Egmont papers

résumé: In March 2008, the ten Heads of State of the Economic Community of Central

African States (ECCAS) met in Kinshasa for an extraordinary summit to address

the escalating tensions in Chad. In view of the repeated attacks from rebels

against the government of President Idriss Déby and the series of combats in and

around the capital of N’Djamena, the Community’s members expressed their

concern about the ongoing instability in their partner country and the region

and affirmed their support of the Chadian government. In this perspective, the

member states’ political actors affirmed, once again, the regional process’

increased emphasis on security issues since its resumption in 1998.

In February 1998, in a context of continuing regional troubles, unrest and

instability, the Heads of the ten member states had agreed, in the Gabonese

capital of Libreville, on the revival of the Central African Economic Community

after a six-year period of inactivity. At that time, the region was deeply

affected by the aftermath of the Rwandese genocide and the conflict in

Burundi, the violent and long lasting war in former Zaire as well as a series of

political crises and coups d’Etats in many Central African states. Recognizing

that the community’s year-long inactivity had largely been induced by these

crises and conflicts, the member states decided to initiate a substantial reforming

in view of developing the regional cooperation process further into a direction

that would also contribute to the region’s stability and peace. Hereby the

awareness of the regional dimension of neighbouring crimes and conflicts and

notably the risk of regional spill-over largely underlay and fostered the initiative

of giving new dynamic to regionalisation. Strengthening and intensifying

cooperation was considered by the states as a vital approach towards promoting

development, not only through economic growth but also through consolidated

peace and security. The Central African Heads of State took herewith a

decision fully in line with and covered by the concomitant engagement on the

continental level towards promoting cooperation in the field of security and

building a Pan-African peace and security architecture. Thus, ECCAS’ field of

action was enlarged towards security issues, in addition to the original economic

orientation, and it was agreed to establish specific security bodies and

mechanisms to endorse this reform.

An agenda broadening towards peace and security issues has also happened

with the other Central African regional institution, the Central African Monetary

and Economic Community (CEMAC), during the last years. Created in

1994 to replace the former customs union UDEAC, and operational since 1999,

CEMAC is certainly more strongly adhering than ECCAS to its economic objecREGIONAL

tives of promoting trade between its members and developing a common market.

Nevertheless, increasing tensions in the Central African Republic (CAR)

forced the community in 2002 to further address the issue of regional security

and to deploy within its member state a multinational force, the FOMUC, even

if such a measure had never been foreseen in its treaty.

The revival of ECCAS after six years of crisis-induced hibernation and its

agenda’s reorientation towards security issues, as well as the set up and deployment

of a CEMAC multinational force constitute clear manifestations of a new

trend in Central Africa towards approaching security and stability concerns

increasingly on the regional level. In 1999, ECCAS officially affirmed the “promotion

of peace, security and stability in the region” as one of its central missions.

1 And on the members’ Conference in October 2007, the Congolese President

Denis Sassou Nguesso emphasized that “the success of integration is also

conditioned by the capacity to make the region a harbour of peace”.2 This

trend goes hand and hand with the continental aspirations towards peace and

security cooperation. It also reflects the developments in other regions where

more and more economic communities are emphasizing the security dimension

of their collaboration by adapting their agendas and institutional structures

accordingly.

In Central Africa, the connection between security and regional cooperation

rises however a couple of questions. Why, despite this new and enlarged conception

of regionalism and the repeated commitments towards a regional security

approach, insecurity remains considerably high and is still threatening all

the countries in the region? The political crisis in Chad, opposing the government

and various rebel groups, is now enduring for years, and is additionally

aggravated by the country’s considerably strained relations with its neighbour

Sudan that regularly bring the two rivals on the verge of war. Despite the now

yearlong presence of multinational troops, the situation in the CAR still

remains volatile, and villages in the East of the country are frequently victims

of attacks by armed bandits and militia. And in the Democratic Republic of

Congo (DRC), the repeated ceasefires, peace talks and agreements have not

succeeded in completely stopping the now decade-long conflict, as combats and

riots still continue to regularly erupt, notably in the provinces of Ituri, North

Kivu and South Kivu, generating flows of refugees within the country and

across its borders.

