File Title space weaponization good 2
AT: countries wouldn’t support the bans/ treaties would fail
Download 1.17 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- CP solvo- international agreement would help solve US involvement is key in order to get success
- CP solvo- US should lead the effort to develop space laws- space weaponization would fail in providing security
- CP solvo- combination of COC no sim attacks,- US key to development of it agenda setting power for international system
- Cp solvo- US involvement is key in order ensure effectiveness of the negotiations
- United States key to preventing space weaponization – set precedent, leads to international cooperation
- US efforts to go at it alone will not work to prevent space arms race- only if US takes the lead in wep development
AT: countries wouldn’t support the bans/ treaties would failCP solvo- US support would help passage- would also solve multiple issuesKrepon 4- Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt.,“Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option” [A wide range of military-support, commercial, and civilian space activities could damage or destroy space assets even if that was not their primary purpose or their intent. It would, therefore, be necessary to devise behavioral rules to facilitate the continued growth of international space operations while minimizing inadvertent problems, unwarranted suspicions, and deliberate misuse. There are numerous proposals to be evaluated here, including measures to prevent orbital overcrowding and debris generation, to increase missile launch transparency, and to avoid maneuvers that might be mistaken as aggressive or used to hide hostile intent until it was too late for defensive maneuvers. The likelihood of agreement on any of these measures would be significantly greater in the context of US support for a space security system based on mutual cooperation and restraint rather than national dominance. The prospects for successful implementation and high levels of confidence in compliance over time would also be vastly improved if the United States returned to its traditional role as champion of transparency in space activities and helped to create a climate in which states could exchange sensitive information about their space programs without fear that it would be misused.] CP solvo- international agreement would help solve US involvement is key in order to get successKrepon 4- Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt.,“Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option” The Outer Space Treaty should remain as the foundational legal document because its fundamental principles — freedom of access, non-appropriation, equitable benefits, transparency, and peaceful use — make even more sense now that numerous countries can affect each other’s use of space positively or negatively, deliberately or inadvertently, and when even countries without their own programs see space-based information and communication systems as increasingly important for security and economic growth. It would be counter-productive to try replacing the Outer Space Treaty and the various other international space agreements with a single Comprehensive Space Treaty, or to attempt renegotiating specific provisions of the Outer Space Treaty (which would be extraordinarily difficult and would require re-ratification by all member states). Instead, the focus should be on international discussions leading to agreement on one or more supplemental accords, with the understanding that more effective and equitable rules, higher rates of participation, more widespread compliance, and more vigorous international responses to non-compliance are likely to require formal negotiations, legally binding agreements, and implementing organizations that have both resources and political clout. Since the Conference on Disarmament remains the international community’s sole standing body for negotiating multilateral arms control agreements, the United States should cease using procedural maneuvers to preclude even a preliminary discussion about cooperative measures to enhance space security — especially if it wants to continue keeping military matters off the COPUOS agenda. One new rule that follows logically from the OST principles and that could, with US support, gain widespread assent, would be a categorical prohibition on the destruction of peaceful space assets or direct interference with their legitimate purposes. This would begin with a ban on testing and deployment of weapons based in space or targeted at space assets. It should prohibit further development of space-based anti-missile systems because their very limited defensive benefits are dwarfed by the new level of vulnerability they would create for satellites in geostationary orbit. CP solvo- US key to ensure that international constraints are created the failure before was due to a weak US involvement in the effortsGallagher 5– Nancy Gallagher, Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. he has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. , Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security, Any consideration of new rules for space security immediately encounters a basic problem: the current leadership of the United States is intensely skeptical about international constraints on US freedom of action, yet it is hard to imagine international initiatives that could significantly strengthen space security despite the opposition of the United States.65 Some analysts, therefore, try to position themselves as offering a “realistic” middle ground between space warriors and space sanctuary “purists.” They argue that the United States should unilaterally shape how and when space is weaponized by using more passive and defensive measures for satellite protection while neither being the first to deploy dedicated ASATs, space-to-Earth weapons, or space-based missile defense, nor ruling out these options except, perhaps, through carefully tailored constraints such as a ban on missile or ASAT tests that generate debris above 300 miles.66 Such a treaty would appeal to many, but not all, US military space users who want to minimize the proliferation of debris that could damage their satellites, but it is hard to imagine why countries without the non-destructive anti-satellite capabilities being developed by the United States would accept this as an