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Miscalculation- Turn- SSA
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- Situational awareness causes less unified responses
- Miscalculation- Turn- Decision Making
Miscalculation- Turn- SSAIncreased information changes the command and control structure- reduces the effectiveness of decision makingStanovich 8- LtCol Mark Stanovich, USMCR Emergency Readiness and Response Research Center Institute for Security Technology Studies Dartmouth College, “Network-Centric” Emergency Response: The Challenges of Training for a New Command and Control Paradigm” http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/library/191.pdf The “flattening” of the hierarchical ICS command and control structure resulting from unregulated information infusion could erode the strengths of the Incident Command System’s beaurocratic organization, negating advantages that allow for commanders to leverage a wide range of expertise and experience to provide direction to the efforts of the responders. The availability of such a plethora of near-real time information often creates the false impression among commanders that they have as solid and accurate a grasp of conditions and situational awareness as the local responders dealing with an incident at the scene. The result of such an illusion often leads a commander to be overcontrolling with his subordinates, imposing significant restrictions on the initiative of subordinate commanders18. Instead of issuing guidance and allowing his subordinates to leverage their expertise to accomplish their tasks and adapt to changing conditions within that guidance, such a commander is prone to issue overly-detailed directives that are irrelevant or inappropriate for the rapidly-evolving local situation. The infamous Vietnam War parable of President Johnson personally communicating from the White House with Army small-unit leaders in the field while they were in contact with the enemy reminds us that simply because communications are possible, that does not mean they are always a good idea. Such a command and control situation in emergency response is sure to stifle initiative, and will greatly reduce the effectiveness of the efforts of subordinate agencies19. Situational awareness causes less unified responsesStanovich 8- LtCol Mark Stanovich, USMCR Emergency Readiness and Response Research Center Institute for Security Technology Studies Dartmouth College, “Network-Centric” Emergency Response: The Challenges of Training for a New Command and Control Paradigm” http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/library/191.pdf An illusory impression of situational awareness can work to the opposite direction, as well. Subordinate commanders, viewing what they perceive as virtually the same information as higher-level commands are seeing, might come to radically different conclusions about courses of action. This can result in a lower-level entity ignoring guidance from higher commands. While ICS allows for and encourages improvisation and adaptation to handle changing situations and conditions, this adjusting must be done within the context of the overall guidance and objectives of the senior Emergency Operations Center (EOC) or Incident Command Center (ICC)20. If the lower entity’s interpretation of events is at odds with that of the higher command, then the risk is of “freelancing” by people acting on their own interpretation (and consequently ignoring the guidance from higher). “Freelancing” is generally defined as illegitimate improvisation that is not working toward the goals of senior Incident Commanders21. It is deviation from higher intent that is both unpredictable and unexpected, and such activity presents serious problems to a unified response effort. At its least damaging, freelancing results in a squandering of effort and resources best used differently, while at its worst, it may create dangers for those who are freelancing and for others involved in the response effort whose actions and safety will be impacted. Miscalculation- Turn- Decision MakingInformation causes miscalc - decision maker responseAlberts 96- Dr. David S. Alberts, Director, Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies (Actis) National Defense University, Ndu Press Book, The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies, April 1996, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/12th_ICCRTS/CD/library/html/pdf/Alberts_Unintended.pdf The linkages between information quality, distribution, communications patterns, and decision making are complex and diverse. A review of organization theory, group dynamics, information theory, and past research on command and control offers key insights into these linkages and how they function. First, when information is freely available, role overlap tends to be commonplace. Superiors tend to micromanage, particularly when the stakes are high; there are no higher stakes than combat. Subordinates, however, when provided with the larger picture historically available only to senior commanders, are also likely to second guess decisions made at higher levels and (in richly connected systems) have the information required to undertake initiatives their superiors may find inappropriate. Avoiding this set of counterproductive behaviors and management practices requires doctrine, appropriate organizational structures, self-discipline, and training. Second, decision making in an information rich environment increasingly means media attention. The pressures of a "fish bowl" environment affect performance in a variety of often adverse ways. Tendencies to overreact, to act quickly, to appear decisive despite limited information, or to "posture" for the media can only be overcome through realistic training and experience. When decision making becomes a collective process, which tends to occur when several principals have easy access to one another in a situation they all consider important, decisions tend to converge on options that meet group consensus. This "collective wisdom" has been demonstrated in both theoretical and empirical analyses to tend strongly toward risk averse options or poorly thought out "group-think" alternatives. The "brilliant" alternative or innovative approach foreseen by one individual is unlikely to survive this deliberative process. The potential strength of this collective process, which has excelled at solving complex problems such as those at operational and strategic combat levels, can only be achieved by an open approach to command and control decision making and a doctrine that stresses individual innovation and leadership at all levels. Fully-connected systems also reduce the need for detailed action coordination by commanders because they make available information that would have to be requested from other elements in a classic military information structure. For example, rather than having to request information about the availability of transportation assets or ammunition needed for a combat operation, a line commander will be able to check stock levels directly through the information grid. This can lead to insufficient or ineffective coordination because subject matter experts are not consulted or because more than one command makes plans to use the same asset but none has a clear commitment of asset availability. Industry experience with richly connected systems has shown that collaborative planning and decision aids (which automatically perform coordination tasks and/or pass information between nodes in decision-making structures) are needed to avoid these problems. In addition, "red team" procedures to cross-check decisions can help to ensure adequate, timely coordination. As generations of military commanders who have become accustomed to the availability of high density and high quality data about the battlefield mature and move into senior command positions, the expectation of near perfect information and the willingness to delay decisions in the expectation of better information will grow. However, the very rapid pace of future battles, as well as the imperatives of turning inside adversary decision loops, will punish procrastination and inaction severely. The commander who waits for near perfect information will be defeated by one who acts on "good enough" information. Doctrine and effective training for commanders must instill the judgement required to differentiate between sufficient and necessary or desirable information. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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