Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 Mercury China Coop Aff


Solvency – Dialogue – Coop (1/2)



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Solvency – Dialogue – Coop (1/2)



A dialogue with China is necessary to open up cooperation on several fronts and deter miscalculation wars

Chase, Associate Research at the United States Naval War focusing Taiwan’s security policy, Chinese military modernization, and Chinese nuclear and conventional missile force developments, 2011

(Michael, “Chinese Military Modernization: Challenges and Opportunities for the United States,” The Moderate Voice, January 26, http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/chinese-military-modernization-challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-united-states.html, accessed July 6, 2011, NS)


At the same time, attempts to strengthen deterrence must be calibrated to avoid inadvertently fueling China's worst fears about U.S. strategic intentions. Because of China's concern that the United States is determined to prevent its emergence as a great power through encirclement and containment, Washington should carefully weigh taking actions that could further exacerbate Chinese fears. To help prevent misunderstanding or miscalculation, the United States should continue to pursue dialogue with China on issues such as security on the Korean peninsula, space and cyber warfare, and strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship. The United States should also seek to strengthen military cooperation with China in areas such as anti-piracy and humanitarian assistance operations. This week's state visit presents an opportunity for Presidents Obama and Hu to lead the United States and China toward a more cooperative relationship, but mutual strategic suspicion and a complex mix of convergent and divergent interests suggest that neither side should expect the path forward to be an easy one.
Even if no meaningful dialogue happens its worth it – still increases transparency

Martel and Yoshihara, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 3

(William C. Martel is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Rhode Island. Toshi Yoshihara is a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and a research fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts., “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race” The Washington Quarterly 26.4 (2003) 19-35, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.4martel.html, Accessed July 1, 2011, EJONES)

Given the stakes involved, both sides should seek to avert, or at least to manage, this looming competition. Even if efforts to forestall this rivalry fail, the United States and China should formulate policies that seek to limit the suspicions and fears of each other as well as the risks and costs of any confrontation in space. Both sides should begin to develop institutions, rules, and procedures that provide a framework for confidence buildingin space. For example, during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union developed standard operating procedures and arms control regimes to avert confrontation and escalation. To start, Washington and Beijing should at least prepare the way for gradual transparency in space because the absence of knowledge about the other's intentions and actions fuels heightened threat perceptions. It is not too late to pursue several policy initiatives at the highest levels [End Page 30] that would allow both sides to understand more fully what the other is doing and how to interpret those actions. An important first step for both sides is to acknowledge that a potential problem exists and that it requires consideration at the presidential level. Thus, the strategic importance of space should be included as an agenda item at a future summit between Bush and Chinese president Hu Jintao. To be sure, Sino-U.S. presidential summits have sometimes produced symbolic gestures of strategic cooperation rather than substantive progress, such as the 1998 Clinton-Jiang agreement to de-target nuclear weapons. Indeed, concrete agreements or alignments of interests are likely to prove elusive or fleeting in this case as well. At best, the two leaders could simply agree to disagree for the time being. Nevertheless, even a limited discussion at a broader bilateral summit would energize policymakers to focus their attention on the increasingly important problem of a potential confrontation in space. The two leaders could jointly authorize further talks among civilian and military officials on strategic and practical matters related to space, with the objectives being to sustain a regular dialogue, foster realistic expectations about one another, and tailor policies consistent with changing strategic and technological realities.

Solvency – Dialogue – Coop (2/2)




US China dialogue key – if we have disagreements we have to be able to talk about it

Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State, 10

(James B., American academic and political advisor, U.S. Department of State, 4-11-10, “U.S. - China Cooperation on Global Issues”, http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/141772.htm, MLF, accessed 7-1-11)


I think we hope to persuade the Chinese that the world we live in requires more cooperation not competition, and that neither side will benefit from a military competition between the United States and China or between China and any of its other neighbors. This is a situation where we’ve learned from long experience that the risks associated with those kinds of competition are severe and that nobody wins in the long term. So I think that’s why dialogue is so critical in this sphere and why we’ve tried to persuade our Chinese counterparts to try to insulate that dialogue from our disagreements on substantive issues so that we don’t lose the opportunity to discuss areas where we have concerns, as well as where we have obvious common interests.

Bilateral Dialogues are important for science collaboration as well as satellite security

Inside Missile Defense, 6/15/11

(Inside Missile Defense, U.S. OFFICIAL HIGHLIGHTS CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES FOR SPACE, Vol. 17 No. 12, Lexis) AC


Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Frank Rose this week spoke about U.S. space policy during a trip to the Czech Republic. In his speech, he highlighted "conducting regular Space Security Dialogues with both established, as well as emerging, space-faring nations." Specifically, according to Rose: "This is important not only for our broader national security and foreign policy concerns, but also in carrying out our diplomacy and public diplomacy responsibilities under the President's National Space Policy." He highlighted the collision of a commercial Iridium communications satellite and an inoperable Russian Cosmos military satellite in February 2009 as a "key stimulus to establishing these dialogues.""This collision -- and China's 2007 anti-satellite test -- created significant amounts of dangerous debris in low Earth orbit and further increased the future risks to human spaceflight and satellite services," Rose continued. Consequently, U.S. Strategic Command has begun to provide notifications of potential orbital collision hazards to all government and private sector satellite operators, he added.For example, over the past year, STRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center, or JSpOC, has notified Russia 252 times and China 147 times regarding close approaches between satellites, according to Rose. "Furthermore, notifications have been provided to government and commercial owners/operators approximately 677 times since May 2010 due to Chinese ASAT debris alone."After receiving those and other notifications, satellite owners and operators maneuvered their satellites over a hundred times in low-Earth orbit since the beginning of 2010," he continued. "Such notifications are themselves an important confidence-building measure, and they also provide the basis for pursuit of other bilateral [confidence-building measures] in diplomatic, military-to-military, and scientific channels."Rose also highlighted conducting familiarization visits of satellite control centers such as the JspOC as another potential confidence-building measure. The United States will host Russian officials later this year at the JSpOC at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, he added. -- John Liang



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