Gdi 2011 Gemini Lab China qpq cp
Download 406.16 Kb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Say yes - Cooperation
Say yes - CooperationCooperation and banning space weapons go hand in hand Gargasz 10 (Michael, U.S. Air Force, April, “We’ve Rattled Our Sabers…Now What? The Future of US/China Space Relations”, accessed 6-30, JG) Perhaps a change in strategy is necessary to prevent space war between the Chinese and the US and to avoid the crippling economic ramifications of such an endeavor. An alternative to a deterrent strategy is a strategy based on cooperation and engagement. This involves working together, interacting to understand each other’s desires and intentions, and negotiating future course of actions that are mutually beneficial. Actions that could take place in a cooperative US/China relationship include: negotiating bans on space-weaponry, agreeing to “rules of the road” or “codes of conduct” for operations in space20, cooperative programs, and military or civilian exchange programs. Certainly not all encompassing, these few examples each have obvious advantages and disadvantages for the US if a cooperative strategy was pursued. If the US were to negotiate a ban on space-weaponry, it would be a significant departure from historical behavior. The US has long maintained that it will not approve any “restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space.”21 So, what would the US gain from reversing course? One advantage of such an action would be the departure from the aggressive, unilateral path which the US is currently on.22 While viewed as the hegemon bent on dominating all warfighting mediums, the US has a very difficult time dealing with matters that require international collective action as its intentions are often viewed suspiciously. It addition to this bit of face saving in the international community, such an action presents the possibility of stemming escalation as well as potential cost savings.
Civilian space cooperation between key space-faring nations—and especially between the United States and China—is critical to reduce the perceived “demand” for space weapons. A strict convention on the reduction of civilian- and military-produced debris is also essential. The CD should follow up on the efforts of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in this regard to ensure that a catch-all agreement is reached and that all states support these efforts, including existing holdouts such as India. With these initial steps in place, a treaty may well be possible in future years. The evolving Russian and Chinese position could be a useful starting point for such an agreement. The possible inclusion of an exception to allow for non-destructive interference with satellites during wartime (jamming) might help attract greater support from key constituencies within the US military, and thereby pave the way for future political acceptance by the US Senate and future US presidents. In conclusion, the above points demonstrate that there is a strong need for substantive international discussions on these and other issues affecting space security. With focused effort, the members of the CD can assist in creating new forms of space diplomacy, even in this difficult and uncertain period. Such cooperation and consensus building could lay the foundation for more formal space negotiations within the near future. Say yes - CooperationChina wants cooperation – would say yes to stopping weaponization of space Lewis 9 (Lt. Col Brendan, Harvard, 4-23, “Aligning United States and Chinese Space Policies”, accessed 6-30, JG) China is willing to ask for help. For example, a China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation official openly requested cooperation in Chinese space programs during the International Association of Space Safety in October 2005, and so did a China National Space Agency delegation during a presentation at the annual meeting of the National Space Society in Colorado in April 2006.366 The United States and China have both demonstrated sophisticated, anti-satellite capabilities within 13 months of each other. The Chinese ASAT demonstration in January 2007 and the U.S. anti-ballistic missile test, which shot down an errant satellite in low earth orbit in February 2008, described as a safety measure to keep the hydrazine fuel tank on board from poisoning anyone who might come in contact with it, if it struck the ground. Both countries have strong military incentives to deploy offensive counterspace capability. But the deployment would destabilize the space environment and in the long run is advantageous to no one. Although several countries possess the capability to participate in space warfare, this type of operation has never been exercised. Any attack against a satellite not owned by the attacker would be a first, and it is unlikely to be an isolated attack. The consequences of engaging in such a battle would be severe. It is possible that many low-Earth orbit assets could be affected, 72 depending on the scale of the attack, denying both military and civilian users the use of the satellites and their services, and the U.S. would be the biggest loser. For this reason, the United States is obliged to discourage hostile international parties from advancing anti-space capabilities, to deter them from using them if they do develop them, and to be prepared to both take action and minimize the consequences, should deterrence fail.367 Of the options available to the United States in dealing diplomatically with the growing influence of China in the space realm, cooperation has the best potential to increase the transparency of the Chinese program, and the resulting trust built between the two countries can reduce the competitive aspects that may lead to armed conflict. Cooperation was successful in giving the U.S. a view into the Chinese space program at the end of the 1990s, and could be productive again. Cooperation is a reason to ban weaponization bilaterally Krepon 5 (Michael, Space Scholar @ Univ. of Virginia, 4-11, http://www7.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/journal/Issues/sf04/Forum%20Krepon.pdf, accessed 6-30, JG) Transparency measures must be sufficient to alleviate concerns over worrisome activities, particularly that military capabilities designed for other purposes are not being tested in ways that are virtually indistinguishable from preparations for space warfare. If states are sufficiently concerned about the weaponization of space, they will agree to significant, intrusive, and broad-ranging cooperative and transparency measures. Cooperative behavior could be codified in bilateral or multilateral executive agreements as well as in treaty form. Alternatively, cooperative behavior might result from quiet consultations that do not yield written accords of any kind. It makes sense to accomplish what is politically feasible and useful first, while still pursuing other avenues of cooperation in space that are not yet ripe for accomplishment. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 406.16 Kb. Share with your friends:
|