File Title space weaponization good 2
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- US China co op good- key to R and D
- CP solvo- things China and US should do to avoid space conflict and destruction
- International concent helps avoid future conflicts and improve relations fight test ban is key
More CoCSpace weaponization bans not good- Unable to effectively ensure compliance-need to hedge bets and be readyO'Hanlon 11(senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy and budgeting, homeland security, Northeast Asian security, and humanitarian intervention. He is also adjunct professor at the public policy school of Columbia University, a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations."[1], Balancing U.S. Security Interests in Space) Overall, space arms control should not be a top priority for the United States in the future, contrary to what many arms control traditionalists have concluded. Some specific accords of limited scope, such as a treaty banning collisions or explosions that would produce debris above a certain (low) altitude, and confidence-building measures such as keep-out zones near deployed satellites, do make sense. But the inability to verify compliance with more sweeping prohibitions, the inherent antisatellite capabilities of many missile defense systems, and the military need to counter efforts by other countries to use satellites to target American military assets all suggest that comprehensive accords banning the weaponization of space are both impractical and undesirable. That said, the United States should not want to hasten the weaponization of space and indeed should want to avoid such an eventuality. It benefits from its own military uses of space greatly and disproportionately at present. It should take unilateral action, such as by declaring that it has no dedicated antisatellite weapons programs, to help buttress the status quo as much as possible. US China co op good- key to R and DHays and Danielson 9- Peter Hays, Senior Scientist, Policy and Strategy Division Science Applications International Corporation National Security Space Office, Mr. Dennis L. Danielson Senior Engineering and Technical Manager Jacobs Technology, National Security Space Office Pentagon, Washington DC, Improving Space Security through Enhanced [Other specific Sino-American cooperative space ventures or TCBMs that have been proposed and are worthy of further consideration include: inviting a taikonaut to fly on one of the remaining space shuttle missions and making repeated, specific, and public invitations for the Chinese to join the ISS program and other major cooperative international space efforts. The US and China could also work towards developing non-offensive defenses of the type advocated by Philip Baines.18 Kevin Pollpeter explains how China and the US could cooperate in promoting the safety of human spaceflight and “coordinate space science missions to derive scientific benefits and to share costs. Coordinating space science missions with separately developed, but complementary space assets, removes the chance of sensitive technology transfer and allows the two countries to combine their resources to achieve the same effects as jointly developed missions.”19 Michael Pillsbury outlined six other areas where US experts could profitably exchange views with Chinese specialists in a dialogue about space weapons issues: “reducing Chinese misperceptions of US space policy, increasing Chinese transparency on space weapons, probing Chinese interest in verifiable agreements, multilateral versus bilateral approaches, economic consequences of use of space weapons, and reconsideration of US high-tech exports to China.”20] CP solvo- things China and US should do to avoid space conflict and destructionHays and Danielson 9- Peter Hays, Senior Scientist, Policy and Strategy Division Science Applications International Corporation National Security Space Office, Mr. Dennis L. Danielson Senior Engineering and Technical Manager Jacobs Technology, National Security Space Office Pentagon, Washington DC, Improving Space Security through Enhanced [Bruce MacDonald’s report on China, Space Weapons, and US Security for the Council on Foreign Relations offers a number of noteworthy additional specific recommendations for both the US and China including: For the US—assessing the impact of different US and Chinese offensive space postures and policies through intensified analysis and “crisis games,” in addition to wargames; evaluating the desirability of a “no first use” pledge for offensive counterspace weapons that have irreversible effects; pursuing selected offensive capabilities meeting important criteria—including effectiveness, reversible effects, and survivability— in a deterrence context to be able to negate adversary space capabilities on a temporary and reversible basis; refraining from further direct ascent ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as China does, unless there is a substantial risk to human health and safety from uncontrolled space object reentry; and entering negotiations on a [kinetic energy] KE-ASAT testing ban. MacDonald’s recommendations for China include: providing more transparency into its military space programs; refraining from further direct ascent ASAT ests as long as the US does; establishing a senior national security coordinating body, equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council; strengthening its leadership’s foreign policy understanding by increasing the international affairs training of senior officer candidates and establishing an international security affairs office within the PLA; providing a clear and credible policy and doctrinal context for its 2007 ASAT test and counterspace programs more generally and addressing foreign concerns over China’s ASAT test; and offering to engage in dialogue with the US on mutual space concerns and becoming actively