Fitts 96
the focus on individual presidents and their personalities can create greater tension with the president's pursuit of normal political activities. More than individual members of Congress, the unitary president is necessarily in a position to balance personally the interests of groups within his constituency as well as to change his individual position publicly over time, especially as he moves from the primaries, to the general election, to the presidency, and to the advancement of legislation through Congress. In order to be an effective leader, a president must, in other words, be less than candid to different constituencies and appear confident about positions that are subject to doubt or change. But balancing interests and changing positions in different institutional contexts can be in tension with his persona as a caring [*874] and principled individual. As discussed in Part II, institutions are expected to mediate and evolve in this manner; individual politicians who are supposed to have strong moral convictions may not be offered that luxury. The modern personal presidency thus can be caught between the different normative standards frequently applied to individual and familial relationships, on the one hand, and political institutions, on the other. Commentators have pointed out this distinction in moral approaches in other contexts as well. n161 While we apply the personal standard to our friends, family, and extended family, whom we expect to be trustworthy, truthful, and caring, the president must often act impersonally toward individuals and the public. This detachment is often needed for public institutions and officials to balance competing interests and overcome the collective action problems that permeate government. n162 As a result, a single and visible president must act not only with impunity toward many individual constituents, but also strategically in order to balance their competing interests. What are some illustrations of this tension? On the one hand, the qualities that allow a politician to exercise power effectively in the political game have conflicted with the attitudes and normative values that will satisfy private normative standards. Reagan, for example, was constantly asked to reconcile his public concern for family values with his lack of concern for his own family. n163 Similarly, Clinton has been forced to reconcile his support for women's rights with his marital infidelity. n164 Carter may have had the opposite problem: a model personal life, but a seeming inability to engage in instrumental political behavior. [*875] On the other hand, and more importantly, this tension can subject a president's public political behavior to private standards of morality. Clinton and Bush, for example, found that their attempts to mediate conflict on taxes and health care through evolving but inconsistent statements were not considered acceptable instrumental political methods, but rather a sign of a lack of character and moral conviction. Making "speeches that play to public opinion" tends to "create new discontinuities between past proclamations and present ones," n165 even though politicians may simply be attempting to keep up with evolving political forces. Good individuals with strong moral values are not supposed to change positions in light of changing political coalitions, although political institutions and parties can and should do so. n166 Caught in this predicament, politicians easily fall subject to characterizations such as "tricky Dick" (in the case of Nixon), "slick Willy" (in the case of Clinton), or someone who "runs under so many identities it [is] hard to keep track of who he [is] from day to day" (in the case of Bush). n167 The problem is especially difficult because, as studies on leadership have found, "the ultimate impact of [a] leader [often] depends most significantly on the particular story that he or she ... embodies." n168 The personal story of a modern president attempting to respond to changing political forces can be in tension with that role. n169 [*876] >
I/L – Lobbies
Lobby Groups are key to the policy changes.
McCormick 2 [James M. Political analyst for Foreign policy changes, “Decision Making Processes and Actors in American Foreign Policy Formulation” “Decision making Processes” p 53-54, Google Books]
In a recent analysis, Stephen Zunes and Ben Terrall argued that Third World lobby groups, primarily human rights activists, were crucial in changing American policy toward the situation in East Timor. A pri mary focus of this lobbying was the U.S. Congress, where the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) was able to affect American policy toward Indonesia and thus alter how the United States responded to East Timor. While Zunes and Terrall acknowledge that other factors were at work in the change in American policy, they also contend that "one cannot ignore the effectiveness of the pressure applied by human rights activists."' As this case suggests, interest groups can and do make a difference in addressing Third World issues within the United States. Yet an impor tant question is whether this instance is typical for Third World issues and whether the American foreign policy-making process affords such groups ready access to the political arena. Put differently, how general izable are the findings from this case? Are there identifiable sets of in terest groups, much like business, labor, and ethnic groups, who regularly work to advance the interests of the Third World? In light of the current global environment and America's war on terrorism, do these groups have a role to play in the foreign policy-making process today? Most In his recent book, The Paradox of American Democracy, political ana lyst John Judis identified three models of how the American political system works "and how it should work."
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