Explanation of advantages— Science Diplomacy



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1AC Shipbuilding

Sequestration has hampered the navy--We must maintain nuclear powered ships to sustain US naval readiness and aircraft carriers


Whitman 11

(Rob Ph. D in Public Health, the U.S. Representative for Virginia's 1st congressional district, served as a member of the Corps of Cadets and Army ROTC “More Aircraft Carriers Are Key to American Influence” Roll Call pg online at lexis//sd)

That's just one of the words used to describe the effects of the additional $600 billion in cuts set to strike our nation's military, resulting from the abject failure of the 12-member super committee charged with shaping cuts in the federal budget as directed by the Budget Control Act. The Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction is becoming but a memory of another failed initiative in Washington. The effects of its failure, however, are enormous and won't soon be forgotten. The lack of urgency in Congress is bitterly disappointing and, quite frankly, endangers the security of this nation. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in November, one of our nation's highest military leaders, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, said "sequestration" would cause "irreversible damage" to our nation's naval forces. The U.S. Navy faces its smallest force since before World War I. Sequestration will cause irreparable damage to the Navy's manpower and ship force structure. Aging ships in the fleet are already on overdue maintenance schedules, lacking the appropriate funding levels to conduct life-cycle maintenance and modernization work. Without changes to sequestration, ships will be taken out of service before their scheduled decommissioning. What the United States will ultimately sacrifice here is presence and power projection. We will not have the assets to effectively project power and display a forward-deployed presence in regions of the world that demand our attention and oversight. To retain the greatest Navy in the world, we need to maintain our fleet capabilities, or we will lose the ability to project power in the 21st century and our competitive edge at sea and in our industrial base. In order to retain this influence, we must increase our investment in shipbuilding, not cut it. An iconic symbol of American freedom domestically and abroad and a potential item for the sequestration chopping block, the aircraft carrier could face detrimental cuts to her fleet and capability because of a flawed defense strategy driven by looming budget cuts. The Navy has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in her fleet. While six remain deployed across the world, supporting operations, others are in rotation, utilized for training or remain in the shipyard for necessary maintenance. In 50 years, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has made history and shaped the world into what it is today. The USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the first of the 11 nuclear-powered carriers, has served during Vietnam, the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Libya, Desert Shield/Storm, Bosnia, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The aircraft carrier also symbolizes the industrial engine within the United States that will sputter if sequestration remains in its current form. The construction of these great ships is supported through business and industry spanning 50 states and built by our greatest asset: the American people. They are designed, manufactured and engineered by the most skilled American tradesmen and craftsmen in our entire industrial workforce. Some of the most skilled workers in the shipyard train for seven years to attain the proficiency necessary to build these nuclear-powered carriers. These carriers take five years to build, and if we do not move without interruption from completing one and beginning construction on the next, the American workforce cannot be maintained. The shipbuilding industrial base - those skilled workers - cannot stop and start work. The men and women who build our ships will go to the back of an already long unemployment line, and those critical skills, that knowledge base and experience, will be lost as they seek employment elsewhere. That is not simply American job loss. It is a loss of critical national security capability.

Both commercial and government shipyards use the same workforce—increasing non-military ships is vital to military shipbuilding


Marine Link 10

(Provides maritime news, quoting the Navy's Intermediate Maintenance Activity review on shipbuilding activity “The Need To Rationalize Navy ship Maintenance Capacitu” pg online at http://www.marinelink.com/article/ship-repair/need-rationalize-maintenance-capacitu-755//sd)

