We must de-develop now, growth based politics are impossible to sustain, and they lead to increasing environmental degradation and massive economic inequality
Shrivastava Distinguished Professor and Director of David O'Brien Centre for Sustainable Enterprise at Concordia University, 2015
(Paul, Organizational sustainability under degrowth, pg1, emeraldinsight, http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/MRR-07-2014-0157)
By degrowth, I do not mean what traditional economics calls recession or stagnation. It is not just temporary or even medium-term shrinkage of the conventional economy. The degrowth movement begins with the realization that due to ecological limits and social and intergenerational considerations, conventional economic growth as currently measured will generally slowdown, and economies will have to fit within socially and ecologically acceptable parameters (Brown and Garver, 2009). Degrowth is both an empirical reality and a response to our current economic and ecological crises. Empirical evidence of degrowth is manifested in the slowing growth rates in the post-2008 global financial crisis. US and European economies are struggling to maintain even a 2 per cent to 3 per cent growth. India and China, which grew for a decade at double digits (10 to 14 per cent), have cut their growth estimates to less than half those numbers. Japanese growth has meandered between −2 per cent to +2 per cent for over a decade. Virtually, all national governments around the world, and many state and municipal governments as well, are running deficit budgets at historically high levels. This is not just a temporary recession for a quarter or two, but rather a sustained trend reflecting natural limits to economic growth (Meadows et al., 2004; Stiglitz, 2012). At the Montreal International Conference on Degrowth for the Americas (http://www.montreal.degrowth.org) held in May 2012, we examined degrowth solutions as a response to the global financial economic crisis. These included collaborative consumption, shared economy, hybrid organizations, alternative currencies and population control, among others. Degrowth is a call for a radical break from traditional growth-based models of economy and society. It seeks to move away from the production – consumption-dominated models of the past. It seeks to invent new ways of living together in a true democracy and embodying values of equality and freedom. It is based on sharing and cooperation, and with sufficiently moderate consumption so as to achieve personal and collective fulfillment. Schumacher’s (1973) notion of “small is beautiful” was a precursor of this type of degrowth thinking. Now, the degrowth paradigm has emerged with great vitality in English, German, French and Spanish worlds (Brown and Garver, 2009; Daly, 1996; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Jackson, 2011; (Latouche, 2009; Alier, 2009; Victor, 2010). Degrowth paradigm assumes that in a physically limited world, working under the laws of thermodynamics, it is impossible to grow endlessly (Daly, 1996; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). If we do not plan for it, degrowth will be forced upon us through inflation, increased work, reduced leisure hours and other forms of immiseration of living standards (poorer education, health care, infrastructure, quality of air and water, etc.). It is better to deliberately face degrowth scenarios earlier on and then intentionally choose our paths forward instead of facing dire circumstances where we might be left with little choice. An essential insight of degrowth thinking is that natural capital cannot be entirely substituted with money or artificial capital. We cannot replace potable water, clean air, fertile soil and beautiful landscapes in our current linear economic model of “take, make, dump”. To replenish natural capital stocks, we need to create circular economic loops. It acknowledges the need to limit consumption and pollution to maintain healthy ecosystems for the long-term future. In a growth-based world, market solutions and technological innovations that are ostensibly eco-friendly still contribute to an increase in overall consumption. The efforts at dematerializing consumption remain marginally effective. The relocation of polluting industries away from the Western industrial nations was not accompanied by a reduction of our global ecological footprint – there is no decoupling between our economy and ecological impact (Costanza, 1991). Degrowth is necessary because conventional economic growth (measured in terms of GDP) has not kept its promise to improve our collective well-being (Stiglitz, 2012). GDP growth no longer guarantees us better material living conditions. It is no longer associated with well-paying stable jobs. As GDP increases, we have also seen pollution, obesity, depression, crime and high-risk technologies on the rise. GDP growth also does not guarantee increased economic or social equality. In fact, growth in recent decades has been accompanied by the significant widening of our societal inequalities.
