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2NC Must Read – No Arctic War

**The status quo features low propensity for military expansion in the Arctic – Russian belligerence is purely rhetoric aimed at the public. Containment efforts cause conflict and deteriorate relations.


Gorenburg 14 – Dmitry, Senior research scientist, CNA, Senior Fellow of Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and East European Studies, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2014 (“How to understand Russia’s Arctic strategy,” Monkey Cage, Washington Post, February 12th, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/12/how-to-understand-russias-arctic-strategy)//AW

During most of the late 20th century, the Arctic region was primarily a zone of military interests, used by both NATO and Soviet strategic forces as bases for their nuclear submarines and as testing grounds for intercontinental ballistic missiles. With the end of the Cold War, the Arctic initially lost its strategic significance. In the last decade, however, thanks to a combination of accelerating climate change and a rapid increase in energy prices, it has become a key zone of strategic competition among a range of regional actors and outside powers. Russia has become heavily involved in these fledgling efforts to develop the Arctic. Russian leaders now primarily see the Arctic as a potential source of economic growth for the country, both as a strategic resource base for the future and a potential maritime trade route.



Russian actions in the Arctic are governed by a combination of factors. The highest priority is undoubtedly economic development of Russia’s Arctic region. Russia’s natural resources ministry has stated that the parts of the Arctic Ocean claimed by Russia may hold more petroleum deposits than those currently held by Saudi Arabia. Russia has already put in place plans to exploit resources in this region, beginning with deposits on the Yamal Peninsula and adjacent offshore areas. The first offshore development is the Prirazlomnoye oil field south of Novaia Zemlia, which started production in December 2013. Russian companies face several challenges in developing these oil and gas resources. Because most of these deposits are offshore in the Arctic Ocean, where extraction platforms will be subject to severe storms and the danger of sea ice, the exploitation of these resources will require significant investment and in some cases the development of new technology, and will only be economically feasible if prices for oil and natural gas remain high.

The future economic potential of the region is not limited to the extraction of natural resources. In recent decades, it has become clear that climate change is leading to the rapid melting of the polar ice cap, which has already improved access to the Russian Arctic. Russian planners are banking on the relatively rapid development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which they hope might compete with the Suez Canal route for commercial maritime traffic. This will require a serious investment in icebreakers, new and expanded port facilities, places of refuge and other services.



While much of the recent increase in attention paid to the region and investment in it is the result of perceptions of the Arctic’s economic potential, Russian leaders also see the Arctic as a location where they can assert Russia’s status as a major international power. This is done by claiming sovereignty over Arctic territory and through steps to assure Russian security in the region. Many of the actions designed to promote Russian sovereignty claims to the Arctic have been highly symbolic in nature. The planting of a titanium flag on the sea floor at the North Pole in 2007 is typical of these types of actions, as are the highly publicized occasional air patrols along the Norwegian, Canadian and Alaskan coastlines. The recent action against Greenpeace protesters who sought to scale the Prirazlomnoye offshore oil rig is also highly symbolic in nature. While an almost identical protest in 2012 resulted in nothing more than the protesters being removed from the platform and their ship escorted out of Russian territory, the 2013 incident resulted in Russia impounding the Greenpeace ship and highly charged statements by Russian officials accusing the protesters of engaging in piracy. These actions are indicative of an effort by the country’s leadership to ensure that the Russian public perceives Russian sovereignty over the Arctic as uncontested.

Russian policy is thus pursued on two divergent tracks. The first track seeks international cooperation to ensure the development of the region’s resources. This includes efforts to settle maritime border disputes and other conflicts of interest in the region. The second track uses bellicose rhetoric to highlight Russia’s sovereignty over the largest portion of the Arctic. This is combined with declarations of a coming military buildup in the region. This second track is primarily aimed at shoring up support among a domestic audience. Managing the lack of alignment between these strategic and policy positions, and their potential for counter-productiveness, is an important challenge for Russia’s leadership.

