[Draft Book Chapter] South Asia in transition: India-Sri Lanka relations in the twenty-first century Arijit Mazumdar, Phd assistant Professor of Political Science University of St
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- Economic Linkages
- Table 1: India-Sri Lanka Trade Statistics, 2006-2011 (in US$ million)
- Total trade India’s trade balance with Sri Lanka
- Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2012
- Political Transition
New Trends and Transformations Rajapakse came to power through the support of the JHU and the JVP. A nationalist hardliner, he soon advocated a military solution to the Tamil insurgency. Currently, Rajapakse is basking in the glory of the victory over the LTTE. The international community is trying to persuade the government to respond to the historical grievances of the Tamils but the government has shown little inclination to do so. What is unmistakable though is that Sri Lanka is a country in transition. The end of the civil war is an opportunity for India to deepen its engagement with Sri Lanka and push for national reconciliation. Following the IPKF debacle, India decided to adopt a ‘hands-off’ policy to the conflict on the island. Later, through trade and investment, India has attempted to rebuild relations. New economic linkages, political transition and greater US interest in the South Asian region provide India with the opportunity to further consolidate its relationship with Sri Lanka. The focus of this section is to examine the new developments that have the potential to reshape ties between the two countries. Economic Linkages Sri Lanka has been witness to the longest civil war in South Asia. The experience of countries that have been affected by civil war during the Cold War period suggests that domestic conflicts have a very destructive impact on economic development. However, Sri Lanka appears to be an anomaly in this regard. The average annual growth rate during the civil war (1983-2009) was about 4.86% (World Bank 2012). Since its independence, Sri Lanka has achieved remarkable success on most human development indices. Successive governments have wisely invested in education and healthcare (Pradhan 2001). Today, Sri Lanka has a better record in human development than its larger neighbor India. The civil war did not appear to have a substantial impact on the economy. Trade with the international community has expanded in recent times. India and Sri Lanka have seen a substantial increase in bilateral commercial relations over the past two decades. The civil war did not hamper growth of trade ties between the two countries. Trade between the two countries can be traced back to ancient times. During the colonial period, British India and Ceylon traded with each other but the nature of trade revolved around the requirements of Empire and the needs of the colonial power (Weerakoon and Thennakoon 2006). After independence, both India and Sri Lanka adopted inward-looking economic policies. Both countries engaged in limited trade with each other. Like many other post-colonial countries, India and Sri Lanka wanted to achieve a degree of self-reliance. Socialist policies were implemented and the government was to play a major role in the management of the economy. The public sector would be the engine of growth. Through the use of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies the two countries hoped to develop their economies. However, economic growth stalled by the mid-1970s. The limitations of ISI forced a rethink among the Sri Lankan elite regarding their autarkic economic policies. In 1977, under the leadership of Jayewardene, Sri Lanka became the first country in South Asia to embark on the path of economic liberalization. The economic liberalization policies included opening up to foreign trade and investment, deregulation, privatization, reduction in currency controls and tax reforms. India was not entirely happy with the re-orientation of the Sri Lankan economy. Sri Lanka’s greater economic engagement with the rest of the world was deemed a threat to India’s interests in South Asia. Although the economic policies it adopted resulted in lower domestic and foreign investment and limited trade with the West, India still persisted with ISI. Sri Lanka’s move towards an outward-oriented economy also created other problems for India. During the 1980s, there was a marked reduction in bilateral trade. Indian goods were less competitive compared to goods imported from the Far-East and South-East Asia. Also, Sri Lanka began to look to the West as markets for its exports (Weerakoon and Thennakoon 2006). The weakening economic links between the two countries during the 1980s contributed to the strain in political relations as well. Economic ties are therefore an important element in India’s relations with its neighbors. India could not leverage economic ties to persuade the Sri Lankan government to halt military operations in Jaffna Peninsula in 1987. The Sri Lankan establishment believed that its links with countries outside the region would provide the country some protection from Indian hegemony. Under the circumstances, India had to resort to coercion (violate Sri Lanka’s airspace) in order to convince Sri Lanka to halt the offensive. India began its own economic liberalization