Egmont papers

Until now CSDP has thus been a bottom-up undertaking, the capabilities being developed and the operations undertaken gradually generating indications of what might evolve into a strategy, rather than being guided by a strategy. A more explicit security and defence strategy is now required to give more direction to CSDP. Otherwise Member States cannot ensure that scarce resources and limited capabilities are consistently focussed on commonly identified priorities. In any case there are, sadly, too many conflicts and crises for the EU to deal effectively with all of them, especially in a leading role. Therefore, as the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS states, “We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources”. This holds especially true at a time when as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis defence budgets across Europe are under severe pressure and every Euro spent on defence must – rightly – be justified to taxpayers. The reverse is also true, however: if it wants to remain credible, the EU must commit the necessary resources, in line with its priorities and ambitions.

Three dimensions must thus be considered in any CSDP-strategy: priorities and objectives, the types of operations that can potentially be undertaken to meet those, and the capabilities to be committed to that end. In this Egmont Paper, we will argue that the building-blocks are already available – it remains for the EU to construct the edifice. We are grateful to the many colleagues, practitioners as well as academics, who inspired us, and wish in particular to thank the following colleagues for their insights and comments on the first draft: Bastian Giegerich (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr), Alexandra Jonas (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr), Alexander Mattelaer (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), Thomas Renard (Egmont), James Rogers (University of Cambridge), Luis Simón (Royal Holloway University), and Nicolai von Ondarza (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). A fine team of architects indeed.

n°36: The EU as a global actor in a multipolar world and multilateral 2.0 environment, Luk Van Langenhove, March 2010.

résumé: Executive summary

This paper discusses a number of long-term global trends that are likely to affect

the ambition of the EU to be a global actor. Being or becoming a global power

is indeed not only determined by an internal and voluntary policy of that actor.

It also depends on a number of external forces. The first part of this paper will

present two ongoing transformations of the world that together are weakening

the position of the EU as an aspiring global power. The first trend is a shift in

economic gravity from the East to the West. The second trend is a demographic

decline in Europe. Both trends make it increasingly difficult for the EU to be a

global power. But at the same time one can also identify a number of developments

with regard to multilateralism that bear in them opportunities for the EU

to increase its influence as a global actor. The second part of this paper focuses

on two such trends, the shift to multipolarity and the changes in the multilateral

architecture. As for the latter, this paper introduces the notion of ‘multilateralism

2.0.’ as a metaphor to grasp these changes.

It will be argued that the described trends are of particular relevance for the

European Security Strategy as they imply that Europe’s prosperity and stability

is increasingly determined by outside forces and by changes in the geo-political

world-order. As such the challenge for the EU is twofold:

– To make sure that it can act as one of the poles in the emerging multipolar

order;

– To contribute to shape that multipolar order into one that strengthens global

Finally, it will be argued that the EU can under the given circumstances only

affirm itself as a global power if two conditions are fulfilled:

– The EU deepens its integration with the rest of the Western world; and

– The EU steps up its role as a change-agent in the multileral system.

Together these two issues have the potential to balance the forces that are weakening

the position of Europe as a global actor. But in order to capitalise on this

potential, Europe also needs an ambitious new ‘story-line’ or grand strategy.

The paper ends with presenting some possible avenues for such a storyline.

n°35: Fearing a 'Shiite Octopus'. Sunni – Shi`a relations and the implications for Belgium and Europe, Jelle Puelings, Jan. 2010.

résumé: Executive summary

During the last five years, and more specifically since the US invasion of Irak,

different Sunni policy makers and religious actors have ventilated their concern

for what they see as the rise of Shiite Islam. Although the condemnation of Shiism

by more rigorous currents such as Wahhabism is hardly new, recently different

governments in the Middle East have taken concrete measures against Shiite

actors. The same ‘Cold War scenario’ the region witnessed immediately after the

Iranian Revolution seems to appear again, making Arab Sunni voices reverberate

up to Western policy makers, who start to worry themselves about the role

of Iran and its allies. In this paper we will try to give an evaluation of this alleged

shift in the Sunni-Shi`a power balance, and point out the possible consequences

for Belgium and the EU emanating from this controversy.

