Egmont papers

own right, with its own policies and priorities, and with ever growing ambitions

and capabilities.

The EU and NATO already have 19 out of respectively 25 and 26 members in

common and, collective defence apart, have the same functional and geographic

scope: peace support operations (PSOs) – or ‘Petersberg Tasks’ and ‘non-Article

5 operations’ – across the globe. As long as the relationship between them has

not been settled, no ‘NATO-to-NATO’ summit can provide a lasting answer to

the questions which the Alliance is facing, and every initiative, including the

upcoming summits themselves, will be seen in the light of EU-NATO competition.

This paper proposes one model for a re-equilibrated transatlantic partnership:

a two-pillar Alliance.1

Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP

Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)

Professor of European security, Ghent University

n°10: UN Reform and Nato Transformation: the missing link, Dick A. Leurdijk, 23 Nov. 2005.

résumé: From NATO’s perspective, Kofi Annan’s report In Larger Freedom: Towards

Development, Security and Human Rights for All at first sight seemed hardly

relevant.1 In dealing with regional organizations, it nowhere explicitly mentioned

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This was all the more

surprising because Annan thus bypassed NATO’s active involvement in the

implementation of a number of post-conflict peace-building settlements, based

on UN Security Council resolutions, in areas such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and

Iraq. In the weeks after the publication of Annan’s report, NATO’s Secretary-

General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, on several occasions expressed his support for

his UN counterpart’s reform package. In a keynote address in Brussels, among

others, he argued that ‘NATO will increasingly act in concert with other institutions’,

including the UN, pointing at NATO’s cooperation on the ground in

the Balkans and Afghanistan, while adding:

However, we need to raise our sights beyond ad hoc cooperation on the

ground. We need structured relationships at the institutional level as well

– to coordinate strategically, not just cooperate tactically. We need to

establish such relationships with the UN.2

In this context, he referred to his address to the Security Council in 2004, the

first ever by a NATO Secretary-General, saying ‘Kofi Annan’s recent proposals

for UN reform provide further opportunities for fresh thinking’. However, it is

hard, not to say impossible, to find any ‘fresh thinking’ on the relationship

between the UN and NATO in Annan’s report. One could even argue that the

1. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, report of the

UN Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.

2. ‘Reinventing NATO: Does the Alliance Reflect the Changing Nature of Transatlantic Security?’,

keynote address by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 24 May 2005, http://

www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050524a.htm. See also ‘Liberty as a Security Policy Challenge’,

speech by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the 35th ISC Symposium, 19 May

2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050519b.htm.

academia-egmont.papers.10.book Page 3 Wednesday, November 23, 2005 11:34 AM

same holds true for the broader issue of the relationship between the UN and

regional organizations. On the one hand, Annan recognized in his report that ‘a

considerable number of regional and sub-regional organizations are now active

around the world, making important contributions to the stability and prosperity

of their members, as well as of the broader international system’.3 NATO had

played a key role in this development, given its involvement in the wars in the

Balkans in the 1990s. The notion, however, was not further elaborated by

Annan. On the other hand, the only recommendation that he made with respect

to regional organizations was to create ‘strategic reserves’ in support of the UN,

aimed at improving the UN’s deployment options for ‘peacekeeping’. Notwithstanding

Annan’s call for ‘a decisive move forward’, his recommendation for the

establishment of ‘an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities’ was but a

small step compared to the calls, in recent years, for further clarification and

formalization of the relationships between the UN and regional organizations,

and has nothing to do with the kind of fresh thinking about which de Hoop

Scheffer was talking.

It is against the broader background of evolving relationships between the UN

and regional organizations that this paper analyses the relevance for NATO of

Kofi Annan’s report In Larger Freedom, in an extremely dynamic environment

in which the UN and NATO, since the 1990s, have developed their operational

cooperation in the field, in different formats (politically, militarily, legally and

conceptually), in areas such as the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Afghanistan,

Iraq and Darfur.

n°9: Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?, Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys, August 2005.

résumé: Sixty years after the birth of the United Nations, UN reform is high on the international

political agenda. One of the most controversial issues, if not the single

most sensitive one, concerns the structure and practice of the Security Council

as the primary actor regarding international peace and security. Indeed, criticism

of the Council’s lack of representativeness and transparency has not diminished

in recent years, despite a shift towards more openness. On the contrary, as the

Council has become ever more active, criticism has increased correspondingly.

