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- Growth Causes War – Resource Scarcity
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Growth Bad Impacts – WarGrowth Causes War – Monteiro Pursuit of growth creates structural incentives for conflict Monteiro and Debs 14 (Nuno and Alexandre, Department of Political Science at Yale , “An Economic Theory of Hegemonic War”, http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/papers/MonteiroDebs(2014)Feb03Yale.pdf, dml)//WB This paper introduces a novel framework for understanding the economic causes of hegemonic wars that allows us to solve these two puzzles. Our argument starts from a simple premise: countries differ in their economic power, and a hegemon has a greater influence than other countries in setting the terms of international economic engagement. Specifically, the hegemon can affect the division of the surplus generated by its economic interaction with other, weaker states. It also has the ability to regulate the cost other states have to pay to access foreign resources they need in order to grow. Combined, these two mechanisms may prevent weaker states from using their available resources in an optimal way, undermining their economic growth. For these states, war against the economic hegemon may be a rational option. A challenger faced with a constraining structure of the international economy will find war rational not depending on whether its relative power is rising or declining, but on whether war would bring about a more favorable international economic environment, thereby facilitating faster economic growth. Although war is costly and the challenger’s relative weakness make it less likely to win, victory would allow it to invest its available resources optimally, generating faster economic growth. Therefore, when the gain in economic efficiency brought by victory in war is sufficiently large to make the challenger’s expected outcome of fighting (despite its relatively low likelihood of winning) better than the continuation of peace, war will break out.
(Rafael and Katherine, “On the effect of natural resources on interstate war”, progress in Physical Geography 2014, Vol. 38(6) 786–806, http://ppg.sagepub.com/content/38/6/786.full.pdf+html)//WB The effect of resources on interstate war has attracted growing scholarly and governmental attention. The quantitative literature, by contrast, has been slow to develop. This paper examines the causal role of a country’s resources on its overall propensity for war in world politics. Our formal model offered competing effects, and so we turned to empirical analysis. Our statistical models included measures of eight types of resources per country and other variables. The estimation used a large N sample of countries and years. We find that a country’s resources play statistically significant roles in its overall propensity to engage in war. Next, we consider implications of these findings for the coming decades, assuming that past trends in our model will continue into the period on which we plan to comment. In so doing, we return to the NIC (2012) projection of growing international conflict over resources increasing the likelihood of interstate war by 2030. Regardless of whether this projection will hold true, it is useful to use it as a reference point for our discussion if only because of the stature of the NIC in the USA and the influence it can exert on its government (and possibly others). Our first stepis to forecast the average levels of the resources included in our models by 2030. This is a major undertaking, for any numbers pertaining to one resource are linked to the supply and demand patterns of other resources. Such a forecast would need to venture into geology and environmental science (for resource availability), and into economics and sociology (for resource extraction and consumption). In place of such extensive additional work, we rely on the NIC’s resource change expectations for 2030 and use our model to examine implications for war. To summarize, we assume: (1)the effects identified by our models will hold to 2030; and (2) the availability of resources will evolve according to the NIC’s projection. The NIC expectation for declining availability of energy, freshwater, and minerals by 2030 implies Fuel, Freshwater, and Minerals will decline. By 2030, the NIC expects rainfall will generally decline due to climate change, indicating less Precipitation. The NIC expectations of rising demand for food and declining food supply imply that Agriculture will rise to meet the demand, but still fall short. The NIC also highlights the precedence for countries’ reliance upon increased deforestation as means to support growing populations, suggesting Timber, Arable Land, and Cropland could increase. We recognize these are strong assumptions and revisit them shortly. Taking the NIC projections at face value, our finding that increases in Freshwater, Precipitation, Minerals, and Fuel in a country reduce its overall propensity for interstate war, coupled with the NIC projected worsening outlook for these resources, suggests higher chances for interstate war by 2030. Our finding that rises in Arable Land, Timber, and Agriculture raise war propensity, taken alongside the NIC’s projection of increases in these resources, also suggests increased chances of warfare. We find these effects grow over time and have the same order of magnitude of those obtained for the non-resource variables. Summarizing, our finding for the NIC resource scenario to 2030 supports an expectation of growing chances of interstate war for the average country. This prospect is worrying, but it assumes, as all regressions do, that the other variables in the model remain constant. This assumption rarely holds, so let us consider next which