The plan can’t address poor network management
Litvaitis 8- Arturas Litvaitis, graduate of the Joint Command and General Staff Course 2007/2008 of the Baltic Defence College, Challenges of Implementation of the Network Centric Warfare Tenets in Coalition Environment Baltic Security & Defence Review Volume 10, 2008
Having the national networks deployed and getting them interconnected is not the end of the story – usually real operating environment demands the ability to flexibly reconfigure the network, provide increased bandwidth between particular nodes on the network or connect new nodes to the network. Multiple nations, operating in a relatively small area, have diverse requirements for the use of electromagnetic spectrum, necessary for operation of their sensors and wireless communications. This is all about the network management. Taking into account the growing bandwidth demand, it is most likely that opportunities, provided by rather rapidly evolving communications technologies, will be behind the user requirements. Therefore implementation of the net-centric concepts would require an efficient use of network resources, and this is the place, where network management will play its very important role.
Network management within national domains is quite a challenging issue (Donnelly, 2005). However, within the multinational environment, it requires even more effort. First of all, in the recent years, we cannot observe any significant improvement in defining multinational networks’ architecture. For instance, NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board and its sub-committees are working on NATO Information Infrastructure (NII), which is supposed to address the Alliance’s Network Enabled Capabilities architectural issues, but at present stage, it doesn’t seem that architectural developments are turning towards the real netcentric approach. On the contrary, we are still discussing the issue how backbone network, which is supposed to be provided by NATO, will be interconnected with national “appendixes”; therefore hierarchical network architecture is still in place (CNSSC, 2008). Continuing with this approach would not contribute to the construction of flexible and dynamic networks, where a network participant can communicate with any other wherever it is located and whatever nation it belongs to. How can we imagine communication in a hierarchical network between an airborne platform from nation A and a ground-based unit from nation B, when that platform was re-tasked on the spot to accomplish the mission in the airspace over a ground unit, if co-ordination didn’t take place between nations A and B in advance? These issues were already identified during real operations (Hayes, 2004).
Deterrence- No Solvency- Network Management Information exchange doesn’t exist- lack of common network
Litvaitis 8- Arturas Litvaitis, graduate of the Joint Command and General Staff Course 2007/2008 of the Baltic Defence College, Challenges of Implementation of the Network Centric Warfare Tenets in Coalition Environment Baltic Security & Defence Review Volume 10, 2008
Similarly to networking solutions themselves, nations usually have their nation-specific approaches to the network management, consisting of a variety of methods, tools and technical solutions, because there is no multinational consensus how to manage multinational federation of networks, or, in case of the network-centric approach, the single network made of national “pieces”. This happens because we are still thinking in the hierarchical network architectural dimension.
Network, truly supporting net-centric approach, has no centre. In a single nation case, it is possible with current technologies to construct the network, made of self-managed nodes, but there is no commonly agreed technology in place today, supporting management of a multi-domain network, where constitutive elements are based on different technology. To illustrate the situation in an even more realistic way, it should be stressed that nations are usually deploying not a single national network, but a number of networks to support different services (Army, Navy, Air Force), different functional areas (intelligence, logistic, command and control), and different classification domains. Therefore co-ordinated network management doesn’t look very much realistic. “One analysis of CENTCOM operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that year noted that American planners were dealing with more than 84 different coalition networks. … Needless to say, interoperability between this wide variety of networks was extremely variable, and mostly non-existent. As such, information exchange between members of the coalition was often a sluggish affair” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 54).
Inconsistency in national network management solutions could be illustrated by the following example. Informational advantage primarily is facilitated by sharing real-time information among the members of the coalition (Alberts, Papp ed., 2001:258), which in turn can contribute to the achievement of the desired military effects. However, without the coordinated network management, it would be hard to achieve the “identical real-time”, i.e. in the multinational environment, every national domain might have its own “current time”, not necessarily matching with the current time in other nation’s domain. These time differences could produce a vast impact on the quality of certain processes, such as tracking of an adversary’s fast-moving platform by one nation, then sharing track information and expecting the engagement of that platform by another nation.
A2: SSA Deters Rogue States U.S. military poer ensures rising challengers
Gray 99- Colin S. Gray, author and professor of international relations and strategic studies at the University of Reading, The Second Nuclear Age Chapter 1: To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies 1999
This fallacy has two important aspects. First, it misunderstands current conditions, and, second, it all but invites misunderstanding of some chaotically non-linear futures.34 At the level of general deterrence, US military power casts a shadow of global domain over the cunning plans of any and every wouldbe ‘rogue’—or regional ‘aggressor’—in the world. But each would-be regional revisionist polity has to interrogate its specific circumstances, and its understanding of American affairs, to inquire whether that general deterrence has any plausible, let alone probable, relevance to the adventure that it contemplates. Unfortunately for reliability of scholarship, if the general deterrence delivered by the US armed forces has practical effect in immediate deterrence, we are unlikely to know about it.When lines are not drawn in the sand, there are unlikely to be footprints for scholars to photograph.
It is a common failure of the strategic imagination to recognize how difficult it can be to deter those who are truly desperate, those who are overconfident, and those who are fatalistically resigned to submit to ‘History’s command’ or the ‘will of Allah’, and so forth, according to cultural predilection.
35 For most of the time the absence of conditions of acute crisis and war will not be (negative) evidence of the successful functioning of some mechanism for stable deterrence. The leading problems of evidence for scholars are that they cannot know how much dissuasive influence US military power produces for a general deterrence that discourages those would-be aggressors who rule out certain forms of challenge to a US-backed regional order; and they cannot know or discover whether or not a regional power declines to be heroic in face of immediate US deterrence, having first decided to be brave in face of
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