We have treated the subject from two different angles. First of all, we looked at

the level of regional politics and tried to formulate a context in which we have

to see the Sunni fear for the conception of a ‘Shiite Crescent’, a geopolitical

construction in which Shiites take over power in the Middle East, thus making

the region the backyard of Iran. We pointed out that it is a nationally focused

socio-political movement, aiming at emancipating the Shiites in their own

national context. The transnational system of religious guidance, the marja`iya,

is at the same time both a diversified, non-uniform source of religious and social

ideology, and a drive for Shiite political participation and adaptation. The Iranian

role in this construction is to be seen in the light of its hegemonic aspirations,

through the way of a pragmatic foreign policy. Its relations towards

regional allies is largely tactical, and not to be overestimated. The Islamic

Republic uses Shiite Islam more or less as a political instrument, surfing the

wave of the Shiite movement more than actually steering it. We conclude this

section with a first set of recommendations towards Belgium and the EU for

their policy in the Middle East.

The second part focuses on the actual Sunni-Shi`a relations, varying from a

Wahhabi hostility towards the religious identity of Shiism to a search for rapprochement

and coexistence. Within Sunni circles like the Muslim Brotherhood,

a certain form of distrust and a hardened speech is apparently on the rise, especially

regarding a perceived infiltration of Shiite Islam in what they call ‘Sunni’

countries. The same fear has recently been instrumentalized by Sunni regimes of

Egypt and Morocco, who undertook drastic measures to counter Iranian intrusion

in their national sphere. The motives behind this are mainly a matter of

regime survival and safeguarding their strategic position in the region. An

important element in this controversy is the tashayyu` and Shiite proselytism, an

instrument used in the Iranian search for hegemony.

To conclude the second part, we took a look at the European theatre, where we

can see a largely similar development as witnessed in the Middle East, with Iran

trying to gain influence amongst local Shiites. For the case of Belgium, the controversy

hanging over the Moroccan community is of specific interest, given the

concerns raised by Rabat on mass conversions towards Shiism taking place, thus

threatening to destabilize the Moroccan State.

Overall, the power balance Sunnism and Shiism is not so much a problem than

it is an expression of the existential fear of Sunni regimes. The red line within

this paper is thus the political use of Islamic confessional identities (Sunni and

Shi`a), in the framework of a regional political agenda. This will be, more than

a structural opposition between Sunnism and Shiism, a threat to confessional

coexistence, and can be a future cause for intra-Islamic strife.

n°34: Europe Rediscovers Peacekeeping? Political and Military Logics in the 2006 UNIFIL Enhancement, Alexander Mattelaer, Oct. 2009.

résumé: Executive summary

The war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 came to an end when both conflict parties accepted the plan of reinforcing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as a means to enable a ceasefire. In political as well as military terms, European nations were the driving force behind this UNIFIL ‘enhancement’ – marking a difficult return to the UN peacekeeping system since the debacles in the former Yugoslavia. This Egmont Paper explores both the political and military logic underlying the UNIFIL enhancement. On the basis of a detailed analysis of both the political decision-making process and the military planning cycle of the operation it develops two interlinked arguments.

On the one hand, it argues that UNIFIL’s operational strategy relies on its threedimensional presence as a security buffer, as a mechanism for de-escalation and as an important actor in the local economy. On the other hand, it argues that friction between the political and military levels is at the root of persisting problems in terms of information management, organisational structures and the conceptual foundations of operational planning. As such this Egmont Paper assesses the strategic rationale of the operation, which is shown to be limited, and accounts for a variety of practical problems that hamper an effective functioning of the operation. On the basis of this twofold argument, three main conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the enhancement of UNIFIL showed that the UN peacekeeping system still constitutes a suitable platform for deploying European armed forces, but under two specific conditions. On the one hand, the question under which organisational flag troops are deployed was answered on a pragmatic basis. The UN framework in this case was chosen because the host nation insisted on it. The Lebanese government excluded the other options, whether NATO, ESDP or an ad hoc multinational coalition. On the other hand, the European troop contributors insisted on redesigning the organisational set-up for the operation, both in terms of expanding oversight via the ad hoc established Strategic Military Cell as well as introducing their own approach to planning operations.

Secondly, the inherent tension between intergovernmental political decisionmaking process and integrated military planning that is natural to any multinational operation was compounded by a mental gap between the UN political staff and the NATO trained military officers from European contributors. This mental gap boiled down to two competing views on how to manage operations. The UN approach was characterised by a much higher level of political sensitivity – with obvious implications for information management e.g. – and a decen tralised approach to operation management. The greater political unity amongst European troop contributors as well as the preference for more robust command structures thus created a structural fault line in the mission set-up early on. Interestingly, the confrontation between both worlds proved to be a learning experience and tensions eased over time. Individual UN staffers came to see that military planning doctrine as standardised by NATO had something to offer in terms of making planning and management processes work smoothly. At the same time, European troop contributors rediscovered UN peacekeeping ten years after leaving it and found it could be made to work better than it had in the past.