program during the early-1990s. Trade between the two countries slowly began to pick up. In 1994, the countries of South Asia signed the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) to promote trade and economic cooperation in the region. However, the Sri Lankan business community was frustrated with the slow progress on implementing SAPTA measures. This was primarily due to the acrimonious relations between India and Pakistan and fear among some of the smaller regional countries that trade with India may destroy their economies. The Sri Lankan government and business community believed that there was scope for expansion of exports to India, beyond what was envisaged in SAPTA (Harilal and Joseph 1999). As a result, the two countries signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in December 1998. The FTA was implemented in March 2000. The FTA was meant to provide duty-free and duty-preferential access to goods produced in two countries. Import tariffs would be gradually eliminated over a period of eight years. India and Sri Lanka would both maintain negative lists to protect certain sensitive domestic industries. India had 429 items on the negative list, while Sri Lanka had 1180 items on its negative list. Each country would extend concessions/preferences to all other commodities. The FTA also articulated the Rules of Origin (ROO) content to ensure a minimum local content in goods being imported by a country. This was to avoid the prospect of third-party goods being imported through each other’s territory. However, the terms for Sri Lanka were liberal. Only 35% local content was sufficient (reduced to 25% if Indian content). There were also safety clauses that would protect certain domestic industries, especially the agricultural industry. Also, India agreed to relax tariffs on Sri Lanka’s major exports like textile items, tea and ready-made garments. India-Sri Lanka trade has grown in recent times (See Table 1). Both countries have benefitted from the FTA. India faces less competition from other countries in exporting to Sri Lanka due to its duty-free and duty-preferential access. India also hopes to demonstrate to the other countries of South Asia that economic linkages represent the basis for a strong relationship and it is possible for smaller countries to trade with India. At the same time, Sri Lanka benefits from its trade and association with the larger economy of India. Sri Lanka was able to export a number of products to the hitherto protected Indian market (Harilal and Joseph 1999). A number of Sri Lankan companies have successfully entered the Indian market. These companies sell industrial and commercial products like tea, biscuits, furniture, footwear, machinery, herbal products, etc. Table 1: India-Sri Lanka Trade Statistics, 2006-2011 (in US$ million)
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2012 Most of the trade between the two countries has been in goods and not services. The bulk of India’s exports to Sri Lanka include petroleum products and transport equipment, while India imports tea, coffee, edible oil, spices and electrical machinery. India has emerged as one of the most important trading partner of Sri Lanka. It is the largest importer to Sri Lanka and among the top export destinations for Sri Lankan products. The trade pattern in goods has also changed since the signing of the FTA. Prior to the 1990s, agricultural products, food and beverages, cotton, machinery, etc. were the main Indian imports into Sri Lanka. In recent times, motor vehicles parts, mineral fuel, pharmaceutical and cement are the major imports. In 2010, India was Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner. It was the fourth largest export destination, constituting 5.5% of Sri Lanka’s total exports (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2012). It is the largest importer of goods to Sri Lanka, constituting 19.1% of the latter’s total imports. The success of the FTA has encouraged the two countries to negotiate a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to further boost trade in services and investment (Muralidhar Reddy 2008). Preliminary discussions between the two countries involve reducing the number of items on the negative list. India has offered to reduce the number of items on its negative list from 429 to 315, while Sri Lanka has offered to reduce the number of items on its negative list from 1180 to 1148. More sectors of the economy will be opened up for trade. The ROO criteria will be further relaxed. India will also remove non-tariff barriers (NTBs) like port restrictions, sales tax, laboratory testing, certification and phytosanitary regulations. There have been concerns expressed by some sections of the business community in Sri Lanka regarding the CEPA, which has slowed the progress of talks. Trade in services and liberalization of investment regulations may harm some domestic sectors and companies. However, it is expected that these concerns will be addressed in the near future and the CEPA will be signed soon. Expansion of bilateral trade has also facilitated Indian investment in Sri Lanka. In 2010, India was the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Sri Lanka with $110 million (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011). Indian investors are