Among the key questions which need to be addressed by policymakers are: 1) As submarine and surface ship repair work available to shipyards shrinks over the next 10 years, should the available work be channeled to an increasingly smaller number of repair yards in order to maintain a critical mass of activity in each remaining yard? 2) Would a government policy to distribute the increasingly smaller volume of work to all existing yards result in increased cost of naval ship repair and cause a long term decline in industry capability? 3) Since the major commercial yards build and repair both naval and commercial ships, while public yards are limited to naval ship repair only, would channeling an increasing percentage of available business to the commercial sector result in lowered cost and spur capital expenditures in new processes and facilities? 4) Would a properly planned downsizing of the public shipyards provide an opportunity for redeployment of government assets and personnel to alternative uses? These questions are difficult to answer. They require hard information about future maintenance workload, resulting facility usage and comparative costs under various downsizing options. Our report attempts to provide this hard information. THE FUTURE BUSINESS SITUATION One thing is very clear—budget pressures and changed military requirements will result in a significant downsizing of the U.S. Navy's fleet over the next several years. Plans being discussed would cut the Navy operating inventory from 460 ships today to 340 ships by 1995 under Defense Secretary Aspin's proposal, or 320 ships by 1999 under a recent Navy proposal (See Exhibit 1). This would result in a much smaller fleet than that envisaged under the 600 ship Navy plan of the 1980's, and would be substantially smaller than the plan presented by the Bush Administration last year. Among the cuts being discussed is a 50 percent reduction in the number of attack submarines, early retirement of nuclear powered cruisers, retirement of several aircraft carriers and a large scale reduction in the number of support ships. This radical surgery on the Navy's fleet will seriously impact future ship maintenance requirements. A shrunken fleet—in which only the EXHIBIT 1 NAVY FLEET UNDER VARIOUS PROPOSALS Q, 6 0 0 2 500 ^ 400 Z 300 ja 200 I 100 Z 0 460 600 425 340 320 Today Reagan Plan Bush Plan Aspin "C" Plan Current Navy Plan Source: IMA Associates, Impact of Fleet Downsizing on the Economics of Navy Ship Maintenance, Report No. 7123 most modern Navy ships are retained— will generate fewer ship repair and maintenance job starts. As a result, there will be fewer job opportunities for existing yards. CURRENT SHIP MAINTENANCE CAPACITY A wide network of ship repair facilities is currently available to perform Navy ship repair. It consists of a variety of governmentowned and commercial facilities (see Exhibit 2). 1) The Navy operates eight shipyards in which depot level maintenance is performed. Six are qualified for nuclear work, two are limited to work on conventional ships. The Navy also operates two repair facilities in the Pacific, two Trident refit facilities and a variety of shore intermediate maintenance facilities and tenders at which ship repair is performed. 2) Two commercial yards are qualified to perform naval nuclear work. One yard builds and overhauls nuclear submarines and carriers. The other builds submarines. Another 35 commercial yards are active in the repair of conventional combatant and support ship repair. Six of these yards both build and repair Navy ships. Several foreign yards are also frequently used by the Navy for ship repair. These government-owned and commercial shipyards draw on the same workbase. The extent to which this workbase declines will determine the level of opportunity available to the entire sector. The extent to which Navy assigns the decreasing amount of available work to its own yards will determine the rf sidual opportunities available to th commercial sector.

Deterrence is ineffective due to shrinking land capabilities and budgets, only offshore naval power enables US power projection to disincentive conflict


England et al 11

(Gordon England is a former secretary of the Navy. James Jones is a former commandant of the Marine Corps. Vern Clark is a former chief of naval operations. “The Necessity of U.S. Naval Power” pg online at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303339904576406163019350934//sd)