Decline Solves – Warming
Decline now is key in order to stop climate change from becoming irreversible
Swanbrow 12
Citing a UM study published in the peer reviewed Environmental Science and Policy (Dian, “Global warming: New research blames economic growth”, 5/1/2012, Michigan Chronicle, http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/20369-global-warming-new-research-blames-economic-growth)//WB
It's a message no one wants to hear: To slow down global warming, we'll either have to put the brakes on economic growth or transform the way the world's economies work. That's the implication of an innovative University of Michigan study examining the most likely causes of global warming. The study, conducted by José Tapia Granados and Edward Ionides of U-M and Óscar Carpintero of the University of Valladolid in Spain, was published online in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Science and Policy. It is the first analysis to use measurable levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide to assess fluctuations in the gas, rather than estimates of CO2 emissions, which are less accurate. "If 'business as usual' conditions continue, economic contractions the size of the Great Recession or even bigger will be needed to reduce atmospheric levels of CO2," said Tapia Granados, who is a researcher at the U-M Institute for Social Research. For the study, the researchers assessed the impact of four factors on short-run, year-to-year changes in atmospheric concentrations of CO2, widely considered the most important greenhouse gas. Those factors included two natural phenomena believed to affect CO2 levels - volcanic eruptions and the El Niño Southern oscillation - and also world population and the world economy, as measured by worldwide gross domestic product. Tapia Granados and colleagues found no observable relation between short-term growth of world population and CO2 concentrations, and they show that incidents of volcanic activity coincide with global recessions, which may confound any slight volcanic effects on CO2. With El Niño outside of human control, economic activity is the sole modifiable factor. In years of above-trend world GDP, from 1958 to 2010, the researchers found greater increases in CO2 concentrations. For every $10 trillion in U.S. dollars that the world GDP deviates from trend, CO levels deviate from trend about half a part per million, they found. Preindustrial concentrations are estimated to be 200-300 parts per million. To break the economic habits contributing to a rise in atmospheric CO2 levels and global warming, Tapia Granados says that societies around the world would need to make enormous changes. "Since the mid 1970s, scientists like James Hansen have been warning us about the effects global warming will have on the earth," Tapia Granados said. "One solution that has promise is a carbon tax levied on any activity producing CO2 in order to create incentives to reduce emissions. The money would be returned to individuals so the tax would not burden the population at large. "What our study makes clear is that climate change will soon have a serious impact on the world, and the time is growing short to take corrective action."
The only way to reduce climate change is degrowth- the only instances where CO2 has decreased is during
Caradonna et. al., Ph.D. The Johns Hopkins University, 7 May 2015
(Jeremy, A Call to Look Past An Ecomodernist Manifesto: A Degrowth Critique, http://www.resilience.org/articles/General/2015/05_May/A-Degrowth-Response-to-An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf)
After careful analysis, those in the degrowth camp have come to the conclusion that the only way for humanity to live within its biophysical limits and mitigate the effects of climate change is to reduce economic activity, to downscale consumerist lifestyles, to move beyond conventional energy sources, to give up on the fantasy of “decoupling” economic and population growth from environmental impacts, and to rethink the technologies that have gotten us into our current predicament. There has been no known society that has simultaneously expanded economic activity and reduced absolute energy consumption. x All efforts to 3 decouple growth of gross domestic product (GDP) from environmental destruction through technological innovations and renewable energies have failed to achieve the absolute reductions necessary for a livable planet. There has only been a handful of instances over the past century during which global or regional carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have actually declined. Notable instances include: 1) the Great Depression of the 1930s, 2) the economic recession following the second oil shock in the early 1980s, 3) the collapse of Soviet economies after the end of the Cold War, and 4) the two years of recession following the financial crisis triggered in 2008. That is, from all that we know, only a less “busy” economy can actually achieve lower emissions. xi Likewise, the ecological economist Peter A. Victor has shown through modeling the Canadian economy that economic growth makes the job of fighting climate change all the more difficult. He writes that “for example, if an economy grows at 3% per year for 40 years, an average annual reduction in GHG [greenhouse gas] intensity of 7.23% is required if GHG emissions are to be reduced by 80%. This compares with an average annual reduction in GHG intensity of 4.11% if there is no economic growth during that period.
Yes Mindset Shift
Crisis solves for mindset shift—that results in transition
Alexander, PhD and University of Melbourne Lecturer in Environmental Programs, and Rutherford, 2014 (Samuel and Jonathan, “The Deep Green Alternative: Debating Strategies of Transition,” Simplicity Institute, Report 14a, 2014, http://simplicityinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Deep-Green-Alternative.pdf, p. 19-20, IC)
Perhaps a more reliable path could be based on the possibility that, rather than imposing an alternative way of life on a society through sudden collapse, a deep crisis could provoke a social or political revolution in consciousness that opens up space for the deep green vision to be embraced and implemented as some form of crisis management strategy. Currently, there is insufficient social or political support for such an alternative, but perhaps a deep crisis will shake the world awake. Indeed, perhaps that is the only way to create the necessary mindset. After all, today we are hardly lacking in evidence on the need for radical change (Turner,'2012), suggesting that shock and response may be the form the transition takes, rather than it being induced through orderly, rational planning, whether from ‘top down’ or ‘from below’. Again, this ‘non-ideal’ pathway to a post-growth or post-industrial society could be built into the other strategies discussed above, adding some realism to strategies that might otherwise appear too utopian. That is to say, it maybe that only deep crisis will create the social support or political will needed for radical reformism, eco-socialism, or eco-anarchism to emerge as social or political movements capable of rapid transformation. Furthermore, it would be wise to keep an open and evolving mind regarding the best strategy to adopt, because the relative effectiveness of various strategies may change over time, depending on how forthcoming crises unfold.
