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SMIL Good --- Accidental Launch
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- SMIL Good --- China
- Chinese capabilities means conflict over Taiwan
- China will attack US space assets
- China will win over Taiwan
- Taiwan conflict’s coming–Chinese space mil takes out US advantages
- Chinese space attack means any conflict over Taiwan escalates
- Nuclear war
SMIL Good --- Accidental LaunchPrevents accidents and conflict escalationDolman and Cooper 11 – Everett C. Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Henry F. Cooper, Jr., Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense, March 7, 2011, “Toward a Theory of Space Power, Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/space-Ch19.pdf A limited strike capability from space would allow for the engagement of the highest threat and the most fleeting targets wherever they presented themselves on the globe, regardless of the intention of the perpetrator. The case of a ballistic missile carrying nuclear warheads is exemplary. Two decades ago, the most dangerous threat facing America (and the world) was a massive exchange of nuclear warheads that could destroy all life on the planet. Since a perfect defense was not achievable, negotiators agreed to no defense at all, on the assumption that reasonable leaders would restrain themselves from global catastrophe. Today, a massive exchange is less likely than at any period of the Cold War, in part because of significant reductions in the primary nations' nuclear arsenals. The most likely and most dangerous threat comes from a single or limited missile launch, and from sources that are unlikely to be either rational or predictable. The first is an accidental launch, a threat we avoided making protections against due to the potentially destabilizing effect on the precarious Cold War balance. That an accidental launch, by definition undeterrable, would today hit its target is almost incomprehensible. More likely than an accidental launch is the intentional launch of one or a few missiles, either by a nonstate actor (a terrorist or "rogue boat captain" as the scenario was described in the early 1980s) or a rogue state attempting to maximize damage as a prelude to broader conflict. This is especially likely in the underdeveloped theories pertaining to deterring third-party states. The United States can do nothing today to prevent India from launching a nuclear attack against Pakistan (or vice versa) except threaten retaliation. If Iran should launch a nuclear missile at Israel, or in a preemptory strike Israel should attempt the reverse, America and the world could only sit back and watch, hoping that a potentially world-destroying conflict did not spin out of control. When President Reagan announced his desire for a missile shield in 1983, critics pointed out that even if a 99-percent-reliable defense from space could be achieved, a 10,000-warhead salvo by the Soviet Union still allowed for the detonation of 100 nuclear bombs in American cities—and both we and the Soviets had enough missiles to make such an attack plausible. But if a single missile were launched out of the blue from deep within the Asian landmass today, for whatever reason, a space-based missile defense system with 99-percent reliability would be a godsend. And if a U.S. space defense could intercept a single Scud missile launched by terrorists from a ship near America's coasts before it detonated a nuclear warhead 100 miles up—creating an electromagnetic pulse that shuts down America's powergrid, halts America's banking and commerce, and reduces the battlefield for America's military to third world status8—it might provide for the very survival of our way of life.
Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the need for care would completely overwhelm the available health care resources. Most of the major medical centers in each urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The number of patients with severe burns and other critical injuries would far exceed the available resources of all critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's 1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already occupied). The danger of intense radiation exposure would make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local and regional transportation, communications, and energy networks would make it almost impossible to transport the severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived. From Danger to Prevention Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable. The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide. SMIL Good --- ChinaNo US response to Chinese space mil collapses deterrence—causes prolifFisher 10 – Richad D. Fisher, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Alexandria, Va, January 20, “China's Scary Space Ambitions,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704320104575014341463615862.