On the whole, Russia seeks cooperative international relationships in the Arctic. Although Russian leaders’ rhetoric is at times confrontational, it is primarily targeted at maintaining their popularity with their domestic base. Bellicose statements by President Putin and his subordinates about ensuring Russian sovereignty in the Arctic should not be treated as indicators of an expansionist or militarist agenda in the region. Although Russia is planning to improve its military and border patrol capabilities in the Arctic, these improvements are primarily focused on areas such as protection of coastlines and offshore energy extraction installations, search-and-rescue operations and icebreaker capabilities, and should therefore not be viewed as inherently threatening to other Arctic states.

In observing Russian activities in the Arctic, the U.S. government needs to be careful to avoid assuming that provocative statements intended primarily for a domestic audience are signals of belligerent intent in the region. Instead, U.S. policymakers need to watch for more subtle signals of Russian intent. While statements of Russian intent to build up military capacity should not cause much worry, actions such as placing and deploying expeditionary forces would be far more provocative. Russian refusal to recognize the decisions or authority of international organizations in the Arctic, or its withdrawal from such organizations, should be considered a strong signal that Russia is truly shifting from a cooperative to a confrontational posture in the Arctic.


Diplomacy

Peaceful Arctic diplomacy via multiple institutions prevents conflict. Russia still perceives the region as a strategic priority that could require military protection if encroached upon.


CFR 14 – Council on Foreign Relations, 2014 (“The Emerging Arctic,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 25th, date acquired from “Emerging Arctic Explored in New CFR InfoGuide” available at http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic-explored-new-cfr-infoguide/p32654, article available at http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/#Diplomacy%20and%20Security | ADM)

Less than a decade ago, many geopolitical analysts warned that the Arctic had all of the makings for great-power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War. However, the movement has gone quite the other way. Despite a few remaining territorial disputes, the overwhelming majority of Arctic resources fall within accepted national boundaries and all Arctic governments have committed to settling disagreements peaceably. Notably, Russia and Norway resolved a decades-old maritime border dispute in 2010, equally dividing some 67,600 square miles of water in the Barents Sea, and partnering in the region on energy development. The historic deal is often cited as a model for future Arctic diplomacy.



The Arctic Council, the leading international forum for cooperation in the region, was established by the eight Arctic states in 1996 with participation from indigenous peoples like the Inuit and Saami, and all member states except the United States and Norway have appointed ambassador-level diplomats to represent their interests in the region. With a secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, the council is a forum that sponsors major assessments and studies, and develops policies and guidelines that focus on environmental protection and sustainable development. Chairmanship of the council rotates every two years.

But Arctic cooperation takes place in a variety of other forums. Nordic nations—Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland—also partner on sustainability and issues related to Arctic indigenous peoples via the Nordic Council. Nineteen countries are party to the International Arctic Science Committee, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to research. The nonprofit Arctic Circle, formed in 2013 by Icelandic president Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, aims to provide a setting for political and business groups, as well as other organizations from around the world, to discuss Arctic issues.

Still, steady diplomacy has not precluded nations from maneuvering to protect their interests in the region. Each of the eight Arctic nations has updated their strategy for the region in the last several years, including the United States (see interactive diagram below). Russia, the only non-NATO littoral Arctic state, has made a military buildup in the Arctic a strategic priority, restoring Soviet-era airfields and ports and marshaling naval assets. In late 2013, President Vladimir Putin instructed his military leadership to pay particular attention to the Arctic, saying Russia needed “every lever for the protection of its security and national interests there.” He also ordered the creation of a new strategic military command in the Russian Arctic by the end of 2014.

Economic powers further afield are also angling for a larger role in the Arctic. India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and China became Arctic Council observer states in 2013. Analysts say Beijing is particularly attracted to the region given its mounting energy demands and reliance on maritime trade. Chinese officials now characterize their country as a “near-Arctic state,” and Beijing has recently increased its investment in polar research, spending some $60 million annually, and ordered a second, $300 million ice-breaking research ship. China strengthened its toehold in the Arctic by signing a free trade agreement with Iceland, its first with a European country, and building an embassy that is Reykjavik’s largest.

