China will maintain a peaceful use of outer space with renewed U.S-China cooperation.
The White House 9 (Office of the Press Secretary, "U.S.-China Joint Statement." November, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement, AD 6/29/11) AV
The United States and China believe that bilateral cooperation on common global challenges will contribute to a more prosperous and secure world. They reaffirmed their commitment made on 27 June 1998 not to target at each other the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides believed that the two countries have common interests in promoting the peaceful use of outer space and agree to take steps to enhance security in outer space. The two sides agreed to discuss issues of strategic importance through such channels as the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and military-to-military exchanges. The United States and China agreed to handle through existing channels of consultations and dialogue military security and maritime issues in keeping with norms of international law and on the basis of respecting each other’s jurisdiction and interests.
China will stop space militarization for space cooperation with the U.S.
CNA 6 (CNA Corporation, Project Asia, "China's Space Program: Civilian, Commercial, & Military Aspects." May, http://www.highfrontier.org/Archive/hf/Finkelstein%20China's%20Space%20Program.pdf, AD 6/28/11) AV
US-Chinese space cooperation would have to be part of a strategic-level "grand bargain". Moreover, US-Chinese space cooperation is unlikely to occur only as part of a "grand bargain" (a phrase that was specifically used) making a broader, strategic-level change in US-Chinese relations. This change would require the perception that cooperation would be mutually beneficial - i.e., that the United States would gain something from the Chinese, as well as vice versa. From the US Government's perspective, it was suggested, space cooperation with the PRC is possible only if there is a quid pro quo. That has been a hallmark of both major ongoing US cooperative space efforts: those with Russia, and those with India
China is bargaining peaceful uses of space for U.S-China space cooperation
Cheng 9 (Dean, senior analyst at a not-for-profit think-tank who has been analyzing Chinese military and space developments for nearly two decades, "Beginning the journey of a thousand miles?." March, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1335/1, AD 6/30/11) AV
Given these pitfalls, what are the prospects for space cooperation between Beijing and Washington? If there is to be any chance of success, there are working-level and strategic level prerequisites that first must be satisfied. In the first place, it will require both sides to understand the other’s approach to negotiations. These are substantially different. The American approach, in the broadest sense, is one in which negotiations begin by establishing specifics or creating precedents. This is integral to the idea of confidence-building measures, with small steps leading up to larger, more encompassing efforts. The whole intent is the exact opposite, with American negotiators generally trying to avoid generalities in order to not become entangled in political differences. For Chinese negotiators, it is precisely the political and the ideological which must be first established. Thus, in general, Chinese negotiators seek first to establish sets of principles that will then govern and guide all subsequent efforts. One staple of Chinese international bargaining, for example, is the “five principles of peaceful co-existence”: Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty Mutual non-aggression Mutual non-interference in internal affairs Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence Once these principles are agreed upon, specific details are often left to lower-level officials—with the principles invoked whenever the specifics are seen as running counter to them. In essence, Chinese negotiators tend to adopt a “top-down” approach, with senior leaders focusing on broad principles, whereas American negotiators more frequently adopt a “bottom-up” approach, with working level officials focusing on concrete measures. Given the fundamental issues of trust (linked to opacity), these differences in approach to negotiations, and the lack of precedent in space cooperation between the two states, any effort at expanding cooperation will entail a strategic level decision on both sides to commit substantial political capital to this end. Moreover, in light of the concerns about technology transfer, industrial and military espionage, as well as the uncertainty of military-to-military relations, high-visibility projects, such as cooperation in manned space efforts, is likely to arouse substantial opposition. The recent incident involving a US Navy vessel south of Hainan will only exacerbate concerns and raise doubts about the desirability of extensive cooperation. It would seem, then, that setting the bar too high too early is only a formula for disappointment on both sides. And a failed effort at cooperation will only deepen suspicions on each side of the other’s intentions and viability as a future partner. Instead, it is far more likely to serve the interests of both sides to learn to crawl together before striving to (space)walk jointly. In light of the limited interactions between the two sides’ space programs, establishment of additional working groups between the two sides to foster dialogue is far more likely to create a payoff without engendering nearly the same level of opposition. Establishing common standards and procedures, for example, to facilitate interaction is less likely to entail revelations about manufacturing procedures and industrial processes. Such discussions would also allow each side to gain more familiarity with both the individuals and bureaucracies that constitute their counterpart. If the United States, in particular, is to engage in extensive, extended cooperation with the PRC in space, then it will be essential to know who their opposite numbers are, and where they fit into the larger scheme of the Chinese bureaucracy.
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