involved in discussions on establishing international space codes of conduct and confidence-building measures.21 Finally, Beijing and Washington should pursue specific initiatives to follow-up on the cooperative dialogue during the visits of General Xu Caihou and President Obama, as well as initiating discussions about recent statements by General Xu Qiliang, commander of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), that a space arms race is inevitable and the PLAAF must develop offensive space operations.22 President Hu quickly repudiated these statements but the two sides need to find a way to initiate and sustain focused discussions about the difficult space security issues raised by the general’s statements since they represent an unprecedented level of public transparency on the part of the PLA, undoubtedly reflect the position of the PLA and other important stakeholders within the Chinese government, and represent an inherent part of the context for space security about which the US and China must develop better shared understanding. Counterintuitively, Beijing and Washington can lay a stronger foundation for sustainable space security through transparent dialogue over these most difficult issues rather than by trying to avoid them since more diplomatic approaches may assuage but cannot eliminate the growing strategic and military potential of space capabilities.] International concent helps avoid future conflicts and improve relations fight test ban is keyKrepon 4 - Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs., Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses—Conference Report, 25–26 March 2004, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE WEAPONS There is a widespread international desire to avoid the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons. At the same time, a number of nations appear to be hedging their bets by engaging in research and development programmes that would allow them to compete effectively in the event that another country crosses these thresholds first. Only one country—the United States—has publicly endorsed a doctrine of “space dominance” that includes “space force application”. The full fruition of this doctrine would deepen fissures in alliance ties and relations among major powers, whose assistance is most needed to form “coalitions of the willing” to stop and reverse proliferation. The choice between space assurance and space weapons is therefore fundamentally important since it will shape the contours of international security, global commerce, alliance ties and relations between major powers. The United States and other countries cannot have it both ways: the flight testing and deployment of space weapons will come at the expense of space assurance, and space assurance is undermined by the pursuit of space weapons. The United States’ choice is therefore stark and clear: it can either take the initiative to flight-test and deploy space weapons on the assumption that 51 conflict in space is inevitable or useful, or it can seek to reinforce an interlocking network of restraints designed to avoid the crossing of these key thresholds. US restraint, however, would not ensure similar restraint by others. Indeed, potential adversaries might mistakenly conclude that they could gain advantage by covertly developing, flight-testing and then using space weapons against the United States first. not effective- missile defense- Russia- nuclear capability- gets freaked out- also cp could be to place it on the ground to solve the Russia freak out DAEdland 2k - Eland Ivan Eland, is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office., January 24, 2000, Should U.S. Missile Defense Be Limited to a Ground-Based Systems? Yes, We Can Build a Limited Homeland Shield Without Breaking an ABM Treaty [Smaller U.S. defenses do not pose as big a threat to the Russian nuclear arsenal and would be less likely to engender those responses. But the Russians believe that any smaller U.S. defense against rogue states could be a stepping stone to a larger defense that would threaten Russia. That concern is an important reason why the United States should work to negotiate with the Russians to amend the ABM treaty rather than simply abrogate it outright. Although the Russians currently oppose U.S. initiatives to amend the treaty, the Bush administration made substantial progress in renegotiating the treaty to allow the GPALS system, which was more ambitious than the Clinton administration program. U.S. negotiating leverage also would be enhanced by stronger statements that the United States is prepared to abrogate the treaty unilaterally if the negotiations fail. (In addition, the United States could offer deep cuts in offensive warheads--below START III levels [2,000-2,500 warheads]--to lessen the threat to Russia’s decaying nuclear arsenal.) When facing the choice between an unrestrained U.S. defense program and a restrained one under the treaty, the financially strapped Russians probably will see the light. Given the needless kicks in the pants that the United States recently has delivered to Russia (NATO expansion and a war against Russia’s Serbian ally) and potential Russian retaliation if the United States abrogates the ABM treaty (stopping cooperation on securing Russian weapons of mass destruction or actually selling such weapons to rogue states or terrorists), unilaterally abrogating the treaty before attempting to renegotiate it is a bad idea. Building a sea-based NMD essentially would require abrogation of the treaty merely to obtain a system that is likely to be more costly and less effective in protecting the United States than a land-based system. Renegotiating the ABM treaty to permit the deployment of a limited land-based system is a better alternative.] 1 2 3 4 5 6 Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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