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- Countries would weaponized to control H-3
- Link --- Missile Defense
- Even a missile defense test causes weaponization and provokes Russia and China
- BMD functionally neutralizing deterrence of countries forces them to pursue space weapons
- BMD triggers space arms race
- China will freak out if US goes at it alone and developes space based missile defense
Link --- H-3Mining H-3 leads to weaponization of space to control resourcesGagnon 6 – Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator Global Network Against Weapons And Nuclear Power in Space, December 17 2006, “NASA Plans Moon Base To Control Path To Space,” http://www.rense.com/general74/path.htm Some scientists predict that one metric ton of helium-3 could be worth over $3 billion. Researchers at the Princeton University Plasma Physics Laboratory have estimated that some one million tons of helium-3 could be obtained from the top layer of the Moon. If all this turns out to be true and scientifically possible, imagine the gold rush to the Moon and the conflict that could follow in years to come. Who would police the Moon, especially when countries like the U.S. refuse to sign the Moon Treaty that restricts "ownership claims"? The U.S. Space Command's plan, Vision for 2020, says, "Historically, military forces have evolved to protect national interests and investments - both military and economic. During the rise of sea commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests....Likewise, space forces will emerge to protect military and commercial national interests and investment in the space medium due to their increasing importance." I have always been convinced that, by creating offensive space weapons systems, one of the major jobs of the Space Command would be to control who can get on and off planet Earth, thus controlling the "shipping lanes" to the Moon and beyond. There has long been a military connection to NASA's Moon missions. In early 1994, NASA launched the Deep Space Program Science Experiment, the first of a series of Clementine technology demonstrations jointly sponsored with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The Pentagon announced that data acquired by the spacecraft indicated that there is ice in the bottom of a crater on the Moon, located on the Moon's south pole - the same venue NASA now envisions as the site for the 2024 permanent base. According to a Pentagon website, "The principal objective of the lunar observatory mission though was to space qualify lightweight sensors and component technologies for the next generation of Department of Defense spacecraft [Star Wars]. The mission used the Moon, a near-Earth asteroid, and the spacecraft's Interstage Adapter (ISA) as targets to demonstrate sensor performance. As a secondary mission, Clementine returns valuable data of interest to the international civilian scientific sector." In the end, the NASA plan to establish permanent bases on the Moon will help the military "control and dominate" access on and off our planet Earth and determine who will extract valuable resources from the Moon in the years ahead. Countries would weaponized to control H-3Beljac 8 – Marko Beljac, Foreign Policy in Focus contributor, teaches at the University of Melbourne, March 31 2008, “Arms Race in Space,” Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/articles/arms_race_in_space As noted, China has tested an anti satellite weapon and Russia has stated that it would not allow other states to control space and threaten its own space assets. In Asia a nascent space race seems to be developing between China, Japan and India. In the far future the large deposits of Helium-3 on the moon's surface could lead to a militarized race to colonize the moon to secure Helium-3 for nuclear fusion energy technologies based on anuetronic fusion reactions in the context of depleting hydro-carbons. Link --- Missile DefenseEAGLE missile defense is ineffective and causes proliferationHardesty 5 – Captain David C. Hardesty, U.S. Navy, member of the faculty of theNaval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department, "Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives," 2005, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521114&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf A deployed EAGLE missile defense system by the United States would hold at risk the ballistic missile assets of every other state. Even states with enough missiles to overwhelm EAGLE if launched simultaneously would feel increased risk, since a first strike might reduce their inventory below the size required to saturate defenses. In that light, opponents might: • Develop faster-burning missiles to reduce their period of vulnerability, or harden the missiles to reduce the laser’s capacity • Proliferate the missiles and their launchers to saturate the lasers • Develop antisatellite capabilities against the lasers • Shift force structure toward cruise missiles. 