File Title space weaponization good 2
AT: Space weaponization deters arms race and conflict/ CP solves better
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- CP solvency- would protect satellites
- CP solvency miscalc/ Arms race
- International concent helps avoid future conflicts and improve relations fight test ban is key
- Space weaponization bad causes arms race and flight testing ban would avoid it
- COC is key to ensure space warfare is avoided
AT: Space weaponization deters arms race and conflict/ CP solves betterSpace law needed- deterrence fails in the context of weaponized space- due to the goal of space weaponization supporters of dominance not deterrentKrepon and Clary 03- Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College., Clary is currently a PhD student in the Department of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., Space Assurance or Space Dominance? Concepts of limited warfare and escalation control that were intimately associated with nuclear deterrence during the Cold War have not been propounded by U.S. advocates of space warfare. To engage in tit-for-tat, controlled warfare against satellites would suggest that the first kill of a satellite in the his tory of armed conflict would reflect a mere quest for balance or a novel form of message sending. The rationales provided by proponents of space control are notably different. The object of acquiring space warfare capabilities is to win, not to tie. In other words, U.S. advocates of space warfare capabilities are less interested in deterrence than in dominance and compellance. Unlike nuclear weapons, ASAT capabilities have been tested infrequently and deployed (using a generous definition of deployment) minimally. Nuclear deterrence was based on large numbers of overt deployments of lethal capabilities regularly demonstrated at nuclear test sites that made the earth shake. ASAT capabilities, in contrast, are mostly inferential. The basic message of deterrence of space warfare during the Cold War—the prospect of mutual loss exceeding potential gains—was therefore accomplished without the heavy encumbrances and trappings of nuclear deterrence. Library shelves groan under the amount of intellectual effort devoted to deterrence theory written during the Cold War, but there has been little application of these concepts to space warfare. With respect to escalation control, however, nuclear deterrence and space warfare had, and continue to have, much in commo n: Both rely on threats that leave something to chance. Escalation control becomes very problematic once the threat is used. The quest for preemptive space warfare capabilities alongside dominant conventional military capabilities is therefore bound to be viewed in worrisome terms by potential adversaries. The flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry is thus likely to generate low-cost blocking action, comparable to the countermeasures likely to be employed by states fearing the viability of prospective U.S. missile defenses. Space weaponry, like missile defenses, can be designed and sized for the limited purpose of dealing with maverick leaders. Both need not be confined to specific locations; they can go where directed. Additional deployments can be added rather quickly from covert stocks. Moreover, the goal sought by advocates of U.S. space weaponry, as well as missile defenses, is not deterrence but dominance. CP solvency- would protect satellitesBan on weaponization is key to protect satellites effectivelyHui 05 (Zhang Hui is a research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research includes nuclear arms control verification techniques, the control of fissile material, nuclear terrorism, nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and space. An extended version of this paper was produced for the, Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf) [Furthermore, a number of measures could be taken to secure space assets by multilateral rules or agreements. Specific rules or agreements for space use might include, for example, "keep-out zones," a non-interference rule for satellites, cooperation on reducing space debris, notification of space launch, development of safe traffic management procedures, and building a hotline between major missile and space powers. These "rules of the road" would be intended to reduce suspicion and encourage the orderly use of space. However, it should be noted that the above technical measures and rules, although important for reducing present risks, would not remove the implicit threat of ASAT attacks. A potential rule on "keep-out-zones" would not prohibit an attack by a space-based laser at long distance. Technical solutions are unlikely to suffice in the absence of strengthened international agreements on space activity. In addition, hardening satellites would be extremely costly, and potentially infeasible, in particular for civilian and commercial satellites. It would impair the operational flexibility of satellites.] CP solvency miscalc/ Arms raceCompromise on ban of missile defense-would allow some form but not all forms and help avoid the tech that would cause arms race and full scale wepJohnson 02- Rebecca Johnson, Dr. Johnson is an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Command and Staff College at Marine Corps University. In addition, she is currently completing a Masters in Divinity at Wesley Theological Seminary with concentrations in ethics and world religions., CHAPTER 3 SECURITY WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS1 [Another proposal builds on an earlier Bunn proposal to distinguish between weapons in low and high orbit. With the aim of getting the support of key actors among the inevitable weaponizers and militarization realists, James Clay Moltz argued the case for prohibiting the use, testing or 75 deployment of weapons or interceptors of any sort above 500 miles and prohibiting the stationing of weapons in LEO. His proposal would permit the testing (and presumably use) of ground-based, sea-based and air-based interceptors in LEO against ballistic missiles but not against satellites or other space-based objects (while recognizing that implementation of this would have to rely on taboo-building and confidence, since verification techniques would be unable to distinguish between permitted ABM interceptors and banned ASAT purposes).36 While such a compromise would be unlikely to satisfy the space hawks, it allows key elements of the Bush Administration’s missile defence plans, while clear barriers would prevent space-based lasers or kinetic kill weapons, and might