Democracy Promotion/Soft Power—Affirmative Tentative 1AC


Democracy Promotion Good—Terrorism



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Democracy Promotion Good—Terrorism

Democracy is vital to counterterrorism


O'Connell 12 - Jamie O'Connell is a Senior Fellow of the Honorable G. William and Ariadna Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, as well as a Lecturer in Residence. He teaches and writes on political and legal development, and has particular expertise in law and development, transitional justice, democratization, post-conflict reconstruction, and business and human rights. (“Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy in Arab States Can Benefit the West,” Stanford Journal of International Law, Lexis Nexis, Summer, 2012) STRYKER

C. Preventing Transnational Terrorism Many of the bloodiest terrorist attacks against Western countries in the last fifteen years have had some connection to Arab countries, rather than being entirely homegrown. n150 (It would be grossly unjust to associate Arabs generally with terrorism; those involved in terrorism represent a tiny fringe, and Westerners also perpetrate terrorist acts. n151) Social scientists understand the impact of democracy on transnational terrorism less well than its impact on domestic instability or interstate conflict. n152 Their findings indicate, however, that democratization of Arab countries is likely to serve Western countries' interests by reducing the threat of terrorist attacks against them. The U.S. government, under both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, has made democratization a central component of the country's official counterterrorism strategy. Large-sample statistical research supports this conclusion. n153 The large majority of studies find that freer, more democratic countries have been less likely to generate transnational terrorist attacks than more repressive, less democratic [*376] countries. n154 Consequently, Western countries are likely to benefit from liberalization of countries from which terrorism might originate. Alan Krueger and David Laitin examined countries with high civil liberties and found that attacks on them were most likely to originate in countries with restricted civil liberties and least likely to originate in ones with expansive ones. n155 Findings such as these lead some scholars to urge policymakers to "encourage more liberal institutions to facilitate political and economic freedom" within states, so as to reduce terrorism originating in those states. n156 Some transnational terrorists attack foreign targets in order to influence their own governments. n157 Lacking effective channels for influencing their government directly, such as voting, citizens of autocracies try to pressure them indirectly, by attacking their Western democratic allies. n158 (One of Osama bin Laden's oldest grievances was the presence of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia, with Saudi government approval, because this placed them too close to Mecca. n159) Such attacks can lead the public in the target state to press their own (democratic) leaders to try to influence the policies of the terrorists' (autocratic) home [*377] government or more generally to scale back their support for it. n160 Democratization of Arab countries would reduce the number of their citizens who found foreign terrorism appealing for these reasons by giving them a peaceful, legal, and less dangerous means for shaping their governments' policies. n161 As Jennifer Windsor wrote in 2003: The source of much of the current wave of terrorist activity - the Middle East - is not coincidentally also overwhelmingly undemocratic, and most regimes in the region lack the legitimacy and capacity to respond to the social and economic challenges that face them... . Democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for participation in policymaking, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the recent rise of Islamist extremism. n162 The United States' National Strategy for Counterterrorism adopts this logic. "Promoting democracy" was the sole "long-term" component of the strategy President George W. Bush officially promulgated in 2006. n163 "Transnational terrorists are recruited from populations with no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse political vision based on violence and destruction." n164 President Obama has maintained democratization as a central component of his official counterterrorism strategy: Promoting representative, responsive governance is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy and directly contributes to our [counterterrorism] goals. Governments that place the will of their people first and encourage peaceful change directly contradict the al-Qa'ida ideology. Governments that are responsive to the needs of their citizens diminish the discontent of their people and the associated drivers and grievances that al-Qa'ida actively attempts to exploit. Effective governance reduces the traction and [*378] space for al-Qa'ida, reducing its resonance and contributing to what it fears most - irrelevance. n165

[Insert terrorism impact]

Democracy Promotion Good—Africa

African democracy is slipping—the US needs to alter DOMESTIC practices to beat out authoritarianism


Joseph 14 - Richard Joseph is John Evans Professor of International History and Politics at Northwestern University. He is the author of Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (1987; reissued 2014). He is writing books on post-1975 Nigerian politics and society; and on governance, development, and the state in Africa. (“Growth, Security, and Democracy in Africa,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 25, Number 4, pp. 60-72, Project Muse, October 2014) STRYKER