14 The space-based segment of EAGLE would be highly predictable in its movements. An attacker would know how large a salvo of ballistic missiles would have to be to overwhelm the defenses and when coverage would be at a minimum. Furthermore, the one or two EAGLE laser-defense platforms that would have engagement opportunities during the boost phase of the missile salvo could be attacked just before it was launched. Defensive sensors could be degraded using relatively low-powered lasers or decoys, while space-based weapons platforms were attacked by ground-based lasers, orbiting space mines, or fast-burning, hardened, direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. In this way, with relatively modest resources an enemy might overwhelm the extremely expensive EAGLE boost-phase capability. A more sophisticated foe might deploy clusters of space-based mirrors to use in conjunction with mobile or hardened ground-based lasers. The mirror clusters could attack large segments of the U.S. defensive system whenever they came over their targets’ horizon. Given these vulnerabilities and initiative possessed by the attacker in a missile attack, it seems unlikely that EAGLE could provide anything like assured boostphase intercept. Even a missile defense test causes weaponization and provokes Russia and ChinaGraham 5 – Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is a former senior-level diplomat and a world-renowned authority on nuclear nonproliferation. As a U.S. diplomat, Ambassador Graham was involved in the negotiation of every major arms control and nonproliferation agreement from 1970 to 1997. He participated in nuclear talks with more than 100 countries. Graham was general counsel for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has advised five U.S. presidents. He earned his J.D. from Harvard Law School and his bachelor’s degree from Princeton. December 2005, "Space weapons and the risk of accidental nuclear war," Arms Control Today, 35.10, p. 12 Obviously, nothing should be done in any way further to diminish the reliability of the space-based components of U.S. and Russian ballistic missile early warning systems. A decline in confidence in such early warning systems caused by the deployment of weapons in space would enhance the risk of an accidental nuclear weapons attack. Yet, as part of its plans for missile defense, the Pentagon is calling for the development of a test bed for space-based interceptors as well as examining a number of other exotic space weapons. In an interview published in Arms Control Today, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, director of the Missile Defense Agency, touted what he said was "a very modest and moderate test-bed approach to launch some experiments." Obering said the Pentagon would only deploy a handful of interceptors: "We are talking about onesies, twosies in terms of experimentation." (2) Despite Obering's claims, however, establishing a test bed for missile defense in space, as opposed to current preliminary research, would be a long step toward space weaponization. Once space-based missile defenses are tested, they are likely to be deployed, and in significant numbers, no matter if the tests are successful. To see the path that a space test bed is likely to follow, one need only look at the present ground-based program: the Pentagon claims there is little true difference between a test bed and an operational deployment. Moreover, in space the deployment could be more dramatic. Although the current ground-based configuration envisions a few dozen interceptors, continuous space coverage over a few countries of concern would likely require a very large number of interceptors because a particular interceptor will be above a particular target for only a few minutes a day. Today's missile defenses provide very little real protection as the United States currently faces no realistic threat of deliberate attack by nuclear-armed long-range missiles. But space weapons could actually be detrimental to U.S. national security. They would increase the perceived vulnerability of early warning systems to attack and cause Russia and perhaps other countries such as China to pursue potentially destabilizing countermeasures, such as advanced anti-satellite weapons. These dangers would be particularly worrisome for those components that are placed in geosynchronous orbits (GEO). Space objects in GEO are sufficiently far from the Earth (about 36,000 kilometers) so that their speed roughly matches the rotational speed of the Earth and they remain "stationary" above one location. To be sure, any country that can place a satellite in these farther orbits--and there are several--could potentially threaten another country's satellites there. Yet, it would be easier to do so, and perhaps more importantly, the threat perception would be greater with weapons based in space than with existing ground-based technology. The 15 U.S. early warning satellites are almost entirely in GEO. The three functioning Russian early warning satellites utilize two different orbits. Two of the satellites use a highly elliptical orbit, which ranges from low-Earth orbit (LEO)--100 to 2,000 kilometers above the Earth where space objects travel at about 8 kilometers per second--out to GEO. The other satellite is permanently stationed in GEO. BMD functionally neutralizing deterrence of countries forces them to pursue space weaponsGilbert 10 – Jo-Anne Gilbert, PhD candidate and research assistant at the Griffith Asia Institute, September 2010, “A Spoon Full of Sugar Makes the Medicine Go Down? An Analysis of the Obama Administration’s ‘New’ National Space Policy,” http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/spoon-full-sugar-makes-medicine-go-down-analysis-obama-administration%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98new%E2%80%99-national-space BMD, nuclear issues, and space weaponisation are intrinsically linked. The paradox of the push towards BMD capacity is that it deepens the US military’s