Counterplans Inuit Consult cp

Russia Arctic Mil

1nc – containment turn

No risk of Arctic War in the squo – cooperation and diplomacy

Tor Bukkvoll, Visiting fellow at The Leverhulme Program on the Changing Character of War, University of Oxford, 9/22/11, (“Prospects for peace and cooperation in the Arctic”, http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/31960.html)//AW

On a related note, one must also keep in mind that while there is nothing inevitable about a deterioration of relations in the Arctic, the fact that it can or will be avoided should also not be taken for granted. The chances for building peaceful relations in the Arctic are good, but it will demand serious focus, a great deal of dialogue and willingness to compromise from the states involved. Regional cooperation arrangements such as the Arctic and Barents Councils can also play an important role in this regard.

Despite the reasons for conflict discussed above, the conditions for conflict resolution through peaceful means are probably more promising in the Arctic than in many other regions where similar conflicts exist. First, all the states concerned, to varying degrees, are relatively economically developed and politically stable. They are therefore likely to be more predictable in their policies than less economically developed and politically stable states. Second, a comprehensive basis of agreements and normative acts for regulating bilateral relations in the area already exists. Third, civilian cooperation among the Arctic states is expanding on issues such as maritime search and rescue and environmental monitoring, to mention just two. Such cooperation could also be expected to have a spillover effect into the security realm.

Fourth, in military terms the most significant players in the Arctic – the USA and Russia – face much greater security challenges elsewhere in the world. The USA is concerned by the rise of China’s military capacity, their continued ability to be a significant military player if the Pacific, and the defense of U.S. interests in a number of hot spots in the developing world. Russia is concerned by the significant potential for political upheaval along its southern and eastern borders, in addition to also keeping an eye on China’s rising military might. Thus, both countries could be expected to work particularly hard to avoid the Arctic becoming yet another area of instability. Fifth, to some extent the Arctic five share a common interest in limiting non-Arctic states’ access to the region. On the one hand this could lead to greater cooperation among the Arctic five on limiting outside influence, but on the other hand it could also lead to conflict between them should differences of opinion arise about what the role of “outsiders” should be or whether some should be given priority over others.

Arctic neo-containment fails – eviscerates cooperation and sparks military brinksmanship – causes war

Robert W. Murray is the Vice-President, Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. Tom Keating is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, 4/25/14, (“Why Neo-Containment Should Not Extend to Arctic”, http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/why-neo-containment-should-not-extend-to-arctic/)//AW

The efforts to increase NATO’s common interests in the Arctic began as far back as 2010 with Norway broaching the subject at a NATO Summit. At that time, Canada requested that the Arctic be removed from the Summit’s agenda as Canada felt that NATO had no place in Arctic affairs.

The idea of extending NATO to the Arctic theatre is not a new one. Canadian officials raised the possibility of such an extended mandate in the 1950s when Soviet bombers posed a threat to North America through Arctic airspace. Canada’s concerns at the time, however, were shaped as much by the relationship with its southern neighbour as they were with the Soviet threat. Indeed, Ottawa was hoping to deflect living under an exclusively bilateral (NORAD) umbrella by including our European allies in the plan. The Americans and NATO’s European members took little interest in the Canadian request and the matter was dropped.

The situation today is completely different. Russian interests in the Arctic are not primarily about a global competition for power through territorial expansion (despite the indirect implications of power accumulation); it is about pressing territorial and resource claims to their most extreme limits. At the same time, every other Arctic state is pressing similar claims. While military power is not insignificant in asserting and defending such claims, it has not been the exclusive, nor even primary, means employed thus far. Diplomatic and institutional measures are still a viable option for resolving these territorial disputes. A NATO presence in the Arctic would severely undermine these non-military measures and would likely provoke Russia into a game of brinkmanship.

To date, Arctic relations have been entirely diplomatic, with no genuine hint of armed conflict on the immediate horizon. It is true that Arctic states have invested significant domestic resources into Arctic scientific exploration, resource extraction technology and military assets but thus far relations in the Arctic Region have been cooperative. For the first time since the crisis in Ukraine began, though, the Arctic became a component of a broader strategic discussion when Canada withdrew from the meeting of the Arctic Council’s task force on black carbon and methane held in Moscow. Even so, it is likely that Canada’s withdrawal from the proceedings had more to do with the fact that the meeting was being held in Moscow and not a sincere effort on Canada’s part to goad Russia on policy issues concerning the Arctic.