isolated measure. CP solvo- US should lead the effort to develop space laws- space weaponization would fail in providing securityGallagher 5– Nancy Gallagher, Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. he has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. , Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security, Rather than assuming that conflict in space is inevitable and then taking unilateral actions that turn that dire assumption into a self-fulfilling prophecy, the United States could lead international efforts to update the rules for space so that they fit the changing circumstances of global security. As the dominant power in space and in world politics, the United States could be confident that an expanded and elaborated set of formal and informal rules would reflect its preferences and could be widely accepted as long as the rules also enhanced the security and prosperity of others. Of course, the United States could only return to its traditional position as champion of an approach to space security based on peaceful cooperation, freedom of access, equitable benefits, and transparency if its political leaders accepted something that a majority of the public already knows: competing for national advantage by deploying anti-satellites weapons, space-based missile defense interceptors, and other expanded military uses of space is no more likely to bring lasting security now than during the Cold War.60 Key trends associated with globalization and the information revolution strengthen, rather than undermine, the logic of restraint that shaped US space security preferences in the 1950s and 1960s. They also pose new challenges that are best addressed through a comprehensive effort to formalize, operationalize, and institutionalize new rules for space within the broader strategic context of global security. CP solvo- combination of COC no sim attacks,- US key to development of it agenda setting power for international systemKrepon 4- Michael Krepon, Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College. He also studied Arabic at the American University in Cairo, Egypt., Avoiding the Weaponization of Space [Space also deserves “rules of the road” to help prevent incidents and dangerous military activities. Such a code of conduct would include provisions against simulated attacks; the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons; dangerous maneuvers in space, except those for rescue, repair, and other peaceful purposes; and commercial interference, as well as requirements to mitigate space debris.10 The definitions of space warfare, the scope of agreed constraints, and the ability to monitor them have plagued every prior initiative in this field. They will also bedevil efforts to craft a code of conduct. Nonetheless, this Avoiding the Weaponization of Space effort is worth pursuing. The risks associated with pursuing a code of conduct for responsible space-faring nations are minimal compared to the risks of flight-testing and deploying space weapons. The weaponization of space was avoided during the Cold War, even though both superpowers jockeyed for military advantage on virtually every other front. Space weaponry can also be avoided now, when the United States enjoys unparalleled agenda-setting powers. Existing norms against weaponizing space can be strengthened if Washington exercises restraint, adopts prudent hedges, and joins others in diplomatic efforts to pursue space assurance. The time is ripe to reinforce existing norms in space that have greatly benefited space-aided commerce, scientific exploration, and the US armed forces. 20 | A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations ] Cp solvo- US involvement is key in order ensure effectiveness of the negotiationsMoltz 2-James Moltz, A longtime securities analyst and respected mentor cites the importance of geopolitics, Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control [But a new forum is needed to allow the issues to be presented openly and discussed in the presence of all international parties interested in space. Such a process should begin whether or not all governments choose to participate at the present time. This forum could craft possible compromise proposals for later discussion at the inter-governmental level, when conditions are more favorable. One analyst, Rebecca Johnson, suggests an “Ottawa process” approach for space, referring to the successful negotiation of the Land Mines Convention by a group of organizations and concerned states working outside typical intergovernmental channels.12 Such an avenue might be fruitful, but it must include key U.S. constituencies—such as commercial space users and representatives from both parties in Congress. It must also not be held hostage to “purist” approaches that rule out all forms of missile defense. Media representatives should be included in order to communicate the importance of these questions to the U.S. and international publics, which are currently virtually unaware of the security debates going on behind the scenes that will affect their futures. An alternative approach might be to let the commercial space community lead the negotiations,13 which could have the advantage of placing greater credibility and clout behind any eventual agreement in the eyes of national legislatures.] transparency effort- if US gets involved it would work wellJohnson 02- Rebecca Johnson, Dr. Johnson is an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Command and Staff College at Marine Corps University. In addition, she is currently completing a Masters in Divinity at Wesley Theological Seminary with concentrations in ethics and world religions., CHAPTER 3 SECURITY WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS1 [Space security has been the subject of United Nations resolutions for more than 40 years. General Assembly resolution 172125 of 20 December 1961 established many of the foundational principles of space arms control that were later to be enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Streaty (OST). It stressed that exploration and peaceful uses should be open to all, and that international law should apply to space and celestial bodies. It advocated the registration of space launches and international cooperation on issues such as communication and meteorology.26 The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), attached to