It was Milton Friedman (1982: ix) who once wrote: ‘only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.’ What this ‘collapse’ or ‘crisis’ theory of change suggests, as a matter of strategy, is that deep green social and political movements should be doing all they can to mainstream the practices and values of their alternative vision. By doing so they would be aiming to ‘prefigure’ the deep green social, economic, and political structures, so far as that it is possible, in the hope that deep green ideas and systems are alive and available when the crises hit. Although Friedman obviously had a very different notion of what ideas should be ‘lying around’, the relevance of his point to this discussion is that in times of crisis, the politically or socially impossible can become politically or socially inevitable (Friedman, 1982: ix); or, one might say, if not inevitable, then perhaps much more likely.
It is sometimes stated that every crisis is an opportunity – from which the optimist infers that the more crises there are, the more opportunities there are. This may encapsulate one of the most realistic forms of hope we have left.
Mindset shift is possible—people are willing to decrease energy consumption. Even if it’s difficult, it’s try or die
Proedrou, American College of Thessaloniki IR lecturer, 2015 (Filippos, “Rethinking energy security: An inter-paradigmatic debate,” Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Policy Paper No. 24, February 2015, http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/%CE%9D%CE%BF-24-Rethinking-energy-security.pdf, p. 11-12, IC)
Critics also argue that a broad downscale of energy consumption, especially in the global North with an eye to benefit the global South, is not a feasible project. As Daly (2005, 1973, p. 163) argues, however, ‘such a policy is radical, but less radical than attempting the impossible, i.e., growing forever’ and ‘in choosing between tackling a political impossibility and a biophysical impossibility, I would judge the latter to be the more impossible and take my chances with the former.’ There are strong grounds, nevertheless, for someone to believe that taking this course might not be so utopian after all. Lovins (1976), for example, has focused on behavioral changes that can lead to a substantial change in energy consumption. Our behavior is premised upon our normative and ideological background and our fixation on growth. It is a matter of understanding that more does not always equal better (Max-Neef 1991, 1995). When it does not, we should free up energy resources for the poorer regions, in the same way that we donate a part of our income for charity, not least to the third world channeled through the activities of a vast network of NGOs that work for the improvement of living conditions in the least developed countries. There is a certain threshold of sufficiency, beyond which the accumulation of more material wealth does not significantly add to human happiness (Daly 2008, p. 10). To the contrary, adding a small amount to the income of the poor makes a big difference to their welfare level and, subsequently, to their experience of pleasure, satisfaction and happiness.
Freeing up resources, as well as income, then, is neither as irrational nor as unlikely as it might seem in the beginning. Switching into less energy-intensive modes of living would also be wholeheartedly welcomed by a significant part of the population in modern societies. Data show that the most affluent societies present the highest number of suicides, as well as increased levels of stress that are connected with a number of serious health problems. Disentangling prosperity from growth and moving beyond the subsequent addiction with the infinite accumulation of wealth and resources would thus render western societies less rich, but holds the potential to make them more prosperous with their citizens enjoying better quality of life and higher welfare standards (Jackson 2009; Speth 2008; Kallis et al 2012).
Continued ecological degradation results in mass mindset shifts—ecological protests prove
Lawrence, St Joseph’s College New York sociology assistant professor, and Abrutyn, University of Memphis sociology assistant professor, 2015 (Kirk S. and Seth B., “The Degradation of Nature and the Growth of Environmental Concern: Toward a Theory of the Capture and Limits of Ecological Value,” Human Ecology Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2015, http://press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ch043.pdf, p. 93-96, IC)
Ecological degradation alters supply and demand curves for ecological services, reducing supply and increasing demand (Costanza et al., 1997). We posit that the increase in demand is both a reflection and an outcome of the growth of ecological concern, which can act as a powerful motivation for ecological value-seeking by interested individuals, organizations, and nation-states. Early examples of environmentalism appeared in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the protection of colonies (Grove, 1995). Protests following Three Mile Island and Love Canal in the United States, Kenya’s Green Belt Movement, Chico Mendes and the rubber tappers in Brazil, and the appearance and expansion of environmental and environmental justice movements as the scale of degradation increased in the post-World War II period are clear examples of the growth of ecological concern (Foster, 1999; McNeill, 2000; Pellow et al., 2001; Rudel et al., 2011).