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopBucket China's Jan. 11 test of exoatmospheric missile interception is worth paying attention to—especially in Washington. It isn't just an early step toward development of a missile-defense system; it's also a signal of a radical change in the country's stance on the militarization of space. The United States should take this as a wake-up call that in the long term, China intends to challenge its strategic superiority in aerospace. The People's Liberation Army publicly unveiled its new strategy as part of the Air Force's 60th anniversary in November last year. It appears that this strategy was formulated in 2004, but the world did not learn about it until PLA Air Force Commander General Xu Qiliang summarized it as "effecting air and space integration, possessing capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations." Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats continued to hew to the line set down in 1985 by the late leader Deng Xiaoping, when he told former U.S. President Richard Nixon that China "is against whoever goes in for development of outer space weapons." China started an intensive diplomatic and propaganda campaign against American missile defense programs. Most recently Beijing added its vocal assistance to Vladimir Putin's intimidation campaign, which succeeded in helping to convince current U.S. President Barack Obama to reverse his predecessor's commitment to build ground-based defenses in Europe against Iran's Chinese-aided nuclear missile threat. Today, China is beginning to shed the cloak of deception over its own missile-defense efforts, and has all but declared its intention to build an aerospace power to rival that of the U.S. After General Xu's statements, Chinese media commentaries explained that the new aerospace strategy emerged from Communist Party leader and PLA commander Hu Jintao's December 2004 call for the PLA to implement new "historic missions," which include defending China's international interests. The PLA Air Force in particular will shift from being a "campaign air force" for theater-level wars (such as against Taiwan) in cooperation with the Army, Navy and Second Artillery missile force, to a "strategic air force" increasingly capable of independent action farther from home. Of particular importance is the PLA's willingness to publicly justify a space combat mission. While it is not yet clear which service will lead this mission, the PLA Air Force is the most vocal booster. In an Oct. 31 interview, General Xu stated that "competition among armed forces is moving toward the space-air domain and is extending from the aviation domain to near space and even deep space . . . having control of space and air means having control of the ground, the seas and oceans, and the electromagnetic space, which also means having the strategic initiative in one's hands . . ." General Xu's candor forced the Foreign Ministry to inveigh the following month: "We oppose the weaponization of outer space or a space arms race . . ." But even some Chinese scoff at this self-serving propaganda. Also in November, a Chinese military expert stated that as long as "hegemonism" (code for the U.S.) maintains primacy in space, "air-and-space non-militarization is merely people's naive illusion, or just a slogan and banner." This isn't the first warning to Washington. In 2006, the PLA used ground-based lasers to "dazzle" a U.S. satellite, and in January 2007 demonstrated a ground-launched satellite interception. Last November, Chinese experts noted that the PLA may develop "assassin" satellites and "laser-armed" satellites, and reported China may already be developing an "orbital bomber." The PLA may also consider placing military assets on the moon—the first "Chang'e Three" moon lander may be equipped with a small radar and laser range-finder for "scientific" missions. The strict military-civilian "dual use" policy governing China's space program may mean that future larger unmanned Moon bases could be used to locate and target U.S. deep-space satellites that provide warning of missile strikes. It's already public knowledge that China is now developing or deploying four new nuclear-armed intercontinental land-mobile and sea-based nuclear missiles. The key variable is whether the PLA will equip these missiles with multiple warheads, as some Asia sources have suggested to me, which could conceivably allow China quickly to achieve 400 or more warheads. These same sources also estimate a national missile-defense capability could emerge before the mid-2020s. China is upgrading its aerospace capabilities closer to earth, too. Since the November PLA Air Force anniversary, PLA leaders have stated that China's fifth-generation fighter could fly "soon" and be in service by 2017-19, exceeding a recent U.S. government estimate by about a decade. Other Chinese sources speculate the PLA may build 300 of these fighters.
