Drones Case Neg
AT: Modeling Adv.—Ilaw Bad (War on Terror)
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AT: Modeling Adv.—Ilaw Bad (War on Terror)Strengthening international law bad—hurt US war on terror efforts Singer, ‘9 [P.W. Singer, Director of the 21st-Century Defense Initiative at Brookings, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, 2009, p. 391] The "soldiers" who respect the laws of war might then be at a disadvantage to the "warriors" and criminals who do not. It is not merely that the laws and lawyers limit what they can do, but that the other side knows the limits, and will do everything possible to take advantage. During the Fallujah fighting in 2004, for example, insurgents knew U.S. forces were prohibited from shooting at ambulances, so they used them as taxis to carry about fighters and weapons. Such "lawfare," describes Major General Dunlap, is perhaps the ultimate misuse of international law, because it knowingly abuses it. "They are intent on manipulating our adherence to the rule of law." Ralph Peters is more blunt. "We approach war in terror of lawsuits and criminal charges. Our enemies are enthusiastic killers. Who has the psychological advantage?" AT: Modeling Adv.—Ilaw Bad (Demo)International law incorporation leads to democratic backsliding McGinnis 6 [John, Professor of Law @ NU, The Comparative Disadvantage of Customary International Law, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Questia] A glaring problem with customary international law, the most important category of raw international law, is that it has a democratic deficit built into its very definition. To be customary international law, a principle must result "from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." (7) This definition mentions only the "general and consistent practice of" nation-states without any reference to representative processes or to the welfare of citizens. Thus, by its very definition, customary international law neglects democratic decision making. In addition to this theoretical problem, customary international law has at least five different democratic deficits that arise in practice. First, nations do not have to assent affirmatively to the creation of a principle of customary international law. Instead, nations are considered to have consented to a principle if they simply failed to object. (8) This measure of assent compares unfavorably with the requirements of domestic democracy, which assure both deliberation and accountability. Domestic political actors cannot create norms by inaction but instead must affirmatively embrace a practice to make it law. Second, undemocratic, even totalitarian, nations wield influence on international law. This influence is most obvious in multilateral human rights treaties, like the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, (9) which are often asserted as a basis for customary international law even if not ratified by the United States. (10) Totalitarian nations like the Soviet Union and communist China participated in the negotiations of these treaties. One can hardly be confident that the same provisions would have emerged absent the influence of those "evil empire[s]." (11) Consider this analogy: Should the United States give domestic effect to provisions of treaties that it did not ratify, but that instead were approved by Nazi Germany and other Axis powers? Third, many treaties and other international declarations are merely empty promises if nations do not actually enforce them. Many nations flout international norms imposed by treaty while others often fail to give them domestic effect. In contrast, Congress expects that the norms it codifies into domestic law will be enforced, providing evidence that those norms are sincerely embraced. (12) Fourth, it is often unclear what the customary international legal norm is, or if one even exists. Provisions in negotiated agreements are at least documented. Many, if not most, principles of customary international law do not rest on a canonical text like domestic statutes do. Someone must assess how widespread a practice is and whether the practice reflects a legal norm. Those responsible for these determinations are primarily international law professors. Although law professors have many virtues, they are most likely not representative of their fellow citizens. A recent study found that elite law professors in the United States were extremely unrepresentative in political ideology, leaning Democratic over Republican by a ratio of over five to one. (13) An ideologically skewed group will likely choose ideologically skewed norms. Finally, social science unsurprisingly suggests that average Americans have a poorer understanding of what happens in Geneva and other foreign places than of what happens in Washington, D.C. (14) Moreover, government will be more accountable to Americans if only Americans are responsible for setting the law. Following customary international law makes government less transparent and accountable; it also permits interest groups and elites greater influence over the law because they can operate more effectively outside the United States than the ordinary citizen can. Thus, international law has many democratic deficits. Domestic democracy is far from perfect, but elections, deliberation, and the scrutiny of public officials provide substantial assurance that norms beneficial for Americans will develop over time. AT: Modeling Adv.—ILaw Bad (Civic Engagement)International law prevents civic engagements – citizens are comparatively less likely to perceive and understand international judicial incorporation McGinnis and Somin 7 [John, Professor of Law @ Northwestern, Ilya, Professor of Law @ Georgetown, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, Stanford Law Review, Questia] Another aspect of the democracy deficit is that citizens are rationally ignorant about international law and the institutions responsible for its creation to an even greater degree than domestic politics and domestic institutions. This problem affects both classical and modern customary international law. Public ignorance exacerbates the democracy deficit because citizens cannot monitor or control the individuals and institutions responsible for international law fabrication if they are unaware of their existence or operations. It is the key factor reducing the relative transparency of international law, thereby enabling political elites and interest groups to establish international norms that run counter to the interests of ordinary citizens. This point has common sense support: the doings of international agencies in Geneva are more opaque to Americans than events in Washington. (169) Here, we offer empirical evidence to demonstrate its validity and provide it with theoretical grounding. Decades of social science research show that most citizens have very low levels of political knowledge. (170) This result is not accidental and is not primarily caused by stupidity or by low availability of information. Most voters are "rationally ignorant" about politics. (171) Because of the low significance of any single vote, (172) there is a vanishingly small payoff to acquiring political knowledge in order to vote in an informed way. Even if a voter makes a tremendous effort to become highly informed, there is almost no chance that his or her well-informed vote will actually swing the electoral outcome in favor of the "better" candidate or party. (173) The acquisition of political information is a classic collective action problem, a situation in which a good (here, an informed electorate) is undersupplied because any one individual's possible contribution to its production is insignificant. And those who do not contribute will still get to enjoy the benefits of the good if it is successfully provided through the efforts of others. (174) This prediction is confirmed by studies showing that there has been little or no increase in voter knowledge during the post-World War II era, despite massive increases in education levels and in the availability of political information. (175) Most citizens are thus often ignorant of basic political information, such as the very existence of important legislation, the differences between liberal and conservative ideology, and the responsibilities of different branches of government. It would not be surprising, therefore, if they also tend to be ignorant about international law and the institutions that form it. But more importantly for present purposes, political ignorance is likely to be a more severe problem with respect to international law than in traditional domestic lawmaking. This is so for two reasons. First, to the extent that comparisons are possible, citizens seem to have a lower absolute level of knowledge about international legal institutions than about domestic ones. Second, it is more difficult for citizens to make up for their ignorance by using "information shortcuts" in the domain of international law than in the domestic arena. This relative ignorance has serious consequences. It exacerbates the potential for interest group influence and manipulation by elites that we have already noted is inherent in the structure of raw international law. (176) If citizens do not know about the process of international law making, their ability to influence its development is greatly reduced. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 157.71 Kb. Share with your friends:
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