of our nonresource variables could change by 2030. The NIC, the UN, and many others, expect the populations of the large majority of countries to increase by 2030, though by a declining rate. Our model suggests a larger Population will increase propensity for war, but a smaller Population Growth rate will reduce this propensity. By 2030, GDPpc will likely rise for all countries, though we do not know if it will rise Reuveny and Barbieri 801 Downloaded from ppg.sagepub.com at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on July 13, 2015 above the US$14,250 (in current dollars) threshold for the inverted U we see for the one-year lagged results. If it does, further rises in GDPpc would make warfare less likely; otherwise, or if the effect proves to be linear as in Table 4’s distributed lag results, the chances of war will rise. The NIC assumes climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of weather Disasters. This too would raise the chances of war in the model. National Capability may climb, reflecting the likely growth of its components. This effect would reduce the chances of war. Considering these modifications, increased chance for warfare still seems possible, provided, again, the future trends will resemble their estimated precedents and that resource stocks will follow the NIC’s projected trajectory, neither of which is assured. A2 “Diversionary War” Diversionary conflict theory is not true- There is no rally around the flag affect and states do not attack rivals Clary, 4/21/15- PHD candidate at MIT (Christopher, Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, MIT Political Science Department, p.16, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)//WB Why Diversionary Peace and Not Diversionary War? A theory that argues economic crises are likely to generate pressures to improve relations with historic rivals is seemingly at odds with one of the most well-known concepts in security studies: diversionary war. Diversionary war theories suggest that economic downturns or political difficulties lead national leaders to instigate conflict oversees. Two distinct causal logics are often posited: (1) that conflicts with external groups will generate greater feelings of “in-group” loyalty, spurring a “rally around the flag” effect37 or (2) that success in diversionary war could serve as a substitute for failures in domestic policy, so that leaders might opt to “gamble for resurrection” when domestic policies have failed but foreign policies might succeed.38 Given these arguments, why is it more plausible to believe diversionary peace is observed rather than diversionary war? First, the constituent mechanisms that propel the theory were questionable upon examination. German theorist Georg Simmel, perhaps the earliest to study “in-group/out-group” behavior, the social psychological foundation of many theories of diversionary war, stressed that empirically, “conflict between groups or nations has often led to anomie rather than to an increase in internal cohesion.”39 Similarly, close examination of U.S. public opinion data has shown weak support for consistent “rally around the flag” effects, finding overall the rally effect being perhaps a 1 percent increase in public support. 40 In general, the U.S. public appears to be “pretty prudent” in its support for the use of force overseas, rather than blindly patriotic.41 Additionally, it seems odd to 17 assume voters are unaware of the perverse incentives that a blind “rally around the flag” effect would generate. Michael Colaresi has proposed an informational model whereby voters are more likely to increase support to an executive during the use of force only in instances where it is easy for the public to observe post hoc if the rationale for conflict was true. The public knows post hoc they can punish the executive for lying to them, so gives them the “benefit of the doubt” during crisis.42 The further implication of Colaresi’s model being that the rally around the flag effect should be smallest in countries where no such post hoc accountability is possible because of the absence of elections, free media, or external oversight institutions. In other work, Philip Arena has demonstrated formally that so long as voters continue to take into account the state of the economy after a diversionary episode, then a leader is unlikely to benefit any more from diversionary war during downturns than he or she might during normal times.43 Unless the rally affect swamps retrospective economic voting, there should be no behavioral change during downturns. Second, the empirical support in favor of diversionary war during periods of economic or political disturbance is at best unconvincing. M. Taylor Fravel concludes, “[D]espite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of U.S. behavior and in cross-national studies. By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.”44 Of particular interest, Williams, Brulé, and Koch find evidence in advanced economies that voters punish foreign diversions during economic downturns, and they hypothesize this 18 empirical finding stems from voters preference for marshaling resources at home during periods of economic trouble.45 This empirical finding conforms to Geoffrey Blainey’s more casual observation four decades ago that starting trouble overseas during periods of economic difficulty is irrational since paying for that conflict is more difficult because of those economic hardships at home.46 In addition to null findings in support of diversionary war’s existence, there is limited support for the opposite conclusion that domestic vulnerability might spur reconciliation abroad. Christopher Darnton provided historical, qualitative evidence that economic downturns facilitated rapprochement when rival states in Latin