As a new U.S. administration tries to "move beyond the Cold War," primarily by limiting U.S. military power, China is signaling its intent to start an arms race. An American failure to respond would constitute a retreat from leadership. Asians will then face two unpalatable choices: accommodate China or obtain their own military deterrence. Both would increase political instability and in turn threaten the region's economic growth. Chinese capabilities means conflict over TaiwanJohnson-Freese 07 – Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, Summer 2007, “China’s Space Ambitions,” Proliferation Papers, www.ifri.org/downloads/China_Space_Johnson_Freese.pdf Let's be clear: Chinese military strategy, planning and capability development is, first and foremost, about Taiwan. If China felt it had to hold Taiwan by force and assumed that the United States would intervene on behalf of Taiwan, China's best option might be to hold the United States at bay for some minimal amount of time, 48 hours for example, to pressure Taiwan into acquiescence. Because the United States military is so dependent on space systems for virtually all activity, being able to disrupt or disable those systems might buy China the time it feels it needs to bring Taiwan back into the fold. While there are a number of scenarios about how China might approach a crisis with Taiwan that do not heavily rely on either space system usage on their part or disruption of U.S. space systems, such as a submarine blockade, the Chinese are acutely aware of U.S. space dependence as a potential Achilles' heel. Disrupting or denying the U.S. military use of its space systems exploits the asymmetrical balance of military power between the U.S. and China in China's favor. It also "fits" with Chinese military doctrine which emphasizing the importance of securing information dominance and the use of "soft kill" rather than "hard- kill" space systems – those that interfere with satellites and their transmissions. The Chinese recognize, as does much of the world, that it is futile to take on the U.S. military directly, and therefore seeks all ways it can to find an asymmetric advantage. China will attack US space assetsBrown 10 – Peter J. Brown, satellite journalist, January 20, “China vents anger with missile test,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LA20Ad01.html. "It should also be expected that the PLA will soon build on China's early Chang'e unmanned moon missions by placing a range of unmanned sensors or even weapons on the moon to better enable attacks against US deep space assets," said Fisher. That may seem a bit far-fetched to many readers. However, China is not backing off, while the US is intent on maintaining the security of Taiwan. Tensions are not going to subside especially when China is so determined to build increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to counter the US in particular. Is China's anti-missile system as good or as reliable as the systems now deployed by the US - both on land and at sea? Probably not, but it is a significant development nonetheless. China wants the world to know that this is an impressive achievement, and that there will be many more in the years to come. China will win over TaiwanBrown 10 – Peter J. Brown, satellite journalist, January 20, “China vents anger with missile test,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LA20Ad01.html. China has conducted a successful "defensive" anti-missile test with the intent of sending the United States a stern message of disapproval over Washington's latest arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu described the January 11 event as a test of "ground-based midcourse missile interception technology" conducted "within its territory". It was defensive in nature and targeted at no country, she said. The test "is just a game about the US sales of weapons to Taiwan; about the non-proliferation of missiles; and about the prevention of an arms race in outer space between the US and China." according to Li Shouping, professor in international law at the School of Law of Beijing Institute of Technology and director of the Institute of Space Law. The test was a direct response to the US Department of Defense decision on January 6 to sell weapons, including the Patriot III anti-missile system, to Taiwan, Li said in a commentary at the Res Communis web site [1]. Since the sale would integrate Taiwan into the Theater Missile Defense System (TMD) of the US, the Chinese government thought it harmed the sovereignty of China and violated the principle in international law, he wrote. Li declined to respond to questions from Asia Times Online. Professor Tan Kaijia, of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) National Defense University told Xinhua news agency "If the ballistic missile is regarded as a spear, now we have succeeded in building a shield for self-defense." The test was conducted within China's territory, "so the missile that intercepted the incoming target would not fly or [fall into] another country's territory, China had no obligation to declare the missile test, but doing so revealed that the military was becoming more transparent," Tan said. Many missile experts contend that what China really carried out was a test of anti-satellite capabilities without actually shooting down a satellite. "We still do not know exactly what happened, but it the current hypothesis is that China tested the same system that it used to destroy a satellite in 2007, this time in an anti-ballistic missile mode. The technology is essentially the same," said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Non-proliferation Initiative at the Washington DC-based New America Foundation. [2] Brian Weeden, technical advisor with the Colorado-based Secure World Foundation, says that while none of the objectives for the test are "apparent due to the opaqueness of the PRC [People's Republic of China] decision-making process," the ultimate objective of the test was as a strategic communication to the US. "First, the timing of the test - exactly three years after the successful 2007 Chinese ASAT [anti-satellite weapon] test - indicates that whatever motivated China to do the ASAT test has not gone away," said Weeden. "Some have argued that the Chinese ASAT test was an attempt to push the US towards serious negotiations on a space weapons treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. Others have argued that it was a demonstration of Chinese capability to disrupt and degrade US space capabilities in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict. Whatever the real reason or reasons were, it can be said that they still apply." China implemented a significant change in the way it communicated this most recent test to the public which indicates that they learned a great deal from the strategic communications failure that took place after the 2007 ASAT test, according to Weeden. "It has gone way beyond the stoic silence displayed in 2007," he said. "An objective [in 2010] for China was to see if it could carry out this sort of coordinated communications strategy and what sort of geopolitical response it would engender," said Weeden. "A large part of this learning came from watching how the US did strategic communications for the 2008 destruction of USA 193. While the USA 193 destruction was in fact a test of an anti-satellite system, the US went to extraordinary lengths to communicate that it was no such thing and that it was all about public safety. The US was also ahead of the curve, bringing the issue to the public spotlight itself with a coordinated communications strategy." This test also enabled China to communicate that it too can develop an ASAT capability as a side effect of working on kinetic kill missile defense interceptors. "This just further cements the fact that hit-to-kill technologies for both missile defense and ASAT are really the same capability. However, in the current geopolitical climate testing a hit-to-kill missile defense system is politically acceptable while testing a hit-to-kill ASAT system is not," said Weeden.