One of the traditional stumbling blocks has been the existence of the veto power

of the Council’s permanent members, which enables any one of the so-called P-

5 (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, China and Russia) to block

any resolution that is not merely procedural in nature. The veto is considered

fundamentally unjust by a majority of States and is thought to be the main reason

why the Council failed to respond adequately to humanitarian crises such

as in Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2004). It is thus not surprising that most

States wish to abolish or restrain the veto. Equally unsurprising is the fact that

the P-5, whose concurring votes and ratifications are required for even the

smallest amendment of the UN Charter (pursuant to articles 108 and 109) reject

any limitation of the veto outright.3 For this reason, many States have abandoned

radical reform proposals and have adopted a pragmatic approach, pleading

in particular for voluntary restraint on the veto use. Furthermore, the focus

of the discussion seems to have shifted to the question whether the possible

enlargement of the number of permanent seats should result in a parallel expansion

of the veto or not.

1. Professor of International Law and the Law of International Organizations, Director of the Institute

for International Law, Leuven University; President, United Nations Association Flanders Belgium.

2. Research assistant, Institute of International Law, Leuven University.

3. B. FASSBENDER, ‘Pressure for Security Council reform’, in D.M. MALONE (ed.), The UN

Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (London: Boulder) (2004), at 352.

Yet one cannot afford to be overly pragmatic on this point. The approaching

reform process presents a unique opportunity, which will not be repeated in the

near future. During the past sixty years, the UN Charter was amended only

three times, including one time in 1963 to increase the number of elected members

on the Security Council from 6 to 10.4 What is at stake is the very survival,

legitimacy and efficiency of the collective security system in the 21st century.

Therefore at least a substantive debate on the veto power is needed, which is

exactly what the current contribution aims to stimulate.

The first chapter presents an overview of the creation of the veto power, having

regard to some initial interpretation problems. Subsequently, some controversial

aspects of the actual use of the veto will be examined. A third chapter will consider

the various national positions on veto reform. In light of the foregoing, a

fourth chapter will evaluate whether the veto still serves its original purpose or

whether it has become obsolete. The contribution ends with some final recommendations.

n°8: Arab reform: what role for the EU?, Irene Menendez Gonzalez, May 2005.

résumé: The issue of Arab reform has been brought to the fore of discussion in the aftermath

of the September 11 attacks, and further intensified by the transatlantic

debates which followed the Iraq war. In stark contrast with the ‘benign neglect’

and active support towards authoritarian governments of preceding decades,

Arab reform in the West is now seen as a vital security interest and the main

antidote to Islamist terrorism. Heightened concern with the democratic deficiencies

of the region has given rise to a plethora of initiatives on both sides of the

Atlantic. The US Greater Middle East Initiative, the “Partnership for Progress

and a Common Future” launched by the Group of Eight (G8) in June 2004, EUUS

summits, together with European programmes towards the Mediterranean

and wider Middle East all attest to a commitment to reform.

Such developments have also sparked off debate on how best to implement the

enhanced focus on reform. Recent initiatives have reflected transatlantic consensus

on the sequencing of reform, where – despite differences in approach –

emphasis is laid on the strengthening of civil society as a motor of reform and,

more generally, on a gradual bottom-up approach. However, the apparent convergence

in policy circles on the merits of gradual change has been increasingly

challenged by experts of democratization processes on both sides of the Atlantic.

The role of civil society as a motor of reform is increasingly contested, while

cooperation with governments of the region has proved of limited relevance,

especially in the post 9/11 context. Attention has thus focused on the need to

target political institutions and other actors in the political arena as a complement

to existing approaches.1

In light of these developments, it is important to assess whether Western (particularly

European Union) policies have a significant role to play in Arab reform.

To what extent do existing and intended policies provide a window of opportunity

to enhance reform? What to make of transatlantic cooperation? Does this

call for a fundamental revision of EU strategies, or should EU approaches

merely be improved? Although the focus shall be on European Union action,

reference shall be made to initiatives external to the EU in so far as they affect

and raise questions about EU policy (initiatives such as GMEI and NATO).

1. D. Brumberg, ‘Liberalization versus Democracy: understanding Arab political reform’, Working

Paper 37, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003; A. Hawthorne, ‘Middle Eastern

Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer?’, Carnegie Papers No. 44, March 2004; R. Youngs,

‘Europe’s uncertain pursuit of Middle East reform’, Carnegie Papers No. 45, June 2004.

