Dr. Constantinos Filis Dimopoulos Dimosthenis, Karagiannopoulos Petros-Damianos


North Atlantic Treaty Organization



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North Atlantic Treaty Organization


One could validly argue that the Ukrainian crisis is a product of the continuous expansion of NATO, which following the dissolution of the USSR absorbed a great number of former Warsaw Pact Member-States and slowly, but steadily started to move its borders closer and closer towards Russia. Since the mid-1990s, when NATO started its march eastwards Russia opposed its plans, but there was little it could do as it was hampered by economic and political crises. However, today’s Russia is stronger than it what it used to be in the 90’s, that was evident by their reaction in 2008 and by its actions in the Ukrainian crisis, if it was not apparent already by its enhanced economic, military and political influence around the globe.

One of the key problems NATO has faced so far in the Ukrainian crisis, which led it to be nothing more than an observer, is the reality that Ukraine is not a member of NATO and has no legitimate reason to get involved, since there have been no direct threats towards the security of its member-states.

Secondly, NATO being a military alliance does not have the appropriate tools to deal with the covert and indirect aggression, which is the tactics Russia has used so far; this is the reason why NATO and the West have been taken by surprise several times during the crisis. [92]

So far NATO’s responses to the Ukrainian crisis has been to suspend almost all cooperation with Moscow, decide the provision of military assistance to Ukraine by providing training to the Ukrainian forces, hold a number of NATO exercises and Joint exercises between NATO and Ukraine and the strategic redeployment of a handful of airplanes and warships at the eastern member-states. NATO has already decided to increase presence in Europe with two main initiatives, the European Reassurance Initiative and the Readiness Action Plan. These two initiatives are not aiming to deter Russia, after all no one believes that Russia is interested in attacking any member of the alliance, but rather to reassure nervous allies in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. [93]

The most important things that NATO should do are: firstly to make sure that the alliance is strengthened so it can hold together politically and convey the message it cannot be picked apart; and secondly that it refrains from any further expansion eastwards as such a move would definitely provoke Moscow and would cause unpredictable reactions, that may as well destabilize not only Europe but seriously impact global politics.

Russian Federation


So far the Russian Federation has been the leading actor in the Ukrainian crisis. President Vladimir Putin has been calling the shots, while the EU and the US are merely trying to react.

Before the tools at Russia’s disposal are discussed, it is imperative to understand the reasoning behind Russia’s actions so far, as well as its objectives. European Union’s attempts to lure Ukraine away from Russia’s sphere of influence was perceived and is a direct threat to Russia’s core national interests, as Russia sees itself as the unique dominant force in the post-soviet space. If Ukraine was to align from the west and distance itself from Russia, firstly shattered any hopes for a successful and viable Eurasian Union and secondly highly increased the danger of having NATO at Russian borders in the mid-term future.

What Westerners failed to grasp was that President Putin considers Ukraine so important to Russia, that he would be willing to wage overt war for its sake, if he had to. Putin has been willing to pay a substantial price, because Russia’s vital interests were at stake. Neither the European Union nor the US have any vital interests at stake in Ukraine, which is the reason they have repeatedly stated that they are not going to wage war against Russia for Ukraine’s sake. [8] A nation should never vehemently "vocally" oppose actions by another country when they are unwilling and or unable to influence the outcome of a regional dispute.

President Putin believes that the Maidan and the ousting of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych was a western plot, which aimed to weaken Moscow and deprive a close partner from it. The danger of losing Ukraine, such an integral partner for Russia, created certain objectives that had to be achieved and specific messaged had to be communicated to the West and the rest of the international community.

Russia’s objectives so far have been the following: firstly to put an end to the NATO and EU expansionism, particularly in the post-Soviet space by making it clear that Russia will firmly oppose such plans; secondly Russia had to solidify the control over its naval base in Sevastopol, which preserves its ability to project power in the Mediterranean and beyond; and thirdly Russia had to remind Ukraine’s Leaders – current and future – that Russia has several ways to seriously disrupt their country and it is in their interest to remain Moscow’s good books. [8]

Russia has seemingly managed to achieve its goals, with a small cost and has tried to de-escalate the crisis, by accepting the results of the Ukrainian Presidential elections and by slowly and discreetly distancing himself from the separatists and decreasing his assistance towards them. [8] Russia most likely will not attempt to further escalate the crisis, unless it is seriously provoked or its gains become endangered.

The message Russia needed to communicate to the world has been that it has recovered from the post-Soviet meltdown, that it is seeking to play a more prominent role in the new multipolar international system and that it had no longer to accept whatever indignities anyone might decide to impose on it.

Russia is aware that Ukrainian economy is already collapsed, therefore has been and is willing to use several economic measures in its efforts to coerce the Ukrainian Government and influence the outcome of the crisis. Such economic measures are the exports of natural gas to Ukraine, as well as the other bilateral trade relations, which can be severed or severely disrupted, if Moscow wants to, as Russia is its biggest trading partner. [94]

Taking under consideration the imminent austerity measures and reforms that Ukraine will have to adopt in order to receive its IMF bailout loan; one would expect that the undisrupted continuation and further improvement of bilateral trade with Russia is essential for the viability of the economic recovery of the country.

If Ukraine and Russia do not reach an agreement over the gas debt and prices and the Russian natural gas does not start to flow towards Ukraine soon, the social and economic consequences could be severe. Moscow realizes that austerity measures, which most likely will include lower salaries and pensions, cuts in healthcare and social security and increase gas prices, can turn public opinion very quickly against Kiev, especially if the economy continues to deteriorate. A deteriorating Ukrainian economy can not only alienate the people with its current government but also with its current western patrons, who will have brought the IMF and its measures to their country. So Moscow understands that unconventional warfare in the form of measures targeting the Ukrainian economy can coerce and disrupt the current government and, in the long term, possibly overthrow it as well.

Russia has conducted in great extent and effect a series of unconventional warfare tactics. That has been the case in Crimea and currently in Eastern Ukraine. Russia used pro-Russians, alongside Special Forces, mercenaries and secret agents in order to achieve a swift and covert capture of Crimea, while at the moment uses similar tactics with the aim of destabilizing Eastern Ukraine, by providing guidance, training, supplies and other types of assistance to pro-Russian separatists. [95] [92]

A dismembered Ukraine is not something that the Kremlin wants. Moscow has a genuine interest to have a weakened but stable Ukraine, if not docile to Moscow at least cooperative. That is another reason Russia is not interested in annexing Eastern Ukraine as it did with Crimea. Russia wants a decentralized Ukrainian Government preoccupied with its internal rifts, so it can retain its control and influence over the country.

The above makes overt actions, like a direct military intervention in Ukraine by Russia rather impossible. However, the stakes at risk for Russia are great and if it is left with no other option or it is seriously provoked to the stated that it feels ridiculed in front of the international community, a direct military intervention in Ukraine would be considered as an option.

Russia has taken all the measures necessary to reassure both Kiev and the West of its willingness to do so, as it has held a great number of surprise military drills along its borders with Eastern Ukraine and the amassment of large number of troops and other military assets along the borders for prolonged periods of time.

While the US has unsuccessfully attempted to isolate Russia, Moscow has been carefully building before and during the crisis stronger ties with several countries. President Putin recently has improved diplomatic and economic ties with countries like Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, China and currently is on a tour to Latin America. [78] [82] [87] [80] [96] [97] [98] [86] [99] [100]

Nevertheless, Russia - despite its current advantageous position and the ample of tools at its disposal- has nothing to benefit from if the situation in Ukraine escalates further and ends up destabilizing the whole region.





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