Globalization has eradicated great power war, dedev reverses
Interdependence / Trade Good
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Interdependence / Trade GoodYes Trade ImpactYes trade impact Jeffrey E. Garten 9, 3-3-09, professor at the Yale School of Management and chairman of Garten Rothkopf, a global advisory firm. He held economic- and foreign-policy posts in the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Clinton administrations, The Dangers of Turning Inward, Truth About Trade & Technology, 3-3-09, http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/13454/54/lang,en/ The point is, economic nationalism, with its implicit autarchic and save-yourself character, embodies exactly the wrong spirit and runs in precisely the wrong direction from the global system that will be necessary to create the future we all want.
And beyond all that, how will economically embattled and inward-looking governments be able to deal with the critical issues that need global resolution such as control of nuclear weapons, or a treaty to manage climate change, or help to the hundreds of millions of people who are now falling back into poverty? Extinction Michael Panzer 8, 25-year veteran of the markets who has worked for for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and J.P. Morgan Chase. New York Institute of Finance faculty member and a graduate of Columbia University. Financial Armageddon, 136-8 Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to fullscale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up confl icts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war. Interdependence Good – GeneralInterdependence mitigates violence—history provesConan, Goldstein & Pinker 12-7-11 (Neal – host of Talk of the Nation on National Public Radio Joshua, Professor Emeritus, School of International Service, American University Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland and Research Scholar, Dept. of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Steven, Professor of psychology at Harvard University, National Public Radio Interview – Talk of the Nation, War And Violence On The Decline In Modern Times http://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143285836/war-and-violence-on-the-decline-in-modern-times, jj) CONAN: Steven Pinker, Harvard college professor of psychology. And also with us, Joshua Goldstein, a professor emeritus of international relations at American University. You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. And this email from Michael in Spanish Fork, Utah: Looking at what's going on right now in Europe, one can't help but think that 70 years ago, similar issues were resolved with tanks and airplanes. In my opinion, economic interdependence has done more to mitigate violence than anything else. GOLDSTEIN: Absolutely. The European story is just miraculous after centuries of bringing the world some of its biggest, most bloody conflicts. People there, it's not all economic. That's part of it, but people deliberately set out to integrate the continent, to make the countries dependent on each other and to build a common culture of Europe. And today, that French German border that was fought over with huge fortifications and massive armies crossing back and forth, now that border consists of a single sign by the side of the road that says Germany or France. By the way, you're crossing a border, which barely is a border. And this is remarkable, it's the dog that didn't bark. The thing that didn't happen, the war in Europe, the war in China that we don't pay attention to because it didn't happen, but it is the story, the things that are not happening that could have happened or that in the past would've happened. CONAN: Let's try to - oh, I'm sorry. Steven, go ahead PINKER: Yeah. And for all the criticism that greed and capitalism and profit and materialism are subject to, we should remind ourselves that they're historically often better than rectifying historic injustices, promoting national or religious supremacy, bringing the kingdom of God to earth, and all kinds of spiritual motives that can do a lot more damage than people just wanting a good material life for themselves. Growth controls conflict escalation – solves aff impacts Griswold 7 Griswold, Trade Policy Studies @ Cato, 4/20/’7, (Daniel, Trade, Democracy and Peace, http://www.freetrade.org/node/681 A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.
Nam Kyu, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ the University of Nebraska, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, April, “Testing Two Explanations of the Liberal Peace: The Opportunity Cost and Signaling Arguments”, http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/04/22/0022002713484280.full Conclusion¶ An increasing number of studies have found that greater economic interdependence or globalization, particularly bilateral trade, is associated with a decreased probability of MID. The opportunity cost argument suggests that interstate commerce discourages states from fighting by increasing the cost of fighting. The signaling argument emphasizes that economic interdependence and integration allow states to more credibly reveal their intentions and resolve, thereby reducing uncertainty and the likelihood of conflict. I contend that the failure to conduct a test to discriminate the two perspectives is one of the reasons for our inability to adjudicate alternative explanations. Most studies have examined the onset of militarized disputes. This is not helpful in differentiating the two arguments since both of them identically predict the pacifying effect of economic interdependence or integration.¶ I employ the information theory of war to seek the different empirical implications of the two arguments. Under the incomplete information assumption, both the opportunity costs of fighting and the costly signaling can reduce the equilibrium probability of war. However, I can derive different predictions regarding how states behave in dispute situations by drawing on the existing literature on democratic peace and audience costs. If the signaling argument is correct, a threat from a more economically integrated or interdependent challenger is more credible since that challenger can more effectively convey information. Therefore, the target is less likely to reciprocate. To the contrary, should the opportunity cost argument hold true, challengers more dependent on bilateral trade with the target or more exposed to the global economy are more constrained from using force. The target is aware of this fact and thus, the challengers’ threats are less credible. This leads the target to be more likely to resist the challenge. These different predictions about the crisis behavior of target states can shed light on how economic interdependence and integration influence states’ behavior in a crisis, helping us adjudicate the competing explanations.