This paper outlines the rationale behind European democracy promotion policies

in the Arab region. It reviews European policies implemented in the area

since the 1990s, and, after assessing them, concludes by suggesting ways in

which to enhance European strategies of reform. It will argue that while the

comprehensive approach underlying EU policies, from the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership and the European Security Strategy to Wider Europe, provides an

appropriate framework to tackle the problems of the region, EU policies need

revision to be successful. In particular, EU policy should address the Islamist

dimension of Arab civil societies and enhance the use of conditionality. That

said, since genuine reform must ultimately come from within Arab societies,

there are limits to what any external policy of reform can achieve. Nevertheless,

external actors can and must certainly help in the process.

n°7: E Pluribus Unum? Military integration in the European Union, Sven Biscop, May 2005.

résumé: The adoption of the Headline Goal 2010 and the decision to create rapidly

deployable ‘battlegroups’ are proof of the continued dynamism of the European

Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Yet, although major progress has been

booked in recent years, and further important achievements can be expected in

the short term, not all questions relating to ESDP have already been addressed

by policy-makers. All EU Member States are engaged in the transformation of

their armed forces. Because of budgetary constraints, this is necessarily a gradual

process. Furthermore, for most of the Member States it becomes increasingly

difficult to maintain the traditional wide range of capabilities in army, navy and

air force. This paper will set out to assess whether cooperation, pooling and

specialisation in the framework of the EU can offer an answer to these challenges.

This Egmont Paper brings together contributions that were presented at an

expert seminar on the topic. Including military and civilian experts from small

and big and ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, it offers a broad range of perspectives.

The first three contributions, by Radek KHOL, Richard GOWAN and Serge VAN

CAMP, look at the short term. Are the battlegroups, the HG 2010 and the ECAP

process sufficient to enable the Member States to complete the transformation

of their armed forces and to produce all the capabilities that the EU needs? Will

the battlegroups result in a number of Member States’ ‘red lines’ being crossed?

How effective can the European Defence Agency be expected to be in auditing

the capabilities that Member States contribute?

The second set of contributions, by Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH, Volker HEISE and

the editor, takes a long-term perspective. How far should military integration

go? Should ESDP encompass a larger portion or even the whole of (some) Member

States’ armed forces? What are the options for pooling and specialisation?

Which use can be made of ‘permanent structured cooperation’? Is some sort of

‘European army’ imaginable and what would be the consequences for national

sovereignty and autonomy of action?

The seminar, which took place in the Egmont Palace in Brussels on 28 February

2005, was co-organized by the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRIKIIB,

Brussels), the Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID, Brussels), the Foreign

Policy Centre (FPC, London) and the Centre d’études en sciences sociales de la

Défense (C2SD, Paris).

Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP

Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute for International Relations

n°6: The Lisbon Strategy: Which failure? Whose failure? And why?, Tania Zgajewski, Kalila Hajjar, May 2005.

résumé: Pessimistic comments are crowding the media about the failure of the Lisbon

strategy. At the end of 2004, the latest report of the Kok group has emphasized

“the failure of the Lisbon strategy”. There is now a debate about the remodeling

or the rationalization of the strategy. Before taking decisions, it would be opportune

to organize a reflection about the extent of the failure and its causes. Otherwise

any reform runs the risk of being not adapted or even counterproductive.

Different questions must be examined. What is the real competitiveness problem?

Is there a real need for an EU initiative? Do the different characteristics of

the approach chosen in 2000 make sense?

1. T. ZGAJEWSKI is director of HERA and senior researcher at the University of Liège. K. HAJJAR

is researcher at the Royal Institute of International Relations. This comment is personal and

does not engage the responsibility of the institutions to which the authors belong.

This paper has been realized in the context of a research program sponsored by the French Community

of Belgium (Direction Générale de l’enseignement non obligatoire et de la recherche scientifique,

Ministère de l’éducation, de la recherche et de la formation).

n°5: Between al-Andalus and a failing integration Europe's pursuit of a long-term counterterrorism strategy in the post-al-Qaeda era, Rik Coolsaet, 18 April 2005.

résumé: “Now, in 2004, with Al Qaeda having risen and mostly fallen, the threats that

US intelligence must monitor in the current decade have in a sense returned to

what existed in the early 1990s; only now the threat has many more moving

parts, more geographically disparate operations, and more ideological momentum.”

