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LinkContainment LinkStatus quo cooperative drilling solves Arctic relations – the plan’s military containment strategy escalates tensions and causes violence.Pate 10 – Chad Pate, Major in the US Air Force, Thesis paper for an MA in Security Studies, 2010 (“Easing the Arctic Tension: An Economic Solution,” Naval Postgraduate School, December, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11038) Yet Russian technology is incapable of extracting the oil and natural gas from its newly uncovered Arctic territory. Conversely, Western corporations are in need of new oil reserves and possess the technology to begin extraction almost immediately. The capitalist peace is based on the establishment of economic relationships, which serve to override the potential for increases in hostilities. The hydrocarbon industry may be where these relationships are forged. Achieving a capitalist peace is by no means a foregone conclusion. Political obstacles, such as the Russian law mentioned above, as well as counterarguments posed by realist critics will inhibit the transition from the region’s tense present state to one more pacific. 243 Facilitating the capitalist peace will require Russian leaders to reevaluate the costs and benefits of its barriers to FDI in the hydrocarbon industry. Considering its maturing wells and its dependence on oil and gas revenue as well as its use of gas for strategic leverage, Russia should comprehend the folly of fostering a business climate unattractive to investors. Unfortunately, Russia’s recent behavior has given little indication that it will soon reevaluate its policies. Its 2008 law as well as the examples set in Kovykta and Sakhalin may be indications that Russia would rather keep its resources in the ground rather than risk losing them in the competitive atmosphere that is capitalism. For its part, the United States should maintain its “reset” policy designed to create more peaceful American-Russian relations. Though the Obama Administration still adheres to NSPD-66, it has shown a willingness to depart from realist principles and adopt more conciliatory policies. 244 Continuing to do so may make Russia more receptive toward U.S. industry becoming involved in its strategic resources. There are at least two possibilities for how the situation in the Arctic will evolve. One resembles a realist solution with large increases in military capabilities and states posturing for regional dominance. This solution involves enormous expenditures and a future characterized by tension and possibly violence. The other solution appears to be more universally beneficial. With Western oil and natural gas corporations joined with those of Russia, the expectation is that such high levels of FDI would bring a kind of peace to the region. It is important to note that the prospect of a capitalist peace does not equate to a lack of rivalry. The resultant atmosphere will involve fierce competition over markets as both sides vie for greater profits and larger shares of resources. However, an atmosphere characterized by competition is much preferred over the realist vision of an atmosphere characterized by military conflict. This strategy specifically fails with Russia – escalates conflictPeople’s Daily Online, 5/8 (People’s Daily Online, “Will U.S. containment of Russia be effective?,” May 8, 2014, http://english.people.com.cn/98649/8620824.html, Accessed: 7/24/14, RH) This all shows that Obama is adopting a “containment” policy to undermine Putin economically and politically in the coming years, thus weakening his influence over Russia. Practically speaking, Obama’s containment policy may not be as effective in practice as is seemed when first proposed. The international economy is more interdependent and political power is more widely dispersed. Obama has not yet convinced his European allies to give active support to his policy of containment. For many European countries it seems an overreaction to impose harsh sanctions on Russia unless Russian troops are dispatched to the east of Ukraine. This attitude was particularly obvious during the visit of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to the United States. Germany has 6000 companies in Russia and nearly 30 percent of its natural gas and petroleum come from Russia. While showing its solidarity with the U.S., Merkel emphasized that a comprehensive solution was needed when the U.S. and the EU discuss sanctions on Russia if damage to the interests of some EU countries is to be avoided. Politically, the U.S. has encountered bigger obstacles in isolating Russia. In the United Nations vote on Ukraine many key countries were unwilling to side with America. India and South Africa abstained and America’s firm ally Israel was absent from the vote. The Ukraine has already split. Even without Russian intervention, the country is still faced with a major task: to rebuild Ukraine, establish its national consensus and revive its economy. Rather than trying to contain Russia, what the U.S. needs to do is cooperate and look for solutions based on negotiations. Otherwise, the situation is likely to deteriorate.