With displaced degradation, ecological value—in addition to economic profit— is captured by more powerful groups as they increase the level and quality of the ecosystem services they enjoy. But the use of power can also be in response to pressures from below for increases in ecological quality; specifically in the form of the ideology of ecological concern and in demands for ecological services that exceed current supply. We argue that ecological degradation triggers or amplifies these two factors, which tend to converge and become forces of social change. Given that humans prefer higher quality environments and the ecological services they provide for their mental and physical benefits, the environment is clearly a component in what is commonly called a standard of living. A decline in the real or perceived standard of living is an important motivating force for social action (Harris, 1977). And, similar to other forms of collective behavior, a certain level—or threshold—of concern typically needs to be met before that concern grows into pressure for change (Granovetter, 1978). Thus, the threshold would be reached when a significant proportion of the population—in size and/ or influence—experiences a real or perceived decline. We include the perception of a decline because the images of nature, the environment, and its effects are “refracted” through cultural lenses (Foster & Holleman, 2012). When an actual or threatened reduction in local ecological quality from pollution or other forms of degradation creates a real or perceived decline in the standard of living, social movements often emerge to address the problems, including applying pressure on elites in the political economy to respond (cf. Polanyi, 1944 [2001]). The response can be for the improvement of local ecological quality through the institutionalization of sustainable use and a “steady-state economy” (Daly & Townsend, 1993), but that solution is often subordinated to unsustainable economic growth (Foster et al., 2010; Pierce, 1992).
Another response to the demand for ecological services is to harness power for the capture of ecological value from distant sources; this can lead to conflict and imbalanced trade. In the modern world-system, scholars have studied the effects of imbalanced coercive power in systemic processes including colonization and trade. Core nations, or those in the most dominant trade positions (Frank, 2007), are able to extract natural resources and obtain cheap labor, either through the use of force or imbalanced exchanges, from semi-peripheral and peripheral nations (Chase-Dunn, 1998; Wallerstein, 1974). For example, typical unequal exchanges involve the transfer of economic and ecological value as low-value (but ecologically costly) raw materials flow from less-developed “extractive economies” in the periphery to developed countries in the core who profit from the transformation and consumption of the raw materials into highervalue products; some of which are exported back to the periphery (Bunker, 1985; Eisenmenger & Giljum, 2007). Moreover, core nation-states and their multinational corporations use economic and political power to negotiate the terms of trade and foreign environmental, labor, and other regulations in their favor (Woods, 2006; see also Konisky, 2008; Stiglitz, 2007). Research has also uncovered “recursive exploitation”: reforestation in the powerful core countries of the world-system, such as the United States and Japan, is linked to deforestation in the less powerful semi-periphery, such as Costa Rica and Indonesia, which in turn is tied to greater deforestation in the least powerful countries, such as Madagascar and Cote d’Ivoire (Burns et al., 2009; cf. Roberts et al., 2009)
When the growth of ecological concern is limited to the local environment, a characteristic that can be traced back to our hunting and gathering origins (Moran, 2006, pp. 9–11), the capture of ecological value from others may meet with resistance primarily from ecological limits and opposition from groups who suffer the negative consequences. As previously mentioned, the demand of payments for ecological debt by groups in the global South is one example of contestation (e.g., Martínez-Alier, 1997). Other examples include movements in India against water use by Coca-Cola (Ciafone, 2012), in Brazil against ethanol production by Cargill (Via Campesina, 2010), and movements across Latin America against ecological injustices committed by powerful groups within the countries (Carruthers, 2008).
In recent years, the ideology of ecological concern has become globalized, and may constitute a worldwide value-orientation (Dunlap, 2006; Dunlap & York, 2008) as it has been institutionalized as part of global governance (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 2009; Frank et al., 2000; Lawrence, 2009; Schofer & Hironaka, 2005). The expansion of concern acts as an emergent counter-force to attempts at ecological value capture. Sometimes the pressure emerges from local groups and “boomerangs” through international organizations to return back to the local political economy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). International certification programs, such as “dolphin safe” and organic labeling, are additional means by which ecological concern is globalized (Pattberg, 2012). Ecological concerns are also part of larger movements for global change, such as the anti-capitalist movement (Buttel & Gould, 2004) and as “a movement of movements” as revealed at World Social Forums (Kaneshiro et al., 2012). Additionally, the proliferation of global environmental, nature-based, and environmental justice organizations, such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and possibly thousands of others is evidence of other emerging global movements (Hawken, 2007).
It would be a mistake to ignore the pressure these groups and movements put on those in positions of power to effect change; if only as a means to reducing political and economic costs found in grievances and protests that threaten political elite’s legitimacy or potential constituency (Martínez-Alier, 1997). As movements and organizations emerge and polities react to the pressures by creating environmental departments and regulations, a global ideology of ecological concern becomes a real force shaping the relationships between nation-states and patterns of legitimacy, albeit with inconsistent results thus far (Schofer & Hironaka, 2005).