America shared a common enemy.47 M. Taylor Fravel examined China’s willingness to undertake compromise in territorial disputes, drawing on Steven David’s concept of omnibalancing, in which national leaders seek to employ resources to best manage both external and internal threats simultaneously.48 Particularly for developing states, David and others have argued, internal threats may present more acute risks to regime survival.49 Fravel argues that internal threats to territorial integrity or threats to internal political stability can create incentives for states to compromise on disputes in order to free up resources for other tasks or gain new resources as a result of the resolved conflict.50 Finally, Krista Weigand has presented crossnational quantitative evidence that states undergoing periods of domestic political turmoil have been more likely to attempt territorial settlements than those with placid domestic conditions.51 19 Setting aside the overall levels of empirical support, there is at least one other way to reconcile diversionary war with patterns of diversionary peace. It is possible that if diversionary war does occur it is less likely to occur between rivals. While rivalries have emotional salience because of the enduring conflict, they also involve states that have been unable to resolve the rivalry through military force, as evidenced by the rivalry’s continued existence. A war that a leader expects to lose is unlikely to be an attractive diversion from domestic woes.52 As Amy Oakes notes, many weak states are seeking at most a “diversionary spectacle,” by provoking controversy with a target “unlikely to fight back.”53 The median dyad in the international system is 71 percent more unequal in its distribution of capabilities than the median rival pair.54 Rivals, on average, are less attractive targets for opportunism than other states. Domestic diversionary theory is not true- empirics prove Swagerty 13- PHD candidate in Political Science (Scott, “Domestic Diversionary Conflict and Economic Performance”, Arizona State University, January 2013, http://www.scottswagerty.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/SwagertyDivCon.pdf)//WB This paper has considered the theory of domestic diversionary conflict, which posits that when faced with domestic political unpopularity, state leaders initiate conflicts with domestic ethnic minority groups in an effort to consolidate political support. The theory is derived from the strand of diversionary conflict literature that focuses on interstate wars, but argues instead that domestic targets are more attractive for leaders because there are more opportunities to initiate a conflict and because they are inherently less risky for the belligerent state than an interstate war. The theory hypothesizes that in times of domestic political unpopularity, state leaders will be more likely to use repression against domestic ethnic minority groups. However, as this paper has argued, the theory of domestic diversionary conflict is underdeveloped and makes competing theoretical commitments that render it problematic for explaining patterns in the use of violent repression against ethnic minority groups. Empirically, this paper has provided strong evidence that no significant relationships exist between variables measuring domestic political unpopularity and the frequency of incidents violent repression against ethnic minority groups. The results from algorithmic data partitioning methods did not identify any variables related to domestic political unpopularity as making improvements to the misclassification rate of the model. More directly, comparing the statistical results from a model that includes and excludes these variables shows that the predictors measuring domestic political unpopularity have very little effect on the model’s overall predictive accuracy. This is compelling evidence that previous positive empirical relationships may be related to potential endogeneity in the independent variables. 21 The results from this paper call into question the theoretical plausibility of domestic diversionary conflicts and provide evidence that states use violent repression against ethnic minorities in response to rebellious activities that threaten state power. Additionally, violent repression against ethnic minority groups can be predicted where discrimination against that ethnic group is highly institutionalized, where the state has the military capability to execute such acts, and in states with low levels of economic development. Across all models, no indicator measuring political unpopularity or economic under-performance was ever a significant predictor of a state’s use of violent repression against ethnic minority groups. In short, this paper provides strong evidence that states use violent repression to contain threatening ethnic minority group activity and not as a diversion to consolidate political support. A2 “Interdependence”Trade institutions do not keep the peace – empirics prove Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 12- Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin, honorary M.A. from Oxford University, M.A. in political science from University of Wisconsin, B.A. in political science and philosophy from Seattle University in 1995 and B.A. 1996, Physics, University of Chicago. M.A. 1999, Energy and Resources, University of California at Berkeley. M.A. 2003, Sociology, Stanford University. Ph.D. 2006, Political Science, Stanford University (Emilie and Alexander, “War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade Agreements Don’t Always Keep the Peace”, p.261, Conflict Management and Peace Science, July 2012, http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/29/3/257.short)//WB Why Trade Institutions Don’t Always Keep the Peace