Naval prowess - only one head of the hydra Moreover, it must be said that China's growing 'naval power' is not only about an expanding fleet of ships and submarines. All militaries advancing towards greater sophistication seek to integrate their sea, air, land and space capabilities in order to increase overall lethality, efficiency and effectiveness. The Chinese Navy is but one head of the country's military hydra. In a larger sense, the Chinese Navy should be regarded as a placeholder for the sea, air, land, and space-related capabilities that China will bring to bear against an adversary in the maritime realm of conflict.
In January, the Chinese media published a video of China's first aircraft carrier undergoing sea trials. The bid to field a Chinese aircraft carrier may look like an unwieldy proposition because of the indomitable presence of 11 US aircraft carrier groups policing the world's oceans. The Chinese carrier, which is an upgraded version of a partially-built vessel purchased from Ukraine in 1998, is generations behind American carrier technology. However, China's plan to field an aircraft carrier since the 1990s is not an arms-race-type rejoinder to the US. It is simply borne out of a pragmatic need to use carrier-based aviation to better protect China's surface fleet. The Chinese Navy has calculated that an aircraft carrier with 40 aircraft on board would generate a combat effectiveness of between 200 and 800 land-based fighters in air-support functions. A Chinese carrier, supported by a fleet of attack submarines, may allow the rest of the Chinese Navy to secure an area up to the 'second-island chain' stretching from the Aleutians to Papua New Guinea. China's fledgling anti-ship missile capability threatens US aircraft carriers. In early January, the US Navy's intelligence director acknowledged that China's anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, had finally reached its initial operating capability, leaving US carriers open to attack. Previously, US observers were sceptical that Chinese engineers could master the complicated science of hitting a manoeuvrable target such as a moving aircraft carrier. With the impending deployment of the DF-21D, its immediate role would be to deter the US Seventh Fleet from approaching the Taiwan Strait. The key target would be the USS George Washington, the aircraft carrier assigned to this fleet which carries the US Navy's best strike aircraft capable of attacking Chinese sea, air and land targets and destroying vital Chinese radar systems. These carried-launched aircraft have a range of less than 1,000 kilometers. Therefore, the DF-21D, which shares a similar range, is intended to keep the aircraft belonging to the George Washington out of lethal range. The US and Taiwanese airborn-early-warning aircraft that support their respective navies are also not immune from attack. It was reported in early January that the Chinese military successfully test flew their own indigenously-built fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft known as the J-20 "Black Eagle", designed to creep up and destroy those aircraft that would otherwise provide real-time intelligence and surveillance of a Chinese naval attack. Until recently, US officials have played down China's ability to make advances on its J-20 program launched in the 1990s. In fact, the American defence community previously estimated that the J-20 would be operational only around 2020 when it is more likely to be ready in about three years from now. Lastly, the Chinese military is very close to fielding an anti-satellite missile capability that stands to cripple the network of satellites that the US military depends upon to marshal and coordinate its air, land and naval forces effectively. Chinese military planners realize that the US military satellite and communications network is both its greatest strength and greatest weakness. While it makes the US military more effective and efficient, it is also reduced to fighting 'blind, deaf and dumb' without it. In January 2007, Beijing successfully destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a direct ascent anti-satellite missile, based on the same missile airframe used for the DF-21D, hence proving that it could obliterate US satellites in low earth orbit.