The future security environment underscores two broad security trends. First, international political realities and the internationally agreed-to sovereign rights of nations will increasingly limit the sustained involvement of American permanent land-based, heavy forces to the more extreme crises. This will make offshore options for deterrence and power projection ever more paramount in support of our national interests. Second, the naval dimensions of American power will re-emerge as the primary means for assuring our allies and partners, ensuring prosperity in times of peace, and countering anti-access, area-denial efforts in times of crisis. We do not believe these trends will require the dismantling of land-based forces, as these forces will remain essential reservoirs of power. As the United States has learned time and again, once a crisis becomes a conflict, it is impossible to predict with certainty its depth, duration and cost. That said, the U.S. has been shrinking its overseas land-based installations, so the ability to project power globally will make the forward presence of naval forces an even more essential dimension of American influence. What we do believe is that uniquely responsive Navy-Marine Corps capabilities provide the basis on which our most vital overseas interests are safeguarded. Forward presence and engagement is what allows the U.S. to maintain awareness, to deter aggression, and to quickly respond to threats as they arise. Though we clearly must be prepared for the high-end threats, such preparation should be made in balance with the means necessary to avoid escalation to the high end in the first place. The versatility of maritime forces provides a truly unmatched advantage. The sea remains a vast space that provides nearly unlimited freedom of maneuver. Command of the sea allows for the presence of our naval forces, supported from a network of shore facilities, to be adjusted and scaled with little external restraint. It permits reliance on proven capabilities such as prepositioned ships. Maritime capabilities encourage and enable cooperation with other nations to solve common sea-based problems such as piracy, illegal trafficking, proliferation of W.M.D., and a host of other ills, which if unchecked can harm our friends and interests abroad, and our own citizenry at home. The flexibility and responsiveness of naval forces provide our country with a general strategic deterrent in a potentially violent and unstable world. Most importantly, our naval forces project and sustain power at sea and ashore at the time, place, duration, and intensity of our choosing. Given these enduring qualities, tough choices must clearly be made, especially in light of expected tight defense budgets. The administration and the Congress need to balance the resources allocated to missions such as strategic deterrence, ballistic missile defense, and cyber warfare with the more traditional ones of sea control and power projection. The maritime capability and capacity vital to the flexible projection of U.S. power and influence around the globe must surely be preserved, especially in light of available technology. Capabilities such as the Joint Strike Fighter will provide strategic deterrence, in addition to tactical long-range strike, especially when operating from forward-deployed naval vessels. Postured to respond quickly, the Navy-Marine Corps team integrates sea, air, and land power into adaptive force packages spanning the entire spectrum of operations, from everyday cooperative security activities to unwelcome—but not impossible—wars between major powers. This is exactly what we will need to meet the challenges of the future.

Readiness collapse causes global war


Spencer 00 – Jack Spencer, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation's Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “The Facts About Military Readiness”, Heritage Backgrounder #1394, 9-15, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness

Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

Federal commercial shipbuilding stimulus is key to re-vitalize the economy and US shipbuilding


Pritchett 8

(Raymond, technologist, entrepreneur, owns a technology consulting company, worked in government on health care “Don't Bail Out Automakers, Invest in Shipbuilding” pg online http://www.informationdissemination.net/2008/12/hello-it-is-nice-to-meet-you.html//sd)