The disputes at play in the Arctic are also fundamentally different from those being played out in Ukraine. Any attempt to link them would be counterproductive on many fronts. Much has been made in the weeks since the implosion in Ukraine on the effects that NATO expansion has had on Russian foreign policy. Regardless of how one interprets the effects of NATO’s expansion to the borders of Russia, extending the alliance into the Arctic would only confirm the perception in Moscow that the alliance’s primary objective has been to encircle Russia and deny what it views as legitimate security interests on its borders. If Russians weren’t paranoid about being trapped before, such a move by NATO would surely reinforce such a view.

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2nc – no arctic war

The Arctic is safe – no miscalc, intentions are benign

(Vladimir, Counselor for nuclear affairs at the Russian embassy in Washington, Lecturere at Carnagie-Plowshare, “The Arctic: region of multilateral cooperation or platform for military tension?”, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_03/The-Arctic-region-of-multilateral-cooperation-or-platform-for-military-tension/)

Two other factors were contributing to the opening up of new opportunities in the Arctic: the emergence of new technologies and rapid thawing of the Arctic ice, both rendering natural resources and shipping routes more accessible. It should also be noted that the ice-cap depletion also has a military dimension, namely the gradual increase of US multipurpose nuclear submarines and the deployment of missile defence AEGIS warships in the Northern Seas may be considered by Russia as a threat to its national security.

No risk of war – empirics are conclusive

Hong 11

Nong, Postdoctoral fellow with the China Institute, University of Alberta, Deputy Director at the Research Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, ‘Arctic Energy: Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North?’, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375

While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote. The existing vehicles for dispute resolution and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will also help to reduce tensions. Joint management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries involved in a dispute might see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather than losing a claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future. Another example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where their borders extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between the two countries over this area, it seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential benefits. Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to dominate. They can also reflect cooperative, multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures are often considered desirable and even unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally. At the same time, cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – in some cases formally, in others less formally – by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust. Recognizing and respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other's rights under the international law. Examples between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22 November 2010, the Sovcomflot Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast, both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice as well as additional heavy-duty ice breakers will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive duel-bowed oil tankers that are set to come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they normally would through open water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is underway on two 70,000-tonne ships and two more 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on order.

2nc – containment

Containment turns the case – based on perception

Troitsky 10

Mikhail Troitsky is an associate professor at the Department of International Relations and Russia’s Foreign Policy of the MGIMO University. He holds a Doctorate in Political Science, 12/25/10, (“Containment Must Be Overcome”, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Containment-Must-Be-Overcome-15078)//AW

Containment, especially when based on nuclear deterrence, was the main link in the vicious circle that emerged in Russian-U.S. relations after World War II. The situation has changed dramatically since then, but people’s mindsets have not – you can’t trust the one you seek to deter. The lack of mutual trust makes it highly difficult to resolve conflicts.

COSTS OF CONTAINMENT

The containment strategy can freeze a conflict, but it cannot pave the way to its solution. Nuclear deterrence represents existential confrontation. Realizing this, economically developed nations seek to avoid a situation of containment (especially one involving nuclear weapons) in relations with any significant economic partner. Potential commercial costs would be too high.

By containing each other, the U.S. and Russia strongly impede mutually advantageous bilateral cooperation. The saga of Russia’s accession to the WTO, which has broken all records for the process’s duration, is hard to explain by anything other than the West’s psychology of containing Moscow. The refusal to sell the Opel car company to a Russian investor has shown that NATO member-countries are reluctant to share their latest industrial technologies (and not only military ones) with countries that are their opponents (at least potentially) in the military-political sphere. Mutual containment feeds mistrust, prevents interaction in the field of modernization and impedes efforts to find effective solutions to climate change, to work out a mutually advantageous regime for using transportation routes and natural resources in the Arctic, etc.