An additional limit emerges as systemic degradation, or the total amount of degradation across Earth’s entire biosphere. It is accelerated both by the feedback loop discussed above and by the pursuit of ecological value as a solution. Climate change, for instance, is a form of degradation that has global effects regardless of the source of pollution. When system degradation threatens the system, as experienced locally in terms of declining quality of ecological services and opportunities, another source of pressure to act is placed on those in power. Systemic degradation can also contribute to spread the ideology of ecological concern, although with a lag effect because transportation/communication technologies, scientific knowledge, and the perception of a declining standard of living have not kept pace with the ability to degrade ecosystems and the entire biosphere; in addition, any ideology is always filtered through cultural lenses and must compete with other ideologies for prominence (Foster & Holleman, 2012). Ultimately, a struggle ensues between forces of ecological degradation and protection.
Ecological degradation spurs mindset shift
Taylor, University of Victoria environmental studies assistant professor, and Segal, University of Victoria Master’s degree in Health and Social Services, 2015 (Duncan M. and David, “Healing Ourselves and Healing the World: Consumerism and the Culture of Addiction,” Journal of Futures Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, March 2015, http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/19-3-A5-Taylor_and_Segal.pdf, p. 84, IC)
We began this article by claiming that over the next few decades we will undoubtedly witness the rapid decline of industrial civilization. Why? Because a viable economy is utterly dependent on a sustainable and viable ecology and the current industrial global economy has been designed to grow constantly and ignore the limitations of a finite planet. At this time humanity is now using more than 25% more renewable resources each year than the biosphere is producing (Taylor and Taylor, 2007). Issues such as climate change and energy shortages are impelling us to confront the issue of limits to conventional economic growth as well as our profound inseparability and mutual vulnerability with the larger social and biophysical systems of this planet.
We recognize that a voluntary transformation away from a consumer based culture and towards life sustaining practices is likely not going to occur, at least on a wide level. However, as the unraveling of ecological and social systems continue to increase, this will also allow for more and more people to question their own values and life meanings. In turn, those individuals and communities that have begun to experiment with the sustainable practices and more ecologically informed worldviews will be the seeds, or little perturbations that just may influence the trajectory of the collapse in more positive directions. Further, as the veil of egobased individualism and frenzy of addictive consumerism is lifted, a rich network of ideas and practices may be ready to catch the fall, hopefully with enough resiliency to act as attractor points for a new level of cultural reorganization.
This is the silver lining to the Great Unraveling. Whether we acknowledge it consciously or not we are being affected by the larger systemic social and biophysical changes that are taking place around the world. As subsystems of these larger systems we are changing as they are changing – and conversely, as we change so can they. Individual and collective social systems rarely change without experiencing unsustainable levels of disequilibrium. As industrial society becomes progressively unhinged individuals and communities will be forced to experiment with new ways of living, both with each other and the natural world. Already, transition town initiatives (Hopkins, 2011), ecovillages, city revitalization projects (e.g., Portland Oregon), permaculture communities, downshifting and simplicity forum groups, local food and buy local initiatives are acting as social “attractor points” and as visions of hopeful possibilities. It is our hope that this time of transition will compel those living beyond their means to slow down and pay attention to the fertile inner landscape primed and ready for growth.
Yes Transition
Consumerism destroys the environment, and transition is necessary and possible—adaptation to economic decline is key to reframing lifestyles
Brown, Clark University environmental science and policy professor, and Vergragt, Clark University senior research scientist with a PhD in Chemistry from Leiden University, 2015 (Halina Szejnwald and Philip J., “From Consumerism to Wellbeing: Toward a Cultural Transition?” Journal of Cleaner Production, 5/12/2015, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652615004825, p. 17-18, IC)
Since its rapid evolution after the WWII, consumer society in the US, and the lifestyles it has engendered, has long ceased to deliver on the great promise of wellbeing for all, while exacting a heavy ecological toll. It runs on its own momentum, propelled by cultural meanings and symbols, social practices, institutional inertia, existing infrastructure, and by business and political interests. Since technology alone cannot counteract the ecological cost of unrestrained growth and consumerism, much less address the shrinking gains in wellbeing, a transition beyond this dominant economic model is needed. But it is unrealistic to expect the policy and political leaders to lead that social change. Similarly, there are few signs so far that the established NGOs are about to include consumption and consumerism in their agendas. The change will need to come from the people and, we contend, have at this core an evolution toward a new framing of wellbeing.