Cooperation

No risk of Arctic War in the squo – cooperation and diplomacy


Bukkvoll 11

Tor Bukkvoll, Visiting fellow at The Leverhulme Program on the Changing Character of War, University of Oxford, 9/22/11, (“Prospects for peace and cooperation in the Arctic”, http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/31960.html)//AW

On a related note, one must also keep in mind that while there is nothing inevitable about a deterioration of relations in the Arctic, the fact that it can or will be avoided should also not be taken for granted. The chances for building peaceful relations in the Arctic are good, but it will demand serious focus, a great deal of dialogue and willingness to compromise from the states involved. Regional cooperation arrangements such as the Arctic and Barents Councils can also play an important role in this regard.

Despite the reasons for conflict discussed above, the conditions for conflict resolution through peaceful means are probably more promising in the Arctic than in many other regions where similar conflicts exist. First, all the states concerned, to varying degrees, are relatively economically developed and politically stable. They are therefore likely to be more predictable in their policies than less economically developed and politically stable states. Second, a comprehensive basis of agreements and normative acts for regulating bilateral relations in the area already exists. Third, civilian cooperation among the Arctic states is expanding on issues such as maritime search and rescue and environmental monitoring, to mention just two. Such cooperation could also be expected to have a spillover effect into the security realm.

Fourth, in military terms the most significant players in the Arctic – the USA and Russia – face much greater security challenges elsewhere in the world. The USA is concerned by the rise of China’s military capacity, their continued ability to be a significant military player if the Pacific, and the defense of U.S. interests in a number of hot spots in the developing world. Russia is concerned by the significant potential for political upheaval along its southern and eastern borders, in addition to also keeping an eye on China’s rising military might. Thus, both countries could be expected to work particularly hard to avoid the Arctic becoming yet another area of instability. Fifth, to some extent the Arctic five share a common interest in limiting non-Arctic states’ access to the region. On the one hand this could lead to greater cooperation among the Arctic five on limiting outside influence, but on the other hand it could also lead to conflict between them should differences of opinion arise about what the role of “outsiders” should be or whether some should be given priority over others.

No Escalation

No risk of war – empirics are conclusive


Hong 11

Nong, Postdoctoral fellow with the China Institute, University of Alberta, Deputy Director at the Research Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, ‘Arctic Energy: Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North?’, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375


While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote. The existing vehicles for dispute resolution and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will also help to reduce tensions. Joint management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries involved in a dispute might see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather than losing a claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future. Another example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where their borders extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between the two countries over this area, it seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential benefits. Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to dominate. They can also reflect cooperative, multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures are often considered desirable and even unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally. At the same time, cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – in some cases formally, in others less formally – by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust. Recognizing and respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other's rights under the international law. Examples between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22 November 2010, the Sovcomflot Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast, both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice as well as additional heavy-duty ice breakers will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive duel-bowed oil tankers that are set to come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they normally would through open water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is underway on two 70,000-tonne ships and two more 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on order.

No Miscalculation

The Arctic is safe – no miscalc, intentions are benign


Rybachenkov 13

(Vladimir, Counselor for nuclear affairs at the Russian embassy in Washington, Lecturere at Carnagie-Plowshare, “The Arctic: region of multilateral cooperation or platform for military tension?”, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_03/The-Arctic-region-of-multilateral-cooperation-or-platform-for-military-tension/)