Thirdly, peacekeeping in a context such as Lebanon after the 2006 war is fraught with conceptual problems when it comes to operational planning doctrine. The UN’s approach to operations, which is procedurally flexible but chronically under-resourced, is very light on the content of operational planning. There is no real peacekeeping doctrine spelling out the causal reasoning how the ambitious goals set out in the mandate can be achieved. Peacekeeping thus relies on a more programmatic approach to planning operations, bringing about conditions that hopefully lead in the right direction. If such hopes prove to be idle, the operation simply goes on in time and becomes part of the scenery. The NATO planning doctrine preferred by European troop contributors does give planners the conceptual toolkit for designing operations, but this conceptual toolkit is only fully applicable to missions with powerful political mandates. Traditional planning concepts such as centre of gravity and end-state remain useful as an intellectual compass, but in a peacekeeping context they lead planners to think far beyond their mandate.

What can be made of the strategic effectiveness of the enhanced UNIFIL? The most straightforward effect was that the enhanced UNIFIL made the ceasefire on 14 August 2006 possible in the first place and contributed to maintaining it ever since. The three-dimensional strategic role outlined in this paper does give a coherent answer to how the operation can foster the intended effects. The enhanced UNIFIL in this sense does harness the use of armed forces for political ends. Yet it is equally true that such a strategy cannot achieve conflict resolution – it can only enable the sort of conditions that make renewed hostilities less likely. An operation with a limited political mandate can only achieve limited objectives. In that sense, the enhanced UNIFIL cannot be strategically decisive: it manages conflict on an interim basis, but does not make peace.

n°33: The value of power, the power of values: a call for an EU Grand Strategy, Sven Biscop (ed.), Oct. 2009.

résumé: Executive summary

In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU has a grand strategy, embracing all instruments and resources at the disposal of the Union and the Member States, but a partial one. The ESS tells us how to do things – in a preventive, holistic and multilateral way – but it is much vaguer on what to do: what are the concrete objectives and priorities of the EU as a global actor?

The recent debate about the ESS, resulting in the 2008 Report about the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, failed to answer this question. Offering little in terms of recommendations for the future, the Report creates an impression of unfinished business, which the EU can ill afford now that the Lisbon Treaty will change the institutional set-up of its foreign and security policy, NATO has launched a strategic debate of its own to which an EU contribution is essential, and the EU risks being overshadowed by the much more purposive emerging powers or BRICs. Regardless of one’s initial opinion about its opportunity, a fully-fledged strategic review is now in order, with the aim of completing the ESS.

The first rule of strategy-making is to know thyself. Which values and interests should our grand strategy safeguard? Europe has in fact a very distinctive social model, combining democracy, the market economy and strong government intervention. Preserving and strengthening this internal social contract between the EU and its citizens, guaranteeing them security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social well-being, is the fundamental objective of the EU, both internally and as a global actor. The conditions that have to be fulfilled to allow that constitute the EU’s vital interests: defence against any military threat to the territory of the Union; open lines of communication and trade (in physical as well as in cyber space); a secure supply of energy and other vital natural resources; a clean environment; manageable migration flows; the maintenance of international law and universally agreed rights; and autonomy of EU decision-making.

To safeguard these interests, the EU must be a power, i.e. a strategic actor that consciously and purposely defines long-term objectives, actively pursues these, and acquires the necessary means to that end. Which kind of power the EU chooses to be, is also conditioned by the international environment. Marked by interpolarity, i.e. existential interdependence between an increased number of global powers, that environment is very challenging, but at the same time presents the EU with an opportunity to pursue a distinctive grand strategy. In the absence of enemies and in view of the need for cooperation to tackle global challenges, the best way of defending our interests, in order to defend our model and values, is precisely to spread those values, because increasing the access of citizens worldwide to security, prosperity, freedom and well-being directly addresses the underlying causes of threats and challenges. If the fundamental objective of the EU is the preservation and strengthening of its internal social contract, the best way of achieving that is to promote it in the rest of the World (an external social contract), which moreover constitutes a positive agenda in its own right. The EU does not seek to coerce others into adopting it, not even merely to entice them through conditionality, but to convince them of the benefits of our model and values on the basis of shared interests and common challenges. Thus the recognition of the universality of our values can be gradually and consensually increased.