Containment turns the case – based on perceptionTroitsky 10 Mikhail Troitsky is an associate professor at the Department of International Relations and Russia’s Foreign Policy of the MGIMO University. He holds a Doctorate in Political Science, 12/25/10, (“Containment Must Be Overcome”, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Containment-Must-Be-Overcome-15078)//AW Containment, especially when based on nuclear deterrence, was the main link in the vicious circle that emerged in Russian-U.S. relations after World War II. The situation has changed dramatically since then, but people’s mindsets have not – you can’t trust the one you seek to deter. The lack of mutual trust makes it highly difficult to resolve conflicts. COSTS OF CONTAINMENT The containment strategy can freeze a conflict, but it cannot pave the way to its solution. Nuclear deterrence represents existential confrontation. Realizing this, economically developed nations seek to avoid a situation of containment (especially one involving nuclear weapons) in relations with any significant economic partner. Potential commercial costs would be too high. By containing each other, the U.S. and Russia strongly impede mutually advantageous bilateral cooperation. The saga of Russia’s accession to the WTO, which has broken all records for the process’s duration, is hard to explain by anything other than the West’s psychology of containing Moscow. The refusal to sell the Opel car company to a Russian investor has shown that NATO member-countries are reluctant to share their latest industrial technologies (and not only military ones) with countries that are their opponents (at least potentially) in the military-political sphere. Mutual containment feeds mistrust, prevents interaction in the field of modernization and impedes efforts to find effective solutions to climate change, to work out a mutually advantageous regime for using transportation routes and natural resources in the Arctic, etc. History knows examples of states making large-scale economic exchanges between themselves without establishing socio-economic or political rapprochement (for example, the Soviet Union and Finland during the Cold War). However, there have never been full-fledged economic relations between major powers containing each other. Strategic containment and overemphasis on the maintenance of the nuclear balance is against the logic of interstate relations within the economically developed part of the international community and against the imperative of multilateral cooperation in addressing the increasingly challenging global problems. Today, this is well understood by China, for example. Beijing and Washington do not trust official declarations of mutual intentions in the military-political sphere. At the level of military planning, they probably proceed from the assumption that in case of exacerbation of the Taiwan problem, for example, the parties will have to resort to the rhetoric of nuclear deterrence. However, now that the U.S. accounts for about 15 percent of China’s trade, both Beijing and Washington are seeking to downplay the significance of potential nuclear deterrence. Otherwise, economic cooperation with the United States, which is vital for China’s development, would directly depend on the parties’ perception of each other. In the event of a bitter confrontation between the two countries, in which they would contain each other in the security sphere, the employment by U.S. companies of even civilian advanced technologies for the production of goods and the provision of services in China would become a politicized issue. This would bury China’s hopes to maintain its economic growth rates and, consequently, social stability in the country. Interstate relations within military-political alliances are the only sphere that guarantees against containment. Yet the psychology of the zero-sum game between Moscow and Washington is not a direct consequence of the fact that Russia is not a NATO member. The United States maintains close partner relations with states that are not in a formal alliance with it and that often oppose Washington on the international scene. These states include a wide range of different actors, from European “neutrals,” China and India to some Middle East countries. Russia also has experience of long and trustful interaction with countries that do not have formal allied relations with it. These include, for example, large states in the Middle East, some European countries and Russia’s neighbors that are not parties to the Collective Security Treaty Organization and that do not fully share Moscow’s position on military-political issues. A revision of the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States would not necessarily mean that Moscow and Washington will reach full agreement on the dynamics of further arms reductions. The renunciation of deterrence is not directly linked with the controversial “nuclear-free world” project and does not require an immediate recognition that nuclear weapons are rather a threat to international security than a factor of stability. As long as the parties are confident that the possession of nuclear weapons is an indicator of prestige and a factor of influence in the contemporary world, nothing prevents them from maintaining their nuclear arsenals at a level that they deem necessary and that they can justify to the public from a financial point of