**Ground cp 1nc- ground cp
Deterrence- Alt. Cause- Ground-Based
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- **Miscalculation**
- Miscalculation- Transparency/=Solve Miscalc
Deterrence- Alt. Cause- Ground-BasedEven if space assests are secured- attacks on gorund absed systems are a viable optionGinter 7- Lieutenant Colonel Karl Ginter United States Army Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Project Adviser Space Technology and Network Centric Warfare: a Strategic Paradox, 30 MAR 2007 Ground segment attack or sabotage to disrupt space assets is an attractive option to lowtechnology or cash-strapped groups such as terrorists or transnational insurgents. Critical ground control facilities associated with U.S. space systems, both military and civilian, are targets to terrorist cells and foreign special operations forces. While military ground control facilities are located on DoD installations across the world to service the various satellite constellations, as well as provide redundancy for continuity of operations, they also have the added benefit of being operated and secured by military personnel. Commercial ground control facilities in the U.S. and overseas generally don’t have that luxury. Adversaries need only to glean information about which ground facilities are critical to the U.S.—especially those that offer non-redundant vulnerabilities—and where they are located. Unfortunately, many of these facilities are described in open-source reference materials. Foreign commercial satellite providers present additional vulnerabilities in terms of their satellite ground control facilities and ground control redundancy. Leasing critical warfighting capabilities from a foreign source presents its own risks. Beside the risk of assured access and availability for U.S. forces, the DoD can not oversee what potential adversaries may have access to foreign commercial ground control facilities, nor are these facilities necessarily accorded the same level of physical security as U.S. satellite ground control facilities. Such vulnerabilities at these facilities render them susceptible to unauthorized monitoring or even sabotage of U.S. leased assets. Another inherent risk of using any advanced technology is that failures will occur, and when these failures occur at commercial or foreign ground control facilities, redundant paths for communications circuits and sufficient on-hand bench stock (e.g. spare parts) that maintain continuity of operations are paramount. If the communications architecture is not engineered to be sufficiently robust, allowing both equipment and path redundancy, then the U.S. increases its vulnerability to enemy actions. Not all foreign commercial satellite providers employ a sufficiently redundant ground control capability for continuity or reconstitution in the event of ground system or power failures. **Miscalculation**Miscalculation- Transparency=/Solve conflictTransparency fails- realism proves nations will bypass transparency for security interestsJames 7- Marquardt, James J, assistant professor of politics at Lake Forest. College in Illinois, Transparency and Security Competition: Open Skies and America's Cold War Statecraft, 1948–1960. Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 9, Number 1, Winter 2007, pp. 55-87 (Article) Realist theory helps to ªll some serious gaps in our thinking about transparency and CBMs as a form of security cooperation. Realists see world politics as inherently conºict-ridden. They claim that the anarchic structure of the international system has a profound effect on state interactions.18 In the absence of a supranational authority that can enforce international rules and punish transgressions, states must rely on their own capabilities to ensure their survival. In this self-help world, states provide for their security through external balancing (the formation of alliances) and internal balancing (the buildup of military forces), or some combination. Because military forces can be used for aggressive as well as defensive purposes, states view each other with considerable fear and suspicion. They normally dismiss each other’s declarations of peaceful intent and focus instead on the ability of others to inºict serious harm. The mutual distrust spawned by this uncertainty exacerbates the security dilemma and sometimes leads to war. Structural realists highlight the impediments to security cooperation under anarchy—impediments that have important implications for transparency and arms control.19 One such impediment is relative-gains considerations. States’ willingness to cooperate will be affected by their judgments about the likely distribution of gains from cooperation. Efforts to control weaponry are highly unlikely if one state expects that the limits will result in a negative shift in the balance, leaving it relatively worse off than its adversary.20 A second impediment is the concern states have about each other’s compli-ance with international agreements. That cheating is possible and, more importantly, may go undetected, limits the scope of cooperation to situations in which compliance can be easily and closely monitored and defection can be quickly identiªed. The problem with cooperation is that gains considerations and the transparency necessary for effective compliance with agreements work at cross-purposes. Each state seeks to maximize the amount of information it obtains about its potential adversaries and minimize the information it reveals about itself, placing the onus of transparency on its rivals. States’ willingness to open themselves to outside scrutiny rarely satisªes the compliance demands placed on them by others. Miscalculation- Transparency/=Solve MiscalcTransparency doesn’t build trust- realism means states will always remain cautious about intentionsJames 7- Marquardt, James J, assistant professor of politics at Lake Forest. College in Illinois, Transparency and Security Competition: Open Skies and America's Cold War Statecraft, 1948–1960. Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 9, Number 1, Winter 2007, pp. 55-87 (Article) Moreover, because states in an anarchic world are wont to assume the worst about each other’s intentions, they must carefully take account of their rivals’ military forces. Hence, structural realists are skeptical about transparency CBMs as a worthwhile form of security cooperation.21 The exchange of information about military matters may help states safely navigate crisis situations and avoid war, but it does not change the fundamental assessments each makes of the external threat environment. Furthermore, even if states are interested in promoting transparency, they do so with an eye toward obtaining strategic advantages over their adversaries. But because other states fear that they will be taken advantage of in this way, they resist their rivals’ self-serving transparency initiatives. Structural realists therefore expect that transparency and CBMs, if agreed to at all, will permit only a very limited degree of outside scrutiny of military matters and will do little if anything to reduce tensions and build trust.Moreover, by producing “winners and losers” in the exchange of information, transparency has implications for the distribution of power.22 Consequently, institutionalized transparency is bound to be limited by states’ caution about the security implications of the disclosure of military information. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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