therefore head off the escalation to higher levels of space weaponization that many fear as the most threatening and destabilizing facet of the missile defence project.] International concent helps avoid future conflicts and improve relations fight test ban is keyKrepon 4 - Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs., Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses—Conference Report, 25–26 March 2004, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE WEAPONS There is a widespread international desire to avoid the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons. At the same time, a number of nations appear to be hedging their bets by engaging in research and development programmes that would allow them to compete effectively in the event that another country crosses these thresholds first. Only one country—the United States—has publicly endorsed a doctrine of “space dominance” that includes “space force application”. The full fruition of this doctrine would deepen fissures in alliance ties and relations among major powers, whose assistance is most needed to form “coalitions of the willing” to stop and reverse proliferation. The choice between space assurance and space weapons is therefore fundamentally important since it will shape the contours of international security, global commerce, alliance ties and relations between major powers. The United States and other countries cannot have it both ways: the flight testing and deployment of space weapons will come at the expense of space assurance, and space assurance is undermined by the pursuit of space weapons. The United States’ choice is therefore stark and clear: it can either take the initiative to flight-test and deploy space weapons on the assumption that 51 conflict in space is inevitable or useful, or it can seek to reinforce an interlocking network of restraints designed to avoid the crossing of these key thresholds. US restraint, however, would not ensure similar restraint by others. Indeed, potential adversaries might mistakenly conclude that they could gain advantage by covertly developing, flight-testing and then using space weapons against the United States first. Space weaponization bad causes arms race and flight testing ban would avoid itKrepon 4 - Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs., Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses—Conference Report, 25–26 March 2004, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE WEAPONS By virtue of its leadership position in space commerce and military power, the United States has unprecedented leverage to shape whether the peaceful conditions that now exist in space are maintained, or whether 53 space becomes weaponized. If the United States exercises restraint in the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, while maintaining readiness to respond if others do so first, there is a reasonable chance that these thresholds will not be crossed. If, however, the United States takes the lead in flight-testing and deploying space weaponry in the vain pursuit of still greater military supremacy, Washington will find little diplomatic support and much low-tech competition. As a consequence, by initiating the weaponization of space, Washington will find itself isolated diplomatically while placing still greater burdens on US armed forces. The salience of space weapons will remain low if such techniques are not flight-tested or deployed. Given the extraordinary and growing differential in power that the United States enjoys in ground warfare, sea power and air power, it is hard to find compelling arguments for seeking to supplement these advantages by weaponizing space. If the United States pushes to extend its pronounced military dominance into space, others are likely to view this pursuit through the prism of the Bush Administration’s national security strategy, which places emphasis on preventive war and pre-emption. COC is key to ensure space warfare is avoidedKrepon 4 - Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs., Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses—Conference Report, 25–26 March 2004, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE WEAPONS One value of adding to treaty-based prohibitions on space warfare lies in the strengthening of international norms that define unacceptable behaviour in space. Treaty regimes, when combined with military capabilities to deny gains or to punish violators, have more of a salutary deterrent effect than either would have in isolation. Deterrence is further enhanced when treaties contain intrusive monitoring provisions and complementary transparency measures. When deterrence by means of treaty constraints and supplementary military capabilities fails, treaty signatories are on much firmer ground in taking compensatory military steps than in the absence of treaty norms. Negotiating a multilateral treaty prohibiting space warfare in general and ASAT tests in particular will not be easy. The forum in Geneva established for this purpose, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), now has 66 members and operates by consensus. The United States has opposed a negotiating mandate for space arms control, and appears reluctant even to engage in preliminary discussions on this subject. Several nations are likely to be uncomfortable with the transparency measures necessary to provide assurance of compliance and early warning of troubling activities. Nor will it be simple to construct a widely acceptable, common sense definition of what constitutes the acts of space warfare to be prohibited. The mix of monitoring arrangements and transparency measures sufficient to verify that prohibited activities are not being carried out also poses a significant challenge. If the CD remains deadlocked over space arms control, then a single state or a grouping of states might decide to take the lead in tackling these difficult questions. The model here would be the Government of Canada’s 55 role in promoting an international convention banning the use of landmines. The “Ottawa process” was given a significant boost by the technical inputs and energy provided by non-governmental organizations that convened alongside governmental experts. The advantage of this approach is that a coalition of the willing would not be constrained by the requirement for a diplomatic consensus. The disadvantage is that some key states could be absent from the drafting process and would feel no compulsion to join the draft agreement. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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