Many before us have been skeptical of the claim that interdependence promotes peace among states. It is well understood that international institutions can have adverse effects on conflicts among member states, mismanaging crisis situations and worsening conflict intensity (Gallarotti, 1991), or producing rivalry among states due to their relative social positions (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006). We are nevertheless among the first to directly tackle the principal claims supporting the liberal thesis that trade institutions dampen conflict, and to propose an explanation for why conflict often characterizes outcomes. This is important because we observe significant instances of violent conflict4 between PTA members: the 1990s alone included border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); the outbreak of war in the Great Lakes, with foreign involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, all members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and violent border clashes between Egypt and Sudan, all members of the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU); and fighting between India and Pakistan, members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). North and South Korea frequently are involved in violent incidents; both are members of the Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries (GSTP). A majority of these disputants are also members of the WTO. Powers contends that in Africa, 16% of all militarized international disputes registered by the Correlates of War data from 1950 to 1992 occurred between PTA members (Powers, 2003, 2004). These examples show clearly that members of the same trade institution can and do conflict, that conflict often breaks out into violence, and that commerce is frequently not enough to keep the peace. They stand in sharp contrast to the liberal expectation that trade institutions dampen conflict through an increase in trust. Trade institutions do increase repeated contact between members; however, contact does not necessarily build trust or a sense of community. The lessons of European integration theory suggest that building community through upgrading the common interest between PTA members requires a minimum level of homogeneity: a pluralist social structure, a high level of economic and industrial development, and ideological similarity (Haas, 1960). Security communities are also most likely to develop through economic relations among Western nations, as even the most institutionalized forms of integration in the developing world 4As per the usual convention, we define ‘‘violent’’ MIDs to be any MID in which at least one death occurred. Hafner-Burton & Montgomery: War, Trade, and Distrust 261 Downloaded from cmp.sagepub.com at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on July 15, 2015 cannot be said to create the mutual identification at the core of the concept (Bearce, 2003). Although evidence suggests that economic integration has led to the formation of a collective identity and trust among member states of the European Union over time, it is well understood that ‘‘democratic features of liberal democracies enable the community in the first place’’ (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 166). The liberal argument that trade institutions dampen conflict by building trust among leaders to overcome commitment problems consequently chiefly applies to the Western world of advanced democratic nations. Yet the overwhelming majority of trade institutions manage trade between partners that include at least one developing or nondemocratic state, and there is no evidence to show that these institutions build trust over asymmetrical distribution of gains. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom cogently argue that states that belong to many different international institutions may have a greater number of international interests to competitively defend and a greater array of opportunities to enact aggressive behavior in defense of those perceived interests (Boehmer et al., 2002). We extend this argument one step further; trade institutions create and shape states’ interests, affecting not only the number of potential issues for dispute, but also establishing conditions that can lead to distrust. Institutions do this by placing states in social positions of power within international relations, which shape expectations for behavior by defining which issues are legitimate for contestation via military means and enable states to coerce, bribe, reward, or punish each other. We address this possibility in the next section. Overdependence in the current trade system causes countries to go war due to thinking that it is the only way- as dependence increases so does trust thus increasing the propensity for conflict Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 12- Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin, honorary M.A. from Oxford University, M.A. in political science from University of Wisconsin, B.A. in political science and philosophy from Seattle University in 1995 and B.A. 1996, Physics, University of Chicago. M.A. 1999, Energy and Resources, University of California at Berkeley. M.A. 2003, Sociology, Stanford University. Ph.D. 2006, Political Science, Stanford University (Emilie and Alexander, “War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade Agreements Don’t Always Keep the Peace”, p.261, Conflict Management and Peace Science, July 2012, http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/29/3/257.short)//WB We are concerned with two particular types of relative social positions: dependence and access centrality. Take two states, A and B; state A’s dependence on state B is proportional to the number of trade institutions both belong