view. The deterrence problem is not technical but political and psychological. It is not even the number of warheads and delivery vehicles the parties have that really matters, or the response time available to the leaders of Russia or the United States to an impending nuclear attack. These issues are only secondary to the perception by Moscow and Washington of each other as strategic rivals in the nuclear field. American diplomat and disarmament expert James Goodby wrote in his book Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations back in 2000 that it is desirable to exclude any nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States from possible development scenarios for sub-rational reasons. The parties must be kept from aggressive actions not by the awareness of huge material costs but shared values. Counterbalancing LinkRussian Arctic doctrine proves counterbalancing only causes warNilsen 13 Thomas Nilsen, Former Senior Fellow of Bellona Foundation’s Russian study group, editor of BarentsObserver, 2/27/13, (“Danger of militarization of the Arctic exists”, http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/02/danger-militarization-arctic-exists-27-02)//AW Putin made his speech at the expanded meeting of the Defense Ministry Board in Moscow, reviewing the ministry’s work last year and examined plans for the Armed Forces’ continued development. “Methodical attempts are made to rock the strategic balance in one way or another. The US has practically started the second stage of its plan to set up a global missile defense system and there are probes into the possibility of NATO’s further eastward expansion. The danger of militarization of the Arctic exists,” Vladimir Putin said according to the transcripts posted at the presidential portal. Russia has earlier communicated that the Arctic is an area with no military tension.
“Our task - to create a mobile, well-equipped armed forces ready to respond promptly and adequately to any potential threats to peace, to protect our citizens, our allies, the future of our nation and state,” Vladimir Putin said. Russia is currently increasing its spending on military hardware. “By 2015, the proportion of the new generation of weapons should be 30 percent, and by 2020 to reach 70-100 percent,” Putin said. Naval Deterrence LinkThe plan results in naval deterrence strategies – that forces Russian retaliation and American attacksPate 10 – Chad Pate, Major in the US Air Force, Thesis paper for an MA in Security Studies, 2010 (“Easing the Arctic Tension: An Economic Solution,” Naval Postgraduate School, December, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11038) NSPD-66 and the Arctic Roadmap’s proposed assessment of the Navy’s strategic deterrence capability in the Arctic region is equivalent to an investigation of its ability to strike with nuclear weapons, something with very little relevance when confronting non-state actor threats in the Northwest Passage. Further, the Roadmap highlights a need to “Initiate a Capabilities Based Assessment for Naval Arctic capabilities.” 67 The purpose of the Capabilities Based Assessment is to examine the Navy’s “current and required capability to execute undersea warfare, expeditionary warfare, strike warfare [and] strategic sealift.” 68 The acquisition of platforms specifically designed for these roles, such as aircraft carriers and destroyers, may also prove adequate for deterring terrorist infiltration, but based on Russia’s actions and its projected military presence in the North it is more logical that the capabilities based assessment is specifically designed to counter Russia. Yet the Navy is not the only branch of the U.S. military using Russian actions in the North to justify contemporary policy decisions. On 8 August 2007, Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) in Anchorage, Alaska, welcomed its first of a projected forty F-22 Raptor aircraft. 69 Only the second operational military installation to receive the state-of-the-art fighters and the first Pacific-based fighter wing to accept them, the decision to station “America’s most prominent air-superiority fighter” 70 so close to Russia’s border may be an attempt by Washington to ensure the region’s balance of power remains in favor of the United States. In 2000, when the Air Force was considering locations to base the second wing of F-22s after Langley AFB, Virginia, fielded the initial delivery; the locations under consideration were Eglin and Tyndall AFBs in Northwest Florida, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, and Elmendorf. 71 Though political and infrastructure considerations likely influenced the final outcome, the security of having a multi-role, stealth fighter in close proximity to Russia just as likely added weight to the final decision. For its part, the Russian military has not proved the decision to expand the U.S. presence in the North to be a poor one. 72 The examples below illustrate recent events where Russia has worked against the other Arctic states. The intent is to illustrate why realists believe there is potential for a military confrontation with Russia in the North and why they are proposing a buildup in their nations’ military capabilities. The remainder of this section details some of these actions. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.65 Mb. Share with your friends:
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