Egmont papers

n°31: A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, Europe, and the Coming Order, Thomas Renard, Oct. 2009.

résumé: Executive summary

The world is changing. It is becoming increasingly multipolar with the emergence of China, India, Brazil, and with the resurgence of Russia – forming the so-called BRIC. The world is also becoming increasingly interdependent, not only economically as recently illustrated with the US financial crisis turning into a global economic crisis, but also regarding the threats and challenges our societies face, such as climate change. This multipolarity in the age of interdependence, or interpolarity as Giovanni Grevi names it, will most likely shape the 21st century.

The American unipolar moment has ended. Yet, it seems too early nonetheless to evoke true multipolarity. Indeed, the US remains the dominant power, or the “lonely superpower”, and is likely to maintain its status for years and probably decades to come. America’s decline is not an illusion, but it must be understood in relative terms. US global influence is fading because it contrasts with the rise of the ‘rest’, i.e. the empowerment of other actors at the local, regional and global level.

There is a great uncertainty as regards to who will emerge as a major power and when the US dominance will become definite history. In fact, it is very likely that only few a countries will emerge as central hubs of the system in the 21st century, creating a sort of asymmetrical multipolarity with a distinction between dominant or central powers, major powers, regional powers and local powers.

Based on the analysis of several indicators, this paper refines the “BRIC dream” into a more realistic BR–I–C scenario in which China appears to be the real story and the only emerging power that can challenge the US in the coming years. India will follow the path of China but its emergence will be slower and in all less impressive. Brazil and Russia are probably the least emergent among the emerging powers, but this is not to say that they are not emerging.

What place will be left for the EU in this coming interpolar order? According to most indicators, Europe has the appearance of a global power. However, there is a natural reluctance to join the words ‘Europe’ and ‘global power’ together. Indeed, the EU is not a power in the classical sense of the term for the very good reason that it is not a state in the classical sense of the term either. But if global power is defined as the capacity to have an influence at the global level, then the EU has certainly some global power, for it is a leading voice in many important affairs, such as the fight against climate change. To become a true global power or even a great power, i.e. a major pole in the coming order, the EU will need a more coherent approach and a more integrated strategy.

This will require EU member states to increasingly speak with one voice in foreign policy. On a global scale, all European countries are now small states. They are less and less capable of defending their vital interests on their own against rising powers and are even less capable of achieving major ambitions. Nevertheless, when the capabilities of the 27 member states are joined together, the EU becomes a significant power. There is a strong case for the EU to act together in foreign policy: Divided we fail, united we prevail.

The EU will also need to develop its relations with the emerging poles of the coming order through the use of strategic partnerships. A truly strategic use of the strategic partnerships, i.e. in function of EU foreign policy, must start from a thorough assessment of EU interests in the various regions of the globe and a clearer definition of its objectives towards them. In practice, two types of partners may eventually emerge: those with which the EU establishes cooperation in a comprehensive range of areas – probably at least Russia, China and India, if they would be inclined to such cooperation that is, and of course the US; and those with whom cooperation focuses on a more limited range of issues or regions. In order to promote European unity, strategic partnerships should establish the EU as the unique interlocutor on a series of key issues, hence limiting the margin of manoeuvre of individual Member States.

For the EU to remain relevant in the 21st century, it will need to promote effective multilateralism at the global and EU levels, to seal real strategic partnerships, and to develop its leadership capacity in order a) to influence the global agenda, and b) to take the lead in issues of particular importance to the EU. Leadership and effective multilateralism are complementary and mutually reinforcing. They are Europe’s best option to enter interpolarity as a global power. The EU will not rule the 21st century, but it can still become a major pole, and it must certainly avoid to be ruled out. Thomas Renard Research Fellow - Security & Global Governance Programme.

n°30: RFID: New killer application in the ICT world, New big brother, or both?, Franklin Dehousse and Tania Zgajewski, June 2009.

résumé: RFID (“Radio-Frequency Identification”) is a new telecommunications service

that has received a lot of attention in the last years, due to its growing use1.

Though it is based on a rather old technology (the Radar), a progressive rise in

quality and decrease in price seem to have opened a lot of new opportunities. It

has been estimated that this market could reach the world value of 30 billion

euro in 2015. In 2007, its value was already estimated at 5 billion dollars.

Worldwide sales of RFID tags reached approximately 2.16 billion in 2008, a

substantial increase from the year before. In 2015, some estimate that 400 billion

could be sold. According to the European Commission, in 2007, tags sold

were used in smart cards and payment key fobs (36%), smart tickets/bank notes/

secure documents (14%), cases or crates of consumer retail goods (13%), retail

apparel (5%), animals (5%), and books (4%).