Canada is discussing an interesting idea for an economic stimulus package, they are directing money directly into shipbuilding programs as part of the package. I'm personally not a big fan of government stimulus packages, they don't work very well normally because bureaucracy gets in the way of building effective packages. The New Deal was a good example. As an often politicized project to stimulate the economy during a depression, depending upon your politics one can find arguments suggesting it was critical to the country overcoming the economic challenges of the time, or it was a failure because it prolonged the depression. Such massive government investment projects are never as simple as the political rhetoric allowed, a more detailed review notes some of it worked, some of it didn't. What didn't work was investment in the service sector. If you look at spending as a tree, the services sector becomes a stick, output with no tangible product that builds larger networks of economic growth. The New Deal investments in manufacturing on the other hand tell a different story, that tree branches out in a number of ways as a manufacturing facility networks with suppliers, subcontractors, and science to produce products. In many way the manufacturing investments of the new deal led to high production rates and more efficiency, was successful in building economic stimulus across several sectors, and ultimately put the US in position to be highly competitive industrially just as WWII arrived. The New Deal sealed the deal for the United States before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. In the spirit of encouraging government to be wise in investment during difficult economic times, the Canadian model is very smart, and it could be that several Senators see that. Emelie Rutherford of Defense Daily has an article titled Bipartisan Group Of Senators Calls For Obama To Boost Shipbuilding Support (subscription only) where eighteen Senators have called for the new administration to support "a robust shipbuilding budget and policies" for military and commercial vessels. Their letter to Obama seeks support for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard shipbuilding efforts, and for re-energizing commercial ship construction. It notes the 400,000 people employed by the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and says "thousands of jobs" would be generated with a "renewed commitment to shipbuilding that has been lacking in the past decade." The article goes on to note the Senators who signed the letter. Landrieu and Collins' letter is co-signed by: Sens. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), John Kerry (D-Mass.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.), Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), Mel Martinez (R-Fla.), Joseph Lieberman (I/D-Conn.), Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), David Vitter (R-La.), Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii), and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio). Today, the US Shipbuilding industry is a mess following eight years of Clinton and eight years of Bush, and due to many, many factors is uncompetitive in the commercial market while also suffering from a seasoned (ie. old) workforce lacking young trained professionals. If Barack Obama does not take serious action, the shipbuilding industry in the United States will be mortally crippled for decades. This letter strikes me as a smart way to look at economic stimulus. How bad is it? You know how there is this big political debate about offshore drilling? There is a dirty little secret, we couldn't produce more oil rigs even if we wanted to, they are building at capacity and growth simply isn't a real option. It seems to me we are probably going to lose the automobile industry regardless of whether the government bails them out or not, that industry is flat out broken beyond repair and all of those companies deserve to go out of business. Sad, but true. Doesn't mean those workers have to go without though, major investments in the Gulf Coast shipyards would revitalize that region and allow workers losing jobs in Michigan to go south and find similar work down there, where some training can not only revitalize a troubled industry but inject some confidence into the manufacturing sector as a whole. I'd rather invest $35 billion into shipbuilding over the next 4-8 years of the Obama administration fixing that industry to be globally competitive than spending the same amount just to keep the automobile manufacturers in Michigan on life support for another year. The Coast Guard has extremely old ships is stretched thin right now, and could use the investment towards homeland security. The Navy has not retooled since the cold war, and is shrinking at an extraordinary rate. In a time of global climate change on a planet covered 70% with water, in a time where the world will soon be competing for fresh water, in a time when the worlds population is growing at a huge rate but most people live in the littorals, and as world trade by sea has become the lifeblood of the global economic system it seems to me that investment in the nations maritime sector has never been more important to our long term national interest. The shipbuilding sector could also be the solution to the automobile industry problems as it relates to the workforce soon to face major cuts, after all the nation needs more than just frigates, and the need for ships like new ice breakers is just the tip of the iceberg, pun intended.

Decline across the board – GDP, housing, inventories, consumption – only increased spending reverses that


Foley 5/30/14

“Here’s Why the U.S. Economy Shrank After Three Years of Growth” MEGHAN FOLEY- Syndicated Reporter-Bachelor’s degree from the University of California at Berkeley and a Master’s degree from Boston University., MAY 30, 2014, http://wallstcheatsheet.com/business/heres-why-the-u-s-economy-shrank-after-three-years-of-growth.html/#ixzz33zNmIWG6