eager to utilize Sri Lanka’s preferential duty access to Indian markets. India has emerged as one of the largest investors in Sri Lanka. Major investments are concentrated in the steel, cement, tourism and tourism-related infrastructure, information technology, telecom, textiles and garments, food products, rubber products, financial services and retail petroleum sectors. Majority of investment is in the services sector in Sri Lanka (Kelegama and Mukherji 2007). Indian companies like Indian Oil Corporation (through its Sri Lankan subsidiary Lanka Indian Oil Corporation), Apollo Hospitals, TATA group, CEAT, State Bank of India (SBI) and ICICI have a strong presence in Sri Lanka. More than 50% of Indian investments in South Asia are in Sri Lanka. Many of these companies make products in Sri Lanka which are then exported to India. Sri Lanka has emerged as both a destination for Indian products as well as a manufacturing center for Indian companies. In the ten years since the signing of the FTA, both bilateral trade and Indian investment in Sri Lanka have increased substantially (Daniel 2010). It is expected that the CEPA will further boost bilateral trade and Indian investment in the services sector of Sri Lanka. In the post-civil war period, India has provided development assistance to Sri Lanka (Weerakoon and Thennakoon 2006). The assistance includes infrastructure projects and humanitarian assistance. India has provided development credit for rail infrastructure in Sri Lanka. It is also undertaking the development of Kankesanthurai harbor and Jaffna airport, both in northern Sri Lanka. Improving electricity connectivity between the north and the rest of the country is another important project. It is also involved in small projects related to education, health and transport connectivity. On the humanitarian side, it has provided $110 million worth of family relief packs, emergency medical units, medicines, material to construct temporary housing for displaced persons, tractors and other machinery, agricultural implements and seeds and financing de-mining teams to help rebuild the north and east, which have been devastated by the civil war. It has also expanded the number of educational scholarships to Sri Lankan students to study in Indian colleges and universities. Tourism in Sri Lanka has received a huge boost as a result of closer ties between the two countries (Kelegama and Mukherji 2007). In 2011, Sri Lanka recorded its highest ever tourist arrivals of 855,975, an increase of over 30% compared to the previous year (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011). The largest number of these arrivals was from India (171,374). The economic rise of India has led to the growth of a large middle class with disposable incomes, contributing to these high numbers. The decision of Sri Lanka to grant ‘visa-on-arrival’ to Indian tourists and a bilateral agreement to increase the number of flights from Indian cities to Sri Lanka has made it easier for Indians to travel Sri Lanka. The greater number of tourist arrivals has necessitated development of the tourism-related infrastructure. This has brought Indian investment in the hospitality sector and created jobs for locals. One of the few problems in the economic relationship involves the dispute over fishing by Indian trawlers in Sri Lankan northern waters. Over time, fishing stocks in the Indian territorial waters have become depleted, forcing Indian fishermen to venture deeper into Sri Lankan waters. In the past, the Sri Lankan navy and coast guard did not assert its rights to territorial waters. It was primarily concerned with tracking LTTE attack boats and supply ships rather than arresting Indians who had inadvertently crossed into its territorial waters to fish. Also, not many ships ventured out into these waters for fear of being attacked by LTTE attack boats. Sri Lankan fishing stocks are now under threat, forcing the Sri Lankan authorities and fishermen to pay more attention to the problem. In addition, the Sri Lankan government is keen to ensure that there is no resurgence of violence in the north and therefore carrying out intensive patrolling to interdict any LTTE vessels that may be carrying supplies to Jaffna peninsula. The intensive patrolling has posed problems for Indian fishermen. Mechanical failures or weather-related problems can sometimes take them accidently across into Sri Lankan territorial waters. There have been several instances of Indian fishermen being arrested by the Sri Lankan coast guard and naval authorities, including some instances of firing that has resulted in injuries and deaths. Most of the casualties happen to be from the state of Tamil Nadu across the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay. This has become an emotive issue for Tamil Nadu and the state government has asked the central government to demand a stop to such attacks. In response, both countries have established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Fisheries to sort out the matter (Radhakrishnan 2011). Solutions include coordinated patrolling, installing GPS devices on fishing boats and talks between fishermen of the two countries. Good relations between the two countries have opened up the possibility to address thorny issues through diplomacy. Despite the economy’s steady growth during the civil war, the conflict did create problems for Sri Lanka’s economy. Lower investment, disruptions in trade and commerce and lower revenues from tourism were observed during the civil war period (Pradhan 2001). The militarization of the economy was inevitable. However, since the end of the war, even these challenges are no longer obstacles to Sri Lanka’s economic development. India is in a position to benefit from the improvement and re-orientation of the Sri Lankan economy. Trade, investment and economic assistance to Sri Lanka are the backbone of the developing relationship. Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral economic ties represent an excellent model of how a larger country can develop a productive relationship with a smaller country. Regional integration in South Asia has been hampered by territorial disputes and insecurity about India’s intentions and actions. The bilateral relationship between India and Sri Lanka was not immune to such problems. However, the two countries have shown that it is possible to push aside contentious bilateral issues and work towards building a strong economic partnership. This in turn helps the two countries better understand each other’s concerns, fears and vulnerabilities. The ‘trust deficit’ is reduced and it is possible to address issues like the firing on Indian fishermen through talks, instead of passionate outbursts. It is no surprise that a downturn in bilateral relations accompanied weak economic relations between the two countries during the 1980s. President Jayewardene felt he could ignore India’s calls for halt in military operations in 1987 because a downturn in relations would not have a significant impact on Sri Lanka’s economy. Contrast this with India’s vote in favor of a US-sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva, which called for Sri Lanka to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and war crimes during the last days of the civil war. Even though Sri Lanka railed against the West accusing it of interference in its internal affairs, its criticism of India was muted. It was clear that the Rajapakse government did not want to alienate an important economic partner like India. Today, even Sinhalese nationalists who were up in arms against Indian intervention in 1987 welcome India’s involvement in Sri Lanka. India’s prompt assistance to Sri Lanka during the 2004 Asian Tsunami also earned it the goodwill of the people. The perception of India as ‘big brother’ insensitive to Sri Lanka’s concerns is slowly disappearing. Economic linkages have contributed to the transformation of bilateral ties. Political Transition4 Fareed Zakaria (2007) has argued that democracies around the world may be classified according to ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’. He argues that democracy involves both the process of selection of government by the people and the tradition that seeks to protect the individual and/or minority groups from coercion by state, church or society. Illiberal democracies lack the latter quality. They are characterized by strong (elected) rulers, weak political parties, weak system of checks and balances and arbitrary use of power. It is a system in which the forces of communism, fascism, nationalism, religion and ethnicity threaten liberalism and use the democratic process to attain political power. The introduction of democracy in divided societies with intense ethnic preferences forments conflicts because it is easy to mobilize people on the basis of identity, particularly because there is space available for indulging in this kind of mass politics. As mentioned before, Sri Lanka has a long tradition of civilian rule and representative democracy. However, Sri Lanka is not a model democracy. In fact, it is more accurate to use the term ‘illiberal democracy’ to describe the political system of the country. The high degree of centralization of power, executive dominance, state repression, long-standing deprivation of the country’s Tamil minority and systematic intimidation of opposition parties, ordinary citizens and media persons have posed questions about the quality of democracy in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has faltered in the task of state-building and nation-building because of a lack of unifying national identity. The unequal treatment of Tamils in the allocation of government resources and dominance of the government, bureaucracy and military by the Sinhalese has alienated the minority community (Embree 1997). The classification of Sinhalese as the ‘permanent majority’ and Tamils as the ‘permanent minority’ has polarized the country along ethnic lines. Discrimination on the basis of religion and language and weak redressal mechanism for grievances has worsened the problem. The legitimacy of the state in diverse societies depends upon its ability to accommodate this diversity by building a multi-layered identity for its citizens (Sabhlok 2002). The goal is to link the citizens of diverse groups with each other as well as link citizens with the state. However, the state in Sri Lanka has been fashioned by the interests and preferences of the majority group, without due consideration to minority groups. The imposition of a unitary Sri Lankan nationhood (based