Much hype has surrounded RFID during the last years. One describes ill patients

who would be automatically treated in the hospitals or at home through body

sensors, immigrants who could be tracked anytime anywhere on the map, refrigerators

which would select outdated food or compose propositions of menus

according to their content, prisoners under permanent radio control through

chips borne or injected under their skin, cars which will pay fees and find their

way in the traffic alone, food whose origin will be permanently controllable.

Sometimes, however, the deployment of RFID has not brought the anticipated

benefits. It has also brought protests in some parts of the public.

The rise of RFID systems provokes a lot of interrogations. They encompass

among others health protection, privacy, standards’ compatibility, and the

development of a new Internet system. RFID thus leads to a broader reflection

about the Internet of the future. Furthermore, RFID appears at the vanguard of

a much broader and deeper change of the Internet, though not fully clear until

now, which is described as “the Internet of things” (IoT). In such a context,

many colliding interests must be taken into consideration. In 2006, the European

Commission thus launched a consultation process on this topic, which

produced various reactions. In 2007, it presented a communication.

The present report aims at describing the main stakes of this technology in

Europe3. It will describe the nature of RFID (§ 1), the numerous new uses of the

technology (§ 2), the main problems it generates (§ 3) and the present regulatory

framework in the European Union applying to RFID (§ 4).

n°29: End-State Afghanistan, Jo Coelmont (ed.), March 2009.

résumé: The international intervention in Afghanistan was a reaction to the terrorist

attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2009. At the time, the

intervention could count on broad political support and the understanding of a

large share of public opinion, also because of the UN mandate. Very quickly,

remarkable results were obtained: ousting the Taliban from power, closing the

terrorist training camps, undermining al-Qaeda as an organization and suppressing

insurgent activities in large parts of Afghan territory. After a while a

security situation was achieved which allowed for reconstruction in regions

which had known nothing but war for thirty years. Significant political, economic

and social progress was achieved in a relatively short term.

Seven years later the optimist discourse has lost all credibility. The security situation

is constantly degrading, not just in Afghanistan, but far into Pakistan as

well, while tensions are mounting in the broad region. It has become clear to

everyone that now, more than ever, a new approach, a different strategy is

needed – muddling through is not an option. Nor is a hasty retreat: too many

parameters have changed for the negative to allow that.

Yet, defeatism, as it emerged a few years ago with regard to Iraq, is not now

called for either. Paradoxically the current situation, bad though it may be, also

contains the roots of a renewed and improved approach, thanks to a number of

external developments. First of all the new US administration has opted for a

new foreign policy, for which Afghanistan, and Pakistan and India, are clear

priorities, while it also envisages a new policy vis-à-vis Iran. The situation in

Iraq has seen major developments. In Afghanistan itself elections are planned

later this year. The changed political and economic conditions in Pakistan lead

to a change in policy towards Afghanistan and India alike. The interests of the

three countries, relations between which historically have been marked by high

tensions, are now converging. These developments have engendered more attention

for the crisis by the EU, where the conviction is growing that “flanking

measures” alone are no longer sufficient. The global economic and financial

crisis has necessitated a reinforced dialogue between all global actors, including

China. Thus, a new approach is not just vital – it is achievable.

There is no lack of publications about Afghanistan, addressing such issues as the

fragmented efforts of the international community, the shortage of military

means, the unintentional but very negative side effects of military operations,

the inefficiency of the donor community and of NGOs, the relative weakness of

the Karzai government, wide-spread corruption and drug trade, the lack of

involvement of Afghan local authorities and traditional and religious elites,

spill-over towards Pakistan, the absence of economic perspective in the region…

The question is whether this bottom-up approach, addressing the many dimensions

of indeed very complicated crisis management, is sufficient to engender

change in the current situation and eventually come to a successful solution.

That immediately leads to another question: what is success? Which are the

strategic objectives? Is there consensus about them in the international community,

in consultation with Afghanistan? What is the position of Pakistan and

India? A limited number of official publications do address these more strategiclevel

issues. Such analysis always starts from a specific national perspective,

which has its own logic and which emphasises the national contribution, while

other actors are expected to fill the perceived gaps. All too often confusion is

created – willingly or unwillingly – between strategic objectives and the means

required to achieve them, which produces confusion at the political level and

generates false hope among the local population. This probably explains why a

sincere assessment of the indeed ambiguous, but at the same time ambitious

objectives versus the required means is rarely if ever made.