Third, the growing Chinese capability for space warfare implies that a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait would entail serious deterrence and crisis instabilities. If such a clash were to compel Beijing to attack U.S. space systems—primarily intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, military communications, navigation and guidance, and meteorology assets— right at the beginning of a war to increase China’s chances of achieving its objectives, the very prospect of such a “Space Pearl Harbor” could, in turn, provoke the United States to contemplate preemptive attacks or horizontal escalation on the Chinese mainland, particularly if such a conflict were to occur before Washington had the opportunity to fully invest in survivable space capabilities. Already, U.S. Strategic Command officials have publicly signaled that conventionally-armed Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles would be appropriate weapons for executing the prompt strikes that might be necessary in such a contingency. These types of attacks on space launch sites, sensor nodes, and command- and-control installations on the Chinese mainland could well be perceived as precursors to an all-out war. This indicates how difficult it would be for all sides to limit the intensification of such a conflict, even if one discounts the complications of accidents and misperception. Nuclear warHunkovic 9 – Lee Hunkovic, American Military University, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States,” American Military University Course Paper, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf World News Connection (2006) then addresses American responses to each scenario, which notably vary. They conclude that all three scenarios suppose a situation in which the U.S. will be unavoidably involved in the regional conflict, due to the Taiwan Relations Act. World News Connection (2006) then also states that due to geographical distance, the U.S. finds it difficult to respond quickly to the potential conflict, especially since its military is stretched thin in Iraq. They also state that the U.S. cannot predict the consequences of using nuclear weapons or putting excessive military in the conflict in a hurry. World News Connection (2006) then states that their report settles for predicting the U.S. response to the conflict by classifying it in four stages: deterrence, crisis stability, war fighting and war termination and analyzing. World News Connection (2006) then addresses these options that the United States has for each of the previously listed scenarios. They state that the first scenario of a low-intensity conflict, would be difficult for the U.S., in that it would not be able to easily step in, presumably because covert operations are difficult to attribute to the party responsible, especially if plausible deniability is maintained. World News Connection (2006) also states that while the U.S. is expected to be proficient in intelligence in the early days of such a conflict, after intervening, conditions would make it difficult to secure a quick victory and the U.S. would be taking the risk of having to engage in street warfare as in Iraq. World News Connection (2006) addresses the U.S. response to the second relevant scenario involving a massive Chinese invasion, stating that this is the worst case scenario and possibly a nuclear war. They state that the U.S. is thought to be able to target China with its nuclear weapons to end the conflict quickly, but that their report cautions that the ensuing political repercussions after a nuclear war could be serious. They also state that the U.S. might have to risk a long-term dispatch of its forces in Taiwan in the case of a conventional war. World News Connection (2006) also states that the scenario of Taiwan attacking is equally difficult to respond to as the one involving a low-intensity conflict. They state that this would be so because once a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, unless it ends with a one-side victory, nobody will surrender. They also state that while the deploying of responding forces in a massive scale by the U.S. might guarantee winning for Taiwan, it would take the tremendous cost of a long-time dispatch of its forces and a very unstable post-war situation. While this article once again addressed strategic and tactical issues, which are not the focus of this study, they are very valuable for the establishment of indicators of a conflict between China and Taiwan. The first scenario involving the deployment of Chinese special forces into Taiwan to carry out covert operations to eliminate key members of the Taiwanese government, military and attack early warning stations could be an excellent indicator that a surprise attack is in order, as well as the third, where the Taiwanese attack a Chinese joint forces exercise, which may or may not be a stealth attack. The indicators that will be addressed later that these situations would present could give warning of an imminent war, especially if it is not the massive conventional invasion that the United States expects from China and is the most prepared for. A crucially important part of the analysis to examine the chances for transposition, as well as the establishment of indicators, is a knowledge of the Chinese perspective on the situation, particularly, what actions they will not tolerate from the Taiwanese. Studying the AntiSecession Law, as well as other rhetoric from Chinese leaders, particularly Hu Jintao, as to which actions on behalf of Taiwan would lead to their going to war is enlightening, as well as paramount, because the tone of these proverbial lines in the sand can also potentially give insight as to whether China’s primary objective for Taiwan is really forcing reintegration or merely preventing secession. While political rhetoric, particularly from the Chinese, who have