Gop will pick up seats now but won’t achieve a filibuster proof majority – increasing Trump’s approval rating flips it
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1NC Readiness DARecruiting increasing now – Trump Newland 17 — (Jonquil Newland, reporter @ News Channel 5 Nashville, "U.S. Army ramps up recruitment efforts in historic military increase", WTVF, 2-15-2017, Available Online at http://www.newschannel5.com/news/us-army-ramps-up-recruitment-efforts-in-historic-military-increase, accessed 7-18-2017, JSO) NASHVILLE, Tenn. - The U.S. Army has increased their recruiting efforts in response to a new demand from President Donald Trump.∂ At the U.S. Army Recruiting Battalion headquarters in Nashville, Lt. Col. Kevin Polosky oversees several recruitment districts in Tennessee and Kentucky. Some do a little better than others, but all of them were made responsible for increasing recruitment numbers.∂ "The reason for the historic increase is just because we have to try and grow the Army so large in a short period of time," said Polosky. ∂ The rush to recruit stems from the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017.∂ "We were as an Army going down to 460,000 people. The President has come in now and said that he wants that number to be 476,000; so that's a 16,000 increase in a short period of time. So the Army has to be ready with that number by October 1, 2017," Polosky said. ∂ Prior service members will also be welcomed back. $200 million in incentive bonuses nationwide may also help enrollment numbers.∂ "There's bonuses that can go up to $40,000, whether it be tuition assistance, money for college," explained Polosky. ∂ Despite the incentives, recruitment of this size still poses a challenge. Currently, only 29 percent of our nation's youth meet the mental and physical requirements needed to serve in the military.∂ "We're now competing against colleges. We're competing against the job market; so we're competing for the best of the best as we try to bring them into the Army as opposed to have them do other things," said Polosky. ∂ The Army has 180 diverse jobs waiting for those willing and able to enlist.∂ "We ask people, don't be intimidated when you come in. Take a practice test and see what happens. If it's not for you, we'll be more than happy to thank you for your time and appreciate the support you give us every day," Polosky said. Lowered soldier numbers destroy readiness—each branch is individually decimated Spoehr and Zissimos 17 — (Thomas Spoehr, conducts and supervises research on national defense matters, Research Associate specializing in National Defense, "Preventing a Defense Crisis: The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act Must Begin to Restore U.S. Military Strength", Heritage Foundation, 3-29-2017, Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/preventing-defense-crisis-the-2018-national-defense-authorization-act-must-begin, accessed 7-18-2017, JSO) The Status of the U.S. Military With clear threats in many corners of the globe challenging U.S.∂ security and interests, one would assume the nation is investing more∂ into its military. Yet for years the opposite has been the case. Whether through the “peace dividend” of the 1990s, the efficiency∂ initiatives under Defense Secretary Robert Gates, or the∂ Budget Control Act of 2011 and its subsequent sequestration-level∂ cuts, the military has been continuously∂ handicapped in its ability to meet global responsibilities. The effects of this strain are becoming clearer∂ with each passing year. The Army is the smallest it∂ has been since 1940,1∂ even as soldiers deploy at a high∂ frequency. As the needs of those soldiers deployed to∂ harm’s way rightfully take priority, the readiness of∂ the rest of the force has suffered. The Navy’s fleet is∂ some 70 ships smaller than is required to meet all its∂ missions, which means fewer ships and sailors are∂ taking on the same workload.2∂ This in turn has yielded∂ two damaging trends. First, sailors are at sea longer∂ than they should be, meaning less time at home∂ with families, less time for training and education,∂ and more fatigue on the force. Second, as too few∂ ships strive to maintain a high operational tempo,∂ they are wearing down prematurely while also cutting∂ out time for desperately needed maintenance∂ work—a combination that has caused more frequent∂ breakdowns and has prematurely aged the fleet. The Marine Corps has suffered a combination∂ of personnel cuts and a failure to modernize equipment,∂ which means that it is maintaining a high∂ operational tempo with insufficient training and∂ with old, worn-out equipment. This has—tragically∂ led to an increase in training accidents.3∂ The Air∂ Force has seen its workforce erode in key places,∂ with officials acknowledging in 2016 that the service∂ was short 700 pilots and 4,000 maintainers.4∂ Both∂ shortages have led to a force that is overtaxed and∂ facing serious readiness shortfalls. Across the board, the military is straining to keep∂ up the same pace of operations with smaller, undertrained∂ forces operating rapidly aging, worn-out∂ equipment. With threats growing around the globe∂ in both new and frighteningly familiar places, there∂ is simply no justification for any delay in correcting∂ this dangerous situation. Congress must take significant∂ steps to work with the Trump Administration∂ in its first year in office to reverse this course and∂ begin rebuilding the military. Readiness is key to power projection Ryan 17 — (Maj. Gen. Kurt J. Ryan, commanding general of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, at Scott Air Force Base, “Power projection readiness: A historical perspective,” The Cambodian Times, http://www.cambodiantimes.com/news/253019630/power-projection-readiness-a-historical-perspective, 5-2-2017, JSO) For close to a decade and a half, U.S. forces deployed on a rotational basis and were not required to exercise critical short-notice unit-level rapid deployment skills. As a result, the Army's ability to project units rapidly with their full complements of authorized equipment has atrophied.∂ The time and location of the nation's next major conflict is unknown, but we do know that we must be ready. To be ready, it is imperative that the total force build the collective skills of power projection and large-scale deployment readiness so that, if called upon, we can provide a viable land force that is prepared to operate across the conflict continuum.∂ As a continental United States-based expeditionary Army, we must train deployment readiness relentlessly, and we must practice these skills at the 'speed of war.' The Army must leverage every training opportunity, such as deployments to and from combat training centers, rotations of forces in support of combatant commanders' theater security and cooperation plans, and emergency deployment readiness exercises.∂ Bottom line: the Army must build its capabilities and instill a mindset to be ready to rapidly alert, marshal, deploy, and upon arrival at the theater, be ready to fight. Installations are the power projection platforms, and deployment readiness begins in the motor pools. Leaders must build unit capacity to marshal and upload equipment at home station, to move equipment by rail, line haul, or inland barge, or to convoy equipment to any of the nation's 23 strategic seaports.∂ Strategic enabling commands, including the Forces Command, the Army Materiel Command, and the U.S. Transportation Command, must practice fort-to-port and port-to-port tasks to rapidly load seagoing vessels to sail combat power to foreign ports of debarkation.∂ When units arrive, theater enablers, including the Army service component commands, theater sustainment commands, and assistance from allied support agreements, will facilitate deploying units' reception, staging, onward movement, and integration tasks, which are key to building and providing ready-to-fight forces to the joint force commander.∂ Historical vignettes from the Army's own power projection experiences over the past 50 years show many applicable examples of how the Army can effectively campaign as long as it can deploy rapidly.∂ THE VIETNAM WAR∂ The United States managed the considerable feat of transporting 200,000 troops to South Vietnam in the early months of 1965 following the presidential order to deploy a large-scale combat force to Southeast Asia. However, the moves of the first two divisions--the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Infantry Division--were neither synchronized nor efficient.∂ The Army had last deployed a large-scale joint force for the Korean War in the early 1950s; it was out of practice. The initial force move to South Vietnam required 17 special trains, 126 aircraft, 27 cargo vessels, 933 buses, 12 troop ships, and five aircraft carriers to move the two divisions. After this initial, albeit inefficient, success, the nation made changes to significantly improve its power projection readiness.∂ The Army faced long delays in offloading ships in South Vietnam, and the delays were made worse by single ships making multiple port calls. The Army adjusted its deployment processes by sending fully loaded ships of combat configured loads to a single port whenever possible.∂ While only 7 percent of ships en route to South Vietnam were destined for a single port in October 1965, by April 1966 that number had improved to 95 percent. This vastly increased the nation's capability to efficiently project military forces and to amass combat effects upon arrival.∂ The Army was relearning quickly and began institutionalizing deployment processes by investing in training and focusing on critical deployment and redeployment mission-essential tasks. These tasks are now resident in nearly every unit's mission-essential task list.