Today, as is often observed, democracy in many places must battle unfriendly circumstances while experiencing a global slippage. In line with this trend, democracy in Africa has been on the retreat. As Freedom House has charted in its annual Freedom in the World reports, swings in civil-liberties and political-rights scores have been more pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other world region. Two years ago, I noted that media accounts presented Africa’s story as a hopeful tale accompanied by impressive economic-growth statistics. There has also been a disaster narrative of corruption, bogus elections, rights abuses, epidemics, and violent conflicts. Readers have been left to resolve the antinomies.1 I suggested a third account called “prismatic” because, just as a [End Page 61] prism separates the various colors that comprise a beam of light, this account explores the complex interplay of local, regional, and global factors that affect Africa.2 Security is now high on the African agenda, and so are accelerated growth and development as well as democracy. Discoveries of major oil, natural gas, and coal deposits are making the continent more significant in meeting global energy needs. Abundant and underused land will steadily contribute to global food supplies. And expanding economies will continue to provide increased opportunities for investors. It is the physical-security side of the African ledger, however, that poses the greatest challenge, as dramatized recently by violent insurgencies and disease outbreaks in West Africa. How this challenge is tackled will greatly affect progress in other spheres. The “complex interplay” of forces in contemporary Africa is one that prevailing paradigms are unable to explain. The present reflections, like the ones I offered in these pages almost a quarter-century ago regarding the original democratic abertura, are provisional.3 Now as then, events are moving swiftly and on a broad front. The stalling of democratization globally is taking place amid other major developments, especially terrorism, warfare, and the rise of a phenomenon referred to as authoritarian modernization. Authoritarian modernization is curious because, scarcely two decades ago, the very term would have seemed an oxymoron. Commenting on the revolutions of 1989, Marc Plattner recently wrote that a “key reason for the resurgence of democracy undoubtedly lay in the increasingly manifest failings of its autocratic rivals.”4 Today, that assessment is often reversed. The Western model of liberal-democratic development is losing ground to an authoritarian alternative. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge capture this trend and suggest that the liberal democracies need a “fourth revolution” in governance and affairs of state (to follow the revolutions of state sovereignty, individual rights, and moderate welfarism) if they are to avoid falling permanently behind their autocratic rivals. “A global race is on,” write these two British journalists, “to devise the best kind of state and the best system of government.” The dysfunctions of liberal democracy can be contrasted, they contend, with “the impressive track records” of “modernizing authoritarianism pursued by Asian countries such as Singapore and China.” The key concern is performance—namely, “which innovations in governing yield the best results.”5 Michael Ignatieff agrees that “the liberal state is in crisis.” Authoritarian modernization now forms “an alternate route to modern development: growth without democracy and progress without freedom.”6 Ignatieff’s conclusion is widely shared: It is “difficult to defend liberal democracy with much enthusiasm abroad if it works so poorly at home.”7 Plattner is hopeful that the “apparent vigor” today of modernizing autocracy as compared to liberal democracy will “prove to be temporary.”8 David Brooks is not sure. He sees “an ideological war” being [End Page 62] waged “between centralized authoritarian capitalism and decentralized liberal democratic capitalism.” This “battle of regimes is playing out with special force in Africa.” While democracy is experiencing “a crisis of morale,” autocracies “are feeling confident and on the rise.”9

The US is key


Gyimah-Boadi 15 - E. Gyimah-Boadi is executive director of both the Ghana Center for Democratic Development and the Afrobarometer, and professor of political science at the University of Ghana, Legon. (“Africa’s Waning Democratic Commitment,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 26, Number 1, p. 100-111, Project Muse, January 2015) STRYKER

Finally, the illiberal acts of the United States and other Western democratic nations in the post-9/11 global “war on terror” have given Africa’s elected autocrats easy justification for their own retreat from the principles and practices of democratic accountability. African political elites opportunistically cite U.S. actions such as the rendition or waterboarding of suspected terrorists as examples to justify their own privileging of national-security interests over citizens’ rights. Similarly, Africa’s elected autocrats are finding great comfort in the resurgence of authoritarian and illiberal role models provided by China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and others.


African democracy is crucial to stability


Ohlson and Söderberg 2 - Thomas Ohlson is an Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict at Uppsala University. Mimmi Söderberg is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict at Uppsala University. (“From Intra-State War To Democratic Peace in Weak States,” http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18593_UPRP_No_5.pdf 2002) STRYKER

***2002 was the date of an earlier version of this article

To understand politics in the weak state context, Chabal and Daloz argue, one must consider the ways in which individuals, groups and communities seek to instrumentals the resources that they command within the context of political and economic disorder. Disorder in many African states, for example, should not be viewed merely as a state of failure or neglect, but should also be seen as a condition that offers opportunities for those who know how to play the system. The failure of the state to be emancipated from society may have limited the scope for good government and sustainable economic growth, but the weakness and inefficiency of the state has nevertheless been profitable to political elites and probably even more so to European and North American economic actors. The clientelist networks within the formal political apparatus have allowed the elite to raise the resources necessary for providing their constituencies with protection and services in exchange for the recognition of their political and social status. The instrumentalisation of the prevailing political disorder may thus function as a disincentive to the establishment of a more properly institutionalised state on the Weberian model as well as to the implementation of a democratic political system. “Why should the African political elites dismantle a political system which serves them so well?” (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 14). In our view, the important merit of the above arguments is that they point to the highly negative potential of patrimonial structures. Undeniably, these structures pose problems for durable peace, legitimacy and for addressing the so-called national question, that is, for the processes of state formation and nation-building. However, we caution against seeing this as a zero-sum game: either the holders of state power pursue a genuine national interest in the Weberian sense or they completely succumb to the structures of private, sectarian interests. Such is not the case. Rather, we argue that every state, weak or strong, has both Weberian and patrimonial structures. This, too, is a continuum and the balance between the two types of structure 13 should be understood as a variable, not a constant. Neither enlightened leadership nor popular pressure from below should be underestimated. Many weak states have made considerable moves towards greater legitimacy. In addition, when legitimacy is really low, even minor improvements in degrees of rule of law and good governance may generate major improvements in terms of closing the legitimacy gap.


African war goes nuclear


DEUTSCH 2002

(Jeffrey, Political Risk Consultant and Ph.D in Economics, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol 2, No 9, Nov 18, http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html)



The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.


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