While it is generally accepted that cultural change occurs very slowly, under some condition it may actually be very rapid. This was the case with consumer society, which emerged in the US (and other economies) through concerted efforts of government, unions, and the corporate sector when the historical window of opportunity opened up. In the span of a one or two generations the middle class radically changed its “normal” lifestyles, consumption behaviors, and its understanding of what good life consists of. Can such a rapid change take place again, this time following a trajectory beyond consumerism? The difficulty with addressing this question is that the theoretical framework for understanding cultural change of that nature and magnitude is underdeveloped. For one thing, widely accepted theories conceptualize social change as necessarily involving contestation between self-aware incumbents and challengers with specific agendas and alternative collective visions of the future. While that may be the case at in the future, the origins of the change beyond consumerism are very likely to have less conspicuous and less ideological roots. Another difficulty with theorizing about social change toward an alternative to consumer society, based on the history of its emergence, is that the story is commonly told as a historical account, not through a theoretical lens.
In this paper we propose that the cultural change entailing a new framing of wellbeing, if it happens, is unlikely to be driven by moral imperatives or persuasive campaigns, or follow the leadership of organized NGOs. Rather, the fundamental human strife for wellbeing and subjective happiness in everyday life is a more likely driving force. We hypothesize that the shifts in lifestyle choices and adaptations to the current economic realities can produce new social practices, interactions and meanings, which in turn lead to reframing the understanding of wellbeing. Extensive research on what makes people happy and satisfied with their lives suggests that such reframing can readily incorporate a shift away from consumerist lifestyles. In that reframing, materially scaled down life would be richer in other ways: more reciprocal and connected to others, and with a stronger sense of a community. We also hypothesize, drawing on the demographic and economic statistics that technologically connected, educated, confident and open to change millennials might lead the way in the shift toward a less-consumerist society. Their diminishing interest in suburban life in favor of cities, constricted economic opportunities, and the size and interconnectedness all point in that direction.
It is not known at this point whether the various forms of sharing economy, and the growing interest in the precepts of the new economy may contribute to this reframing process. To the extent that some forms (albeit in minority) of sharing economy foster social trust and community building, and that the new economy movement challenges income inequalities and many established institutions, there may be opportunities for mutual reinforcement. In this paper we note these trends and we summarize the small body of relevant empirical research as a way to highlight the opportunities further research on the possible transition beyond consumer society.
Decline forces a transition to sustainable, localized economies
Göpel, 14 – heads the Berlin office of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy. Her research focuses on system transformations and new prosperity models. Preceding this post she helped start up the World Future Council and later directed its Future Justice program with a focus on the representation of future generations and long-termism in current governance structures. Maja has a PhD in political economy and diploma in media and communications; she lectures at universities and enjoys working in international networks. (Maja, Postwachstum, “Getting to Postgrowth: The Transformative Power of Mind- and Paradigm Shifts”, 4/28/14, http://blog.postwachstum.de/getting-to-postgrowth-the-transformative-power-of-mind-and-paradigm-shifts-20140428)
The world now had 20 years to observe the empirical consequences of these mathematical stunts, and the call for a paradigm shift or (great) transformations has become standard in the discourse around the post 2015 development agenda, the emerging Sustainable Development Goals or the new IPCC assessment report: a renewed opportunity for deep structural change. System transformation researchers like those at the Nesta Foundation in the UK brought forward a list of five “main ingredients” for successful transformation: Failures and frustrations with the current system multiply as negative consequences become increasingly visible. The landscape in which the regime operates shifts as new long-term trends emerge or sudden events drastically impact the general availability or persuasiveness of particular solutions. Niche alternatives start to develop and gain momentum; coalitions emerge that coalesce around the principles of a new approach. New technologies are energizing the upcoming alternative solutions either in the form of alternative products or opportunities for communication and connection. In order to achieve far-reaching regime changes, dissents and fissures within the regime itself are key, rather than small adaptations and co-optation into the old regime.[3] A core element in this sequence is the “new approach” mentioned in point 3. Just as paradigms and hegemonic mindsets have a hampering effect on alternative proposals, the challenging of these paradigms and their crisis equally holds the emancipatory power for system transformations. While many argue that, with regard to the development story of economic growth, such alternatives are still dispersed happenings and nowhere near providing a consistent approach, I think we are at a tipping point. A first superficial review of a few movements shows a lot of commonalities between the core principles of, for example, the “Economy for the Common Good“[4], the “Transition Town movement”[5], and the Commoning movement[6], or the international efforts to measure a new development paradigm led by Bhutan with its Gross National Happiness approach[7] . Cross-cutting ideas and rationales juxtaposed to the mainstream economic ones are: A holistic understanding of human needs and prosperity beyond consumption Equitable and balanced progress of the whole socio-ecological system A vision of sufficiency providing freedom from fear of falling behind in the race for more wealth and freedom from constantly created shopping-wants that impede wellbeing Growth in creativity, capacities, time wealth and conviviality (process utility) in co-creative relationships A culture of respect, precaution and caring for what is already there. Shedding old paradigms and imaginaries of life, society and desirable futures usually goes alongside crises in the “real” world. We are looking at a rocky ride ahead, but the more clarity we have about where we want to get and how it can be done, the better we can coordinate. This leaves me to finish with Milton Friedman: “Only a crisis-actual or perceived-produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.”