This is not without consequences on the ground. An international community

which may rejoice in the active contribution of a panoply of actors with a wide

range of instruments, is unable to achieve unity of effort. The perceived capability

gaps are not being filled, while the lack of efficiency and efficacy of existing

means leads to a demand for “more”. In the meantime the security situation is

degrading and the effect of some of the earlier efforts destroyed. Increasing

political tension between the international community and the Afghan authorities

is the result, while because of spill-over effects Pakistan and India are

becoming involved and, finally, tensions within the international community are

rising as well, even between countries that jointly participate in operations or

projects.

This vicious circle must be broken. This Egmont Paper does not have the ambition

to propose a fully-fledged strategy, nor to elaborate concrete actions, but

aims to return to the core of crisis management in Afghanistan and stimulate a

broad debate about a grand strategy. In a first part, it will analyze which were

the strategic objectives at the start of the intervention and which steps have

subsequently been taken by the international community that led to the situation

we know today. In a second part, some recent ideas about key objectives

and desired strategic outcomes will be assessed, to conclude finally with a

number of recommendations to the international community, the UN, NATO,

the EU, and their Member States, including Belgium.

Like other Egmont Papers in this series, this publication is the product of an

informal group of experts from academic, diplomatic and military circles,

including, among others, Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, Egmont, Alex Bracke, Ir. MA,

Prof. Dr. Rik Coolsaet, Ghent University, Alexander Mattelaer, VUB, Jacques

Rosiers, EAAB, Prof. Dr. Tanguy Struye, UCL, Ambassador Baron (Franciskus)

van Daele, and Col. Patrick Wouters. My sincere gratitude to all members of the

working group for their contribution; I of course assume responsibility for the

text.

résumé: Myths colour the past and Belgium’s history in NATO is no exception.

Contrary to what is often thought, the Cold War did not start when the Second

World War ended. The war coalition against Nazi Germany was to hold out

for several more years and give rise to a number of international initiatives,

which all the allies would endorse, with the establishment of the United

Nations at the top of the list. Only in 1947 did the war coalition turn into

confrontation and a cold war. Misperceptions, incompatible security designs

and ensuing diverging interests between the United States and the Soviet Union

had reinforced each other and finally transformed the former allies, both of

whom had been crucial in the defeat of Nazi Germany, into new geopolitical

adversaries.

In those first post-war years Belgium emerged as a convinced supporter of

Western European defence arrangements under British leadership. Only in

1947 did Belgium gradually discover a privileged partner in the United States,

though initially only at the economic and financial level. It would take till the

summer of 1948 before Belgian diplomacy shelved its post-war project for

European defence and signed up to an Atlantic alliance.

In the decades that followed, Belgium proved itself a loyal NATO partner.

Nevertheless, the good relations between Brussels and Washington did not

prevent profound crises disturbing the calm now and then. Moreover, unlike

some other member states, Belgium was to make its own original contribution

to détente between East and West.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, and the implosion of the Soviet Union, in

1991, brought an end to the Cold War and to the bipolar world order. This led

to a debate about new European defence architecture in all the NATO countries,

including Belgium, now the continent was no longer divided between

East and West. In Belgium the debate was settled fairly quickly when the body

politic, across party borders, returned to the original European defence option

Paul-Henri Spaak had championed from 1945 to 1948. Combining European

primacy and autonomy in the field of defence with Atlantic loyalty became a

balancing act that turned out not always to be easy.

n°27: Europe: A time for strategy, Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth and Bastian Giegerich, Jan. 2009.

résumé: The idea to review the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), put forward

notably by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl

Bildt, did not meet with universal enthusiasm. While not everybody was convinced

that the ESS was already in need of updating, some also feared that too

divisive debates would be provoked, particularly on Russia, and that the EU

would end up with a worse rather than a better document. Hence the somewhat

cautiously expressed – and grammatically slightly awkward – mandate given to

High Representative Javier Solana by the December 2007 European Council:

“to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements

on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to

complement it”.

Just like in 2003, when the draft of the original ESS was discussed, the EU Institute

for Security Studies organized a series of seminars, in Rome, Natolin, Helsinki

and Paris, in June-October 2008, to debate the implementation of the ESS

with academics and policy-makers. All three of us were involved in one or more

of these seminars, and in Helsinki we constituted one of the panels, chaired by

Daniel Keohane of the EUISS. Our thanks go to the EUISS for inviting us to

participate in this exciting exercise.

The debate was concluded by the adoption of a Report on the Implementation

of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World by

the December 2008 European Council,1 which decided to leave the text of the

ESS itself untouched. The Report “does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it”

and the ESS remains in force.