1. See the Community’s website: http://www.ceeac-eccas.org

2. ‘La réussite de notre intégration (était) aussi conditionnée par notre capacité à faire de notre

sous-région un havre de paix.’ The President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, as

quoted by Afriquecentrale.info (www.afriquecentrale.info) on October 30th, 2007

So why – 10 years after the increased new orientation of the Central African

regionalisation processes towards security issues – the real contribution of the

aforementioned regional bodies towards sustainable security in the region is still

rather low? What is hence wrong with the current approach?

n°24: The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: transformation and integration, Sven Biscop and Franco Algieri (eds.), June 2008.

résumé: In the few years since its inception following the 1998 Franco-British Saint-

Malo Summit, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has progressed

enormously, certainly when compared with the preceding fifty years. A whole

new politico-military dimension has been added to the EU. ESDP is not just a

paper exercise, as a dozen ongoing operations involving more than 8,000 troops

and 500 civilians demonstrate. If other operations in which EU Member States

participate are counted as well (national, NATO, UN and ad hoc coalitions) the

number of Member States’ armed forces that is constantly deployed stands at 70

to 80,000.

Yet these impressive figures also represent more or less the maximum effort that

Member States can make today, in spite of the fact that together the twentyseven

number nearly 2 million men and women in uniform. Europe’s armed

forces thus still face an enormous problem of efficiency and effectiveness. Ten

years since the beginning of ESDP is a short time to judge its impact, yet the

question must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, those of NATO

included, are really sufficient to achieve the required transformation. The Lisbon

Treaty and its clauses on ESDP (to be renamed CSDP) offers an occasion to

draw up the “state of the union” in this area.

On 28-29 April 2008 Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations

and the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) brought

together practitioners and academics from a wide range of Member States and

institutions at a seminar in the Egmont Palace in Brussels, in order to assess

Europe’s defence effort, including in the NATO context, and explore the

Treaty’s potential to realize a quantum leap. The seminar focussed in particular

on the question whether a shift could and should be made from the current

national focus of Member States and bottom-up nature of ESDP to a truly integrative

approach. This Egmont Paper includes a summary of the debates as well

as contributions from a number of speakers. The editors hope it can serve as a

useful contribution to the debate on European defence.

n°23: Balancing Defence and Security Efforts with a Permanently Structured Scorecard, Patrick Wouters, June 2008.

résumé: Two major developments are set to change defence and security landscapes in

the coming decade: the Lisbon treaty will affect in a significant way the European

Union’s ‘external action’ and at Bucharest, NATO’s Heads of State & Government

decided to overhaul Defence Planning to make it more integrated and

harmonised across all disciplines, which should in turn provide a blueprint for

leaner and more efficient structures. At least, that’s the plan. And it had better

be a good one, since defence planning for both organisations accounts for

approximately 780 billion dollar per annum, on average 2,8% of the GDP their

member states produce (i.e. 2/3 of the wealth produced across the globe).

The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) – when implemented1 – will endow its re-baptised

Common Defence and Security Policy (ESDP in the actual EU treaty) with two

new instruments, the Enhanced Cooperation and the Permanent Structured

Cooperation (PermStrucCoop). By granting the Union a legal personality2 and

limited new decision opportunities, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy or a group of Member States that are ‘willing and have the

necessary capability’ for a special task should be able to take it on (at their own

expense, unless decided otherwise3). PermStrucCoop, second in the rearranged

EU-toolbox, should tailor for longer term capability-building by a strongly

motivated ‘core’ that fulfils ‘higher criteria and which have made more binding

commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding

missions’. Although Art 42§3 explicitly will incite all Member States to ‘undertake

progressively to improve their military capabilities’, it remains to be seen

whether governments and parliaments ratifying the ToL will put their money

where their mouth is.

PermStrucCoop is understood to be ‘inclusive’,4 even for those countries that

would consider spending 2% of their GDP for security and defence entirely out

of reach. But unless it is to be a “zero-growth-doing-more-with-less” exercise –

a distinct possibility in times of austere government spending and competing

budget priorities – a steady decline in national defence budgets will have to be

reversed to meet even the most modest admission standards. Arguably however,

1. The Treaty of Lisbon amends the existing EU-treaty which will be ‘consolidated’ once all ratification

instruments have been deposited. The referendum in Ireland will undoubtedly have an effect

on the intended date of 1 Jan 2009.

The consolidated version of the new EU-treaty will be used as reference and can be consulted on

the website of the EU-council at www.consilium.europa.eu.

2. Art. 47 of the future consolidated EU-treaty.

3. Art. 332 of the future consolidated EU-treaty.

4. Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP (Egmont Paper 20).