A2 “Human Nature” They’re empirically wrong—post-consumerist communities can exist
Chatzidakis, Royal Holloway University of London marketing senior lecturer, et al 2014 (Andreas; Gretchen Larsen, Durham University marketing senior lecturer; and Simon Bishop, Nottingham University Business School organizational behavior assistant professor; “Farewell to consumerism: Countervailing logics of growth in consumption,” Ephemera, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014, http://www.ephemerajournal.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/contribution/14-4chatzidakislarsenbishop.pdf, p. 760, IC)
The associated logic of post-consumerist citizenship centres on a denial of consumption as a central, meaningful act in and of itself (Soper, Ryle and Thomas, 2009). Of course, consumption is not and cannot be absent in any society, but in a de-growth society the primary focus is social and community participation, rather than consumption. Critics of de-growth claim an inherent contradiction within the logic, which emerges from the view that it is human nature to desire power, and that therefore, such communal, egalitarian forms of society and economy would be impossible to sustain. Post-consumerist citizenship has however been adopted in various social movements and ‘new consumption communities’ where people withdraw as much as possible from the market-place by voluntarily and collectively simplifying their lives (Bekin, Carrigan and Szmigin, 2005). The imperative of degrowth is further reflected in various forms of consumer-oriented activism deployed by anarchist movements (Portwood-Stacer, 2012) and has been used as a key political slogan in several anti-capitalist and anti-consumerist spaces, e.g. within the Athenian neighbourhood of Exarcheia (Chatzidakis, Maclaran and Bradshaw, 2012). An increasing number of people are being drawn towards de-growth as a radical alternative to the status quo, despite facing much resistance from those who benefit from current economic systems premised on growth, i.e. owners of capital and those seduced by the promises of capitalism.
Transition is possible but growth must stop—human nature can be changed by contingent circumstance
Lawrence, St Joseph’s College New York sociology assistant professor, and Abrutyn, University of Memphis sociology assistant professor, 2015 (Kirk S. and Seth B., “The Degradation of Nature and the Growth of Environmental Concern: Toward a Theory of the Capture and Limits of Ecological Value,” Human Ecology Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2015, http://press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ch043.pdf, p. 98-100, IC)
In response, environmental and environmental justice movements have led efforts to protect the biosphere in local and distant locations. Their work must be part of global movements toward innovation of sustainable means to live within the limits, however historically defined, necessary for ecosystems and the biosphere to provide ecological value for all inhabitants. As described by the theoretical model, and as demonstrated by societies in the past, failure results in ecological failure and the collapse of an environment’s ability to support life. Due to the expansion of these processes to the global level, the Earth system is now in peril.
Important political, economic, and cultural ramifications emerge from this model. Local, NIMBYist protection of ecological value is unjust in the short term and unsustainable in the long term. The sense of what is “local” may change as knowledge of the complexity and interconnectedness of ecosystems spreads. The displacement of ecological degradation could reach an end when there are no longer any distant resources to exploit, which could occur as resources are exhausted and/or as ecological concern becomes universal, leaving no “others.” An explicit recognition of the value of ecological services to the continuation of our species and of the connections between ours and other species that provide them is essential. But they cannot be privatized and sold to the highest bidder and/or for the benefit of some at the expense of others; that is, a continuation of capitalism’s “cheap nature” strategy (Moore, 2014, p. 308). It must be a recognition and protection of ecological quality that all should share in. And the speed of the treadmills of production and consumption that have been reducing ecological quality cannot continue to expand.
This requires a much larger cultural change, away from ecologically destructive values and practices and toward a holistic ecological view. Beck’s (2000) cosmopolitanism, in which a plurality of actors at multiple intra- and intersocietal levels strives for universal goals, is one guide. While imperfect, there is evidence that this has begun: The United Nations’ conferences on sustainable development, Bolivia’s “Law of the Rights of Mother Earth” (Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra) and the push for its global adoption (Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, 2014), and, as previously mentioned, at World Social Forums. Contra modernization theory, ecological concern is not limited to developed countries. As Foster (2009) passionately argues, it may take a socialist revolution to generate the sweeping political, economic, and other cultural changes necessary to prevent local and global ecological destruction.
We do see the potential in a global ecosocialism for avoiding continued ecological decline and collapse. But, as Harvey (1996) asserts, a successful ecosocialist project must negotiate the multiple and changing temporal and social scales at which power and meaning reside; for example, there are “two senses of universality” in which universal inclusion must coexist with particularities in identity and practice (Harvey, 1996, p. 203). The particularities must, however, recognize the equality of all, both humans and the non-human world, in the sharing of ecological quality. It may be best, then, to return to Marx via Moore (2014, pp. 287, 304), who argued that human and extra-human natures, “historical natures,” exist in a dialectal relationship—they can thrive or decline together. We believe that the emergence of ecological concern for human and extra-human natures as a universal ideology offers that promise. We hope that by explicating the social drivers of the capture of ecological value, the discussion and theory presented here can be part of that process.