on Sinhalese aspirations and identity) has encouraged Tamil mobilization, which in turn has contributed to ethnic conflict. The orderly transfer of power without any violence and the adoption of democracy provided little indication that the country would be engulfed by civil war within a few decades. However, the limited constitutional safeguards for minority rights and the creation of a unitary and centralized state sowed the seeds of future conflict. The emergence of Sinhalese nationalism, supported by the masses and the Buddhist clergy during the 1950s contributed to insecurity among the Tamils. Adeney and Wyatt (2004) have claimed that if dominant groups create a political system in which all groups have the opportunity of effective representation then the process of democratic consolidation is easier. It is the responsibility of political parties to integrate the population by cutting across social cleavages. Unfortunately, this has not happened in Sri Lanka. In fact, far from articulating a unified national ideology the two major political parties of the country, the UNP and SLFP, have competed with each other to prove to the electorate that they are the party capable of protecting the Sri Lankan nation (and Sinhalese-Buddhist interests). A majoritarian, exclusionary system has been perpetuated. There is consensus within the majority community regarding the identity of the state and no substantive guarantees are provided to the minority community (Imtiyaz and Stavis 2008). Political institutions have failed to fulfill their basic functions, i.e., encourage trust between groups and allow for effective representation of interests of different groups within society (DeVotta 2005). The majority community has usually disregarded minority interests and grievances. This is contrary to the arguments of democratic theorists that all stake-holders (including minorities) must be involved in the decision-making process before decisions become binding on them (Dahl 1989; Dryzek 1996; Young 2000). Even when the representatives of the majority community have promised to address the grievances of the Tamil community, they have backed down due to opposition from within the more militant sections of their own constituency. In addition, the electoral rules have also contributed to ethnic polarization. First, the proportional representation electoral system prevents any one party from emerging with a majority in Parliament. Fringe parties can play the role of ‘kingmaker’ in Sri Lanka through their support to one of the two larger parties within a coalition government. Ultra-nationalist and pro-Buddhist parties, who opposed any kind of concession to Tamils, play an important role in government formation. It is no surprise that under these circumstances, the larger political parties are not interested in antagonizing these groups for fear of losing power. Second, in the national elections, people choose not only a party but also candidates. Individual candidates from the same party sometimes run against each other. In order to set themselves apart, each candidate attempts to project a more hawkish stance on the question of Tamil rights. An environment of intense ethnic polarization provides incentives for politicians to engage in ‘ethnic outbidding’ (DeVotta 2005). During the long civil war within the country, the state imposed draconian laws to maintain public order. The colonial-era Public Security Ordinance and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1978) provided security forces with broad powers to search, arrest, and detain suspects (Wedagedara 2011). The liberal use of these laws has tarnished Sri Lanka’s human rights record. They have been used not only against Tamil militants, but also suspected Tamil sympathizers, ordinary citizens (both Tamils and Sinhalese), media persons and opposition members. The declaration of a state of emergency in Sri Lanka in 1971 further eroded civil rights within the country. Although, the state of emergency was finally withdrawn in September 2011, some of the emergency laws continue to be in force. Emergency laws have been retained and used to control/suppress political dissent. The recent attacks against protesting trade union workers and media personnel, allegedly by individuals connected to the regime, point to a disturbing trend. There have been several abductions and killings of opposition members and ordinary civilians since Rajapakse took over power (Kaplan 2010: 204-205). As such, Sri Lanka has seen the development of a weak democracy. Since the end of the civil war, there were hopes that the Rajapakse government would take steps to strengthen democracy within the country and initiate the process of national reconciliation by addressing historical Tamil grievances. However, there appears to be a drift towards greater authoritarianism in Sri Lanka instead of greater liberalization (Goodhand 2012). Rajapakse’s government has embarked on a program of political centralization and regime consolidation in Sri Lanka. Rajapakse’s SLFP-led United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government has an almost two-thirds majority in Parliament. In September 2010, it was able to pass the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution in Parliament, which removed the sentence that mentioned