∂ DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM∂ In March 1988, Brig. Gen. John R. Piatak, the U.S. Transportation Command's first director of plans, presciently stated, 'In the future, we will have to pay closer attention to our deployment readiness and to industry's ability to handle transportation surges.'∂ Just 29 months later, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the president called for the massive deployment of U.S. forces to the Middle East to commence Operation Desert Shield. Deployment lessons learned from combat training center rotations throughout the 1980s helped to shape the Army's response to the massive force deployment requirements of the operation, which included more than 500,000 service members at its height.∂ In August 1990, commercial ports at Jacksonville, Florida; Savannah, Georgia; and Charleston, South Carolina, were selected as the best ports from which to deploy the large volume of equipment needed for the first three Army divisions to defend Saudi Arabia. These divisions were the 101st Airborne Division, the 24th Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division. Soldiers and equipment simultaneously deployed by strategic air from designated airfields close to each division's home station.∂ The divisions and brigades had rehearsed their deployment tasks prior to their deployment notifications. Senior mission commanders had refined readiness standard operating procedures, practiced installation deployment assistance teams, and conducted emergency deployment readiness exercises. These exercises were often held in conjunction with a movement to a combat training center.∂ Units had been evaluated on deployment mission-essential tasks, and the port authorities were familiar with the units' special outload needs. Deploying units had formed and exercised necessary port support activities, routinely conducted reconnaissance of their designated ports, and occasionally performed tabletop exercises or tactical exercises without troops to the port.∂ The port at Jacksonville enjoyed the requisite size to handle the special requirements of the 101st Airborne Division's unique cargo, which included more than 300 helicopters. Savannah's close proximity to the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, Georgia, provided an adequate rail network connecting bases to the port and promised faster loading and departures. Deployments were executed at the speed of war.∂ ENDURING AND IRAQI FREEDOM∂ Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the importance of being ready. Deployments began within days after the terrorist attacks. President George W. Bush initially announced the operation as a bombing campaign and deployed special operations forces to support the Afghan Northern Alliance in its successful drive to topple the Taliban government.∂ Operation Iraqi Freedom began with large-scale deployments to Kuwait in 2002 in preparation for operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army in March 2003. The U.S. Army benefited from months of prior planning, several warfighting exercises, and deployment rehearsals that enabled commanders and staffs to learn from prior deployments.∂ The U.S. Central Command's continual rotation of brigade teams to Kuwait throughout the 1990s had helped to keep the Army ready for large-scale deployments. Using brigade combat teams provided a foundation of familiarity and deployment readiness for future operations in the Middle East.∂ THE ARMY'S FUTURE∂ While history provides us with experience and a frame of reference, the benefits end there if we do not build upon the lessons learned. Readiness can only be attained through focused effort, continued action, and a relentless desire to master deployment tasks.∂ The Army may enjoy only a narrow window of opportunity to prepare for the nation's next conflict. The period we are in now will be described as the current generation's interwar years. We do not know when or where the next fight will take place, but as history shows, it will most certainly come, and we must be ready.∂ Repetition is key, and Army leaders should leverage every unit movement as a deployment training opportunity. In 2017, the Army will deploy or redeploy numerous brigade combat teams. Each movement should be viewed as an opportunity to build deployment readiness in the Army's warfighting formations.∂ By repetitively practicing and mastering the skills associated with deployment and global power projection, the Army will ensure it is ready to deploy, fight, and win when it is called. Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war O’Hanlon 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino- Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue. 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