China will comply - given the lack of resources, the Chinese space program maintains a development approach that copies U.S technologies
Tellis 8 (Ashley, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, " China’s Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests." October, http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=22595, AD 7/1/11) AV
Third, China’s space efforts are focused in multiple ways. To begin with, although some Chinese activities are intended to procure symbolic benefits that enhance the control or legitimacy of Communist rule, these gains are usually conceived of as positive externalities that derive from some other material benefits of exploiting space for specific economic, political or military aims. To that degree, Beijing’s space investments are in fact conservative. Given its relative under-development, China has consistently sought to avoid frittering its resources on showcase projects that provide few tangible gains, preferring instead to invest in those activities that provide highest value within what are acknowledged fiscal constraints. Given the desire to secure the most while spending the least, even more controversial initiatives such as the manned space program have been authorized mainly because it is expected that this effort would push the frontiers of innovation, create a new quality control culture across the space program, generate new demands for technical education, and produce spin-offs that would benefit the economy more generally. China’s space program is focused in other ways as well. Beijing abundantly recognizes that for all its impressive space achievements in recent years, it still operates in a milieu characterized by emerging political competition with a technologically dominant United States. Consequently, given the differences in cultural ethos, political systems and comparative advantage, the Chinese space program has deliberately avoided either replicating the American endeavor or attempting to compete with it across the board. Rather, Beijing’s space efforts have been characterized by two different orientations in this regard. To the degree that raising its technological standards to American levels is judged necessary, China has embarked on a quite calculated “buy, copy, or steal” approach in regards to procuring various critical technologies. Where competing with the United States is deemed necessary, China has focused its space programs not on mustering any comparable superiority but by aiming at Washington’s "soft ribs and strategic weaknesses ". In any event, and irrespective of the endeavor in question, Beijing’s space efforts have been marked by deliberation and purposefulness.
China will say yes – solves for weaponization
Walsh 7 (Frank, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld, "Forging a Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: The Case For Reevaluating The 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite System.", LexisNexis, accessed 7-2, JG)
Beijing would likely be willing to engage the United States if Washington was to seriously address the issue of banning ASAT weapons. The onus is thus on the United States to take China up on its offer to negotiate. The 2006 National Security Strategy correctly argues that the United States "seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people[.]" With respect to American space policy, this means that Washington should encourage Beijing to refrain from deploying ASAT weapons and to avoid a costly space arms race. The best way to do this is through a treaty that allows both China and the United States to cooperatively break out of the space weapons security dilemma.
Say yes – Tech Affs
China will say yes - they will trade militarization for access to U.S technology that will result from the plan
Stokes 3 (Mark A., Country Director for the PRC and Taiwan within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, " The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Space and Missile Development." http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=eb06339b-2726-928e-0216-1b3f15392dd8&lng=en&size582=10&ord582=grp2&id=100625, AD 7/2/11) AV
China’s space and missile industry and the PLA have been able to absorb lessons from the past that will guide its future development. China understands that it can not rely solely on indigenous development in order to achieve significant technological breakthroughs. After years of isolation, Beijing has opened up to the West and states of the former Soviet Union in the hope of attaining access to critical technologies. Organizationally, the PRC understands that reliance upon a sole source for R&D and production does not produce significant incentives for quality control and advancement in technology. For the PLA, the Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE provided valuable lessons on the utility of space for command and control, reconnaissance, weather, navigation, and other combat support functions.
Modeling foreign space technologies is the most important focus of the Chinese space program - funding constraints and both profit and technological incentives.
SCCST 4 (Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, " Testimony of James Oberg: Senate Science, Technology, and Space Hearing: International Space Exploration Program." April, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12687, AD 7/1/11) AV
China's long-range strategy was laid out in a White Paper issued in 2000 by the Information Office of the State Council. It stated that the space industry is "an integral part of the state's comprehensive development strategy." And instead of developing a wide variety of aerospace technologies, China will focus on specific areas where it can match and then out-do the accomplishments of other nations. Further, China would develop all the different classes of applications satellites that have proven so profitable and useful in other countries: weather satellites, communications satellites, navigation satellites, recoverable research satellites, and earth resources observation satellites. It also will launch small scientific research satellites. A unique and highly significant feature of the Chinese space plan is its tight control from the top. As described by space official Xu Fuxiang in February 2001, "China's various types of artificial satellites, in their research and manufacture, are all under unified national leadership..." that will "correctly select technological paths, strengthen advanced research, and constantly initiate technical advances. We must constantly select development paths where the technological leaps are the greatest." Strict funding constraints require selecting "limited goals and focus[ing] on developing the ... satellites urgently required by our country," and on determining which satellites "are most crucial to national development." The Maoist-style "ideological idiom" for this is: "Concentrating superior forces to fight the tough battle and persisting in accomplishing something while putting some other things aside." The value of tackling difficult space technology challenges was explicitly described in Xiandai Bingqi magazine (June 2000): "From a science & technology perspective, the experience of developing and testing a manned spacecraft will be more important to China's space effort than anything that their astronauts can actually accomplish on the new spacecraft. This is because it will raise levels in areas such as computers, space materials, manufacturing technology, electronic equipment, systems integration, and testing as well as being beneficial in the acquisition of experience in developing navigational, attitude control, propulsion, life support, and other important subsystems, all of which are vitally necessary to dual-use military/civilian projects."
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