term limits for the President. It also proposed the appointment of a parliamentary council that would decide the appointment of independent posts like commissioners of election, human rights, and Supreme Court judges. This parliamentary council would work under the direction of the President giving him power over appointment of such officials.This ongoing process of centralization of power has been deemed necessary to address the enormous challenges associated with economic reconstruction and national reconciliation. The Rajapakse government believes that the roots of Tamil alienation lie in the absence of economic opportunities for young Tamils living in the north and east. In their opinion, the Tamil Tigers were terrorists and bandits, masquerading as freedom fighters. The Tamil question is an economic issue not a political problem. As such, the government has begun an economic reconstruction project in the north to prevent a resurgence of the militancy. It believes that this project will help it gain Tamil support. The Rajapakse government has made some concessions like conducting elections to choose members of the provincial council in the demerged Eastern province and the establishment of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee (LLRC), but these measures have been largely limited in effecting political change within the country. The eastern provincial council created in 2008 lacks substantive powers, including jurisdiction over law and order and land rights. Three years after the end of the civil war there is still no provincial council in the Tamil-majority northern province. The LLRC was established to investigate allegations of human rights violations by security forces and Tamil Tigers during the conflict, especially allegations that the military engaged in indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in the final days of the civil war. These actions were believed to have led to the death of thousands of Tamils who were caught in the crossfire between the government forces and the Tamil Tigers. The LLRC report blamed the Tamil Tigers for the deaths of Tamil civilians accusing them of using the latter as human shields, while largely exonerating government forces. The report angered not only the Tamils but also the international community. Flush with success derived from the elimination of the Tamil Tigers, Rajapakse is at the height of his power. A new political dynasty, dominated by President Mahinda Rajapakse and his brothers Gotabhaya Rajapakse (retired army officer and current defense secretary), Basil Rajapakse (cabinet minister of economic development) and Chamal Rajapakse (speaker of Parliament), has emerged during the post-civil war period (Dukkipati and Schaffer 2010). The post-war economic boom and the end of the LTTE as an insurgent organization have led most Sinhalese to turn a blind eye to the curtailment of civil rights within the country. The majority seems to have accepted that certain repressive measures continue to be necessary to consolidate the gains made by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and to prevent the resurgence of violence within the country. The concentration of power in the hands of the Rajapakse family, a divided opposition, a fearful media and an apathetic citizenry has meant that any impetus for change has to come from outside the country. The slow progress in investigating allegations of deliberate shelling against Tamils during the last days of the civil war has earned Sri Lanka the ire of the international community. Donor countries have attempted to put pressure Sri Lanka to address this issue. In March 2012, the UNHRC adopted a US-sponsored resolution calling on the Sri Lankan government to take follow-up action on the LLRC recommendations regarding allegations of extra-judicial killings by security forces during the civil war, demilitarize the north and initiate the process of finding a political settlement to ensure lasting peace in Sri Lanka (Hariharan 2012). Previously, a UN advisory panel had submitted a report alleging that thousands of civilians caught in the crossfire perished during the last days of the civil war due to shelling by the Sri Lankan military. The UNHRC resolution passed with western countries and India supporting it, while China and Russia opposed it. The Sri Lankan government reacted strongly to what it called interference in its own affairs. The government claimed that Sri Lanka had already done quite a lot in terms of investigating human rights allegations. The government pointed out that it faced huge challenges in the north. The development of infrastructure, demining of large areas and the rehabilitation and resettlement of around 300,000 internally-displaced individuals (IDPs) were the priority (Samarasinghe 2009). The government had expected that the victory against the Tamil Tigers would be seen as a red letter day in the global war against terrorism. It felt that it had shown the international community how to wage against terrorism. As such, it was stung by western criticism of its human rights record. Anger was particularly directed against the West, while there was praise for China’s support to Sri Lanka. India’s support for the resolution came as a surprise to many. Some in Sri Lanka felt that domestic