¶ To measure economic linkages, this article utilizes not only bilateral trade but also total trade, government financial openness, and FDI inflows. The estimation of the selection models suggests that target states are less likely to reciprocate as challengers’ bilateral trade increases. This is consistent with the signaling argument rather than with the opportunity cost argument. Next, both theories argue that economic interdependence and globalization reduce the probability of conflict initiation. Only government financial openness and FDI dependence, intended to capture the degree of economic integration, are significantly associated with a decreased probability of conflict initiation. However, there is no significant evidence for a deterrent effect of bilateral trade dependence on dispute initiation. If bilateral trade contributes to peace, it will be through the effect on the probability of reciprocation. Economic growth checks war – empirically proven Griswold, ’05 (Daniel- Director of Center for Trade @ Cato Institute, Free Trade, 12.29.5, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282) Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. But deep trade and investment ties among nations make war less attractive. Trade wars in the 1930s deepened the economic depression, exacerbated global tensions, and helped to usher in a world war. Out of the ashes of that experience, the United States urged Germany, France and other Western European nations to form a common market that has become the European Union. In large part because of their intertwined economies, a general war in Europe is now unthinkable. In East Asia, the extensive and growing economic ties among Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is helping to keep the peace. China's communist rulers may yet decide to go to war over its "renegade province," but the economic cost to their economy would be staggering and could provoke a backlash among its citizens. In contrast, poor and isolated North Korea is all the more dangerous because it has nothing to lose economically should it provoke a war. In Central America, countries that were racked by guerrilla wars and death squads two decades ago have turned not only to democracy but to expanding trade, culminating in the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. As the Stockholm institute reports in its 2005 Yearbook, "Since the 1980s, the introduction of a more open economic model in most states of the Latin American and Caribbean region has been accompanied by the growth of new regional structures, the dying out of interstate conflicts and a reduction in intra-state conflicts." Much of the political violence that remains in the world today is concentrated in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa -- the two regions of the world that are the least integrated into the global economy. Efforts to bring peace to those regions must include lowering their high barriers to trade, foreign investment, and domestic entrepreneurship. Advocates of free trade and globalization have long argued that trade expansion means more efficiency, higher incomes, and reduced poverty. The welcome decline of armed conflicts in the past few decades indicates that free trade also comes with its own peace dividend. A2: WWI Disproves World War I doesn’t disprove our impact – a lack of trade caused the war Gartzke and Lupu ‘12 Erik Gartzke is an associate Professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego PhD from Iowa and B.A. from UCSF, Yonatan Lupu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science @ Columbian College, International Security Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 115-150, “Trading on Preconditions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence”, http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke_lupu_is_2012.pdf Conclusion¶ One's understanding of the relationship between interdependence and World War I hinges on the following counterfactual question: If interdependence did not reduce the likelihood of conflict, where would we have expected fighting during the era leading up to the war? As the analysis above suggests, rivalries involving Britain, France, Germany, and Russia were among the most intense of the period and could well have resulted in major contests, as they had in the past and as was expected by many at the time. Yet, war did not begin among the interdependent powers. During the period of greatest commercial expansion, interdependent powers were less likely to go to war with each other, despite having the means and the motives to do so—motives so strong that few students of history would have been surprised if war had in fact broken out on several occasions. Among weakly interdependent powers, in contrast, wars took place frequently, in patterns that seem both timeless and familiar. If interdependence is ineffective, therefore, we must ask ourselves why World War I began among the less interdependent powers and not in the interdependent West.¶ Just as interdependence is said to increase the incentives for peace by making war more expensive, widening the difference in payoffs between cooperating and not cooperating, so too alliances operate by making war less costly, discouraging aggression or increasing leverage by making it more expensive for allies to fail to intervene in contests involving security partners. It is not clear which effect—the conflict-inhibiting impact of commerce or the conflict-inducing effect of alliance ties—was more intense for the nations of Europe in 1914. We can, however, make the following comparisons. First, the benefits of interdependence varied among countries, ranging from the nearly ¶ autarchic relationships among Balkan powers to the significantly integrated commercial powers. Second, the costs of backing down for European powers almost certainly increased over time, as leaders observed their opponents backing down in previous crises and as alliance ties became increasingly leveraged through tighter commitments. Russia and Germany repeatedly showed a preference for discretion rather than mutual destruction. Yet, tightening alliance ties increasingly vied with crosscutting economic dependencies for the attention and loyalty of national leaders. Only as alliance ties solidified and policymaking increasingly shifted to the less interdependent powers of the Balkans did the interdependent powers appear to become less attentive to the economic consequences of a wider war. Even this risk was discounted by key actors who expected their opponents to crumble under pressure, in part because interdependence increased the cost of war.¶ The analysis provided here suggests that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the 1914 crisis is a particularly weak case against commercial liberalism. Economic interdependence significantly affected crisis bargaining during the lead-up to the war. The system of alliances, created to deter opponents and reduce the likelihood of great power war, had an important and unintended consequence that manifested itself through a series of growing crises: it created an incentive for the leaders of the interdependent powers to shift foreign policy discretion away from themselves and toward powers less closely integrated into the economic system. Importantly, this logic implies that under certain conditions states can take actions to avoid conflict that, paradoxically, may make conflict more likely. States that are highly economically integrated may thus have an incentive to integrate militarily with states that are weakly integrated into the global economy. This in turn can produce unintended results. We hope to explore this potential refinement to commercial liberalism in future research.¶ Our analysis further suggests that conventional methods of inquiry may tend to ignore the kinds of relationships responsible for the outbreak of World War I. Only by looking at the network of ties between highly and weakly interdependent powers can scholars appreciate the role of this structure in the era's crisis behavior.102 Focusing solely on economic interdependence paints an in- ¶ complete and misleading picture, omitting important ways in which the economically developed major powers were connected to less interdependent states through alliances. This level of complexity makes it difficult for scholars to create parsimonious theories, although several scholars have begun to use network theory and methods to do just this.103 We hope scholars will build on our argument to refine claims about how economic interdependence interacts with other ties to affect war and peace. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.56 Mb. Share with your friends:
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