The author of these lines, Paul R. Pillar, former deputy chief of the CIA’s

Counterterrorist Center and now at the National Intelligence Council

(Washington, DC), is quite adamant about the state Osama bin Laden’s network

is in today: “The disciplined, centralized organization that carried out the September

11 attacks is no more. Al Qaeda still has the capacity to inflict lethal

damage, but the key challenges for current counterterrorism efforts are not as

much Al Qaeda as what will follow Al Qaeda.”1

In public perception and political discourse terrorism is still widely perceived as

a more or less structured international movement – an image Osama bin Laden,

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and other jihadi spokespersons themselves are eager to

uphold. Using century-old symbols and myths such as al-Andalus and a

Caliphate reborn, portraying themselves as warriors of the global jihad, in an

epochal struggle with the West, terrorist leaders are indeed hoping for this perception

of a major global threat to last forever.

Four years after 9/11 however, Islamist – or better: jihadi – terrorism is poles

apart from what it was in 2001. The international, regional and domestic

endeavours against al-Qaeda, including the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan,

have indeed been much more successful than most people realize. Compared to

previous attempts at international cooperation to counter international terrorism,

today’s international counterterrorist cooperation is a success story indeed.

By historical standards, an unprecedented level of cooperation and mutual support

now exists among countries, international organizations and other partners

all around the world. Never before has the number of states supporting terrorism

been so small.2

Recognizing that the global cooperation against terrorism has been quite successful,

the Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf has warned that this is nevertheless

“insufficient to ultimately win the war against it”. At the September

1. Paul R. Pillar, ‘Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda’, in: The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004,

27:3, pp. 101-113

2. For a detailed analysis of today’s international terrorism, I refer to my: Al-Qaeda: The Myth.

The Root Causes of International Terrorism and How to Tackle Them. Ghent, Academia Press,

2005

2004 United Nations General Assembly he stressed the need for a clear, longterm

reform in the Muslim world, which is of course the responsibility of the governments

in place, but also an “active support from the major powers to ensure

political justice and socio-economic revival for all Islamic peoples.” Action is

needed, he cautioned, before “an iron curtain finally descends between the West

and the Islamic world”.

Al-Qaeda has left a heavy imprint indeed. Its main contribution has consisted in

plugging into existing insurgencies, rebellions and local brands of terrorism and

offering an overarching jihadi perspective to these groups, who until then merely

had their own local agenda.3 Al-Qaeda stitched together local opposition

groups and disenchanted youngsters in migrant communities in Europe in a

shared world view of a worldwide oppressed Ummah, offering a salafist reading

of the Koran as the religion of the oppressed – an ideological role once played

by Marxism. Al-Qaeda has now ceased to be a formidable foe by itself, but it

has become an inspiring myth to others. Local groups are being inspired by this

myth, rather than being beholden to bin Laden. What is generally dubbed ‘international

terrorism’ can best be compared to mercury blobs of a broken thermometer,

all highly toxic, but unconnected to one another.

Most of the post-9/11 attacks, such as Casablanca (May 2003), Istanbul

(November 2003), Madrid (April 2004) or the brutal murder of the controversial

Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh (November 2004), point in the same

direction. Their perpetrators are largely locally (or regionally) organized, selfsustained

with microfinancing schemes such as cloned credit cards and fake or

stolen ID papers, mobile phone cards and car trafficking, or the smuggle of

precious stones or metals, operating without external support or instructions,

and unaffiliated with what remains of an al-Qaeda hierarchy.

Jihadi terrorism today is a ‘glocal’ phenomenon: its core is essentially local, but

its appearances are global. Even if remnants of the old structured al-Qaeda network

probably still remain at large, al-Qaeda has failed to gain significant traction

for actions in Europe and the United States. Jihadi terrorism now basically

is a cloak patched from different sources of local discontent, real and perceived,

stitched together by a puritanical and radical interpretation of Islam, and thriving

on an enabling global momentum.

The root causes underlying this particular brand of terrorism are composed of

one major global root cause and a multitude of local root causes.

3. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London, Hearst, 2004

n°4: Regional Security and Global Governance: a proposal for a 'Regional-Global Security Mechanism' in light of the UN High-Level Panel's Report, Kennedy Graham and Tânia Felício, Jan. 2005.

résumé: This Egmont Paper is essentially a reduced version of a 180-page study undertaken

during 2004 under the auspices of the UN University’s Comparative

Regional Integration Studies Programme (UNU-CRIS). Our thanks go to both

UNU-CRIS for making the project possible and also to the Royal Institute for

International Relations for proceeding with this shorter version. Our appreciation

also to the VUB Institute of European Studies for its on-going support of

the project and to the Government of Belgium which has recently extended