compulsions, i.e., pressure from Tamil Nadu-based political parties, including the government’s coalition partner the DMK, forced it to vote in favor of resolution (Radhakrishnan 2012). However, the reasons are not so simple. India wanted to see the demise of the LTTE because it felt that the organization was an impediment to reconciliation. However, the issue of Tamil security and political rights has always been of central concern to India (Jain 2010). It has favored the devolution of power to regional units within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. Unlike the Rajapakse government, India believes that the reconciliation process should not be delayed in favor of economic reconstruction. It is also not just a domestic problem of Sri Lanka since more than 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils, who fled the civil war, continue to live as refugees in India. The Indian government had become increasingly frustrated by its failure to persuade the Rajapakse government to initiate a genuine process of reconciliation (Pattanaik 2012). The vote was a signal to Sri Lanka that although India understood the challenges that Sri Lanka faced, it would not tolerate Rajapakse’s efforts to sweep the issue under the carpet. In fact, India’s vote in favor of the resolution was not just out of concern about human rights violations but based on the belief that such a declaration would assist the process of reconciliation and facilitate dialogue in Sri Lanka (Sultana 2012). In addition, India was upset about the fact that despite promising that the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution would be the basis of national reconciliation, the government had done little to implement it. In fact, Rajapakse himself was talking about a vague ‘home-grown’ solution to the Tamil question (Dayaratne 2011). The government appeared to be appeasing ultra-nationalist and religious forces both inside and outside Parliament. It was not impressed by claims that the SLFP could not achieve a consensus among the parties in Parliament. The Rajapakse government had also refused to engage in substantive talks with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a coalition of Tamil parties, which India believed was the genuine representative of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Finally, the support for the resolution was also meant to convey India’s displeasure at the slow progress of finalizing the CEPA. Nevertheless, India was able to successfully modify the language of the resolution so as not to offend Sri Lanka too much. Support to the resolution was consistent with India’s traditional stand on the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has escaped the fate of countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, by remaining a representative democracy even through the darkest days of the civil war. But Sri Lanka shows all the characteristics of an illiberal democracy. The civil war eroded civil rights and weakened democracy within the country. In the post-civil war period, India’s engagement with Sri Lanka is necessary in order to arrest the movement towards authoritarianism in Sri Lanka and another possible downturn in relations. Both the West and India have a shared interest in seeing peace and stability in Sri Lanka, and by extension the South Asian region. India has signaled that it would not turn a blind eye to the situation in Sri Lanka and expects that the government will relax emergency laws and effect genuine national reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The situation in Sri Lanka appears grim at present. However, there are reasons to be positive about the prospects of the development of a ‘liberal’ democracy in Sri Lanka. The increasing spotlight on nepotism and corruption under the Rajapakse government, media scrutiny regarding the government’s human rights record, western pressure, the end of the civil war, the participation of Tamil parties in national elections, the break-down of war-time alliance between Sinhalese parties and India’s insistence that national reconciliation become a priority for the Sri Lankan government are having a positive effect (Uyangoda 2010). The Indian government believes that the end of the civil war represents the best opportunity for Sri Lanka to not only work towards national reconciliation, but also address the challenges facing democracy within the country. In the past, the civil war adversely affected relations between the two countries. Even though there was some improvement during the 1990s, the scope of the relationship remained limited. Today, bilateral ties can finally be conducted free from the shadow of the civil war. Both countries are now in a position to pursue a comprehensive political, economic and security relationship, which was difficult during the civil war. India wants to see a united, democratic, peaceful and stable Sri Lanka, which is crucial for regional stability. In pursuit of this objective, India should continue to persuade Sri Lanka to undertake political liberalization and work towards addressing Tamil grievances. Directory: uthinkcache -> gpa -> globalnotes globalnotes -> What does a Weapon See: hbo goes to War 1 Download 189.53 Kb. Share with your friends:
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