In the first-quarter of this year, the United States economy contracted for the first time in three years. At the end of April, the U.S. Department of Commerce calculated that gross domestic product — the broadest measure of economic activity — expanded at an anemic 0.1 percent rate in the first three months of 2013. That initial estimate of first-quarter growth was far lower than the 1.2 percent rate expected by economists and a significant decline from the 2.6 percent rate of growth recorded in the final three months of 2013. U.S. economic output clearly showed the extremely cold winter weather had stunted growth, but economists disagreed about the implications the quarter’s results. “Here’s why I’m not so worried about Q1 GDP: The components that are weak aren’t persistent, while those that are strong tend to persist,” Justin Wolfers, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, tweeted just ahead of the release. But Euler Hermes economist Dan North argued in an interview with The New York Times that even though “people have gotten used to [sub-3 percent growth] as the new normal,” economic growth is still very weak. Upon a second look, using “more complete source data” than was available when the advanced estimate was made earlier this year, government economists determined that GDP did not grow in the first-quarter, but rather contracted at a 1 percent annual rate. Comparatively, economists had expected growth to slow to a 0.6-percent decline. Consumers were big spenders in the first-quarter, propping up growth as they have for much of the recovery. But other sectors of the U.S. economy that have buoyed the recovery higher in recent quarters slumped in the early months of this year, dragging down growth. Much of the hurt was brought on by the winter weather. Frigid temperatures caused U.S. manufacturing output to record its biggest decrease in more than 4 and a half years in January; kept job creation weak in December and January; and blanketed construction projects with snow and ice, pushing housing starts to nearly a three-year low in January. That reality left personal consumption expenditures as the single biggest boost to economic output in the first three months of the year. But even consumer spending was impacted by the weather, which curtailed foot traffic at many retailers. Why a Contraction? The decrease in real GDP in the first-quarter primarily reflected negative contributions from nearly all major categories — business inventory investment, trade, both residential and nonresidential fixed investment, and state and local government spending — suggesting that economic malaise was widespread. Generally, the Commerce Department’s revision of first-quarter growth did little to change the overall economic narrative, but higher-than-expected imports — which are treated as a subtraction in GDP calculations — and business inventories that grew slower than originally estimated pushed first-quarter economic output into negative territory. U.S. exports declined at 6 percent rate, a slightly smaller drop than the 7.6 percent initially calculated, but imports ticked up 0.7 percent, completely reversing the 1.4 percent drop originally estimated. Nonresidential fixed investment — a measure of business spending on equipment, structures, and software — declined 1.6 percent, an improvement from the government’s previous estimate of a 2.1 percent decline. The housing market — which slowed early in the year due to the weather, higher mortgage rates, and ongoing consumer caution — remained a significant drag as well; residential fixed investment contracted at a 5 percent pace and subtracted 0.16 percentage point from GDP growth, after contributing 0.33 percentage point to U.S. economic output for all of last year. Further, slow growth in business inventories was the unfortunate — but expected — side effect of the big buildup in private inventories, which boosted economic growth in the third-quarter of 2013. With consumer spending too slow too bring down those inventories substantially, businesses were left with a hangover that weighed on first-quarter GDP. Inventories subtracted 1.62 percentage points from GDP growth, a massive jump from the initial estimate of 0.57 percentage points. An increase federal government spending, the first in a year and a half, and further growth in personal consumption expenditures only slightly offset those drags on economic growth. Plus, the positive contribution made by federal government spending was completely erased by decreases at the state and local government level. Overall, government spending subtracted 0.15 percentage points from GDP for the quarter, compared with an initial estimate of a 0.09 percentage-point subtraction.

Manufacturing stimulus alone stops US economic shutdown—empirics prove


Amy 11

[“The Deficit Scare: Myth vs. Reality” Douglas J. Amy, Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College, 2011, http://www.governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=30&p=3]



Conservatives are also wrong when they argue that deficit spending and a large national debt will inevitably undermine economic growth. To see why, we need to simply look back at times when we have run up large deficits and increased the national debt. The best example is World War II when the national debt soared to 120% of GDP – nearly twice the size of today’s debt. This spending not only got us out of the Great Depression but set the stage for a prolonged period of sustained economic growth in the 50s and 60s. Massive investments were made in science and technology, American workers were re-trained and re-employed, private investment was encouraged, and consumer purchasing power was increased. That 25-year post-war economic boom, with the most rapid increase in living standards in our history, would not have happened without the stimulus of all this deficit spending. History also shows that balancing the budget does not necessarily ensure a spurt of economic growth. In fact, in most periods when we have not had deficits, such as the 1990s, this was followed by an economic recession.6 So there is clearly little historical evidence to show that deficits and debt inevitably hurt economic growth.

Economic decline causes global war


Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.


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