The preventive, holistic, and multilateral approach which the EU has pursued is in line with this grand strategy, but implementation has revealed a number of unanswered questions. How to avoid the clash between immediate interests and the emphasis on values, which thus leads to weakness? How to act vis-à-vis the emerging global powers and integrate them in the multilateral architecture? What to do when prevention fails and the threat or use of force is required?

The answers to these questions will determine the objectives which a complete grand strategy should define in more detail. The following priority areas require the identification of specific EU interests and the definition of concrete objectives, in order to direct sub-strategies, policies and actions:

– The Neigbourhood: What is the desired end-state of the Neighbourhood Policy? Can only democracy create a consensual value-based community and thus safeguard our interests, or will democratization create such upheaval that our interests would be damaged? Only when our interests and red lines are clear can a true strategic partnership with Russia be pursued.

– Enlargement: A successful instrument so far, further enlargement is determining for relations with Russia and for the geopolitical position of the EU – and cannot proceed therefore without strategic debate.

– Regional objectives: A reluctance to discuss interests and join up the different European presences, from aid and trade to diplomacy, has undermined policies towards Central Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Other regions too, such as Asia, Latin America and the Arctic need a thorough assessment of EU interests to determine whether or not our presence should be stepped up.

– Global and institutional objectives: The EU must sharpen its view about the multilateral architecture, reconciling reform with increased effectiveness of EU representation. That should inform a really strategic use of its strategic partnerships with the BRICs, the existence of which too often seems more important than their content.

– Conflict resolution and crisis management: A white book should define Europe’s ambition as a security actor. Regardless of whether in a specific case Europeans deploy under the flag of ESDP, NATO or the UN: which types of operations must European forces be capable of, which priority regions and scenarios require intervention, and which is the scale of the effort to be devoted to these priorities?

It is not sufficient to have a more complete grand strategy – the EU must then also apply it. That requires an institutional follow-up structure. At the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission, supported by the External Action Service, should be formally entrusted with the implementation and development of EU strategy.

A grand strategy that translates the values on which the EU’s own social model is based into a proactive and constructive foreign policy, aimed at concrete objectives: on that basis, with the right political leadership, the EU can be a global power.

n°32: Legislating amidst Public Controversy: the Services Directive, Peter Timmerman, Oct. 2009.

résumé: Executive summary

The adoption of the Services Directive in 2006 constituted the final act of one of the most

controversial pieces of European legislation adopted in recent years. The ‘Bolkestein

Directive’ envisaged freeing the provision of a large range of services within the EU.

However, it was believed that the proposal would clear the way for social dumping and would

lead to a race to the bottom regarding worker’s rights.

In 2004, as part of the Lisbon Strategy, the European Commission intended to do away with

the remaining obstacles to the internal market in services. A proposal for a directive set out a

legal framework that would eliminate the obstacles to the freedom of establishment for

service providers, remove the barriers to temporary service provision in other member states

and fix detailed rules on mutual assistance and evaluation between member states.

However, the idea of achieving freedom of almost all services by means of one single

directive proved unrealistic. The controversy surrounding it lead to substantial changes during

the legislative procedure. The final text has less far-reaching consequences, particularly

because of the reduction of scope it underwent by introducing additional exclusions and

derogations in it. These amendments gave it a considerably negative tendency, since more

attention seems to be devoted to what is not regulated by it, than to what actually is. This is to

a large extent the consequence of the zealous efforts of the European Parliament.

Furthermore, it inhibits a number of legal uncertainties, due to careless redrafting of the

directive.

On a positive note, the Services Directive does contain a number of good elements. The

codification of existing case-law in it is important, particularly concerning the right of

establishment and the rights of recipients. The provisions introducing limited harmonisation

regarding the quality of services and administrative simplification (e.g. points of single

contact, applications via internet, the screening provisions of national legislation) will also be

to the benefit of consumers and cross-border service providers.

Regarding institutional matters, the European Parliament played a central role during the codecision

procedure, which is positive from a democratic point of view. Questions can be

raised about the way the European Commission initially handled the issue. The Prodi

Commission adopted this high profile proposal only months before the end of its term and

seemingly had not adequately prepared the ground for it. Finally, the Barosso Commission was wise to follow the European Parliament in most of its objections, after initially defending the proposal.