a rich history of strategic deception, can never be taken at absolute face value, it is nonetheless invaluable, to establish the intentions of governments, which can be used to weigh the pairwise comparisons, as well as establish indicators of whether war in on the horizon or diplomacy will prevail. Xu (2007) wrote his article shortly before the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential elections and begins his article by stating that while neither the Kuomintang or Democratic Progressive Party being a sure win in the election, from the mainland’s perspective, peace and stability are at stake across the Strait no matter which party wins. He then states that upholding peace and stability is the motivating force behind the mainland’s policy response. Xu (2007) then states that as far as China is concerned, Cross-Strait peace and stability hinge on the one-China principle. Xu (2007) then states that in order to make this concept applicable to reality, the mainland has set the “1992 consensus” as the political requirement and that the “magic” of the “1992 consensus” is that it is the only formula involving the one-China principle that both sides have accepted and cannot make any further provisions on and that it leaves a “creative ambiguity” about the political meaning of one China. He explains this ambiguity, as being that Taiwan insists that one China is the “Republic of China”, whereas the mainland, as a concession, holds that in Cross-Strait talks and negotiations, it does not need to touch on the political meaning of one China. Xu (2007) reveals that this inconclusiveness of the consensus is what made it possible to hold the Wang-Koo meeting in Singapore in 1993. Xu (2007) then delves into some of the Taiwanese political candidates vying for the presidency in 2008, mentioning that if the KMT wins the election, it will be possible to reactivate the “1992 consensus” and that Cross-Strait dialogue and negotiations can resume, which will lessen tensions between the two sides, although not tangible results will probably be achieved in the short term. He also mentions that if the DPP wins the election, it will not accept the “1992 consensus”, but will pursue the “consensus” that now exists in the DPP, the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” that was adopted on May 8, 1999, which says that Taiwan is “an independent sovereign country” that is called the “Republic of China”. Xu (2007) also mentions the position of the DPP is that any change in the present state of “independence” must be decided through a referendum conducted among all of the residents of Taiwan. Xu (2007) later in the article mentions Ma Ying-jeou, stating that if he won, the two sides across the Strait should be able to implement the five “common aspirations and prospects for Cross-Strait peace and development”, as announced in the press communiqué signed by Lien Chan and Hu Jintao in April 2005. He lists them as reopening talks on the basis of the 1992 consensus, reaching a peace accord, promoting the “three direct links” fourth discussing the issue of Taiwan’s participation in international activities and establishing a platform for regular exchanges between the two parties, which has already been put into practice. Xu (2007) notes that the KMT has included the five “prospects” into its working agenda. Xu (2007) then get to the most revealing part of the article, stating that if Ma Ying-jeou were the winner, his basic position on the Cross-Strait relationship would be the maintenance of the status quo—“the status quo of the Republic of China”. He states that the status quo should not be changed unilaterally or by nonpeaceful means. Xu (2007) goes on to claim that neither independence nor reunification is the immediate priority. Xu (2007) then states that no matter which party wins the 2008 elections in Taiwan, the mainland’s Taiwan policy would remain “peaceful reunification, one country two systems.” He further states that the most recent and authoritative exposition of the policy is President Hu’s “Four Nevers” of March 2005, which are to “Never swerve from the one-China principle; never give up efforts for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue; never change the policy of pinning hope on Taiwan compatriots; and never compromise on the struggle against secessionist forces in Taiwan” and that the code of conduct is the Antisecession Law. He ends his article by stating that maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by containing secessionist activities in Taiwan would remain the mainland’s policy priority after the 2008 election. While the author of this article is clearly biased, as he is a reporter in the People’s Republic of China, where people are not allowed to speak against government policies and much of his article is nothing more than pro-Beijing political propaganda, some of his points were very revealing, particularly about the issues that Beijing would not be willing to compromise on regarding Taiwan and their claim that their objective is the maintenance of the status quo, rather than coercing Taiwan into being annexed. Despite much of the self-serving rhetoric justifying Chinese aggression and intimidation towards Taiwan that this article contained, it is very useful to establish indicators of action on behalf of Taiwan that could cause China to use military force, particularly the violation of the Antisecession Law or President Hu’s “Four Nevers”. For the meantime, this article makes it abundantly clear that Beijing considers Taiwanese President Ma to be a facilitator and ally, which dramatically lessens the prospects for Chinese military action against Taiwan before 2012 and alters the weighing of alternate scenarios during the pairwise comparison process. Actors and Perceptions: A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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