already acute dependence on space systems for their operational requirements, subsequently increasing their sense of vulnerability. And, while the nuclear taboo has resulted in the ever-increasing lethality of conventional weapons, it is also spurring the development of near-space and space-enabled programs. An example is the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, an integral component of the ‘Prompt Global Strike’ capacity - which envisages the US being able to strike a target anywhere on Earth within sixty minutes. Additionally, although he has not explicitly linked his disarmament agenda to BMD, Obama’s push for a nuclear-free world has the same motivation and justification as Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. On the other hand, US BMD systems potentially neutralise the nuclear deterrence of states such as China, thereby providing an incentive for them to pursue weaponisation. Tied to these developments is the fact that Obama is the first Democrat to take up a Presidency where the narrative of BMD is well entrenched; that is, the discourse about BMD is no longer about whether or not to support the program, but rather, what form of BMD to support.(8) The change in the base level of narrative becomes more important considering the linkage between space weapons and BMD; progression in BMD technology, and its acceptability in political and public discourse increases the chance that space weapons may become a solution. BMD triggers space arms raceLister 11 – Charles R. Lister, Terrorism & Insurgency Research Analyst at IHS Jane's, March 18 2011, “US Missile Defence and Space Security: a Security Dilemma for China?” http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7712 China has long been an opponent of weaponizing outer space and is a leading member of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) initiative. Conversely, the U.S. has staunchly refused to discuss a PAROS-like treaty under the existing terms laid out by China and Russia. Crucially for this paper, space weaponization and BMD are inherently connected in that ballistic missiles travel through space and defending against them requires some extent of space assets. Furthermore, control of space would necessarily result in a comprehensive ‘layered’ BMD system with global scope[44] – something that China is adamantly trying to prevent. This explains why Chinese analysts like Feng Shaolei reacted to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001 by claiming it proved a “U.S. pursuit [for] international primacy in a world of uncertainty.”[45] Space is the last domain free of total human control and any state that acted preemptively to establish absolute space control would undoubtedly acquire bona fide global hegemony. Unfortunately for the arms control establishment, the Outer Space Treaty does not prevent the deployment of orbital ‘defensive’ weapons. In many respects, the ABM Treaty was the last barrier to weaponizing space – now that it has ceased to exist, U.S. BMD development represents a destabilizing power shift that does threaten to initiate a great power arms race in space. Before 2000, there was a widely held Chinese perception that the U.S. was constructing a post-Cold War arms control environment that suited its own interests[46] – the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty proved this to China and encouraged a Waltian ‘balance of threat’ outlook on international relations. China will freak out if US goes at it alone and developes space based missile defenseHui 05 (Zhang Hui is a research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research includes nuclear arms control verification techniques, the control of fissile material, nuclear terrorism, nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and space. An extended version of this paper was produced for the, Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf) [The United States does have legitimate concerns about its space assets, given that U.S. military operations, economy and society are increasingly dependent on space assets and such assets are inherently vulnerable to attacks from many different sources. However, it does not mean that the United States currently faces credible threats from states that might exploit those vulnerabilities.6 Further, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites, since these weapons are also vulnerable to many types of attack, similar to the satellites requiring protection. The true aim of U.S. space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance American military dominance. Prof. Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, recently presented his view that the Transformation Flight Plan indicated that "many types of space-based weapons will be developed," and "the tendency toward space weaponization is obvious and serious." He further noted that military dominance on Earth is not enough, "the U.S. also seeks to dominate space."7 Beijing fears that by unilaterally developing missile defense systems and pursuing space weaponization, the United States is seeking to establish a global military superiority using both offensive and defensive means.8 Moreover, China's fears about U.S. hegemonic tendencies are exacerbated by the fact that space weapons, due to their vulnerability to other less expensive, asymmetric measures, are inherently first-strike weapons. 9 ] Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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