Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 Mercury China Coop Aff



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ISS – Solves Innovation


Inviting China into the ISS would signal to other cooperating countries that the ISS is outdated

Sabathier and Faith senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program and president of consulting for public and private aeronautics policy, 2011

(Vincent G., G. Ryan Faith, “U.S. Leadership, International Cooperation, and Space Exploration,” CSIS, p. 4, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060426_us_space_leadership.pdf, April 26, accessed July 6, 2011, NS)

Another option for the United States is to forge additional partnerships in space with India and China. Efforts are underway with India but should not be overstated. The United States could allow the Chinese to dock at the ISS, showing the current partners that the ISS is passé and that if they do not want to get left behind with a relatively pedestrian project, they had better get on board with a return to the moon. Then the ISS would again serve its original goal of leadership and foreign policy and could allow space exploration to go on.

ISS – Solves Laundry List (1/3)


US-Chinese cooperation in space would revitalize the ISS, draw the line between China's military and civilian program, increase transparency, and would significantly boost relations

Imran, Masters candidate at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 10

(Mara, “China's space program : a new tool for PRC "soft power" in international relations?” accessed:7-01-11, http://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/5473 pg 87-89)TJL


If the United States truly wants to engage China in a positive and productive manner regarding space, this perspective argues that Washington needs to see China as a potential partner and not just as “rival” or “competitor.” As Nicolas Peter notes, “…few if any countries in the world today can stand alone in space activities, demonstrating therefore the importance of cooperation”.307 Although Washington continues to snub Beijing’s request to serve as a partner on the ISS, there may be some actual merit to allowing China to participate in the program. One obvious benefit would be China’s ability to participate financially and allow for some cost-sharing. With its large foreign reserves and sovereign wealth fund, China is in a better position than other ISS participants (e.g., Brazil, Italy) to help offset some of the continual development and sustainment costs. Another potential benefit in Chinese collaboration would be greater insight and transparency into China’s own space program and technical capabilities. Richard Fisher, vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, offered a slightly puzzling, pessimistic argument in favor of denying Chinese participation in the ISS, as follows: When we look to our own potential future cooperation, dialogue, space dialogue with China, we have to keep this [potential for military dual-use purposes] in mind. That when we invite—if we were to invite—a Chinese astronaut onto the space shuttle, that the information technology that that single individual might pick up could be turned into a potential Chinese military space platform.308 There is scant evidence, however, that a man orbiting in space would truly add any significant military advantage, especially concerning information technology. Johnson-Freese dryly noted that neither the Americans nor Soviets could find any particular advantage to having a manned military presence in space and that “there seems little basis for such a fear [that Chinese ingenuity would find value in a military-man-in space that eluded the U.S. military]”.309 On a more optimistic note, space cooperation between NASA and the CNSA, its Chinese counterpart, through increased contact and exchanges of information, could help overcome mutual mistrust and ambiguity. Over the long-term, it could potentially give way to strengthened confidence and assurance of each others’ intentions and concerns about space, reducing ambiguity and increasing transparency across the board. Even during the height of the Cold War, America held a joint space docking exercise with the Soviet Union in 1975 which “achieved important technical and political breakthroughs”.310 If the United States could work with its bitter communist rival during the dark days of the Cold War, according to the “space partner” perspective, Washington could safely find a place for Sino-U.S. space cooperation in the 21st century. Working in a more direct fashion with the Chinese, it could be argued, may also help keep their space program directed at peaceful objectives and dampen any secret ambitions to militarize outer space. Even some Chinese scholars would agree on this point, including Wu Chunsi from Fudan University’s Center for American Studies. He suggests that Washington’s active engagement China in space could help create a clean break between the civilian and military programs and that “the commercial and civilian elements of China’s space program will see their capabilities grow along with a sense of independence from the military”.311 Furthermore, Wu argues, “if China follows a path of isolation, exclusion will only deepen its suspicion and resentment, and the commercial and civilian sectors…would be forced to seek help from the government, or even the military”.312 Thus, instead of acting as a “space hyper-power,” a U.S. invitation to the Chinese to become a space partner could arguably soften its image as a global hegemon, and also increase U.S. soft power and credibility with the Chinese.313

ISS – Solves Laundry List (2/3)



Engaging in talks with China, allowing them entry into the ISS, and promoting more open trade regulations with them can support both economic development and prevention of space weaponization

Moltz, Ph.D at Naval Postgraduate School, 11

(Dr. James Clay, “China’s Space Technology:

International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” May 11, 2011, Accessed 6-30-11, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf, JSkoog)
Supporters of the current freeze in U.S.­Chinese space relations argue that Washington is sending a signal to Beijing about its deplorable human rights record and is also limiting China’s ability to develop advanced space systems. Unfortunately, while well­intended, current U.S. policy is ineffective sends a weak and off­target signal. Unless the United States is also willing to halt U.S. investment in Chinese manufacturing, cut off Chinese access to the U.S. export market, and find a new client for U.S. debt, holding space cooperation hostage will have no significant impact on China, except pushing it to cooperate with others. In addition, it puts the United States in the odd position of promoting “protectionism” in space and adopting a “defensive” strategy, when opening markets and reducing U.S. export barriers instead would strengthen the U.S. space industry and promote American security through greater engagement with the region. Efforts to keep China off of the International Space Station (ISS), for example, have only strengthened China’s resolve to build its own space stations. Former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin, notably, argues that failing to work with China may cause the United States to be left behind in new international missions, particularly given the fact that current NASA funding will not sustain a unilateral return mission to the Moon, much less continue shouldering of the lion’s share of the ISS budget. A step­by­step process to begin space science cooperation and (if successful) allow gradual Chinese participation on the ISS (first via joint research, then a taikonaut visit, then a possible module) would make more sense: reducing U.S. costs and increasing U.S. knowledge about Chinese space activities.9 Similarly, U.S. legislation and ITAR restrictions barring U.S. space technology from being launched aboard Chinese boosters have harmed U.S. satellite sales worldwide, leading to the production of ITAR­free satellites and causing erstwhile clients to turn to other suppliers to avoid U.S. red tape. The 1999 shift in U.S. policy aimed mainly at addressing national security concerns. But it was an overly blunt instrument, taking up all space technologies rather than only those that cannot be found on the international market. China (like other countries) is certainly interested in acquiring U.S. space technology, yet it is important to point out that the Loral and Hughes investigations in the 1990s did not involve illicit Chinese access to U.S. commercial satellites. The problem instead involved improper meetings by U.S. company officials with the Chinese. Thus, the logical solution is not to ban all U.S.­ Chinese space contacts, but instead to ensure that U.S. companies observe export control regulations in their meetings. Fortunately, U.S. companies have ample incentive to protect what is actually inside their satellites, as they do with Russia and other countries. Supporters of current restrictions also argue that the policy helps protect U.S. space launchers. Indeed, highly inflated costs for U.S. boosters have supported a few U.S. companies. But they have also hurt the U.S. space industry overall by reducing timely and affordable access to space. Fortunately, thanks to recent developments by such U.S. companies as SpaceX (with its Falcon 1 and 9 boosters), the U.S. launch services sector is becoming competitive on the international marketplace without the need to fall back on protectionism. A stronger U.S. policy would focus instead on lowering global barriers to space competition and reducing subsidies by European producers. As a condition for opening the American market to Chinese launchers, the United States should insist that China open its domestic market to U.S. satellite producers for on­orbit services. The United States fought and won this battle with Japan in the late 1980s and should now use the World Trade

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