the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee, has long been able to discuss the problems associated with space traffic control and debris, but is hampered by an interpretation of its mandate that precludes any addressing of arms control or disarmament questions. Employing the well-known “ping-pong” tactic, the United States and others insisted that any disarmament-related issues were the purview of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where they could then be blocked. Transparency measures under consideration, in conjunction with wider efforts to control ballistic missile proliferation, include notification of launches, providing pre- and post-launch information, and the licensing of activities. The idea of starting the process of addressing space security by looking at transparency, confidence-building measures and international cooperation to track and mitigate debris and overcrowding in space appears attractive because it is thought possible to bypass the space hawks’ objections and draw the United States into such discussions. If the United States were prepared to engage and if (a bigger if, this) the talks could be effectively managed, they would be intrinsically valuable. However, as long as the CD and COPUOS maintain a rigid division of labour, it will be difficult—if not impossible—to move from such confidence-building measures into the kind of cooperative arms control that is urgently required. There would be a danger that under such circumstances substantive talks on space debris and traffic control would be time-consuming and could be manipulated to divert attention from measures to prevent the first testing and deployment of space weapons.] United States key to preventing space weaponization – set precedent, leads to international cooperationChristy 6 – Donald P. Christy, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, U.S. Army War College, March 15th, 2006, "UNITED STATES POLICY ON WEAPONS IN SPACE," www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf Recommendation The Bush Administration’s new space policy, when published, may do nothing to change the current “wait and see” approach on weaponization of space or it may provide the direction previously lacking to proceed down that path. There is a third and better alternative. I believe the United States government should implement space policy with the goal of actively preventing the weaponization of space while aggressively funding programs that reduce the vulnerabilities of existing commercial and military space systems. First, the United States should take a leadership role on the issue and actively move to prevent the deployment and use of space weapons. Second, we must reduce our military’s reliance on space based force enhancement through diversification of systems, capabilities and technologies aimed at decreasing the threat posed by a “space Pearl Harbor.” The first step is leadership in setting the intended standard. As the world’s only superpower, and the one nation in the best position to weaponize space, by not doing so we may pave the way to ensure it never happens. 60 Our current relative dominance in space gives the United States unique credibility in leading an international effort to limit space weapons, as the nation with presumably the most to give up. It would be easy for Peru to give up space weapons. Since they have no near-term prospects for a space program, they really are not giving up anything tangible. By renouncing space weapons, the United States is giving up something real and tangible. This can have the effect of setting a very high international value on preserving space as a weapons free sanctuary. Initially, the United States should announce a policy of unilateral constraint in the development and deployment of weapons in space. 61 From this position of strength, we should pursue and shape comprehensive and verifiable international conventions that limit weapons in space. The strength comes from a combination of our technological dominance in space and our leadership position in the world. As discussed, space weapons are a choice. If the United States, through international leadership, places great value on a space sanctuary, it increases the international pressure for others to follow suit. It also raises the political ramifications of any nation’s violation of the sanctuary or unwillingness to participate in the conventions. If, on the other hand, the United States acts as the pioneer for space weapons, not only do we pay the political cost of breaking the sanctuary of space, but we also reduce the cost (political and economic) of entry to those who follow. 62 Restraint increases the pressure for others to restrain as well. Failing restraint, should another space capable country be unwilling to sign and comply with the conventions and later develop space weapons, it would greatly enhance the political environment for the United States to counter any threat including a greater likelihood of having partners, political and otherwise, in the process. 6314 US efforts to go at it alone will not work to prevent space arms race- only if US takes the lead in wep developmentKrepon and Clary 03- Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College., Clary is currently a PhD student in the Department of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., Space Assurance or Space Dominance? Put another way, the dominant position of the United States provides agenda-setting powers in space. The flight-testing and deployment of space warfare capabilities is surely inevitable if the United States takes the lead in this pursuit, but not if Washington maintains prudent hedges against unwelcome developments in the form of a readiness to respond in kind to any flight tests or deployments of space weapons by weaker states. These hedges, as discussed in Chapter 3, should be sufficiently persuasive to foreclose such a competition, unless weaker space-faring nations make very unwise choices. While a hedging strategy is necessary, it is also insufficient. Hedges against the flight-testing and deployment of space warfare capabilities need to be accompanied by initiatives that underscore the positive and affirming uses of space for the benefit of humankind. Space assurance, broadly defined, also requires the reaffirmation of existing norms against the weaponization of space Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
|