Brussels, Egmont, 2008.

combining efficiency & efficacy with the magic trilogy of ‘specialisation – cooperation

– pooling’ should bring PermStrucCoop within reach of most Member

States. Thus, a two-tier “defence community” – considered undesirable by some

for CSDP, unavoidable in NATO by others – would be averted.

This paper will explore how ‘theological’ criteria could be translated to key

performance indicators of a pragmatic and balanced scorecard for defence and

security efforts, both in the NATO and EU framework. Whether they are then

also used as discriminators towards PermStrucCoop is a matter of political

debate, but tailoring targets to the different profiles of possible contenders by

checking and balancing the scorecard indicators should provide a positive, yet

challenging roadmap for convergence. Concerning the other major challenge

brought to the fore by PermStrucCoop – generating forces and capabilities for

NATO or EU-led operations – it can be argued that current burden and risksharing

mechanisms (or the lack thereof) are to be reviewed and rethought: food

for those thoughts will be presented.

n°22: The new context of the agricultural debate in Europe, Franklin Dehousse and Peter Timmerman, June 2008.

résumé: The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) was created

in the early 1960s. During its first three decades, it was very successful, and

European agriculture produced large surplus rather than deficits by the 1980s.

This led to ever increasing market interventions in order to buy the surpluses

and to subsidize the exports. Opponents of the CAP were thus offered useful

arguments to question the budgetary and ethical consequences of the policy. In

the framework of international trade negotiations in the GATT, and later WTO,

the CAP also became unacceptable due to its increasing trade distorting character.

The combination of internal European and international criticism led to

three major CAP reforms since 19921.

The first reform in 1992 reduced the level of the intervention prices of cereals,

oilseeds and protein products, dairy products, beef, sheep and goat and tobacco.

As compensatory measure, farmers were entitled to direct payments based on

previous yields so their income was guaranteed, notwithstanding their lower

level of production2. Other mechanisms to reduce production were also introduced,

such as a scheme to set aside arable land3, an afforestation scheme4, an

early retirement scheme5 and an agri-environment scheme6.

A second large reform was approved in 1999, better known as the Agenda 2000

reform. The emphasis of CAP shifted further to direct income payments instead

of production-based support7. The reforms focused on the grain, beef, oilseeds

and dairy common market organisations (CMOs). Besides, a budgetary framework

was introduced by the Agenda 2000 reforms for the period 2000-2006,

with fixed annual expenditure ceilings8. Nonetheless, the most important

change was the introduction of a double pillar structure to finance CAP expenditures.

The first pillar, the Guarantee section, consisted of market measures and

direct income payments to farmers. The second pillar, the Guidance section,

focused on rural development measures9. Although the budgetary implications

of this shift were initially modest, it was an important change in the overall

1. For a detailed examination of the original regulations and of the first reforms, see DEHOUSSE,

Franklin and VINCENT, Philippe, L’éternelle Réforme de la Politique Agricole Commune et les

Limites d’Agenda 2000. In: Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LI, 5, 1998, pp. 1-132. (legal references and

bibliography included)

2. Regulation 1765/92. (OJ 1992 L181/12-20)

3. Ibid. (OJ 1992 L181/12-20)

4. Regulation 2080/92. (OJ 1992 L215/96-99)

5. Regulation 2079/92. (OJ 1992 L215/91-95)

6. Regulation 2078/92. (OJ 1992 L215/85-90)

7. Regulation 1259/1999 (OJ 1999 L160/113-118)

8. Regulation 2040/2000. (OJ 2000 L244/27-32)

9. Regulation 1258/1999. (OJ 1999 L160/105)

orientation of CAP. A comprehensive rural development policy was designed,

which included elements such as environmentally friendly agriculture, food

safety and animal welfare10.

The CAP enters a new phase, linked to diverse evolutions. It is important to

understand them. Different elements must be taken into consideration: the last

2003 reform (§ 1), the subsequent adaptations (§ 2), the evaluations (§ 3), the

evolution of the international markets (§ 4).

n°21: European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty, Bruno Angelet and Ioannis Vrailas, Mai 2008.

résumé: The finishing touches for the setting up of the European Security and Defence

Policy (ESDP) were put, in the small hours of a Monday morning in what is

today the “Anna Lindh room” in the Council building, by the EU Political

Directors who had clearly reached the end of their tether. Four days later, at the

Helsinki European Council (10-11.12.99), their work received a ringing

endorsement by Heads of State and Government. ESDP was ready to move from

the commitment on paper, made in Cologne six months earlier, to the reality of

a building project. Nice, Feira, Gothenburg, Seville, Copenhagen, Brussels,

Thessaloniki were the next stepping-stones in seeing the job through.