The question now is: will actionable conclusions be drawn from the Report in

order to effectively improve implementation of the ESS? For even if one agrees

with the decision not to revise the ESS itself, problems of implementation there

undoubtedly are. If the process ends here, most observers will rightfully be disappointed.

This Egmont Paper summarizes what we see as urgent priorities for

the EU to address in order to fulfil its inevitable ambition of being a global

strategic actor.

n°26: De la maîtrise des armements à la non-prolifération: les nouveaux défis de la sécurité coopérative, Pierre-Etienne Champenois, Nov. 2008.

résumé: La Maîtrise des armements est un processus d’interaction entre des pays sur

les questions relatives à la limitation, la réduction, la non-prolifération et la

production des armements, ainsi qu’au déploiement et à l’emploi des forces

armées.

de confiance et de sécurité (CSBM) ont constitué, certainement depuis le

rapport Harmel2, un élément indissociable de la stratégie de sécurité de

l’Alliance atlantique. Le but était de maintenir, par le biais d’accords vérifiables

et effectifs, le degré de stabilité et de prévisibilité le plus haut au niveau de forces

le plus bas compatible avec le maintien d’une capacité de dissuasion effective et

crédible. L’approche, en soi, reste conceptuellement valable et politiquement

utile mais sous cette réserve, et elle est notable, que le contexte de sécurité a

profondément changé: le pacte de Varsovie a disparu, la Russie n’est plus l’URSS

d’hier et en outre l’Alliance elle-même s’interroge sur la nouvelle nature de sa

mission qui, à l’évidence, ne se résume plus à dissuader la défunte URSS de lancer

une attaque-surprise.

Les défis sécuritaires du XXIe siècle ne sont plus ceux de la fin du XXe siècle.

L’équilibre aujourd’hui ne se mesure plus à l’aune d’une relation de bloc à bloc

mais en fonction d’une relation multiple et globale entre un nombre croissant

d’acteurs qui peuvent être des États ou des entités non étatiques. La marche vers

la multipolarité, quel que soit le contenu précis que l’on veuille donner à cette

notion en pleine évolution, bouleverse les anciens schémas ou les rend inopérants.

La notion de dissuasion est devenue floue dès lors qu’elle perdait ses références

Est/Ouest et qu’elle ne s’appliquait plus dans un cadre symétrique ou

bipolaire. La notion de coalition prend le pas sur celle d’alliance, laquelle

devient elle-même relative faute de casus foederis3 clairement défini. La mondialisation

a eu aussi comme effet de rendre la menace plus diffuse et de la délocaliser.

Elle est devenue civile autant que militaire. Elle s’est en quelque sorte démilitarisée.

La définition de l’armement ou de ce qui pourrait constituer une arme

ne correspond plus à des paramètres proprement militaires. Le résultat de tout

cela est que, dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, les questions de non-prolifération

nucléaire, et à vrai dire de la lutte contre toutes formes de prolifération, ont fini

par transcender les considérations de désarmement au sens classique du terme.

La Maîtrise des armements est un processus d’interaction entre des pays sur

les questions relatives à la limitation, la réduction, la non-prolifération et la

production des armements, ainsi qu’au déploiement et à l’emploi des forces

armées.

2. Rapport sur les Tâches futures de l’Alliance Atlantique – 1966.

l’Article 5 du Traité de Washington. Mais l’URSS n’existe plus. Qu’en est-il aujourd’hui par rapport

à une menace aussi globale qu’indéterminée?

Ce profond changement du contexte mondial entraine une inévitable remise en

question non seulement du rôle de la force armée et des alliances dans les relations

internationales mais aussi, par voie de conséquence, de la maitrise des

armements et du désarmement en tant qu’instruments diplomatiques.

Ce travail comprend quatre parties. La première s’efforce d’analyser le nouveau

contexte de sécurité en Europe (1). La seconde aborde ce qu’il reste d’un acquis

de trente ans de maitrise d’armement entre l’Est et l’Ouest (2). La troisième

envisage ce que pourrait être l’apport de cet instrument à la stabilité dans un

environnement mondial dans lequel les adversaires d’hier sont devenus des partenaires

(3). Sur cette base, la dernière partie tire quelques conclusions sur la

nature du désarmement, les vertus du pragmatisme et de l’approche coopérative

dans le nouveau contexte (4).

n°25: Regional integration and security in Central Africa - Assessment and perspectives 10 years after the revival, Angela Meyer, Dec. 2008.