Some western media have recently been highlighting the view that military conflicts in the struggle to secure the Arctic's natural resources are inevitable. Russia is carefully monitoring developments in polar region and considers the general situation in the area to be positive, stable and, on the whole, predictable, based on the assumption that there are no immediate issues that might call for a military solution. This assessment has recently been confirmed in a report by the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI), which refuted recent conjecture about a polar arms race. It is commonly recognised that there are currently three major factors determining the Arctic situation; Firstly, the end to military and political confrontation from the Cold War when the Arctic was almost exclusively seen in the context of flight trajectories for strategic nuclear weapons as well a route for nuclear submarine patrols. Now the threat of a global nuclear war is substantially reduced, with US–Russian arms control treaties being a key element in the gradual movement towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Impartial assessment of the arms control process shows that both countries' nuclear potentials have steadily diminished over the last 20 years. The START 1 treaty resulted in the removal of about 40% of the nuclear weapons deployed in Russia and the USA while the 2010 New START treaty provided for their further fourfold reduction. Substantial efforts have also been made by both countries to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear launches due to unauthorised actions or misunderstandings: strategic nuclear bombers were taken off full time alert and “Open ocean targeting" was mutually agreed, meaning that in the event of an accidental launch, the missile would be diverted to land in the open ocean.

Two other factors were contributing to the opening up of new opportunities in the Arctic: the emergence of new technologies and rapid thawing of the Arctic ice, both rendering natural resources and shipping routes more accessible. It should also be noted that the ice-cap depletion also has a military dimension, namely the gradual increase of US multipurpose nuclear submarines and the deployment of missile defence AEGIS warships in the Northern Seas may be considered by Russia as a threat to its national security.



Russia was the first Arctic state to adopt, in 2008, a long term policy report in response to the new realities, it pointed to the Arctic region as a, “strategic resource base for the country" which would require the development of a new social and economic infrastructure as well as an upgrading of military presence in the region to safeguard the Arctic territory. The document however underlined that there was no question of militarising the Arctic and expressed the importance of sub-regional and international cooperation to form a favourable social, cultural and economic space. All other Arctic states have adopted similar strategies with the key common point being a statement that the national interests of each Arctic state can only be met through multilateral cooperation. A “race" for territory, energy and seafood has been curtailed by historical decisions taken at the 2008 Ilulissat (Greenland) meeting when five Arctic coastal states declared that their basic framework for future cooperation, territorial delimitation, resolution of disputes and competing claims would be the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS ).

AT: “Ukraine Undermines Cooperation”

The Arctic is largely insulated from the Ukraine crisis – Arctic cooperation over a host of issues is still likely and resolves any tensions


Gudev 14 – Pavel, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Center for North American Studies, holds a Ph.D., interviewed by Eleonora Milazzo, Arctic Climate Change Emerging Leaders Fellow for the Ecologic Institute in Berlin, 2014 (“Prospects of cooperation in U.S.-Russia relations in the Arctic,” Russian International Affairs Council, March 19th, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/arctic-cooperation/?id_4=1053 | ADM)

In the current situation, bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia run the risk of becoming increasingly problematic. Do you think this will affect Arctic cooperation?

In the last years, we have witnessed a deep evolution in the understanding of the Arctic issues among both American and Russian experts. We have understood that we are allies rather than enemies and that we have shared interests in the Arctic.

At the time being, all countries are willing to cooperate in the Arctic. This willingness remains in spite of the crisis in Ukraine or in any other sphere. The Arctic has been and will be a very fruitful field of cooperation between Russia and the U.S., Norway, and Canada. I don’t think there will be any problems. I believe that what we need is to more openly discuss all the issues. In 2013, the U.S. signed the new Arctic Strategy. It refers to the American national interest all the time, but the American experts did not tell us what this national interest is. We need clarity and openness in discussing our goals.

The U.S. is going to chair the Arctic Council in 2015. Both American and Russian authorities consider Arctic cooperation as one of the most fruitful. What will the U.S. agenda be? What do you expect from the American chairmanship of the Council?

What we expect is enhanced cooperation on a number of issues. First of all, we expect to strengthen coast guard and naval cooperation. In the Arctic, there is no such possibility for military conflict. Still, we need to regulate all maritime activities, especially those conducted by non-Arctic states like China or South Korea. All activities, from fisheries to scientific research, must be conducted in accordance with the law. To ensure this, we need to enhance cooperation between the coast guards. When the Canadian Minister Stephen Harper states that they are strengthening their navy or their coast guards, this does not mean that we are witnessing an arm race in the Arctic. It just shows the tendency to regulate unregulated activities[1]. Also, enhanced coast guard cooperation with the U.S. and with the other Arctic states will help in tackling the new threats of the globalized world. Security concerns such as terrorism, piracy, and drug and human trafficking are shared by both Russia and the U.S. Tackling these challenges effectively is in everyone’s interest.