History knows examples of states making large-scale economic exchanges between themselves without establishing socio-economic or political rapprochement (for example, the Soviet Union and Finland during the Cold War). However, there have never been full-fledged economic relations between major powers containing each other. Strategic containment and overemphasis on the maintenance of the nuclear balance is against the logic of interstate relations within the economically developed part of the international community and against the imperative of multilateral cooperation in addressing the increasingly challenging global problems.

Today, this is well understood by China, for example. Beijing and Washington do not trust official declarations of mutual intentions in the military-political sphere. At the level of military planning, they probably proceed from the assumption that in case of exacerbation of the Taiwan problem, for example, the parties will have to resort to the rhetoric of nuclear deterrence. However, now that the U.S. accounts for about 15 percent of China’s trade, both Beijing and Washington are seeking to downplay the significance of potential nuclear deterrence.

Otherwise, economic cooperation with the United States, which is vital for China’s development, would directly depend on the parties’ perception of each other. In the event of a bitter confrontation between the two countries, in which they would contain each other in the security sphere, the employment by U.S. companies of even civilian advanced technologies for the production of goods and the provision of services in China would become a politicized issue. This would bury China’s hopes to maintain its economic growth rates and, consequently, social stability in the country.

Interstate relations within military-political alliances are the only sphere that guarantees against containment. Yet the psychology of the zero-sum game between Moscow and Washington is not a direct consequence of the fact that Russia is not a NATO member. The United States maintains close partner relations with states that are not in a formal alliance with it and that often oppose Washington on the international scene. These states include a wide range of different actors, from European “neutrals,” China and India to some Middle East countries. Russia also has experience of long and trustful interaction with countries that do not have formal allied relations with it. These include, for example, large states in the Middle East, some European countries and Russia’s neighbors that are not parties to the Collective Security Treaty Organization and that do not fully share Moscow’s position on military-political issues.

A revision of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States would not necessarily mean that Moscow and Washington will reach full agreement on the dynamics of further arms reductions. The renunciation of deterrence is not directly linked with the controversial “nuclear-free world” project and does not require an immediate recognition that nuclear weapons are rather a threat to international security than a factor of stability. As long as the parties are confident that the possession of nuclear weapons is an indicator of prestige and a factor of influence in the contemporary world, nothing prevents them from maintaining their nuclear arsenals at a level that they deem necessary and that they can justify to the public from a financial point of view.

The deterrence problem is not technical but political and psychological. It is not even the number of warheads and delivery vehicles the parties have that really matters, or the response time available to the leaders of Russia or the United States to an impending nuclear attack. These issues are only secondary to the perception by Moscow and Washington of each other as strategic rivals in the nuclear field. American diplomat and disarmament expert James Goodby wrote in his book Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations back in 2000 that it is desirable to exclude any nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States from possible development scenarios for sub-rational reasons. The parties must be kept from aggressive actions not by the awareness of huge material costs but shared values.

Russian Arctic doctrine proves counterbalancing only causes war

Nilsen 13

Thomas Nilsen, Former Senior Fellow of Bellona Foundation’s Russian study group, editor of BarentsObserver, 2/27/13, (“Danger of militarization of the Arctic exists”, http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/02/danger-militarization-arctic-exists-27-02)//AW

Putin made his speech at the expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry Board in Moscow, reviewing the ministry’s work last year and examined plans for the Armed Forces’ continued development.

“Methodical attempts are made to rock the strategic balance in one way or another. The US has practically started the second stage of its plan to set up a global missile defense system and there are probes into the possibility of NATO’s further eastward expansion. The danger of militarization of the Arctic exists,” Vladimir Putin said according to the transcripts posted at the presidential portal.

Russia has earlier communicated that the Arctic is an area with no military tension.

In his hardliner speech on Wednesday Putin urged Russia’s armed forces to continue reforms and radical rearmament.

“Our task - to create a mobile, well-equipped armed forces ready to respond promptly and adequately to any potential threats to peace, to protect our citizens, our allies, the future of our nation and state,” Vladimir Putin said.

Russia is currently increasing its spending on military hardware.

“By 2015, the proportion of the new generation of weapons should be 30 percent, and by 2020 to reach 70-100 percent,” Putin said.

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