Transition changes even habituated behavioral patterns—crisis scenarios are uniquely destabilizing
Taylor, University of Victoria environmental studies assistant professor, and Segal, University of Victoria Master’s degree in Health and Social Services, 2015 (Duncan M. and David, “Healing Ourselves and Healing the World: Consumerism and the Culture of Addiction,” Journal of Futures Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, March 2015, http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/19-3-A5-Taylor_and_Segal.pdf, p. 81, IC)
Research in the field of adventure therapy has posited that it is contexts of disequilibrium that allow for the opportunities of healing by unsettling habituated behavior patterns and promoting the adoption of healthier ways of being (Taylor, Segal & Harper 2010). Arguably we are now at a time in our collective history when we are experiencing greater and greater levels of systemic social and environmental disequilibrium and chaos. Consequently, we are experiencing both at the individual and collective levels new opportunities for reorganization and integration. And while the first response for many is both the denial and the reassertion of habitual behaviors as well as the arguments for the continued entrenchment of the industrial/ expansionist worldview, it is this very experience of chaos that is “the mother of our individual and collective evolution” (Dupuy, 2013, p.166). One of the principles of chaos theory is that the trajectory of a system experiencing a high level of disequilibrium can be easily be impacted by even a very small perturbation. A useful analogy is that of a ball-bearing and a series of peaks and valleys. Times of relative systemic stability are akin to a ball-bearing in a valley. Here only very strong outside perturbations can affect its location. However, times of high levels of systemic disequilibrium are akin to a ball-bearing perched precariously on a peak. At such times even very small perturbations and stresses have the potential to destabilize the existing state and determine the ball-bearing’s trajectory into one valley or another. Similarly, we are now at a time in history when even very small groups of people and communities with sufficient intent and focus can make a significant difference in helping to determine the direction of the larger social systems and even biophysical systems in which they are embedded.
Mindset shift solves—their conceptions of human nature are reductionist and misapply science
Bollier, USC Norman Lear Center senior fellow, and Conaty, New Economics Foundation fellow, 2015 (David and Pat, “A New Alignment of Movements? Part II: Strategies for Convergence of Movements,” Commons Transition, 2/26/15, http://commonstransition.org/a-new-alignment-of-movements-part-ii-strategies-for-a-convergence-of-movements/, IC)
Pat Conaty elaborated on this idea by suggesting a strategic focus on protecting and reproducing the “living economy” – the idea that “real wealth is life, not dead coins, and so we should concentrate on livelihoods and the problem of wealth-sharing and abundance… .What is the prize? The living economy. The problematique, he argued, is the same as in earlier generations – How to share the equity? That’s what the vernacular idea of ‘co-operative commonwealth’ is all about.”
The idea of the economy as a living system, and not a set of mechanical, impersonal forces, lies at the center of an important 2012 essay by ecophilosopher and theoretical biologist Andreas Weber, “Enlivenment.”[15] Drawing upon recent findings and theorizing in evolutionary sciences, Weber argues that free-market economics is based on misleading scientific theories about human nature and rely upon reductionist Enlightenment categories that ignore the creative agency of life itself. Weber argues that we should conceptualize “the economy” as a commons – a complex living system in which humans that have broad capacities to co-operate, negotiate with each other, and show creative agency.
A strategy that sets its sights on such a paradigm shift would find it very appealing to protect, enrich and extend the commons; the economy could be seen not as an extractive machine oblivious to the natural world, but as a living system that must sustain all species. David Bollier suggested that this would provide solid ground for a “movement of movements” to come together. Focusing on “real wealth as life itself” provides a powerful rationale for identifying:
Ways and means to internalise market externalities (which are harming the environment, communities and future generations);
Solutions for reducing inequality and social insecurity;
Pathways to reconnect people with nature and with each other; and
A new vision of development that goes beyond conventional markets and GDP.
Adopting the commons perspective, Bollier argued, could help movements highlight the connections between “the economy,” the biophysical environment and social communities. All can be seen as integrated into a living system that commoners themselves must co-create and co-manage: a new vision for re-imagining governance, resource management and culture. In developing a discourse of the commons, movements would be able to reclaim a rich legal history and focus on viable practical models. It would also be possible to emphasise our common humanity as transnational tribes of commoners increasingly work together. Jason Nardi agreed and felt that the Social Solidarity Economy activists could find the idea of “solidarity for the commons” as a resonant and rallying vision.
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