ESDP is a toddler no more. In the world scene, after five years of full operational

capability and a total of 20 military and civilian crisis management missions, of

which many already successfully completed, the policy is definitely included

among the grown-ups. The standard litany is to say that the European Union

has now established itself as a more credible security actor on the world scene,

having added civilian and military crisis management capabilities to an already

considerable array of external action assets. It is true that ESDP has panned out

satisfactorily and, moreover, has proved that it has potential for even further

success. Credit must be given to the impressive political, institutional and operational

progress that has been achieved. The realities of the 21st century dictate

that, had ESDP not existed, it would have had to be urgently created.

At the same time, no more excuses can be paraded for the weaknesses, with

which those who work on ESDP have to make do on a daily basis. Indeed, it is

important to highlight them, as we will attempt to do, so as to set them right. In

a way, weaknesses define ambitions, but the opposite can also be true. During

the negotiations that led to both the Constitutional and the Lisbon treaties, the

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP were the object of

much attention and the target of many of the institutional and decision-making

novelties that their provisions include.

Both of us have been fortunate to follow closely the development of ESDP since

its inception. Based on our common experiences, this study is meant as an “état

des lieux” of where the policy stands today and of its future prospects. The first

part analyzes the overall structural constraints and weaknesses of ESDP, as we

have experienced them to this day, in three main areas: the strategic, institutional

and political aspects; operational activities; and capability development.

The second chapter attempts to anticipate the impact that an entry into force of

the Lisbon Treaty could have on the further development of ESDP. We delve into

the Treaty’s major innovations, with an emphasis on the High Representative /

Vice-President of the Commission, the European External Action Service and, in

particular, on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSCo) which, in our

mind, carries considerable promise for dealing effectively with the problem of

inadequate and irrational defence spending by Member States. On this latter

point, a parallel is drawn with the lessons learnt from the process of monetary

integration. Finally, the last chapter is a more free-wheeling affair, in which we

attempt to focus on certain issues that could be important beyond the Lisbon

Treaty – either steps that could be taken independently from the Treaty or

thoughts about the future ideal end-state in the process of defence integration.

n°20: Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP, Sven Biscop, April 2008.

résumé: The efficiency problem of Europe’s armed forces is well known: of an impressive

overall number of over two million men and women in uniform in the EU-27,

only a meagre 10 to 15% are estimated to be deployable. The causes are manifold:

the low cost-effectiveness of a plethora of small-scale capabilities, unnecessary

intra-EU duplications, the presence of large numbers of quasi nondeployable

conscripts, capability gaps in terms of ‘enablers’ (strategic transport,

command, control and communications), and, although all EU Member States

are conscious of the challenge and are implementing measures, slow transformation

nonetheless from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare. The question

must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, in ESDP as well as NATO, are

sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe.

This paper will argue (1) that the primary cause of this problematic state of

affairs is the still almost exclusively national focus of defence planning, while

capability gaps at the aggregate EU- and NATO-level are being ignored, and (2)

that the only way to achieve the quantum leap that is necessary to realise defence

transformation is through pooling which, by reducing intra-European duplications,

can produce much more deployable capabilities within the current combined

defence budget. From that point of view, it will analyse the potential of

Permanent Structured Cooperation,1 the new mechanism to be established by

the Lisbon Treaty for ‘those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil

higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another

in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’ (Art. 28A §6). One

could argue that the solutions to Europe’s capability conundrum are in effect

well known – the question is whether PermStrucCoop can be the platform that

convinces the Member States to implement them.

Sven BISCOP2

1. Even in a text as full of jargon as the Treaty on European Union, Permanent Structured Cooperation

stands out as especially awkward, all the more so as its logical acronym, PSC, already exists,

referring to the Political and Security Committee. Even though the latter is widely known as COPS,

in order to avoid confusion this article will opt for Soviet-style abbreviation, hence PermStruc-

Coop.

Relations in Brussels and a visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. The author

thanks Daniel Keohane of the EU Institute for Security Studies and various officials in Belgian

Defence and Belgian Foreign Affairs for their indispensable comments and suggestions. The text,

including its mistakes, is the full responsibility of the author only.