to and is inversely proportional to the total number of trade institutions state A belongs to. In other words, A’s dependence on B increases if A and B join additional trade institutions together, but A’s dependence on B decreases if A joins additional trade institutions without B. Like differences in military capabilities, different levels of dependence create structural motives for peace among trading partners in some circumstances, and conflict under others (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006). Here, we focus on one particular type of dependence: direct dyadic sensitivity dependence due to the PTA network. It is direct because the measure relates primarily to direct links to each of the two actors in question; dyadic because it looks at the strength of the link between the two actors; and sensitivity because it measures how sensitive each actor is to the other due to the link rather than the potential opportunity cost of breaking it. Although multiple different kinds of dependence (direct and indirect; monadic, dyadic, and systemic; sensitivity and vulnerability; single and multi-dimensional) are relevant to relations between states (Maoz, 2009, 2010), we are focusing on this particular type and measuring it in this way in this article because it provides for a direct contrast between the mechanism of trust through interdependence, typically also measured as direct dyadic sensitivity interdependence (i.e. the strength of a tie between two states, the number of PTAs that both belong to), and the mechanism of distrust through dependence, which can be measured by dividing the liberal measure by the total number of PTAs that each state belongs to. Specifically, we expect that distrust will characterize conditions of asymmetrical dependence. We consequently expect the liberal prediction to be most robust when states hold positions of dependence vis-a`-vis each other that are relatively equal; under these conditions, mutual memberships in trade institutions are most likely to produce trust and, therefore, to create conditions favorable to conflict avoidance. However, we expect that states will be more likely to conflict with members of their trade institutions when one state is much more dependent on the other; under these conditions, disparity in dependence is more likely to lead to distrust, and therefore, provide incentives for the distrustful state to initiate a conflict. Hypothesis 1: Dyads characterized by greater relative disparity in dependence will be more likely to engage in militarized disputes than dyads characterized by relative equality in dependence. While the (direct dyadic sensitivity) dependence of two states on each other can be derived from their direct membership ties alone, access centrality is an emergent property of the ties between all states in the entire system. There are three (major) classes of centrality measures—access, brokerage, and efficiency— which measure the extent to which an actor is generally well-connected to others, can act as a broker between actors, and can reach other actors quickly (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Here, we use the access centrality measure since this family of measures has been shown to be important in the relationship between international institutions and conflict in general and PTAs in particular (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006, 2008, 2009). Conceptually, a state’s access centrality in a network is proportional to the ties received from other states. A state with high access centrality—that is, one with a large number of strong ties to other important states—is particularly socially powerful and important in the network of trade institutions. Further, we believe that a large number of ties to other important states will increase that state’s capabilities further, and so we use a measure of access centrality (eigenvector centrality) that reflects this. With large disparities in centrality, we expect that (similar to our predictions on dependence) trust will be more likely to form among states that have equal access centrality, while distrust and therefore conflict will characterize relationships between pairs of states with large disparities in access centrality. 5 Disparities in social power thus operate opposite to disparities in material power, where (according to realist arguments) equality leads to increased conflict and a preponderance of power suppresses it. Hypothesis 2: Dyads characterized by greater relative disparity in access centrality will be more likely to engage in militarized disputes than dyads characterized by relative equality in access centrality. Large disparities in dependence and access centrality create asymmetries in states’ abilities to socially coerce, bribe, reward, or sanction each other; more influential and access central states simply have more social capital to expend. These states will distrust marginal countries that are not well integrated into their networks and will be more likely to escalate conflict rather than resolve disputes peacefully. Conversely, less influential states have little ability to respond to social coercion and so may choose to respond in a material way through military or economic action. Disparities thus produce incentives for forum-switching for such states. Highly dependent or peripheral states are excluded from communities and fear domination within economic forums, and thus rather than attempting to compete in the socioeconomic sphere where disparities are large, countries have incentives to enter militarized conflicts instead. Expectations and abilities combine to undermine trust across these dyads. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.81 Mb. Share with your friends:
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