Ukraine doesn’t change Russian presence in the Arctic – militarization is too expensive of a strategy


Canadian Press 14 – The Canadian Press, citing Michael Byers, a professor of international law at the University of British Columbia, holds a Ph.D. from Cambridge University, 2014 (“Canada continues talks with Russia as part of Arctic Council,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News, March 26th, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-continues-talks-with-russia-as-part-of-arctic-council-1.2587566 | ADM)

NATO keeping close eye on Russia



International politicians expressed concerns earlier this month about how Russia's actions in Ukraine may affect Arctic relations.

Former U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton said Russia's reopening of old Soviet military bases in the Arctic could be seen in a different light given its actions in Ukraine. Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson made similar comments.

Observers say NATO hasn't seen any moves yet in the Russian Arctic that alarm them.

"NATO countries keep a close eye on Russian military activities and nothing in the Arctic, so far, has caused them any concern," said Michael Byers, a professor of international law at the University of British Columbia and author of several books on the Arctic.

"That said, NATO countries will certainly be keeping an even closer eye on Russia from now on.

"The Russians have been quite co-operative in the Arctic during the past decade, probably because they realize how expensive it would be to take another approach, especially one involving militarization."


Ukraine crisis doesn’t affect NATO presence or Russian military activity in the Arctic – at worst, it merely increases vigilance on both sides, which magnifies the link


Fouche 14 – Gwladys, Oslo, Reporting for Reuters, citing Ine Eriksen Soereide, Norwegian Defense Minister, 2014 (“Wary of Russia, Norway urges NATO vigilance in Arctic,” Reuters, May 20th, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-norway-defence-russia-idUSBREA4J0HE20140520 | ADM)

(Reuters) - NATO needs to become more watchful about defending its members' security, including in the Arctic, because of the 'completely new' situation created by Russia's behavior towards Ukraine, Norway's defense minister said in an interview.

Until now, NATO's response to Russia's annexation of Crimea has chiefly focused on reassuring anxious members in Central and Eastern Europe that until a generation ago were dominated - or, in the case of the Baltic states, directly ruled - by Moscow.

But Norway's Ine Eriksen Soereide told Reuters that Russia's actions raised broader questions about NATO's collective defense - significant comments from a country that borders Russia and is as keen as Moscow to tap Arctic minerals, oil and gas.

"Ukraine has permanently changed relations between Russia and the international community, including between Russia and NATO," Soereide said.

"We are in a completely new security situation where Russia shows both the ability and the will to use military means to achieve political goals."

She said Norway has long pushed for NATO not only to intervene in crises such as Afghanistan, but to strengthen the collective defense of its members - an idea central to NATO's founding treaty, which declares that an attack on any one member country will be treated as an attack against all.

"We see this issue comes more to the fore in the discussions in NATO now than before. It is clear the Ukraine crisis has given the issue a push in the past weeks," Soereide said.

'CORE AREAS'

Western governments have declared Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine illegal, and accused Moscow of destabilizing parts of eastern Ukraine where pro-Russian separatists have taken over public buildings and declared a breakaway state.

Moscow blames the tensions on the pro-Western Ukrainian government. The Kremlin said on Monday President Vladimir Putin had ordered Russian forces near Ukraine back to their bases, but NATO and the United States said they saw no sign that tens of thousands of Russian troops there had pulled back.

Soereide stopped short of saying that the crisis had increased the threat level in the Arctic, from where Russia shipped its first oil last month.

"But it demands of us that we be more watchful of the activities that are taking place in our core areas," the minister said. "We need a NATO that has a good understanding of its regional areas."



Since the Ukraine crisis broke out, Norway has not registered any new increase in Russian military activity in the Arctic, Soereide said. "But we see that there has been an increase in activity over time."


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