important¶ component of federal funding and will also need to be¶ addressed perhaps differently than true measures of¶ system performance. In the short-term, the structure¶ of a performance-based program could include one or¶ more of the following components:¶ Stand-alone competitive programs focusing on¶ each of the key metrics identified in this report:¶ accessibility, national connectivity, and safety:¶ For each metric, states and metropolitan regions¶ (where applicable) would compete for additional¶ and substantial federal funds to implement¶ important but unfunded projects in the program.¶ Competing across all measures and awarding funds¶ based on the best complete program is one option.¶ Evaluating each program area with an emphasis on¶ one or more metrics provides an alternative.¶ n Programs to fix or overcome system deficiencies:¶ In the short-term, it may be important to consider¶ providing performance-based funding for¶ deficiencies until a performance target is reached.¶ Performance-based funding could be used to¶ help states implement the appropriate systems for¶ managing assets or collecting key data, for example,¶ with additional future year funding available for¶ those showing performance improvements. When¶ considering the idea of providing funds for deficient¶ systems, it is understandable that this could be¶ viewed as rewarding bad behavior. This could¶ be overcome by requiring a larger non-federal¶ match for states applying for funding for¶ system deficiencies.¶ n Rewards for all states based on actual¶ performance in meeting the targets set as part of¶ their regional transportation plans: This provides¶ a less cumbersome way of distributing funds since¶ little evaluation is required; however, it may take a¶ few cycles of reporting on system performance to¶ understand where the bonus thresholds should be¶ for the metrics identified in this report, particularly¶ for empirical measures. Analysis of these metrics¶ over time will help to establish thresholds for a¶ national performance bonus program. Alt CausesAlt cause to cost overruns—technical data inevitably failsFlyvbjerg 5, Professor of Major Programme Management at Oxford University's Saïd Business School and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management, winner of the Fulbright Scholarship, (Bent, Policy and planning for large infrastructure : projects problems, causes, and cures, World Bank Publications, January 2005, Google Scholar)//AG Technical explanations account for cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in terms if imperfect forecasting techniques, inadequate data, honest mistakes, inherent problems in predicting the future, lack of experience on the part of forecasters, etc. this is the most common type of explanation of inaccuracy in forecasts (Ascher, 1978; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005; Morris and Hough, 1987; Wachs, 1990). Technical error may be reduced or eliminated by developing better forecasting models ,better data, and more experienced forecasters, according to this explanation. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.6 Mb. Share with your friends:
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